

THE INTELLECTUAL IN THE FACE  
OF HIS MORAL AND  
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The relationship intelligentsia-morality-politics is characterized by a number of important features. In the first place, it is not a question of an abstract logical structure, but of an objectively existing social phenomenon. In other words, it is a question of the attitude of real, living men, with their intimate personal feelings and experiences, their social and political convictions.

In the second place, we examine here morality and politics, not in connection with a distinct and separate social class, characterized by a definite attitude of ownership over the means of production; such are, for instance, the basic classes in the contemporary advanced societies. The intelligentsia is a social stratum, formed on the basis of the specific features of intellectual labor, i.e., in the process of the production of spiritual values. Even this general definition characterizes most of the intellectuals as people working and producing, without any direct and main attitude towards material problems, relations and interests in society.

The "distance" which separates the different intellectual pro-

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fessions from the so-called material ones, i.e., economic and technological problems, is different. While engineers, agronomists and economists have a direct attitude towards the production of material goods, the position of lawyers and physicians is different; and it is still more different as regards men of art and philosophy: here we usually speak about "an honorable distance." In most cases the very conception of "material interest" has a rude naturalistic meaning in the conscience of an intellectual. As a rule, its content is considered as organically unpleasant, i.e., as alien and standing far away from the "always" pure and noble goals of intellectual creative work. Nevertheless, the logic itself of our reasoning compels us to note the indisputable fact that today again—to our greatest regret—the intellectual cannot and will not possibly be able to be indifferent to the material remuneration for his own labor, to the material conditions of his private and official life. Alongside with this or rather precisely *because of this* he cannot and must not be indifferent towards the great problems of a society in which he works and lives. But this is already a judgement which transgresses the usual boundaries of "pure" intellectual activity, and sinks into the "impure" waters of politics.

With all its diverse characteristic features, politics is above all an activity, a struggle and realization of different and contradictory social-group interests, the central nucleus of which consists of class, party and state interests. The definition of politics as a "direct, concentrated expression of the economy" (Lenin), without exhausting its content, reflects its deepest meaning.

Hence a certain contradiction is embodied in the very relationship "intelligentsia-politics." But here we are interested in the question about the place and role of morality in this contradictory relationship. As a basic, historically most ancient, and elementary system of regulating people's conduct, morality has functioned in all epochs and social groups. In the class societies, a typical form of morality existing in society is class morality, irrespective of the ways and means in which it manifests itself outwardly. But it is in connection with the relationship between intelligentsia and politics that the specific character of morality reveals its own functional significance to a considerable degree.

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One of the characteristic features of morality—unlike the other forms of social consciousness—consists in the fact that moral creative work is not the result of trained specialists (ideologists, philosophers, research workers, priests, jurists, artists etc.), but comes into being in the process of the mass, spontaneous, unpremeditated associating of people from social communities on different levels. The strength of historical tradition has implanted in people's customs and habits a number of moral ideas, evaluations, principles and norms, which are supplemented, developed and changed under concrete social and historical situations. The necessary degree of evaluative and normative regulation of people's conduct is achieved through them in the process of people's association in society.

It is here that the necessity arises to make an obligatory differentiation between the concepts of morality and of ethics. We examine ethics as a *theory*, i.e. as philosophical, sociological, psychological, etc. *knowledge* of moral problems. In social life all practical moral views and norms are mutually influenced, get mixed up and become one with those moral constructions which are set up in a theoretical way. But the different character of moral creative work in the sphere of mass social practice from that in the laboratories of ethical thinkers must always be taken into account. As professionalists they belong to that stratum of the intelligentsia which belongs to philosophy and the humanitarian sciences.

This is one of the first characteristic features of morality, which one should bear in mind in examining its function as a unit linking the attitude of the intelligentsia to politics. In the structure intelligentsia-morality-politics the intelligentsia lends content to its attitude towards politics through its attitude towards morality. Here the latter serves not only as a means of expression, but also as an argument, ground, criterion, initial viewpoint. This is an attitude of specialists and professionals in the creation of *different kinds* of spiritual values created in a theoretical (scientific and ideological) way towards a *certain kind* of moral values, created in a practical (mass, empirical, socio-psychic) way.

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Among the intelligentsia—much more than among the remaining social groups—the presence of one or another common higher degree of theoretical, i.e., philosophical and ethical, understanding of practical moral problems might be expected. But the general ethical culture of the intellectual itself may be not more than a moral wish. Among the different professional groups of the intelligentsia certain common positions might be expected: the possibility and necessity of ethical education among philosophers, among writers and artists is one, among politicians and jurists, among teachers and journalists—another, and it may be yet another among doctors, engineers, agronomists, mathematicians and physicians. But these considerations may also be examined in a different light, when one proceeds from the concrete political affiliation of the intellectual, from his civic positions, from his conscious or actual creed in society. And when there is no such creed, then comes the role of the individual understanding and of the personal taste, very often exaggerated to the degree of such a personal orientation under which the illusion of “being free from society” is typical.

In this connection the question comes up of understanding the social character of the moral problems on the part of the intelligentsia. The relationship “Intelligentsia-morality” is a social relationship of a spiritual and ideological type. But more than anywhere else, precisely among the people of mental labor the real, social objective, i.e., the practical character of this relationship, is underestimated, neglected and often consciously denied. The objective law about the relative independence of the forms of social consciousness is not always known and consciously experienced. But in fact, precisely among intellectuals this law finds its—very often unconscious—vivid and high manifestation. Moreover, sometimes this independence of the moral from the social, is proclaimed as absolute instead of as relative. This can particularly clearly be seen in theory, as for instance in the schools of philosophical and literary subjectivism. But this is so also in practice when the individualism of the intellectual leads him to a detachment from real social problems, to social passivity, assuming sometimes the form of self-isolation, egoism, the well-known “style” of being apolitical. Usually, an apolitical creed makes its appearance after major personal fail-

ures and disappointments. It may also be the result of a condition of general crisis in society, of a military defeat of the country, of social stagnancy, etc. Insofar as in such instances there is an attitude of conflict with politics, the well-known model of thinking is formed: the only refuge from “dirty” politics is “my” personal moral consciousness, it is “my” only “refuge”, “my” faith in the good, in conscience, honor, dignity, etc. “My” moral consciousness is only “my” property, and it represents the desired “calm bay, where I am far from the storms of political passions...” etc.

All this stands out in still bolder relief when we take into consideration the fact that in our case we examine the relationship “intelligentsia-morality” not in isolation, not as an end in itself, but as a subsystem in the more general system: “intelligentsia-morality-politics.” In other words, from the very beginning we limit the role of the moral factor *insofar* as a relationship to politics is expressed through it.

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The historical roots of the relationship “intelligentsia-morality-politics” are to be sought in remote antiquity. The appearance of politics is to be referred to a later period of time when private property, the classes and the state made their appearance. The social age of the intelligentsia is not different. This is due to the fact that the appearance of class societies meant not only a transition to exploitation and social parasitism: during this equally distant and morally dark historical period remarkable conquests in the development of human culture were scored. The indisputable growth of social labor productivity was accompanied by one of the most remarkable and greatest divisions of labor—the division between mental and physical labor. Those who performed this new type of social activity and brought about a remarkable advancement in mankind’s culture, were the professional performers of mental labor—the intellectuals.

But when politics made its appearance on the historical stage, it found there its “elder sister”—morality. As a system regulating man’s conduct, morality made its appearance with the coming into being of primary and most elementary social relations.

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Having passed through all historical periods, moral regulation today again manifests itself in every social situation in which there is the elementary mutual relationship "collective-individual." This is so, because for this type of regulation—unlike law, for instance, where there is administrative coercion by state organs—the role of the individual moment of independent activity is characteristic. To function, a moral norm *requires* consciousness, voluntariness, free assumption of responsibility, i.e. the free choice by a person enjoying equal rights with all other members of a given social community.

Moreover, morality is active at *every* collective, i.e. in *every* kind of social community in which there are no antagonistic contradictory interests both in the sphere of *micro*- and in that of *macro*-social relations. But in the class societies history created the state, politics and law. Here, naturally, morality is in action too: the principles of freedom, fraternity, equality, justice, independence, peace, security have their definite, organic and inalienable ethical aspect. But on a macro-social scale the main role belongs to political and juridical regulation. And in the sphere of micro-social relations morality unfolds its own social function to the highest degree. Here the individual, the person, the citizen acts as a mass individual, on a scale of millions of people.

In fact this is the first sphere in which morality functions directly. Characteristic of this sphere is the fact that the collective requirements (behind which lies a certain common and steady collective interest) refer directly and immediately to the members of the same social community in which they are formed. The main social basis of this function of morality is the area of the private way of life, i.e. the non-productive sphere, the sphere of consumption in social life. The problems of everyday family life are manifested here as well as personal friendly feelings, customs and habits, consumption and transport, mass entertainment, cultural recreation, sports, public order and hygiene, etiquette, etc.

The second social sphere in which morality functions refers to the superstructure. This is the *indirect* impact of morality, its interaction with the factors of an ideological character. Naturally, the interaction of moral consciousness with political con-

sciousness and law comes to the foreground in this instance. In the second place comes the interaction of morality with philosophy and the social sciences, with art and religion as such forms of social consciousness which stand farther apart from economic relations, i.e. which occupy the "second floor" of the structure of social consciousness. The significance of this sphere of the social functioning of morality is obvious in the modern scientifically and culturally advanced societies. The morally motivated and argued ideological position, the moral principles acting through the juridical norms, the philosophically elaborated ethical ideal, the sociologically investigated practical moral problems, the moral component part in the artistic images, religious moralizing—all this constitutes moral values and moral processes which have for us a dual significance. They reveal both the active social function of morality and the active creative role of the different detachments of intellectuals in close interaction with the achievements of modern ethical culture.

The third sphere of the social functioning of morality refers to phenomena in the production process, i.e., in labor. Moral norms interact here with technological norms in a *mutually auxiliary way*. The concept of "technology" itself is used in its possibly broadest sense: included in it are all kinds of rules, norms, indications, programs stemming from the specific character of a given labor activity. The general real foundation of this activity consists in the interaction between man and nature, its substances and energies. Thus, technological rules have no ideological character. As a rule, they do not reflect interests of a class and political character. They constitute a practical application of well-known and mastered natural, biological, geological, meteorological, physical, chemical, etc., laws. From the ancient ways of baking bread and rearing domestic animals, through the steam engine and electrical power, and down to the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful and military purposes, to the cosmic rockets and orbital stations—such is the exceptionally wide range of the functioning of technological norms.

In their interaction with them, moral norms in principle preserve their own entirety, independence and autonomy. The merging, growing together of the moral evaluative and normative material with the tissue itself of political, juridical, artistic,

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religious, etc., thinking is missing here. There is a certain distance and an established parallelism, under which the moral and technological norms interact with and help each other. Moral duty in this case does not assume the aspect of a political or divine commandment, but that of an obligation to abide by and loyally to fulfill concrete technological instructions lying *outside* it. Here moral culture necessarily presupposes a certain strictly specialized technological and professional culture. And *vice versa*. The content of the technological norms cannot be influenced by the content of moral duty. The latter can only secure, strengthen and stabilize the more exact, more timely and qualitative fulfillment of the technological rules that are independent from morality. Even the most moral, professionally qualified priest cannot do that which only a capable surgeon is in a position to perform!

The sphere of the conjoint auxiliary functioning of morality is particularly eloquent as regards the problem we are interested in. Here, the main agents of social activity are the intellectuals of a technological type: the people working in the field of the natural, mathematical and technological sciences. Their own professional life directs them to discovering the truth in the outer, natural, i.e., non-social reality. In principle, this primary and "naked" truth does not coincide with the well-known economic and political, national, class, religious, racial, etc., interests. usually this truth is understood and treated as fully independent from them. It is not accidental that precisely among these strata of the intelligentsia the positive faith in the possibility of an independent and "free" from politics creative research work is widely spread, assuming the aspect of an illusion.

Morality thus has an exceedingly wide scope of social activity. In a direct or indirect way (in interaction with the ideological and technological normative complexes), moral regulation embraces all aspects of social life. It is indeed related to the life and destinies of millions of people.

Politics is also a social conduct-regulating factor affecting millions of people. But political as well as juridical regulation embraces millions of citizens through the prism of the great social groups and organizations—classes, parties, trade unions, state bodies, national communities, interstate systems.

Moral regulation embraces millions of people *first of all*



through the prism of every individual small social group—the family, the classroom, the group of friends, the kinship circle, the group formed on the basis of different hobbies, etc. Morality is indeed a *universal* regulator of conduct, but in the first place from the viewpoint of the separate individual and the small collectives which act with the conviction that “all think in this way”, i.e. all “act in this way.” In other words, regarding moral regulation one thinks, speaks and acts on behalf of the common man, of man in general, and hence—of humanity. And this is not accidental. Since remotest antiquity morality has been the bearer of a common, generic, collectivist spirit. And today moral arguments are called upon to fulfill the difficult but necessary task of lending a character of social community, of virtue and of universally valid justice wherever social conflicts threaten to bring about a social explosion. In the sphere of moral consciousness man’s historical experience has accumulated and preserved to a very high degree the reflection of the universal, all-people’s and collective side of social relations.

That is why the moral viewpoint is very much liked by the intellectual. And he has additional, real professional grounds to speak and act “on behalf of mankind;” the spiritual values which he creates overcome more easily the fragmentation, particularism and—very often—the antagonism of material values and interests. In principle, the spiritual is a reflection, a generalization and systematization of the material. It is such, first of all along the line of its historical origin. But in virtue of the law of its own *relative* independence it goes beyond its original social framework and becomes established as the remarkable realm of spiritual values. And it is not at all accidental that a large part of all intellectuals feel here “at home”, repeating, underlining and pointing out its abstractness and *absolute* independence, ready to fight for its “territorial integrity”, “sovereignty”, “freedom”, “independence”, etc. mainly from the “imperialism and colonialism of politicians.” In this case the fact is more important for us that even the concepts of “man” and “mankind” are the result of the generalizing capacity of theoretical thinking; that very often the intellectual is sincerely convinced that he even has greater ground and moral right to speak on behalf

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of man and mankind than the politician. (Naturally, it is not a question here of *every* intellectual, nor of *every* politician).

Therefore, by tradition, the moral viewpoint of the intelligentsia regarding politics is the viewpoint of individual creators of spiritual values with respect to a phenomenon of a macro-social character, referring first of all to the basic material interests, to the life and destiny of millions of people. From "my" intimate individuality, on the basis of "my" personal moral viewpoint towards the political interests of the millions, of mankind—such is the elementary and traditional scheme of the attitude of a considerable part of the intelligentsia towards politics.

This in itself is not bad, provided that it is true and practically real for every separate case in social life. Provided sincerity and honesty do not cover up an illusion. Provided that the subjective is a true and exact expression of the objective. The opposite happens at least then, when the "proud, free and independent" individual absolutizes his "impartial" individualism to such a degree that he does not notice his factual affiliation to some of the varieties of national, racial, class, religious egoism and even fanaticism! And this is also a factual political position! And one of the worst.

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In the attitude of the intelligentsia towards politics, the link between the individual and the social is revealed. And in a very interesting and characteristic manner.

First of all, we must strive to achieve not the well-known individualization as an end in itself, but such a form and degree of development of the individual, which finds and *seeks* its natural and normal functional links and dependencies with the social environment. Along this line of thought, the dependence of the individual upon the political system comes to the fore. In the extremely wide range of these problems we shall limit ourselves to the relationship between the concepts "individualization" and "democracy." The process of democratizing a given political regime can include individualization only in a certain sense and within certain limits. It will, naturally, be a question

here not of individual cases of isolated individual development but of a *mass* individualization. And in this case, in its development the individual in every separate citizen must take into account the individual needs of all others, must strive to be in harmony with them. It is a question of such an inevitable and reasonable limiting of the individual as is required by the principle of equality. From this point of view the well-known concept of "intellectualist individualism," in spite of all its "attractiveness," reveals a high degree of practical limitation and actual moral poverty. Its content does not correspond to the wealth of social life, to the needs of a truly democratic social environment.

The determinative role of the social principle in the relationship between intelligentsia and politics stems naturally and logically from the very nature of this social relationship. Obviously, it should be expressly underlined in this connection that we in principle do not agree with this simplistic view of the social when it is understood as anti-individual. With all its qualitative characteristic features, for us the social will never have any meaning and justification unless it embodies the joint summed interests of the individuals that make it up. In other words, the "social-individual" relationship is to be understood not as an abstract, mechanical and metaphysical antinomy, but as a living social process of creative interaction between individuals in the communities of a given social medium—free of social parasitism. In such a setup, the role of the process of socialization is determinative. In its most general form it embraces not only and not simply the impact of the social *upon* the individual; it is a question here of a practical *mastery* on the part of the individual of social experience, of his personal perception of the basic social interests and trends, of turning the voice of public opinion into a personal conviction, i.e., into the voice of one's conscience. And it would be perfectly natural if we see in this process the important and active role of the political principle. But here politics is no longer politics pure and simple. In this case the political requirement becomes moral conviction, a question of one's personal conscience.

The process of socialization itself inevitably includes the process of politization as its organic ingredient. Or, in other words, in its first and main aspect, socialization manifests itself as a

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process of political socialization, quite independent of whether this assertion and this objective fact are to the liking or not of certain colleague-intellectuals. Naturally, here we come to a narrowing down of the content of the conception "socialization." But this narrowing down also has its positive sides: it reflects the first-grade and leading role of the political subsystem in the total social system.

In the process of political socialization, the fact stands out of a practical mastery of the problems and needs of real political life, of political necessity as a concrete social necessity, as a concrete practical expression of historical necessity. Not only the necessity of a *clear* and *correct* understanding of the political conjuncture is included here, but also of a correct *practical attitude* to the basic and perspective processes and tendencies of *strategical* significance. Herein naturally belong the questions about political education, political propaganda with all its positive and negative sides, the need to acquire certain political qualities, certain organizational habits, etc.

It is difficult to say that intellectuals as a rule are enthusiastic with regard to political socialization in general and with regard to some of its elements in particular. We have, for instance, the notorious problem of discipline, which is necessary for every kind of political activity and organization: state, party, trade union, national, religious, racial, etc. Very often political discipline is considered as Enemy No. 1 of the very nature of the intellectual—of his freedom, conscience, professional honor, human dignity, etc. Naturally, in this case we must at once say that just as there are different types of politics so there are also different types of discipline. Thus, the question becomes transformed into a problem about the criterion by which the different types and kinds of politics and discipline will be evaluated.

Discipline in itself can be conscious, i.e. voluntary, rising to the degree of moral consciousness, as self-discipline. In this case discipline is the result of a freely taken decision, of an independently made choice, a voluntary inner self-determination, a question of the free will of one's conscience. But there is also administrative, military, professional, discipline which is imposed from outside and which in principle does not require the inner consent of the person. In our case the discipline which is

imposed along the line of political dictatorship and terror, i.e., in contradiction with the needs of social progress, is of no theoretical interest.

More important is to underscore the significance itself of the problem of political socialization in our times. It is a question not only of an objective enhancement of the role of politics as a factor in social life, which is qualitatively different compared with the past decades and centuries. It is a question also of the objective enlistment of other *kinds* of social activities, which have traditionally stood far away from the political sphere and which today enter, to one or another degree, as components of the political orbit. Here again, naturally, we have in mind intellectual production and the respective intellectual professions.

Let us take as an example such a basic and important branch of intellectual production as *science*. In the 20th century, the great epoch of social and technological revolutionary changes—the role of science as well as its carrier—the scientific intelligentsia, developed so obviously, that an eventual attempt to argue against this fact could not be considered as serious. We limit ourselves in this case to certain basic moral and political problems from the life of the scientific intelligentsia.

The main consideration which predetermines the contemporary role of science in social life, its growing social weight and hence political significance, is revealed in the formula “science—an immediate productive force.” From among the many meanings and aspects of this definition we note the fact that the old “romantic” period of independent scientific research, of the research worker as an independent but isolated Dr. Faustus, doomed to solitude, has irreversibly gone by forever. The basic scientific problems today are posed by the needs of social life, their character is many-sided, complex, the way of their solution cannot be anything else but collective. But precisely today, even the most democratically organized scientific collective cannot be deprived of such inner structural dependencies as hierarchy, discipline, coordination, super- and subordination, of the respective individual competences and responsibilities of its individual members. And all this is in full, organic concord with the problem of the freedom of thought, the freedom of scientific creative work.

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In the second place has to be pointed out the basic and widely discussed fact of the moral responsibility of the scientist for the foreseeable social consequences of his discoveries and their application. Atomic power and the ecological crises are eloquent and effective enough examples not only of the significance of this great both moral and political responsibility, referring to the very existence of our planet. These examples also clearly reveal the fact that the solution of such important problems can be secured only in a collective way, by uniting all national and international efforts and factors of a governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental character.

The political significance of the scientist's moral responsibility is thus above all concentrated on his attitude towards *truth*. Naturally, the revelation of objective truth in natural, social and mental phenomena, "the truth, only the truth and nothing but the truth" constitutes the unwavering categorical imperative not only for the scientific intelligentsia, but also for every conscious human being capable of being held responsible for his actions. It is a question of *moral duty* to seek not only the truth in the investigated phenomena, but also to reveal this truth in an indissoluble connection with its practicable application and social, *that is* human significance.

There are all problems, the importance of which is not only not denied, but is ever more openly and more expressly acknowledged by all nations and continents. Today the problem about the moral significance of scientific activity is only a specific expression of its deeper and determinative social and political significance. A concrete expression of this significance has for many years also been manifested in the practice of international scientific and cultural cooperation, in the activity of the different governmental and non-governmental international organizations. Particularly characteristic and typical is the treatment of this problem in the practice of UNESCO. The last, 18th General Conference of the latter organization adopted a Recommendation regarding the statute of the research worker. Elaborated in the course of several years, this remarkable document is the result of the joint efforts of specialists from many countries. The role of the man of science in our times is clearly described both on a national and on an international scale.

Characteristic in this respect is the chapter treating of the calling of the research worker. In this connection the necessity is expressly pointed out of being conscious of serving at the same time the interests of one's compatriots as well as those of mankind as a whole. Hence a number of concrete obligations expressing the moral responsibility of scientists who have the right and the obligation:

— to work in a spirit of intellectual freedom and to pursue, explain and defend scientific truth such as they see it;

— to contribute to the definition of the aims and objectives of the programs in which they are engaged and to the determination of the methods to be adopted which should be humanely, socially and ecologically responsible;

— to express themselves freely on the human, social or ecological value of certain projects and in the last resort withdraw from those projects, if their conscience so dictates;

— to contribute positively and constructively to the fabric of science, culture and education in their own country, as well as to the achievement of national goals, the enhancement of their fellow-citizens' well-being, and the furtherance of the international ideals and objectives of the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

The ethical problems of scientists were also examined in an interesting and meaningful symposium organized by UNESCO in Paris, July, 1974, on the subject "Science, Ethics and Aesthetics." Apart from certain individual opinions on certain details, the general feeling was definitely in favor of strengthening the social and moral responsibility of scientists. Thus, in his paper the wellknown American physicist Mr. Gerald Holten expressly underlined that "science is practical reason rather than pure reason and therefore it is infinitely connected with ethical problems and moral law."<sup>2</sup> Hence, Professor Holton underscores the link of science with the inner ethos, with the personal moral development. In this connection he quotes Einstein's thought expressed during Curie's memorial in 1935. Einstein pointed out that the moral qualities of the scientist's person "are perhaps of even greater

<sup>1</sup> UNESCO, 18 C/125, 18 November 1974, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> UNESCO, SCH/74/ CONF./811/15, 10 June 1974, pp. 3, 4.

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significance for a generation and for the course of history than purely intellectual accomplishment. Even these latter are, to a far greater extent than is commonly credited, dependent on the stature of character.”<sup>3</sup>

In his paper, the Leningrad professor of physics Yuri Demkov underlined the growing social role and responsibilities of the scientist, stemming from the inner development of science, from the contemporary social significance of its inventions. Hence the conclusion: “More and more of science ceases to be morally neutral. In many cases the scientist must be extremely careful because his actions can lead to quite unexpected results, hence his growing desire to turn a personal into a collective responsibility.” And further on: “As scientific is like artistic work creative, the work itself, and individual or collective discovery provide the highest satisfaction—the transformation of the labor from being the cursed obligation proclaimed in the Bible into a joyous activity which reveals a man’s hidden abilities. At the same time, science directly or indirectly provides the machines, in industry and agriculture which take over from men most of the hard, tedious, monotonous and non-creative and unpleasant jobs.”<sup>4</sup> And Professor Derkov concludes that precisely here is revealed the very important aspect of the ethical transformation, of the relationship between man and labor, which is a necessary condition along the way of social progress.

In other words, the research workers as *seekers of the truth*, but being fully aware not only of it but also of its effective social application, of the results of this application and the significance of these results, are not and cannot be isolated “pawns” of an old “romantic” type. Today more than ever before, theory has ceased to be a distant realm of abstract dreams and of individually isolated, separate seekings. According to the character of a given scientific investigation, its results may assume one or another degree of general social, i.e. political significance. This should not, therefore, be a question of an old, metaphysical, antinomic relationship “for” or “against” politics, but of a correct, realistic attitude towards a concrete *kind* of political

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 6, 7.

<sup>4</sup> UNESCO, SCH/74/ CONF./811/14, 13 May 1974, p. 2.



activity, political program and political goals which must serve social progress.

The problem of socializing the activity of a research worker is in itself an objective social fact. It is organically linked, merged and grown together with that responsibility of the scientist in particular, and of the intellectual in general, which from intimate and individual has become an objectively social responsibility, whose moral and political aspects are inseparable from the purely scientific aspects. And precisely on this basis the process of socializing intellectual activity is the basis, essence and content of the individual growth of the different producers of moral values. More precisely, we should be speaking of a dual united process of socialization and individualization, the first aspect being the determinative. Understood in this way, both socialization in general and political socialization in particular cannot be conceived as deindividualization and depersonalization. We see the active participation of the intellectual in social life, the linkage between the spiritual products created by him with the needs of society and of mankind as a first prerequisite for the individual growth and the personal flourishing of the producers of spiritual values. Naturally, many things will depend upon society, upon the concrete social system, upon the political system and its day-to-day problems, upon the style and character of the rulers, etc. But even in the most crucial moments history has not left us without convincing examples. Socrates, Galilei and Spinoza, Chernishevsky and Shevchenko, Emile Zola and Thomas Mann, Einstein and Oppenheimer have already given their unforgettable answer to these questions. And they are not the only ones. Nor the last ones.