



In more controversial territory, the infused virtues and gifts (chapters 6 and 7) also follow this model, unifying Aquinas' account of virtue formation. Mattison defends the need for infused virtues and explains their relationship to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a manifestation of divine agency within the virtuous agent. Is it too much of a stretch to grant that a set of gifts beyond the infused virtues already perfecting human powers is needed to account for divine agency which prompts actions adequate to a supernatural end? Mattison makes a defensible case, even if Aquinas' account here stretches Greek definitions of virtue (and perhaps ours, too) beyond their breaking point.

The volume helpfully highlights the important role of communal socialisation, education as formation and the need for intentional social architecture in habit formation. Mattison rightly notes that these topics need to be further addressed and better integrated into philosophical and theological treatments of virtue formation. His account provides a metaphysical foundation for that work.

Mattison's 'rational specification' account follows Aquinas' distinction between natural and supernatural ends, which yields different species of virtues with different species of actions. In the process of habituation, however, how much of this matters? Phenomenologically, boundaries between dispositions and virtues, or acquired and infused virtues exercised via the gifts, might be blurrier or even inscrutable. For example, with courage, how much functional (behavioural) overlap could one expect between dispositional resilience and everyday occasions of courage, or between military or athletic accustomisation and acquired virtues aimed at the common good? When would infused virtues and gifts lead to noticeably different acts or articulations – only in life-and-death situations? Or would one's supernatural ultimate end 'saturate' daily life in ways that make it noticeably distinct from virtuous persons who have a natural ultimate end? How would answers affect the design of moral training?

Mattison's Thomistic account of growth in virtue would ideally support and guide a practical programme of virtue development. He pushes back against the common assumption that growth in virtue does not (technically) build gradually from disposition to acquired virtue to infused virtue; likewise, the agent does not relapse from infused virtue back to acquired virtue after mortal sin. Will his account help clarify distinct pathways, or cause us to under-emphasise potential overlaps in practical training or neural pathways in child-raising, educational formation and spiritual transformation? That Mattison's foundational study raises such crucial questions is a tribute to both its theoretical clarity and the practical significance of his topic.

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Ligita Ryliškytė, *Why the Cross? Divine Friendship and the Power of Justice*

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Ligita Ryliškytė, in *Why the Cross*, develops an account of the atonement 'in response to the exigencies of a secular age' (p. 440), taking up a line of thought developed in

Augustine and Thomas and transposed by Bernard Lonergan. After an account of secular culture (chapter 1), and the method of transposition (chapter 2), Ryliškytė explores Augustine's theology of the atonement (chapters 3 and 4), Thomas' (chapters 5 and 6) and Lonergan's (chapters 7 and 8), followed by her (thoroughly Lonerganian) account of a historically minded systematic theology of the cross (chapter 9) and her constructive account/summary of the atonement (chapter 10). We might take the following passage from the concluding chapter as a summary of her perspective:

What pleased the Father was not Christ's suffering. It was Christ's love. Nor does God ask us to suffer but to love; yet true love in a fallen world is cruciform. Suffering is intrinsic to accepting and offering forgiveness and to genuine solidarity with the victims of sin. As illumined by St. Thomas, in the presence of sin, charity begets repentance and forgiveness. As Augustine had it, the just society is the penitential society. As Lonergan explained, by living out of friendship with God, such a society is healed of social decline through intellectual, moral and religious conversion. (p. 441)

Ryliškytė's work is a model of scholarship – well researched and meticulous. And it develops a line of thought ripe for careful study: the relationship between the doctrine of the atonement and the logic of friendship (John 15:13), doing so by delving into some of the great theologians of the doctrine, while bringing Lonergan prominently into the discussion. This alone merits her book careful attention.

That said, I had significant difficulties with her argument. First, I found that her 'transposition' of Augustine and Thomas left their work unrecognisable. Particularly with regard to Augustine, I found Ryliškytė engaging, but her summary, echoed throughout the book, of (restorative) justice over power simply fails as an account of Augustine's integration of justice and power in *De Trinitate*. In other words, I found Ryliškytė's approach to be less Augustinian than inspired by a narrow line of thought in Augustine which is not reflective of his overall view of Christ's saving work, resulting in a nearly Pelagian view of God's justice which 'works by way of inspiring human repentance, persuading in God's love, and transforming human free rationality' (p. 137). I found the same to be true of her account of Thomas, whose work she understands primarily 'in the context of penance and friendship' (p. 238). Ryliškytė, as I understand her, gives an account of Thomas which perhaps has more in common with John McLeod Campbell: 'Christ's passion and death is vicarious satisfaction, not retributive punishment, since it is a voluntary... expression of sorrow for sin, rather than an involuntary infliction of penalty' (p. 242).

Lonergan, according to Ryliškytė, transposes this version of Augustine and Thomas, arguing that 'the Son of God became human, suffered, died, and was risen to communicate God's friendship to God's enemies in due order. Becoming a friend of God in Christ means accepting the gift of reconciliation and the offer of friendship and, by the power of the Holy Spirit, extending this friendship to others' (p. 317). What we seem to have is an incredibly robust and sophisticated form of exemplarism rooted in the vicarious repentance of Jesus Christ (p. 319). The causality in question is a 'historical causality', which is 'conceived as the shifting of odds of emergent probability through the diffusion of forgiveness and supernatural friendship' (p. 403). This is a doctrine of the atonement focused on 'transformation of evil into good' (see e.g. p. 291), 'inaugurat[ing] a new historical order by returning good for evil, as attained by an authentic subject' (p. 293).

I find this account fundamentally lacking, though I am thoroughly inclined to develop the atonement in relationship to a theological account of God's friendship with us. The problem with Ryliškytė's approach, as I see it, is that she takes as her starting point a particular understanding of secularity as decisive for contemporary dogmatic reflection and develops Christian doctrine within that constraint. Such an approach, I think, results in an atrophied appropriation of Augustine and Thomas, but, far more importantly, it simply doesn't do justice to the range of the biblical witness to the necessity of Jesus' crucifixion. Does it take crucifixion to enable solidarity, sorrow and vicarious repentance? Does it take death? Ryliškytė's argument would be little changed were it to revolve around an empathetic account of the incarnation alone.

As it stands, the book offers one of the most developed accounts of exemplarism I have found, resourced by Lonergan's distinctive theological approach. But exemplarism has always thrived within a far more comprehensive account of the atoning work of Jesus (as in the work of Augustine, Abelard and Thomas) and has failed when offered as a sufficient account of the significance of Jesus' death and resurrection. We do in fact need a rich account of the cross as the triune God's work of friendship – but I do not believe the path charted by Lonergan and Ryliškytė to be the way forward.

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Tomáš Halík, *Touch the Wounds: On Suffering, Trust, and Transformation*

trans. Gerald Turner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2023), pp. xi + 147. £23.80/\$25.00

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Touch the Wounds is a welcome addition to the growing English corpus of Czech theologian and Catholic priest Tomáš Halík. Like earlier works from Halík, it is masterfully translated – conveying both the insights and personality of Halík – by the distinguished Gerald Turner. It is a translation (to echo a commendation from James Martin SJ) that now graces the anglosphere with a most profound Christian meditation on suffering.

For the uninitiated, Halík was an underground priest and dissident during the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. He collaborated closely with Václav Havel and others during the Velvet Revolution in 1989 and to this day presides over the Academic Parish of Prague whilst remaining an integral figure in Czech public life, a legacy that has been acknowledged in his having been awarded the Templeton Prize in 2014. Hence *Touch the Wounds*, a set of spiritual meditations that orbit and cohere around the dominant theme of suffering, approaches its subject from a unique and personal vantage point on suffering.

The title, *Touch the Wounds*, is inspired by the account of Thomas before the risen Jesus in the Gospel of John. Halík recalls reinterpreting this story upon a visit to an orphanage in India. For though he had witnessed all sorts of forms of 'moral wretchedness' in his lifetime, he would 'never forget that orphanage in Madras' (p. 7). It was a