

THE ALGEBRAIC

AND THE EXPERIENCED*

Among the Arabs,¹ *wijdân* means a particularly rich and moving relationship between essence and existence (and vice versa). In recent periods of their history it has been interpreted as mass movements, emotional violence, and the impulse to change life. Is this but one aspect, one of several effects, or is it the substance of revolutions? Does the concept "to change life" have a value by itself, or is it only a symptom or corollary of more hidden movements which justify such an abstraction?

WHAT IS THE COLLECTIVE EXPERIENCE?

Etymologically *thawra* in arabic means "effervescence."² Moreover, it does not just partially include, but surpasses our understanding of revolutions. We have become accustomed to defining

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¹ Cf. 'Adil 'Awwa, *Al-Wijdan*, Damascus, 1961.

² The *Lisân* defines this root as a synonym of *hâj*. In physics it is used to describe a volcano beginning to erupt, and hair standing on end (an example can be found in the *b'adith*), *Al-thawr*, "red horizon" (*ibid.*).

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them as changes in class relationships. The exercise of a secret logic can be seen which would determine, in the end, the fortunes of production relationships. This is, at any rate, what Marxist doctrine maintained, until recent studies revealed more shades of meaning and completed it. This is not the place to take up in our turn the debate about genesis/structure, structure/superstructure, the predominant factor and its consequences or effects, or “super-determination,” which is the contingency to use ruses.

We feel that the idea of binary dialectics, in which economics sustains and conditions everything else, should give way to a plurality of dialectics, in which technology is but one of several dimensions. By means of a theoretical projection of the arabic *wijdân*, I would like to show the part the personal and collective experience (through which any depth of thought must necessarily pass) plays in actual history, and the part it should play in our analyses.

Experience is not confined to “every-day life.” The sociologist who has been given credit for developing this idea, to a large extent opposed it to a historical philosophy and economic theory then prevalent.³ However, his useful discovery of a single, all-embracing stratum in which spontaneity cannot be reduced to historical terms perhaps leaves aside a characteristic of history, which is precisely that of only revealing itself through every-day life.

How was the economic crisis which shook the world in 1929, and which today can be so masterfully reduced to curves and graphs, actually experienced? The crisis is a worker losing his job, and his wife, embittered by the restrictions, quarrelling with him. Imperialism, “last stage, etc.,” is a French zouave urinating against a mosque in Constantine, or an Indian adolescent accused of raping an English spinster, as in Forster’s novel. By what right can it be said that these situations only constitute evidence, and the “reality” which they refer to and which might “condition” them or might even “produce” them lies elsewhere, and that by acting upon this “elsewhere” one acts upon everything else? Oh residues of Pareto, historical and other superstructures, by what right can you say that what counts for science lies elsewhere than in you? “There is no science but that which is hidden,” said

³ Henri Lefebvre, *Critique de la vie quotidienne*, tome I, 1946; tome II, 1963.

Gaston Bachelard. However, this great vivacious man, who had no lessons to learn from anyone, would not have been shocked had I suggested he thus continue his phrase: "than that which is hidden" agreed, "on condition that the relationships between that which is hidden and that which is shown are established." These relationships must not be stretched in only one direction!

Let us agree then that history, or that which we call history, advances at a "pigeon's pace." It shows itself by hiding, so that to perceive what it is one must start with an analysis of what it uncovers or simulates. An analysis which, as in any reading, interprets, interpolates, extrapolates, modifying at a glance the apparent guiding lines of the moving and specious figure in which I place myself, actor/acted, reader/read, etc. In short, you labor untiringly to discover the moving spirit, the mechanical secrets, the algorism of this enigmatic carnival; sometimes gay, sometimes somber, often insignificant, but always seeking meaning, which is the collective experience, which I throw myself into, and which in many respects I am. But when you have uncovered my code, are you sure that you will then have deciphered me? I am afraid that our going and coming between the shown and the hidden and vice versa is only scientific on the departure but no longer on the return. I fear your assumption that actual experience, through its algorism, could be restituted, exhibits the same kind of naïveté of which you accuse empiricism.

Oscar Wilde used to be accused of judging people only by their facial expression. "And by what do you expect me to judge them?" he politely answered. If it is malicious of him to judge people this way, and if it is in the end only possible to judge them on the basis of the most unstable features, how much more malicious it is to analyse a society on this basis! Nevertheless we possess two converging methods to accomplish this end. The unravelling, if I may use the expression, of the phenomenon into its various expressions, and the analytical break down of their internal mechanism should, by means of reciprocal verification, lead to a sufficient approximation of what they are. I mean what they are on different levels, where I clearly do not have the right to leave out that of the "arrival." But this coalition of methods, ideal of the human sciences, must take into account an embarrassing fact. Between experience and its inner code, whatever it might be, a discontinuity is no less probable than a correlation.

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To understand the existential levels of a society, it in no way suffices to break them down into vertical units, which would “reduce” them to their original components, whatever they might be. It is necessary to take into account the qualitative jumps which, because of and notwithstanding the framework of relationships, make reality what we experience.

In the same way, the beauty of a body can only be illusively reduced to its anatomical, physiological, and even biological and chemical basis. Its aesthetic effect, distinct from its sexual attractiveness, has a particular harmony (or disharmony), in which centrifugal elements come into play—notably pertaining to consciousness—and relationships with the outside: for example an expression which to a large extent depends upon the social context. Today’s painters, if they portray it, are no longer so naïve as to depict the bone structure and tendons under the skin, as was for a long time the custom in fine arts schools. Not only do they take away its supposed supports, but they cut it off from its connections with the social context: artistic conventions, links with custom, pleasure or anecdote. In any case this latter exclusion, leads contemporary painting to contradictory wagers, which do not interest us here. We feel that the former gives back its autonomy to the corporeal frame, recomposed together with other images into a palpating world surface. Thus Picasso recomposed “Dejeuner sur l’herbe,” in which the seated nude woman becomes a variation of the greenery which surrounds her, and vice versa.

Social analysis and practice must follow the example of painting. They must give back collective life its statutory autonomy.

The French revolution can undoubtedly be traced to the conquest of political power on the part of a middle class already ripe for industrial enterprise. However it can only be traced to this in the last analysis. As an uprising against injustice, it felt the effects of an opportunity for happiness.⁴ These are nevertheless rationalizations of a particular intensity which the people of the period felt, which lent an accent to their gestures, to their adventures, to their faces and even to their countryside whose echo can still be felt today. How is it possible not to give

⁴ Besides certain more intimate phenomena, such as sexual denial, which E. Le Roy Ladurie points out in *Le Territoire de l'historien*, 1973, p. 316 ff.

this dimension, in relation to others, back its right to be taken into consideration, provided it is placed in relation to the others?

This should be the task of all historical sociology and even, we feel, of scientific socialism.

HAS THE VIEWPOINT BEEN SUBVERTED?

The preceding considerations lead the ambitions of research and projects to horizons they had never before considered tackling. They can also be linked to certain contemporary tendencies, which I shall describe below.

Existentialism opposes its phenomenology, its taste for the immediate and the spontaneous to the systems based on cause, essence or origin. The idea of the multi-dimensional challenges that of a lineary history, and that of the "one-dimensional man," whether he be the supposed *homo oeconomicus*, the resentful man, or any other. The vindication of the private against the public shows how it is not true that life can always rebuild itself according to given centrifugal quantities, but that it ever more obeys the growing pressures of autonomy: I again refer the above to the analyses of Henri Lefebvre. Another notion which has been developed is that of the theatrical. This new semiology not only enabled Jean Duvignand and others to explicate certain hidden aspects of society, but it also began to free society from its imprisonment in a "scène à l'italienne." Immediacy, spontaneity, birth and recreation confront lengthy, calculated determinism and the morals deriving from it. An appeal to joy, bitter and convulsed, stronger than all the denials of it, cries out for an overflowing of the festivity in the world.

All of these ideas are more or less in opposition to those upon which are founded so many analyses, practices, and ideologies of all time. The return to spontaneity challenges the organizational point of view, too inclined, as we well know, towards bureaucracy. Sexuality upholds itself, or rather shows itself off, in other words it simulates. A revolutionary romanticism, which had never stepped down, but humped its back, in self-defense, claims its needs, so long suppressed by the fetishisms of power relationships. The utopia shakes some morals, which were only programs, and some promises, which were only analyses placed in the future tense. Isn't this reversal going too far? Does its just reaction

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against the abuses of organization take into account the demands of all construction, at the very moment that reconstruction imposes itself on the whole earth? Does its desperate vitality a little too obligingly conceal a counterbalance, a sort of purgatory of structures and codes? These are serious questions, which I cannot take up here. I consider it sufficient to have shown, by means of this diversified list, that collective living is a new idea in the world.

DISSYMMETRIES

Just as surely does the manipulation of societies progress. Their practical and theoretical indoctrination continues, adopting a more and more formal terminology to accomplish this end. Abstract reduction is considered the guide book for all application, the criteria for all "scientific" method. A large part of cognition aims, if not at disobjectifying, at least at mediating vision. According to the Marxist standpoint, copied in its own way by the *Annales* school, technological inventions, the importation of Indian or African gold onto the market, its effect on prices, the development of real estate holdings, etc., all coming under the heading of production relationships and class conflicts, make up the foundations of history. One more step and all these variables form a figurative (or a generative?) curve of a world-wide movement.⁵ One more step and the recording of climatic oscillations, their effects on soil production, and its composition together with their effects on demography, varying according to caloric quotients, will produce an "explanation." One more step and the analysis would be stretched to the point of basing it on variations, themselves codifiable, of chance and necessity, and finally on the vicissitudes of ribonucleic acid. Jacques Monod, who thus liquidated Marxist dialectics and religious morals, nonetheless finds it difficult to deduce a morality and even a sociology from ribonucleic acid.

It is true that another sort of analysis returns to the *chiaroscuro* of subjectivity. It traces individual and mass motivations right down to their deepest roots. It drags up from the bottom

⁵ In the meantime pointing out a recent reaction on the part of social history towards a study of "mentalities."

passageways the stratifications and disguises of impulses. Using totally different ways than the formal and quantitative, it arrives at an elaboration of heterogeneous moulds for the behavior which it claims to control. In this case, as in the preceding one, the specialist, with a severe mein, invites us to devaluate, in as much as it is superficial, empirical, not scientific, what we see, do, feel, for the benefit of a reality hidden by nature. This is becoming banal. The solicitation of complexes, and lawsuits against secret motives are today reported in judiciary news stories and in the *Courrier des Coeurs*.

However, if the market of primary goods constitutes, as Marx said more than a century ago, and as the debate about Arab oil recently showed, "the world-wide form that destiny will take,"⁶ this would not shake the values of justice or of desire, the only ones able to move the individual and the masses. These values have been passed down to us, more or less unchanged in their nature, if not in their expression, since prehistoric times.

That the expansion of the scientific and technological revolution means power relationships throughout the world, first in the form of imperialism and then decolonization, thus guaranteeing not only hegemony to certain peoples but also, to their ways of thinking, "absolute superiority" to some, this does nothing to change the universal which drives all groups, from the strangest to the weakest, to demand their right to survive and to affirm themselves—and gradually to succeed, in spite of an intensification of the power relationships.

If memories of early childhood precondition all affection, if death resides in the depths of desire, if impotence explains Robespierre and his hump explains Gramsci, if morals disguise the super-ego, if I seize these masks, I have done little to comprehend the life of the individual and the community in its own order, which is perhaps that of a carnival.

What if life were foreign to that which analyses, conditions or provokes it? When I pursue the analysis to its limits, I have done no more than discover the superimposed columns. My doubt should come to mind, when we are speaking of retracing our steps along these studious paths, when we are speaking of climbing

⁶ Nevertheless a "destiny" which would not be the same as Antigone's, and which would not have a tragic ending. Would it then only be an objective trend?

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from the depths up to the hanging gardens of Babylon where man's grandiose and fragile existence trembles...

Ah pour ces ouvriers charmants
Sujets d'un roi de Babylone
Vénus! Laisse un peu les amants
Dont l'âme est en couronne...⁷

... That's it, I must climb back up from the depths to the gardens. It is a very arduous task! It is true that for this climb I have the use of the determinist ladder, which makes economics its base, and everything "else" its consequences or results. Besides that I have the use of the psychoanalytical ladder, which from door-step to door-step and from psychological blocks to symbols, offers me, besides an explanation of causes, a hermeneutics of signs. The combined use of these two ladders and of some others will lead me to notable, but not viable results. It is not enough, as far as we know, to place the liberation of the masses and the reconstruction of third world cultures, and my own search for happiness, within the scientific and technological revolution, which is the beginning of earth's maturity.

Is it necessary to insist upon considering these categories by themselves, even if this means, as it usually does, to subordinate one to another, to know the experienced, the reduced, the conceived, that which can be developed? This last possibility, let us take note, is characteristic of the technocrat. It has never been characteristic of the magician. It could lead to an esoteric doctrine of the future. We cannot escape unless we give its reciprocal function back to each category, as well as to the collective experience, this third estate which is, in a sense everything, and would certainly like to become something.

This is not to say that there doesn't exist, at least theoretically, a democratic leadership with the means of leading opinion in a unified, continuous sequence between the proposals of the rank and file and the decisions of the leaders. But would that generally be the case—we are still far from the expiration date—the duality between experienced history and thought or controlled history would not disappear so easily: a thought following the paths of

⁷ A. Rimbaud, *Illuminations*.

a more and more complex abstraction, conveyed by more and more naked manouvering. The best proof of this disquieting separation can be deduced from evidence. The motivations attributed to and which influence a citizen haven't changed from those apparent in historic Roman speeches to those of today's election campaigns. An analysis would uncover the same words, in any case the same ideas are dealt with: pleasure/discipline, tradition/novelty, treachery/loyalty, authority/freedom, and in a larger sense wellbeing and misfortune, good and bad. If this is what makes up "man's nature," we must agree that it hasn't been greatly influenced by the two thousand years which in the mean time have subverted the definition and aims of the life of the group. We no longer live in the Gracchus' times; Aristotelian rhetoric should have managed to bring itself up to date.

Nevertheless an idea comes to mind: namely that this depressing continuity might not express real life, but the methods that rulers have used throughout all time to manipulate it. Such perseverance is extraordinary. In addition it poses an enigma. In this case these expressions are no longer related to a reality experienced by the masses, but to their "analytical" reality.⁸ How can this enduring effectiveness be explained? The posing of this question should be the prelude to all political sociology.

From this moment on an operation which can only be called dialectical is put into action: the placement of one in relation to the other, the organization within their mutual interaction of, on the one hand, the ever more abstract impetus of science, and on the other hand, the impetus of an expressiveness and creativity which would be sensitive to the heart, recognized by instinct, and taken into consideration by spontaneity.

We are far from the goal! Since if we observe how the reductive analysis of beings and things can in some way command them, even if some progress is being made by specialists in the search for associations divorced from appearance,⁹ we see no reciprocal

⁸ Might the continuation of this manouvering, without having noticeably changed for centuries, be the aim of various teachings by which society has established and manifested itself? Let us in any case note that its effectiveness contrasts, paradoxically, with its double inadequacy!

⁹ Also the just rejection of empiricism and the ideological, in that they are outgrowths of opinion, should be noticed. However, empiricism is no more real life than opinion is truth.

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procedure being followed, nor is the method of de-reduction after reduction being used, nor how, nor by what assumption might a conquest of the depths of spirit lead to an experience.

SUPPLEMENT TO FABRICIUS' PROSOPOPEIA

Since we earlier alluded to the *Conciones* of Roman times, let us imagine a Citizen, or a Comrade thus haranging the Consuls:

"You would like to institute a scientific political method, and I admire you. You ask for the adherence of my ardour and of my honor, and that is well and good. But how do you reconcile the one with the other? You cannot at the same time pretend that men's actions follow a truth more abstruse than that of the Kabbalists, and expect virtue's immemorial naïveté from them. A virtue which you sometimes make the corollary of apparent changes! What right have you to presume that history's subterranean complexities pass through the life of individuals and groups with such rapid simplicity? Understand that I am not reproaching you for appealing to the heart's evidence. The thought does you credit, and it is a concession you make to honest men. Nevertheless I am ashamed of you that you guarantee programs of the oldest kind of idealism in the service of an abstraction which is affectively neuter, and very far from any possible classification into good or bad. You must admit that this is one of the problems of our times. It is your turn to solve it, and then we can speak of socialism. We could even place a future for political virtue in the growing phantasmagoria of the technological. However you will not for long lump together the performances of science fiction with the false naïvetés of the *Veillées des Chaumières*.

Let us leave Fabricius' discourse, and pass on directly to modern history.

If the militants of the Second year rise to save the Revolution, it is not because it is bourgeois, and promises the emergence of industrial capital, or because it furnished their fathers with the national wealth. They save it because it excites them. If the maquis (guerrilla fighters) of decolonization brave the bombers of the industrial powers, it is not because the technological flux, so long a privilege of town centers, is now extending to the periphery (let us immediately reject this concentric image!) and they

are rushing to recuperate surplus value which the colonizer had confiscated for so long. It is because they fight better than the adversary, in the name of dignity, freedom, and identity; values which neither the adversary's usage of them, nor his computers, nor his return to the theory of games will be able to silence! Isn't this what we witnessed in Viet-Nam? If these are "idealist" motivations, then it's too bad for me if I didn't realize in time that they ruled the question, and to the extent that I connect them to supposedly objective laws, I involuntarily make myself their reducer and fraud.

Will you go so far as to say that you would mobilize, in the service of the *unum necessarium* of the technological and scientific era, our vestiges from the ages of belief? Are you sure that you have taken your "realism" far enough? Others will be more successful than you, this reaction will go against you. What am I saying? They have already done it and they will continue doing so. Only Nietzschean immorality showed that it was coherent until this point: he took the contemporary analysis seriously in his decomposition of the empiric and of the bequeathed. Neither Marx nor Freud had the same audacity. If Nietzsche is mistaken, as we would very much like to believe, why belabor the question, and pretend that the gap does not exist, and affect, in the age of change and need, the presumptions of a good soul? Wouldn't this only be arrogance?

I concede that point to you. It would not suffice to give experience back its creative autonomy: this would mean to exchange one dissymmetry for another. In this case the reasons would be deduced from living to the full, to be then organized into a collective norm. Who has proposed this up until now? Existentialism, self-government, cultural revolutions? Their just criticism of the deductive order has not yet, to our knowledge, led them to the discovery of a praxis or principle able to unite freedom once it is deduced, or take up the infinite challenges of technological growth, and of a drive undertaken by the last of beings and things. Another contradiction then succeeds the first, or rather the two overlap each other. Because finally the master and the slave can mutually deceive each other.

Let us leave the problem in the air. We believe that these contradictions can only be resolved through an earth system. In this system the resurrection of oppressed cultures is the key. This would mean for them the recompense of long historic misfortunes, and a surfeit of tasks today. Let us look at them. Numerous "third world" nations are endeavoring to lay the foundations for heavy industrialization, for a competitive economy, and at the same time to promote a type of socialism that would not be coercive, nor persuasive, but that would descend to the level of the individual's and group's motivations, or rather that would rise to it. They are trying, in some way, to moralize and culturize their development. What could be more legitimate, or more necessary? They thus show us the chances we lost, and the future we had eluded.

They nevertheless compete with the mortal inequalities which I just spoke of. How can a scientifically created project be united to desire? At least, those who are responsible postulate that once the era's and collectivities' truth is discovered, a certain number of attitudes will result, which, in the short or the long run will become accepted by means of logic, practical success, international declaration. This possible reconciliation between Rousseau's natural man and social manouvering, carried to the extreme, is today one of democracy's axioms. We may accept that, but we must nonetheless notice a gap between the category of collective experience and that of secret commands—others would say real ones—throughout the third world. We must face up to this gap if we want to lessen it some day.

It is even more painful in the case of the oriental peoples, still bound to their memories of the ages of faith, when the ontological indulged itself in the existing condition. At the time, because of the cyclical character of life, by virtue of the rites and models which organized the institutions and even the formation of the city and of the people, there was a familiar exchange between the two categories. Man's society believed itself to be and wanted to live in imitation of the prophets and sages. In fact most of its manifestations, not only referring to but analagous to this subject, were intended to reproduce their ways of speaking

and their faces. One might say that all of their social semiology was “iconographical.”¹⁰

It isn't enough to say that this system has ruined itself. It has condemned itself! Even when conservatism and traditionalism strive to maintain, by overvaluing it, this or that fragment of ancient life in the world-wide rallying to the Other's system, this means that the ancient system gives up. These, then, are the societies that have given up, that are dying, that are decentralized, and which have to impose on themselves the reconstruction of themselves and of the world. Judging from the evidence, they will not be able to succeed in such an effort easily. Even the best of them are imposing an austerity upon themselves which puts off until the future the enjoyment of the comforts acquired or to come, including the exercise of liberties. Their contact with societies which have attained success, which many of them visit as students or workers, demoralizes them by the comparison with the standards of living and the possibilities for protest. Just as the bourgeois revolution, fortified by its technical ability and its riches, could, along with Saint-Just, consider happiness a new idea, political virtue appears in many third world societies to be a justified form of unhappiness.

The example of the industrial nations gives credit to theory and planning. The variations imprinted on the environment, on the rural landscape, on the urban scene, are intended to modify the behavior of men in a given way, within a given period of time. The operation becomes plausible on material conditions, on equipment and on procedures, and assumes that the progress of prosperity and in any case the manifestation of the collective will, shall indirectly shape the people's attitudes. Even the direct conditioning of character by means of the mass media is relied on. At best, all this is based on an ingenuous belief; namely that information by itself would bring about a change of behavior, and would rally man to his true interests. One could ridicule this method of reducing everything to the *doxa* plan, at the very moment when scientific discovery is vertiginously brushing the truth! But let

¹⁰ This word is given the meaning that Ch. S. Peirce gave it, and that Yuri Lotman often lent it. However shouldn't this whole theory of the “iconographical” be replaced by the Heideggerian perspective of the “unveiling” or, (still in the same spirit) of the *eidétique*? cf. J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, t. II, 1973.

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us go on. It is certain that scientific progress has repercussions on all planes. Isn't it true that it becomes incarnated in life through the education of youth and adults? In this way modern technology has endowed the leaders with multiple means: radio, newspapers, television, satellites, etc., in other words propaganda as well. We can add to that the different insidious or declared procedures employed for social control, pressures exerted by the classes or ruling elites, the exemplarity acquired by certain individuals. There are many ways of influencing life. How can arrogance and authoritarianism be passed over in silence? We can see them at work in many countries of the third world, where one might have hoped for more from the access to independence.

These abuses are not, however, so much the result of governments' wickedness as of their generic inaccuracy. Besides which, situations, beings and things resist them more than one would think. In spite of all the tools which modern times puts in the hands of regimes to transform collective life, the latter, for better or for worse, refuses to give in. The acceleration, or even the anachronistic aspects of the proposed aims puts a limit on their significance. Lacking significance, the change does not take root. This is why recent history breaks up the societies of the third world into internal contradictions. The traditionalism of some and the progressiveness of others cuts off mutual communication, and impedes both beneficial and harmful expansion of power. However the most effective limitations remain the difficulties which societies of the third world have in uniting the utilization of the collective experience with the growing abstraction which the control over things requires. A control which until now, in the majority of cases, has foreign names and puts into effect foreign concepts...

That so many prodigious efforts wrongly or rightly to transform things should, at least at the present, be failing, would be serious anywhere. It is even more so in the case of societies who desire, while remaining themselves, to be on the receiving end of the new industrial world. Their apparent submission to the authoritarian State, in most cases, only widens the gaps which trouble them. Their naïve enthusiasm: their adherence to great men, to slogans, their socialization deliria, the triumph of complacency will not deceive them for long. Are new upheavals then to be expected? This will often be the case. Often the changes inflicted

on the group's experience, the discovery of swindles, the realization of failures produce a blocking effect, a fixation, a demobilization. Thus the majority of legendary moralities with which the leaders armed themselves to inspire the masses will collapse, and will make these societies which are in full historical fervor frozen societies. Or worse still: greedy and frozen. This is where neo-colonialism is waiting for them.

PRIVILEGES OF THE THIRD WORLD

Luckily, that is not the only possible outcome. These societies, which we call and which call themselves under-developed, burdened with ignorance, sickness, poverty, are in many ways in a better position than ours.

Decolonization does not mean, as it is often understood to mean, reversal and return to imperialism. We repeat. It is not that decolonization should do an about-face and become the contrary of colonization. It is a question of freeing a superabundance of beings and things. From then on all the problems show themselves to be more universal, more sharply outlined, qualitatively higher than in the preceding period.

Decolonization means existential expansion, experience of the untried, a disorder at the same time material and anthropological, all this destroying the narrowness of the preceding phase. It is necessary to nourish, since no one has dreamed of nourishing; it is necessary to teach the masses to whom no one paid attention; it is necessary to give the course of things a meaning that will be recognized. Certainly we might find more unhappiness than before, because the individual man and the group who are now expanding are only beginning to approach their problems, and this is a painful discovery. The general aggrandizement worsens the distortions coming from the need to appropriate the control of the structures into the collective experience: an appropriation which, of course, greatly surpasses the reprisals of State capitalism! In the long run the example that these societies set for us is not, I must say, one of contentment and tranquillity, but that of an endeavor animated by all possibilities of social analysis, all of our divisions of labor, or supposed divisions, to postulate that a problem cannot be resolved, nor even defined, until it is traced to its roots.

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What are its roots? 1) Ecological roots to begin with. Every problem must be traced to the level of the juncture between societies and nature, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to the worldwide perspectives which the sensible evolution of all people towards planetary unity necessitates. 2) In the second place, and this observation follows from the preceding one, the project must recapture man and the group at the base, in other words radically. A freed society cannot be content with rearrangements, it must desire to be a society at the stage of birth, with all the repetitions, all the vehemence which this requires: and this means revolution. 3) Then this society, obliged to transmit in terms of the future an identity coming from the beginning of times, will submit its identity to a kind of systematic vibration. To chain it down would mean to kill it. It will have to break out of the narrow categories in which we enclose our problems, or rather enlarge all of them to comprehend the anthropological, because in the end, its own effort tends towards the rejection of society as a form, to reconstruct it as an unlimited function of collective man. In such a project the cardinal virtues will not only be the positive realization, but also adventure and recreation. 4) The declaration of the right to difference, the right to escape from figures, and maybe from the laws of the industrial world. To do this it will be necessary to free ourselves from terrible fears, which are more costly than slavery.