

*aporia* is *thaumatic*. However, perhaps discussion of the soul's wonder before the Forms in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* would have pushed the argument further, since these are overwhelmingly sensory, *thaumatic* experiences, but have cognitive content.

Part 1 concludes with Freya Möbus' chapter (61–83), which addresses a significant gap in Platonic scholarship: why we avoid pain. She argues, from discussions in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias* and *Hippias Minor*, that pain is essentially directional, because we perceive it as causing damage, and so avoid it. This conclusion, I think, could be used for interesting interpretations of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, where education is centred upon training citizens to feel pleasure and pain rightly (that is, to have correct responses to certain actions and stimuli).

In Part 2, Olivier Renaut's chapter (103–23) argues that the *Timaeus* presents a psycho-physiological account of emotion. Emotions only occur in the incarnate soul, where it must deal with necessity, the in- and efflux of sensations. His argument is mostly convincing, but I contest his assessment that the *Timaeus* is the first dialogue which proposes such a psycho-physiological account. In the *Phaedrus*, the gods' souls have two good horses, whereas human souls have one good one bad. Seemingly here, too, embodied souls must deal with the turmoil of how love and desire are experienced when embodied.

Karine Tordo-Rombaut's chapter (169–86) addresses the dialogue between the emotions in Plato's psychology. Crucially, it reinforces that emotion is the necessary push which makes us act rightly, and that perception is the seat of emotion: we begin from the sensations of pleasure and pain as children, and these perceptions remain fundamental throughout life. Virtue is a state where our internal dialogue is a *dialogue*, not an argument.

Luc Brisson and Beatriz Bossi both present articles on *phthonos*, meaning malicious envy or jealousy, and how Plato utilizes this culturally pertinent emotion, and reorients it towards his own conceptions of virtue, anger and justice (201–20, 220–38). Frisbee Sheffield offers an excellent and sensitive chapter on the roles of *philia* and *eros* in Plato's *Laws* (330–72). She argues that both are essential to the Athenian Stranger's Magnesia, because *philia* fosters a deep bond of connection between citizens, and *eros* makes us desire things passionately. This chapter convincingly argues for the importance of emotion, passion and human connection in the *Laws*' political theory, a dialogue which is often overlooked or considered dry.

David Konstan's afterword (372–82) closes the volume and harmonizes its three parts, by discussing the category of emotion itself, and its origin. He argues that the category 'emotion' is invented and defined by those who discuss it. This is a convincing conclusion to the volume, which reiterates that Plato's discussion of emotion is founded upon its *function*: epistemological, moral, and political.

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CARBONE (M.B.) **Geographies of Myth and Places of Identity: The Strait of Scylla and Charybdis in the Modern Imagination.** London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. Pp. xvi + 256, illus. £76.50. 9781350118201.  
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A short note at the beginning of *Geographies of Myth and Places of Identity* observes that '[t]he author would like ... to respectfully distance himself from the denomination of "classics" usually employed by scholars' (xvi). With this, Carbone alerts the reader to the fact that his volume is rooted in present-day concerns. His qualms with the 'ideologically loaded' and

'exclusionary baggage' (xvi) of Classics in general is played out in the specific case and place of the Strait of Reggio and Messina, which has long been identified with the myths of Scylla and Charybdis. He demonstrates persuasively that the attachment of myth to place is far from a benign fancy, embedded instead in 'genealogies of meaning and power' (6) which impact upon the economics, identities and potential futures of communities in the present day.

The volume's urgent ideological underpinning is paired with an innovative methodological approach. In places, Carbone is a reception scholar with a focus on texts, as in his third chapter, 'Chronotopes of Hellas', in which he traces depictions of the Strait in Grand Tour literature, and demonstrates the ways in which these post-classical encounters continue to inform current-day tourism and myth-making. Elsewhere, however, Carbone is an ethnographer with a unique identity: a one-time native of Reggio who had become enough of an émigré to be termed by locals as a 'pale Londoner' (26). He describes his camera as a particularly valuable fieldwork tool: more than an instrument for recording, it helped to break the ice with both 'fellow tourists' and locals (24).

Carbone's conversations with his informants represent, to me, his most compelling material. For example, the mismatch between the identification of the region of Calabria as the inheritor of 'Greater Greece' and its status as one of the poorest areas of Italy is captured in the lament of one fisherman who commented to Carbone that Homer 'has done a lot, we have done little' (59). Elsewhere, fishermen asked by an enthused academic to view themselves as 'citizens of the former Greater Greece' responded 'no, as they didn't know any Greek' (107).

The *Odyssey*, of course, looms large over Carbone's scholarly and physical journeys through the Strait. In chapter four ('Mediterranean Place-Myths'), he assesses attempts in both textual and visual media to 'follow in the footsteps' of Odysseus. He acknowledges the power exerted by Homer's epic, finding that even as a self-conscious scholar he ran the risk of inhabiting 'the cliché of re-enacting the voyage of Odysseus' (63). In his fifth chapter ('Myth of Myths'), he shifts subtly from the issue of *following* Odysseus to that of *mapping* his voyage onto the 'real world'. He concludes that 'teleological' narratives which identify the 'real' Strait as direct inspiration for Homer are problematic, but acknowledges that the landscape itself 'created favourable conditions for it to be transformed into a place-myth' (103). Both here and in the following chapter, on tourism in the town of Scilla, he notes the motivations for holding to that place-myth, such as arguments for making the Strait a UNESCO heritage site (104), or simply entertaining visitors. One boat tour organizer, for example, employs actresses to perform as Sirens with an inflatable monstrous Scylla (120–21).

Of course, myths also have the potential to distort and to restrict. In his conclusions, Carbone highlights the problematic essentialism of the pervasive inheritance of Graeco-Roman symbols in an area of 'systemic racism' and 'colourist myths of identity' (176), as suggested above in the comment on the shade of his own skin. Moving beyond myths of place represents in some ways a loss – Carbone admits that, to his own eyes, '[t]he Strait looked less magical and inspiring' (177) once stripped of its Homeric descent – but also the opportunity to escape from the 'gilded cage of imprisoning nostalgia' (179). Here, really, is the root of Carbone's concern with the terminology of 'classics' with which this review began: the 'classical' is monolithic (20) and hegemonic (179), a cultural signifier which has for centuries belonged to the privileged. Carbone argues that, in the Strait, classical historiography reproduces a sense of 'rootedness' which ultimately promotes division. A different, more collaborative future, he suggests, is not just possible when we move beyond myth, but urgently needed in a world of pandemics and environmental crises.

In his acknowledgements, Carbone self-deprecatingly alludes to the 'half-handful of readers possibly interested in my work' (xiii–xiv). This may well be true in terms of some of the fine-grained detail of the book, but in terms of his wider arguments and what it

reveals of the contemporary impact of both myth and ‘classics’, I believe that Carbone’s work deserves to be considered by a far greater number.

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CHRIST (M.R.) **Xenophon and the Athenian Democracy: The Education of an Elite Citizenry**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. x + 215. \$29.99. 9781108797757. doi:[10.1017/S0075426923000873](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075426923000873)

In his previous books (*The Litigious Athenian* (Baltimore 1998), *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens* (Cambridge 2006), *The Limits of Altruism in Democratic Athens* (Cambridge 2012)), Matthew Christ explored Athenian citizens at the boundaries of the social contract, pushing individual interests against structures of the Athenian democracy that they perceived as impinging upon those interests. In *Xenophon and the Athenian Democracy*, he reads several of Xenophon’s works as serving much more civically conscientious purposes: to encourage elite Athenians to dedicate themselves to leadership in Athens’ democracy and to be humble enough to develop the skills that would allow them to do so successfully.

In the first of six content chapters, ‘Athens in Crisis in the *Hellenica*’, Christ lays the groundwork for his further argument. While he notes Xenophon’s criticism of the *dēmos* for such matters as Arginusae, he finds the historian much gentler on democracy itself than is Thucydides. Moreover, he takes Xenophon’s ambivalent portrayals of certain members of the Thirty as revealing a sense that elite Athenians possess the ability to play positive roles in a broadly beneficial democracy, but some need to refine their moral sensibilities to do so.

In the next three chapters, Christ highlights the extent to which Xenophon’s Socrates focuses on skills and approaches that correspond directly to civic leadership. In ‘Politics and the Gentleman in the *Memorabilia*’, Christ emphasizes Socrates as an energetic recruiter of individual elites into democratic leadership, which he takes as implicit encouragement to elite readers of the dialogue to follow Socrates’ advice. In ‘Work, Money, and the Gentleman in the *Oeconomicus*’, he reads Socrates’ recommendation to elite landowners to be attentive to the operations of their holdings as holding democratic value in two main ways: one, it implies attention to civic governance, in that the *oikos* and polis are treated as having much in common, and two, it makes elites more informed leaders of the polis, in that attention to the land is an important way in which elites can identify with common citizens. And in ‘The Education of Callias in the *Symposium*’, he notes Socrates’ emphasis on the development of *philia* among elites as a valuable feature of efficient civic governance, which contrasts with the philosophical theory as the centre of Plato’s version of the *Symposium*.

In the last two chapters before the conclusion, ‘Xenophon as Expert, Advisor, and Reformer in the *Hipparchicus* and *Poroi*’ and ‘Xenophon the Democratic Orator: The Politics of Mass and Elite in the *Anabasis*’, Christ observes even more explicit stress on civic leadership. Xenophon is the main voice in all of the featured works, and in *Hipparchicus* and *Poroi*, he emphasizes skills that directly correspond to those of high-level Athenian leaders: cavalry leadership and public oratory. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon not only puts those skills to direct use, he does so for a group that is specified as being much like the Athenian *dēmos*.

Christ makes a convincing case that, among any number of other motives that Xenophon may have had in his writings, one that is consistent across a considerable number of them is subtly to urge Athenian elites not just to attend to civic leadership, but to develop the skills to be effective in doing so. He thus reads six of Xenophon’s works