

THE REALISM OF ST. THOMAS¹

WHILE it is trite to speak of the realism of St. Thomas, it is less so, perhaps, to attempt to give its precise shade and meaning. The initial question, which I should wish briefly to answer, is whether or not this realism is in the technical sense a critical realism. We are all aware of what is meant by the critical approach which is said, rightly or wrongly, to mark one of the great advances of modern thought. It is just this critical approach which is said to separate thought lifted to the philosophical level from thought which remains on the popular level of ordinary, and perhaps puerile, intelligence. The critical approach requires that the mind should no longer accept anything that does not completely justify itself before the mental court of enquiry. Anteriorly, common sense accepts without discussion a certain number of natural certitudes. Moreover, it is possible to conceive of a philosophy rooted in common sense, which accepts all that the latter accepts in order to hasten forward to the discovery of new truths. To delve into the mystery of things, to scale the heavens, to soar on intrepid wing up into the infinite heights of metaphysics, that is indeed worth the labour of the dialectical effort it demands.

Of what use is it to philosophize except in order to know a little more than that which everybody knows without even having learnt it? But first of all Descartes and, following him, Kant, and after them the whole of nineteenth century philosophy, come to pour cold water on this fine enthusiasm. Before leaving for the stratosphere they require that the mind should assure itself of its jumping-off ground and test its equipment.

It is thus necessary that philosophical reflection should take hold of everything that common sense believed itself to know, and subject it to a rigid examination. And this examination reaches its limit when the mind, before testing anything else, embarks upon an examination of itself and

¹ Substance of a paper read to the London Aquinas Society.

asks itself whether it has any capacity for knowledge or for truth. That is the implication of the critical approach.

It might appear that the thinkers of old, both Aristotle and St. Thomas, were unaware of the need of this. And, to keep to the matter in hand, it might seem that, like everyone else, like the man in the street, they accepted in all simplicity the objective existence of things outside us and the possibility of our knowing them. Without stopping to split hairs upon so obvious a point, they advance straightway towards questions at once more difficult and more worthy to occupy their intellectual energy and attention. They enquire how it comes about that we know things. Things exist, admittedly, and we know them; but how this is to be explained in terms of metaphysics, that is the mystery. Upon that mystery modern philosophies have little enough to tell us; they do not reach so far; they remain embarrassed amidst the scruples of the critical approach. From this point to the allegation of the absence of critique in traditional philosophy is but a single step; and this step some have not failed to take. Thirty years ago the fashion in philosophy was all for the critical approach and the idealism which derives from it. Certain scholastics felt themselves in duty bound to oppose these tendencies in modern thought and they gave the impression of being old-fashioned "die-hards." But with the dawn of the present century a new fashion was born; worn out by three hundred years of critique, philosophy returned to realism. Though originating perhaps in Germany, it was here in England first of all, and later in America, that the *new realism* made its most brilliant flight. To-day it is said to be somewhat leaden of wing. Quite recently I have read, in *Mind*, a *Refutation of Realism*, which is put forward as the reply, just thirty years later, to a celebrated *Refutation of Idealism* with which the campaign for the new realism opened. I am of opinion that, in point of fact, realism is not at the end of its argument or its aspiration. However that may be, one of the favourite exercises of the realist movement has been to make war on the critique camp. To emancipate metaphysics from the bondage of epistemology, to reopen for it the road to lofty

speculations, to return to the natural certitudes of common sense, such were the words of command that were issued, and there was no hesitation in proclaiming the restoration of simple realism as the formula of the future. Certain Thomists at once believed that the hour for a triumphant alliance had struck. Was it not good strategy to unite the old troops of ancient realism to the light battalions of the new realism?

May be, but yet a little prudence was required. There was in the new realism a certain extravagance common to all reactions. The enthusiasm for simple realism was inspired by just this extravagance, which was sufficient to exalt the mind for a moment but was unable to stand against mature reflection. Besides, to attribute to St. Thomas the attitude of simple realism is, in my opinion, to err gravely as to his doctrine.



That St. Thomas admits the need of a critical preamble seems to me incontestable. More than that, he imposes it as a formal duty on the philosopher. Does he not prescribe for him at the beginning of metaphysics, following Aristotle, universal doubt (*universalem dubitationem*) in the very terms of Descartes? That is not mere verbal coincidence; it is, on the contrary, the affirmation of a fundamental condition of all philosophy, a condition which transcends all differences. Philosophy must succeed in constructing a system of ideas and affirmations entirely clear and evident to the reason; it will not arrive at that so long as there remains anywhere, in what it accepts, a point that is obscure and uncertain. Let us therefore uncover all the dark places in order to preserve in the foundations of our building only stones of crystal clearness in which the light of intelligence may shine through in all its fulness. Doubt comes from obscurity; it has no place in the light. Let us summon doubt itself to our aid, and allow it to fret away everything that is not clear; we shall thus be left with the foundations necessary for our philosophy. We cannot tolerate dogmatism of any sort. It is not sufficient to appeal to common sense; why do we philosophize except to go further than common

sense? Natural certitudes are able to direct our practical daily life; but if we wish to give to the intelligence that definite and complete satisfaction which is the ambition of philosophy, we must pass in review all these natural certitudes; they will have to appear together before the tribunal of thought and be subjected to the ordeal of doubt, until we know clearly what their foundations are. They certainly have foundations; let them be exposed and forthwith these natural certitudes shall be re-established in that atmosphere of greater clarity which is the object of our endeavour; we shall then know exactly what they are worth and what they signify. This is the sincere and radical method that Aristotle and St. Thomas recommend to us just as much as do Kant or Descartes.

But to what limits is the point of methodical doubt to be pushed? Cartesian doubt finds difficulties in all the natural certitudes, and it removes all of them in succession from its path until it finds itself face to face with the unique evidence which withstands every assault and which "all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics" cannot succeed in overthrowing. There Descartes stops, he is in possession of the first principle of philosophy for which he was looking, he has reached the luminous pinnacle where, in absolute clarity, the first step of the mind will be taken and whence it will forthwith start, with sure tread, to reconstruct in the same light the whole edifice of knowledge. This first principle is the *Cogito*. I doubt, I think; that at least is incontestable, and I admit it even when I try to doubt it. I doubt my doubt; it is still to doubt, and still to think.

There are many things to be said about historical Cartesianism. It has been reproached with having cast aside too lightly other natural certitudes no less solid. It has been charged also with having very quickly widened beyond measure the meaning of the *Cogito*. Let that pass; the most fruitful ideas, when they appear for the first time in the history of doubt, are inevitably obscured by faulty statement. There is, at the root of the Cartesian method, an idea which has dominated the progress of modern thought for three centuries; it is this: the very condition of philosophy

is "reflection," that clear consciousness of each step taken by the mind; this is the critical approach of which we have already spoken; but there is nothing closer to reflection than reflection itself, than the act of thought reflecting, that is to say, thinking and seizing itself in the act of thinking; it is from this point that a start is to be made. To say that this is the only incontestable certitude is perhaps to say too much. But assuredly it is the first that is presented to us and, in the position that we have taken up and have rightly taken up, it is the most easy to recognize and to establish. "*Nihil prius cognosci posse quam intellectum,*" as it is put in the *REGULAE* of Descartes, and it is very true; it is from this point that a start must be made.

Whither will this starting-point lead us? Nowhere, answer many present-day realists, old as well as new. If you take your starting-point within thought you will never emerge from it, you will remain locked within it. That was the misfortune of Descartes; that will be the fate of all those who venture to follow him. Starting from the *Cogito* one can end only in idealism.

It is a fact that the history of modern thought has led it from Cartesianism to idealism. The moral is clear, we are told: abandon this dangerous path; follow the example of the ancients, of the Greeks, of Aristotle, of the Scholastics, of St. Thomas. At the outset of philosophy, you must admit things as they are. That is a necessary postulate. Let us beware nevertheless of resolving too soon to base philosophy on a postulate; nothing is less satisfying to the mind; nothing is more contrary to the demands of reason.

Is it really true, moreover, that to take our starting-point within thought is to condemn ourselves to the impossibility of escaping outside it? There are several ways of understanding the *Cogito*. According to certain successors of Descartes, if not according to Descartes himself, it is really at one and the same time the starting-point and a barrier not to be passed; and by a kind of law, they attach to all their future researches this qualifying clause that the latter will bring to light nothing that is not contained within the *Cogito*. But why this law? Because thought is the easiest thing that

thought itself can know, it does not at all follow that it cannot know anything else. The *Cogito* is not of necessity closed; it can be open. If it is there that reflection begins, there is nothing to prevent it from emerging forthwith to reach beyond to exterior realities that are distinct from thought.

In fact, it seems to be precisely true that thought is never self-sufficient; it cannot be grasped unless something else is grasped with it. When reflection comes to consider its own act of thought, it is at once obliged to pass beyond it; when it tries to grasp the act of thought alone, the latter disappears. Try to catch yourself in an act of thought without an object to your thinking; you cannot. Thought has no function apart from its object. In order to lay hold of thought it is necessary to lay hold simultaneously of the object without which there is *no thinking*.

But the idealists insist, and with them those who think that the *Cogito* can issue in nothing but idealism. They combine to tell us that "anything beyond thought is unthinkable," while the second group adds interpretatively "at least from the point of view of thought." But what does the phrase "beyond thought" mean? Does it mean any object that is not thought of by any thinking subject whatsoever? It is difficult to see how philosophy could concern itself with an object without anyone thinking about it. If realism has to be thus caricatured in order to effect its refutation, that goes rather to prove its validity. All that the realist maintains is that there are objects about which he undoubtedly thinks but which appear to him, even while he is thinking of them, to be distinct from his thought, opposed to his thought, independent of it; objects which, he thinks, have an independent existence even when he is not thinking about them. But how can he show that such objects exist otherwise than by starting from his thought in order to establish the opposition and the distinction which is apparent between it and certain objects?

Thus we return to St. Thomas; for I believe that in his teaching are to be found the elements of just such a proof of realism, a proof which begins with a reflex action of thought

turning upon itself, a critical proof, therefore, and one which can take the modern *Cogito* as the starting-point of its development and can respond to all the demands that have been made by Descartes and by Kant.

• • • •

I find a reflexive action of this sort more or less clearly formulated wherever St. Thomas speaks of the truth of judgment. This truth consists in the conformity of the intelligence with things, a doctrine which is eminently realist and one which presupposes realism. It might even seem to take for granted a simple or naïve realism. But this is not so; for St. Thomas institutes a critique of judgment and in this critique, while he shows that judgment is related to things, he shows at the same time that there are things independent of thought, and he shows it by taking his stand at the viewpoint of a reflexive action in which thought turns back upon itself.

The most formal passage is that in *De Veritate* (I, 9) where the problem is to see how the intelligence knows that its judgment is true. St. Thomas answers that it is ascertained by the "reflexion" of the intellect on its own act; (to quote the essential words) "*cognoscitur ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum . . . secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem.*" Returning thus by way of reflexion on its own act, the mind establishes the proportion that there is between its act and things. No one could fail to recognize here that critical reflexive action of which we spoke on an earlier page. The intellect returns upon itself, lays hold on its own act; that is surely the *Cogito* and the starting-point of the critical approach. But here the *Cogito* is not enclosed; starting from the act of reflexion, the intellect also reaches *things* and the proportion that exists between its own act and things. And in St. Thomas's view the intellect ends its reflexion by discovering its own nature, which is to conform itself to things: "*in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur.*" In this affirmation of the nature of the mind there is assuredly no dogmatism, no prejudice. On the contrary it represents the result of an examination conducted in accordance with all

the demands of a method that accepts nothing without rigorous justification.

But in order to understand how the intelligence assures itself of this proportion that exists between itself and things it is necessary to attempt now to state precisely the fundamental implications of the critical realism of St. Thomas.

First of all, what is this act to which critical reflexion returns? There can be no doubt that it is the act of judgment or affirmation. The natural certitudes precede the critical movement of the mind which is concerned in testing them. Our affirmations have been accumulating in our minds ever since the beginnings of our conscious life, and they claim to be related to things; it is this very claim that constitutes these affirmations and gives them their characteristic colouring in our mental world. I ask: Do two and two make four? Is the sun shining? I answer: Yes, the sun *is* shining; two and two *do* make four; these things *are* certainly so. That is affirmation; what is its precise function but to establish the relation of my ideas with things which are independent of me? I put the relation at first in question form, indecisively: "Is this so?"; now I set it down positively, the relation which was first of all a concept of my mind I plunge into objective reality, I establish it solidly amongst things, in a word I affirm it. That is what the critical faculty finds when it begins its work; this is what it has to verify. It does this by making explicit the foundations upon which the natural truths already rest. In every judgment, in every affirmation, St. Thomas tells us, there is already a brief and implicit act of reflexion upon which the affirmation leans for support. Critical reflexion, as he conceives it, does no more than rediscover this primary act of reflexion, which was quite spontaneous and unnoticed, in order to give it formal expression wherein the mind becomes aware of its own action and of its own nature.

This element of the implicit in every judgment is the comparison and statement of agreement between two terms. Of these, one is a notion or group of notions already elaborated, expressed, possessed and penetrated by the mind; the

other is the realm of things present before the mind, standing in their independence, of which the mind perceives that its own notions are the image and counterpart because it is aware that it is from these things that they are drawn. This is no more than a translation of a classical passage in the *Summa* (Ia, Q. xvi, a. 2): "*Judicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit. . . . Aliquam formam significatam per predicatum applicat alicui rei significatae per subjectum.*" The reference of an idea or a notion to things is what affirmation posits. The comparison of the idea with things is what justifies affirmation and what the critical faculty has to explain and establish.

How can this comparison be effected? It clearly implies the immediate presence of things before the mind. On the one hand undoubtedly the notion or idea is a double or copy of things. But this copy I compare with the original—which is meaningless unless the original is itself directly and immediately present. If it is itself known only by means of another idea or representation we shall have gained nothing and the whole problem will recur. It would again be necessary to compare this new idea with the original, and so on indefinitely so long as the original is not itself present. The observations which St. Thomas here makes are therefore formally opposed to what is called *indirect* realism according to which all knowledge terminates always in a mental concept, in an idea, in a representation, which is conformable however with reality. This is a form of representative dualism upon which the new realism has waged a relentless and just war. If I know only my ideas, how could I ever know that they correspond with things? I can believe it, I can have confidence in my representations, but this is a groundless confidence, an arbitrary decree which cannot give peace to the mind. Undoubtedly I have such representations in my mind, but in order to judge of their real worth I must compare them with the primary presentation whereby I make contact with things themselves. If, however, I have nothing but representations, all such comparison is excluded, the search for the real becomes a circle without end or hope; indirect realism issues in nothing else but

idealism. It is clear that for St. Thomas knowledge opens out, at least in some of our intellectual operations, on to things themselves. His realism is at one and the same time critical and immediate.

The union of these two termini obliges us to embark on further explanations. To satisfy the demands of the critical approach it does not suffice to believe that knowledge opens out on to things; it must be shown that this is so in fact. The Thomist critique of judgment makes us recognize, on one side, the notions, ideas, representations, that result from the operation of the mind, in which the mind states to itself what it knows; these are, in the language of logic, the predicates of judgments. On the other side there is, present to consciousness, a datum which is not a result of the operation of the mind but is, on the contrary, opposed to it as a pre-existing object which the mind endeavours to express and to reproduce by its own activity. Everything turns on this opposition. What, in effect, does the word "real" signify? What more can it signify except an objectivity independent of the mind? But that is exactly what we have: before any activity on the part of the intellect the primary data are there; as Richard Avenarius, a German forerunner of contemporary realism, happily expresses it, they are *das Vorgefundene*, something that precedes our activity and that we find ready made before we have done anything at all. This is an experience that is bound up with every movement of our conscious life; from its first awakening, from the forgotten dawn when a lightsome transparency revealed us for the first time to ourselves, it accompanies and upholds the feeling we have of our own reality. *I* and *not-I*, these two terms stand by their very opposition; they are defined one by the other; together they give to philosophy the ultimate basis upon which all speculation must rest.

It is to the advantage of idealism to exaggerate the notion of the real and it does not fail to do so. In this way it creates a chimera not patient of proof: a thing that is outside all thought, which cannot be thought of by any thinking subject, which is entirely heterogeneous to thought and has no relation to it. It has thus a fine opportunity of showing that

we can never know a reality thus defined and that it is absurd even to speak of it. But the notion suggested by the texts of St. Thomas is much more simple: something is presented to thought but is independent of it; that is what we call the real. And if it does not depend on us, we know by that very fact that it can exist without our thinking of it and we think of it as such. All this, it need hardly be said, is from the viewpoint of *human* thought—the only one from which the critical review can start.

A complementary proof is suggested by other texts, those namely where the progress of intelligence is under discussion. This progress is effected by successive judgments. The mind first of all gets an imperfect and confused notion of its object; it proceeds then to make that notion more precise by successive refinements, adding more determinate characteristics, properties and relations, and it builds within itself a structure which continues to be enriched and perfected. But that which unifies and directs these efforts of the mind is the reality present before it, whose richness it cannot exhaust at the first onset. Thus we read in the *Summa* (Ia, Q. lxxxv, a. 5): "*Intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem.*" Therefore the intelligence obtains perfect knowledge by successive efforts, seizing upon first one trait, then another, and adding them to the intellectual edifice that the judgments are building: "*et ideo necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere.*" Always it is the same notion: reality present to the mind but outstripping the ideas which the mind can form of it, opposed to the effort of the mind and at the same time sustaining and nourishing it without being exhausted by it; reality precedes the first awakening of the mind and precedes as well its every later step, retaining an independence which continues to be more fully realized with the very progress of thought.

The immediate presence of an object independent of the mind, by which the latter governs its activities, is, we believe, the foundation upon which rests the realism of St. Thomas. It is a foundation that is for the most part merely implicit for St. Thomas, as it is for common sense; a founda-

tion, nevertheless, of which he is well aware and one which he himself points to and even expresses quite clearly in the passages just quoted. We, who are philosophizing after the demands of a critical approach have been put in the foreground of thought, can explore this foundation still more fully. We can draw from it a Thomism that is at once faithful to the mind of the master and perfectly adapted to the intellectual atmosphere of our own times.



But we must examine this immediate presence more exactly, still keeping in line with St. Thomas. Here we encounter a difficulty raised by certain contemporaries. It arises out of other teachings of the master. If he is very reserved in his information on the criteriological problem, he makes amends, with all the Scholastics, by offering us many reflections upon the ontological mystery of knowledge. How is knowledge possible? I am here, self-contained. Things are there, outside me, also self-contained. It is not merely a spatial exteriority; it is more than that, an ontological and substantial distinction, the opposition of two beings which subsist each in its own sphere and cannot in any way be intermingled. Nevertheless knowledge has to unite them in some way or other, for if they do nothing but subsist each in its own sphere it is impossible to see how they can be known. The knowing subject is aware of the object; that is to say, it possesses it somehow within itself, for this awareness is only the turning back of a being on itself, and knowing is said to be an immanent action which takes place in the subject and remains in it. How can this action reach a reality that is not in the subject but outside it, while the action remains immanent?

It is not hard to see that this difficulty is the precise consequence of realism. Idealism suppresses it. For the latter there are no things outside me, all that I know is within me, and there is no difficulty as to what is attained to by my consciousness. But after once having recognized the existence of objective things, realism can no longer withdraw but must respect the distinction which it has laid down. In point of fact, however, contemporary realism escapes

cheaply by simply ignoring the problem and not seeing it. It states the bare fact of knowledge and stops there: there are, it says, two termini, the act of the mind and the external object, both present simultaneously in the world of experience; that is the relation it discovers between them, they are there together. This is no doubt very true, but it does not explain anything; on the contrary, it precisely is what is in need of explanation.

The realism of St. Thomas attacks the problem squarely. It seeks in the thinking subject that which will account for knowledge. To explain it, St. Thomas says, there must be a resemblance of the thing known in the subject knowing; consequently the subject, grasping by consciousness everything that is within itself, grasps this resemblance too and by its means knows the object that it represents. This explanation may seem simple if it is understood in a material and rather mechanical sense, but thus understood it explains nothing and leads us back straight to idealism. This resemblance would be, in effect, an image or copy or double of the external thing, and at this copy the act of knowledge would stop, knowing the thing through this intermediary. Nothing is easier to imagine, but it is the negation of all that we have established by our critical approach; if knowledge is produced by an intermediary, immediate realism is finished with; I know only the copies of things, I shall never know if they are faithful copies. Thus, to explain realism one would have to destroy it.

The truth is that the explanation is more profound. The resemblance in question is in no way material or mechanical; it is a living and immaterial resemblance. It is not an image or a copy, and it is not known. Here St. Thomas is very formal in his vigorous and concise Latin. It is not, he says, "*id quod cognoscitur*" (a thing known), but "*id quo cognoscitur*" (the means of knowing). And we understand that the notion of resemblance is very approximative and employed by him for want of a better; we must take care not to let it deceive us. There is in the knowing subject a resemblance of the object, but it is not there to arrest our consciousness; its sole office is to carry or push conscious-

ness on to the object; by its means the object itself, and it alone, becomes immediately present to us. How that can be is a mystery of the immaterial order that our imaginations cannot grasp; we can really imagine only the solid, palpable, visible things of Euclidean space; when it is a question of passing to another sort of space, undefined and limitless, where straight lines return upon themselves, our imaginations fail; when it is a question of escaping from space altogether, they fail still more. But modern physical science calls for such non-Euclidean space; and realism can be explained only in the non-material order. St. Thomas expounds this at length. In the material order things are enclosed in themselves; they have no other richness than the characteristics which are in them for themselves alone; they are warmed by their own heat, and they cannot communicate it without losing it, nor can they acquire it without taking it from others which will lose it; this is the sequestration, the isolation, the savage egoism of matter and space. But as soon as we pass to the non-material order the frontiers disappear and riches are shared without being lost. The resemblance that is in the subject knowing is not there as a characteristic proper to the subject alone, but as a characteristic which continues to be shared by something else, namely by the thing known; it is *forma alterius*; and consciousness is not shut up within itself and isolated, it opens out on to the world. We find again in the metaphysical theory what critical analysis had discovered. Doubtless it is a thing that the imagination cannot grasp, but it is something that the intelligence can conceive, and that is sufficient for metaphysics.

* • * •

There remains one last point. Is this immediate presence of things, upon which realism rests, revealed to the senses or to the intellect? Is it composed in itself of sensible elements or of intelligible elements? True enough the human consciousness is a simple unity, not composed of water-tight compartments set side by side, but intelligence and sensation are intimately united in a close collaboration and together lay hold of the object which is itself also at once sensible

and intelligible. Such is the starting-point of our knowledge and such is its critical foundation. It is quite clear that according to St. Thomas we have no pure intellectual intuition; he reserves that for the angels and explains why our intelligence, situate at the lowest step of the hierarchy of spirits, is so constituted as to find its object with the aid of the senses; it is in this way and in this way alone that it can grasp the real. But, on the other hand, the senses do not penetrate into the riches which they harvest for the mind, they attain only to the external appearances; the intimate being of things, their true and deep reality, escapes the senses and appears only in the light of intelligence. Moreover this light is always present; one would look in vain for a moment of pure sensation in our conscious life.

This doctrine of the collaboration of the senses and the intelligence is fundamental in the Thomist system and gives to the realism of St. Thomas a character that is peculiar and proper to it. If we are in contact with the real only in our sensations, all the valuations of reality that are recognized by philosophy will always have to be fastened on to a basis of experience. St. Thomas does not shirk this consequence; indeed he applies it with fearless logic even at the summit of his philosophy, even in the proofs of the existence of God.

It is for this reason that he rejects the famous Anselmic argument. An imposing line of thinkers thought it possible to establish the existence of God from the notion we have of Him: the notion of the most perfect being implies every perfection; it implies therefore that perfection which is existence, the most perfect being cannot not exist. St. Thomas will have none of this argument. Based upon a purely intellectual demand, upon a mere play of ideas, without any support from experience, it does not appear to him to touch the question of real existence. For his part he will demonstrate the existence of God only by way of those things that represent the data of experience, by showing that these things are not self-sufficient and cannot be of themselves, that they exist therefore in virtue of something else which is without their defects. An analysis of a fact of experience and of its necessary conditions, that is the lowly

BLACKFRIARS

but solid foundation upon which the loftiest constructions of metaphysics are built up.

To sum up, the doctrine of St. Thomas seems to us to be the outcome of an eminently well-balanced genius. With both feet solidly planted upon the ground of experience, attentive to all the needs of the coldest and most exacting reason, the holy doctor does but fix more perfectly the clear gaze of his mind upon the horizons of divine mystery. And if he curbs the transport within his heart, he makes doubly sure of its power and loyalty. At such a price he has given to Christian philosophers the most fruitful teaching they have hitherto received.

(Translated from the French)

LEON NOEL.