

SOCIAL SCIENCE OBJECTIVITY
AND VALUE NEUTRALITY:
HISTORICAL PROBLEMS
AND PROJECTIONS

For the most part, American sociology has accepted the appealing formula of neutrality with regard to political and ideological values, a formula especially put forward by the functionalist school. It has the golden merit of posing issues in a seemingly natural science manner. The sociologist can adopt the physicist's pose toward his work. We provide society with carefully sifted information, comparative analysis of social structures, and at the upper range, the likely consequences of performing or not performing an action in terms of the given diagnosis. The social scientist using a functionalist *philosophy* can feel free of responsibility at a decision making level. Whether society decides to employ or ignore the provided data is held to be a matter of indifference, a situation requiring moral wisdom rather than social theory. Without minimizing the sound contributions of the function-Structure approach, particularly in overcoming the provincialism

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and conceit of the pre-functionalist schools of anthropology,¹ there is a sure moral undercurrent in a method which sees the social scientist as diagnostician and society as a patient. It has the appearance of satisfying the historic identification of social theory to social welfare, and no less an emotional identification with a neutral-objective image culled from physics. Social history becomes a variable in the preparation of trend reports and thereby trivialized into a moment in the functionalist scheme.²

There is a significant logical shortcoming in the identification of functionalism and neutralism. To infer the value neutrality of functionalism from the fact that conservatives claim functionalism liberal and liberals claim the reverse is a specious form of logic. Upon inspection, the claims of various critics of different persuasion might add up to the same substantive charge, e.g., the pragmatic criterion of success employed. Also to be considered is that the claims of one sector of critics might turn out on inspection to be quite right at any given moment in space. In any event, it is small consolation for functionalism to claim that its results are a consequence of its purge of conjecture and hypotheses from social investigations. It is similarly untenable to deny to those holding distinct and examined existential perspectives the capacity to develop comparable techniques yielding similar results. Yet, this seems very much the prevailing attitude toward non-functionalist modes of analysis, even though it rests on the false assumption that a scientific explanation can be arrived at only by one type of method.³

This critical prolegomena given, it is time to state my thesis: that the history of social science is internally and organically bound at its upper and lower levels by ethical perspectives, to what Nadel has well termed ideas about

¹ Cf. Bronislaw Malinowski, "Functionalism in Anthropology," *Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings* (ed. L. A. Coser, B. Rosenberg). New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957, esp. pp. 519-21.

² Cf. Irving L. Horowitz, "Laws and Levels in the Sociology of Knowledge," *Philosophy, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge*. Springfield, Charles C. Thomas, 1961, pp. 112-19.

³ R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1953, esp. pp. 342-68.

worthwhileness.⁴ It is my further contention that the suppression of this commitment of social science to ethical perspectives leads not to better scientific work, but on the contrary, to a series of disastrous consequences: (a) indifference to problem solving; (b) unconscious ideological distortions in theory construction; (c) a neglect of the scientific evaluation of value theory; (d) an identification of objectivity in social research with indifference to ethical judgments.

The problem of defining the interior relationships between social science and values is obviously more complex than the simple assertion that a relationship exists. On the other hand, the problem is insoluble only if we enter the oracular universe of Scheler and the phenomenalist, irrationalist tradition. To assert the functional role of values in social science hypotheses does not entail the assumption that social position and stratification makes scientific objectivity impossible; and it certainly does not imply that our only recourse is in seeking Providential aid.⁵ To insist that facts have no meaning apart from values is as fruitless as the claim that fact and values are in separate realms. These are the false alternatives that have frustrated the sound development of a social accounting of value functions.⁶

In order to get beyond the present muddle of having to choose between the reified poles of a *seinsgebunden* or *wertfrei* sociology, we must first reconsider the nineteenth century question as to the objectivity of social science, and then consider the twentieth century question as to the character of social science objectivity as contingent for its solution on this older issue. This is not an iconoclastic desire to resort to a regressive chain of problems, but rather an assertion that the "bad faith" of contemporary researches on the place of values in social science issues from a failure to make clear any options to either a narrow empiricism or a far too broad phenomenism.

⁴ S. F. Nadel, *The Foundations of Social Anthropology*. London, Cohen & West, 1951, p. 264.

⁵ Cf. Marvin Farber, "Max Scheler and the Spiritual Elevation of Man," *Naturalism and Subjectivism*. Springfield, Charles C. Thomas, 1959, pp. 297-329.

⁶ Cf. Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge For What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939, esp. p. 187f.

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Efforts to create a social science along natural science lines, free of subjective commitments, are hardly novel. To be sure, there is a taken-for-granted view among classical economists that physics provide the perfect model for constructing a political economy. The "naturalness" of an economic system was said to flow from the objective necessity of labor, industry, value, and profit; just as the "naturalness" of Newtonian physics flowed from the perfect harmony of matter and its "universal" laws of attraction and repulsion. Adam Smith offers this sort of model. "In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant or animal body, admire how everything is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual and the propagation of the species."⁷ Smith's idea of the cosmic destiny of physical order carrying over into human affairs served economic theory very well in its formative stages. So well that Comte made the *telos* a part of society in general by classifying nature into a hierarchy moving from mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and then, sociology.⁸ Comte's belief in sociology as the optimal science was infectious, reflecting as it did the positivist urge to get on with the task of studying society independent of metaphysical considerations, and yet claiming for sociology "a higher position of rationality than the present state of the human mind seems to promise." This apex is guaranteed by the past successes of the "anterior sciences."⁹

Although Smith and Comte believed in the essentially value-free character of their respective sciences, they differ with modern empiricist trends in accepting the notion of the socially curative powers of social science. Smith, for example, concludes his

⁷ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (ed. H. W. Schneider). New York, Hafner Publishing Co., 1948, Section 3:3, p. 125.

⁸ Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (ed. H. Martineau). London, Kegan Paul Ltd., 1893, Vol. I, p. 24.

⁹ Auguste Comte, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 104.

Wealth of Nations with a plea for England to revitalize its notion of Empire along reciprocally beneficial fiscal lines or surrender the “imagination” of Empire altogether.¹⁰ Comte, for his part, went a good deal further, conceiving of positive sociology as the religion of humanity, to be considered primarily in terms of principles of Love, Order and Progress.¹¹ This would indicate that social theory from 1750-1850 considered the dualism between scientific theory and social decisions to be entirely illegitimate.

Nonetheless, the neatness of utilitarian and positivist doctrines, founded as they were on the “lawful” and “objective” nature of human behavior, possessing built-in conclusions of self-evident value open to all men of reason, good-will, or simply self-interest, crashed with the growth of a radical critique of existing society as such. The detection of flaws in the *laissez-faire telos* brought in its wake a new, non-rationalistic vision of human nature and conduct. Marx’s criticisms of Proudhon, the Comte of French economic theory, betrays the growing impatience of the age with neat Enlightenment formulas of education and legislation, the value of which depended on a series of axioms about “the ideal image of man” inherited from St. Augustine.

The basis of Marx’s claims against the philanthropic school of social science, of which Comte and Proudhon were prime examples, is that social theory advances to the extent that social classes mature both politically and ideologically, and not as a consequence of the divine light of reason. The true intellectuals “no longer need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become the mouthpiece of this.” Marx was convinced that the identification of social science with the historical causes of the oppressed would have a salutary effect on science as such, making it “revolutionary” instead of “doctrinaire.” Marx’s argument against Proudhon was the failure of the latter to get

¹⁰ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (ed. Edwin Cannan). New York, Random House, 1937, pp. 898-99.

¹¹ Cf. Rollin Chambliss, *Social Thought from Hammurabi to Comte*. New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1954, p. 400.

behind philanthropy into the hidden unconscious class interests motivating social men. For this reason, Proudhon is a "composite error" rather than the "synthesis" he wished to be.¹² It is not the rationality of scientific discovery that is particularly novel in Marx, but rather the scientific discovery that interests—hidden or overt, irrational or rational—are subject to empirical scrutiny. Given a disequilibrium of economic wealth, interests (of which values are a central part) determine the character of scientific invention more profoundly than the other way around. That is why a scientific gain is not automatically translated into a social benefit.¹³

Freud, for his part, reinforces the Marxian view of science as interest-bound in his efforts to develop a scientific typology of irrational behavior. For Freud, the very systematization of knowledge about the irrational is itself the proving-grounds rather than the negation of science.¹⁴ Upon learning that Marx did not deny the functional role of ideational and super-ego factors in human change, Freud was ready to grant that the contrast he had believed to exist between Marxism and psychoanalysis was groundless. We need not explore the varied efforts to "reconcile" the writings of Freud and Marx.¹⁵ What is important for our inquiry is the functional similarity of Marx's "ideological disguise" and Freud's "mechanism of repression." Both operate unconsciously, behind the backs of men, shaping in the process the contents of scientific as well as social activity. The latent, hidden facets of human interests, ambitions, and impulses, rather than the supposed "common-sense" rational motivations that

¹² Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*. New York, International Publishers, n.d., pp. 106-07.

¹³ Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Chicago, Charles H. Kerr, 1909, Vol. 3, Ch. 5, pp. 92-105.

¹⁴ Cf. Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "Confirmation of Psychoanalytic Theories," *The Validation of Scientific Ideas* (ed. Philipp G. Frank). Boston, The Beacon Press, 1956, pp. 112-14.

¹⁵ Cf. among others, F. H. Bartlett, *Sigmund Freud: A Marxian Essay*. London, Victor Gollancz, 1938; R. Osborne, *Freud and Marx*. London, Victor Gollancz, 1937; N. O. Brown, *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History*. Middletown, Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1959; and H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Boston, The Beacon Press, 1955.

for both men represented the crucible in which science as well as superstition is formed. The stance toward values determines the essence of social theory, just as the stance toward facts determines the essence of physical science theory. The division between *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften* crystallized later in the century was a natural consequence of the disintegration of the earlier positivist orientation.¹⁶

Freud provided an explanation into the function of reason as a disguise and censor of "reality." Rationalism came to be viewed as rationalization, and the process of science became one of "unmasking" individual behavior, much as Marx sought to "unmask" large group behavior. Science is therefore not akin to common-sense observation; to the contrary, social sciences are primarily responsible for considering the function of values as intrinsic to the structure of human activity. We are not here concerned with the special place Marx assigned to the professional politician or Freud to the psychoanalytically trained physician. The values of the scientist for these essentially nineteenth century men were exempted and extrapolated from the main currents of society. The exploration of this hidden assumption of the scientist *qua* scientist as value-free was the work of a later stage in social science.

If for the earlier positivist tradition reality is identified with progress, in the unmasking tradition we have the identification of reality with process. And if in Marx this process is an admixture of progressive and regressive elements with the progressive elements winning out "in the long run," in Freud process is completely severed from progress. The conflict between "civilization" and the "ego impulse" has no finite determination; it is simply a set of polarities: "love and death trends" which display the "innate conflict of ambivalence." Values are intrinsic to social science because progress, unlike process, is a humanly defined concept and not a universal law of nature.¹⁷

¹⁶ Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. I. Leipzig-Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1921 (reprinted 1959). As later efforts demonstrated, this study did not have the intended effect of settling the question of the natural or socio-historical "essence" of human studies.

¹⁷ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930). New York, Doubleday & Company, 1958, p. 89.

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Nineteenth century social science bequeathed to us antithetical views of the relation of science to values: the Smith-Comte tradition which held that all problems in social science are removable once we segregate factual and valuative elements; and the Marx-Freud tradition of unmasking, holding that social science is interest and attitude bound. There can be little doubt that coming into the new century, positivism and empiricism in social science were at a disadvantage. Every empirical explanation of social events seemed tinged, if not entirely reducible, with the point of view or ideological mooring of the investigator. Thus, when Spencer, the last persuasive nineteenth century advocate of an evolutionary functional view, offered an "empirical" typology of society, it was plain that "militant" and "industrial" (the two principle types he distinguished) were collective euphemisms representing Kaiserism for the former, and English constitutionalism for the latter. Indeed his use of the word industrial made no reference to an economic entity at all, but only to the qualities of any English squire of the past: "independence, resistance to coercion, honesty, truthfulness, forgivingness, kindness."¹⁸ Objectivity, at least of such an evolutionary type, seemed less able to explain than be explained. Gurvitch insists that even now empiricism in social theory has not gotten beyond the Spencerian stage.¹⁹

We may sum up the unmasking, i. e., the critical rather than empirical tradition, in the following broad terms: (a) Objectivity in social science differs from objectivity in the physical sciences by virtue of an essential and organic value dimension; (b) social science is purposive in the sense that men seek to establish goals not present in nature as such; (c) Purposive behavior is not capricious, and hence not inconsistent with the truth-revealing potential of science; (d) the acquisition of truths in social science is not open to all equally since social stratification and class differentiation act to prevent a non-interest appraisal of events;

¹⁸ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*. New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1896, Vol. II, part V, pp. 568-640.

¹⁹ George Gurvitch, *Trois Chapitres d'Histoire de la Sociologie: Comte, Marx et Spencer*. Paris, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1955. See especially the 9th conference on Spencer.

(e) the presence of moral components does not prevent a scientific view of society, but to the contrary is its necessary (if not sufficient) condition.

The unmasking tradition, with its newly established bastions capable of showing the ideological basis of the social science which preceded it, itself came on hard times. The Marxian accounting for values became transformed into the dogma of partisanship; the Nietzschean concern for values in a world of historical law became a signal for constructing mythological theories of the *uebermensch*; the Freudian analysis of the properties of the unconscious soon became transformed into philosophies justifying the cult of irrationalism. The unmasking tradition in the hands of lesser individuals was transformed into an oracular, anti-scientific tradition—tied to the desired or anticipated fortunes of petty political considerations. This is, to be sure, not a unique by-product of inherited social theories. Justifications for the established order are just as possible on functionalist as on historicist grounds.

In the social context existing between the *fin de siècle* and the First World War, sociology was once more driven to establish itself as an autonomous science by freeing itself from the moral purpose which on inspection was simply political purpose. A return to the Smith-Comte tradition was indicated, but with a firm realization that the early positivism's "ghost in the machine" had to be eradicated. This was the outstanding achievement of Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim sought to move beyond oracular writers like Stahl in Germany and Cousin in France, who had conceived of social science as an aid and adjunct to patriotism and the moral authority of the State.²⁰ The famous *Rules of Sociological Method* is an attack upon the right of metaphysical doctrine of any variety to exercise an intellectual tyranny over sociology by Durkheim insisting on the ultimate knowability of human action and belief.²¹ Weber carried on precisely the same struggle in Germany against the moralism of Schmoller and the politicalization of social science carried on by Marxians. Weber's

²⁰ Cf. Emile Durkheim, *L'Education morale*. Paris, Alcan, 1925, pp. 3-5.

²¹ Cf. Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Chicago, The University of Chicago, 1938, esp. pp. 141-46.

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rediscovery of the Kantian disjunction of fact and value was a direct consequence of framing a response to a practical question: what should the attitude of the scholar-teacher be towards his materials, and towards the recipients of these materials, the students.²²

It is precisely the practical nature of the response to the unmasking tradition turned oracular that linked Weber and Durkheim. They were united in the common enterprise of placing social science back on the road to empirical discovery by making sociology an autonomous, independent force. The impact of these two men on the evolution of sociology has been immense, so that it is important yet difficult to state their contributions synthetically.

The first point in the methodological counter-attack is that social science cannot be tied to either religious or political ambitions. Restorationism and socialism were equally castigated for failing to distinguish between description and prescription. Durkheim first asserts the independence of sociology from other disciplines, and goes on to assert that it "will be neither individualist, communistic, nor socialistic in the sense commonly given these words." Such emotive concepts are to be ignored since they "tend not to describe or interpret, but to reform, social organization."²³ Weber is no less emphatic in describing the degeneration of German philosophy and religion into a pawn of "fanatical office-holding patriots." Precisely this bureaucratization of society creates the seeds for extremist demands for an ordering of society along totalitarian lines. Vision and pre-vision are muddled.²⁴

The second assault upon the unmasking tradition was the

²² Max Weber's two most famous statements on the relationship of fact to value are contained in the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. Tübingen, 1922. They have been separately translated. See: "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics," *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (edited and translated by E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch). Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949, esp. pp. 3-8; and, "Science as a Vocation," *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills). New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 143-47.

²³ Emile Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method*, p. 142.

²⁴ Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, p. 47.

assertion that social events, in contrast to political decisions, are not purposive, at least not in the teleological sense. The anticipation of future events can only be in the form of presenting existential options, not in determining which option is morally superior. He is most emphatic on this point, indicating that "purpose is the conception of an *effect* which becomes a *cause* of an action. Since we take into account every cause which produces or can produce a significant effect, we also consider this one. Its specific significance consists only in the fact that we not only *observe* human conduct but can and desire to understand it."²⁵ Durkheim is equally explicit in rejecting any but an empiricist attitude toward social causation. "All that we can observe experimentally in the species is a series of changes among which a causal bond does not exist." Continuing in the same Humean vein, he adds that all we can say is that "certain conditions have succeeded one another up to the present, but not in what order they will henceforth succeed one another, since the cause on which they are supposed to depend is not scientifically determined or determinable."²⁶ This non-causal view, which underlies much of the functional-structural literature, operated satisfactorily with Trobriand Islanders, but caused no end of anguish to men like Malinowski, whose ingrained hatred for totalitarianism was frustrated by a categorical denial that such political phenomenon as Nazism could be condemned on moral grounds.²⁷ The relativist basis of this comparative, acausal method, which acting as a brake on the presumptions and fallacies that passed for anthropology from Bachoffen to Lévy-Bruhl, itself became a sterile defense-mechanism against the use of historical criteria in social science research.

The third point in the arsenal of those arguing against a union of the scientific and valuative was the rehabilitation of the philosophic distinction between the "is" and the "ought." Weber was emphatic in viewing the Kantian distinction of the phe-

²⁵ Max Weber, *Ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁶ Emile Durkheim, *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

²⁷ Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Analysis of War," *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays*. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1948, pp. 306-07.

nomenal and the noumenal as a rigid rule of social science. "Even such simple questions as the extent to which an end should sanction unavoidable means, or the extent to which undesired repercussions should be taken into consideration, or how conflicts between several concretely conflicting ends are to be arbitrated, are entirely matters of choice or compromise. There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure of any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision here."²⁸ For his part, Durkheim moved from the disjunction of fact and value to the formulation of three rules of observation; the essence of which is that the further removed we are from moral criteria, equated by Durkheim with the subjective, the stronger the possibilities are for a non-psychological social science.²⁹ Here, the notion of the sociologist as the physician and society as the patient received its earliest formulation. Neither Durkheim nor Weber deny the value-relevance (*Wertbeziehung*) of social science, but rather the value-content of social science. This distinction made, Durkheim did not hesitate to call sociology a natural science.³⁰ Weber was too influenced by the *Zeitgeist* tradition to go so far, and contended only that sociology was an empirical science.

The fourth and final axiom in method sociology noted the importance of social science as an instrument or set of rules which opens objective investigation to all who abide by its canons, without regard to the class, status or power of the investigator. Scientific organization is based on commonly adhered to rules, which alone guarantee the worth of social science data. Weber and Durkheim saw in methodology the precondition for expertise—what Weber called "technical criticism."

The method of sociology lifted the investigator out of all ideological pitfalls. Sociological training prepares the investigator for his elevation from "utilitarian calculation and syllogistic

²⁸ Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, pp. 18-19; also, pp. 13, 54.

²⁹ Emile Durkheim, *Rules of Sociological Method*, pp. 31-44.

³⁰ Emile Durkheim, *Ibid.*, p. 1, *et passim*. See on this, Harry Alpert, *Emile Durkheim and His Sociology*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1939, pp. 80-111.

reasonings." The novice may still be bound by moral considerations, the finished Durkheimian product is illusion-free and bias-clear.³¹ As Ginsberg recently pointed out, Durkheim's "work suffers from a failure to distinguish clearly between problems of origin and problems of validity and from too great a readiness to identify the impersonal with the collective, the pressure of society with objective validity."³² Weber is no less subject to this line of criticism. His idea that the best way to stay clear of illusions and biases is to lay them bare at all times, assumes that this sort of self-revelation is itself free of rationalization and a value perspective.³³

I have dwelt at length with Durkheim and Weber not only to recall the debt modern social science owes to them, but rather to show that even if we accept everything in these four axioms, we are not out of the woods Marx and Freud placed the social sciences in. One can hardly overlook the profoundly moral attitude of Durkheim to society, his attempt to establish a "science of morality." As Catlin notes, "the positivist obsession takes charge, which denies the distinction of science and ethics, logic based on anthropological fact and values conditioning judgments."³⁴ In Weber's case, the moral grounds is only slightly less easy to dissect. There is his famous description of "charismatic authority," so heavily stamped with a youthful absorption in Prussian militarism that it is difficult to avoid a psychological explanation for the form as well as content of this concept.³⁵ Similarly, liberalist values are stamped throughout the editorial comments of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*.³⁶ Nor did the shift from factory to marketing orientation fail to leave its impression on Weber. His concern with the social basis of

³¹ Emile Durkheim, *Ibid.*, p. 144.

³² Morris Ginsberg, *Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy: On the Diversity of Morals*. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957, pp. 52-3.

³³ Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," *From Max Weber*, pp. 145-46.

³⁴ G.E.G. Catlin, "Introduction" to *The Rules of Sociological Method*, pp. xxix-xxx.

³⁵ Max Weber, "The Meaning of Discipline," *From Max Weber*, pp. 253-64.

³⁶ Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, esp. pp. 59-63.

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contracts, status factors in the distribution of industrial privileges, and the bureaucratization of the political process, all of these derived in part from an acceptance of the major premise of the liberal ideology of the twentieth century, that sociology has replaced economy as the central frame of human reference.³⁷

Even Weber's most sympathetic and least critical commentator took note of the moral dominion from which he commenced his studies. "Weber was preoccupied with the problem of individual autonomy in a world that was increasingly subjected to the inexorable machinery of bureaucratic administration." Surely, if bureaucracy is inexorable, the scientist in Weber should have been content with a description of how this process unfolds. Clearly he was not because of the very values which led him to study bureaucracies in the first place. As we learn, "Weber's perspective for the future was a direct product of his personal position as a liberal critic of bureaucratic absolutism in imperial Germany, and today we sympathize readily with this early formulation of George Orwell's 1984."³⁸

To conclude, we may say that Weber and Durkheim and their innumerable followers succeeded in raising the level of craftsmanship in social research to new heights by forging heuristic precepts and rules of procedure. However, they did not succeed, any more than Kant or Hume, in settling the place of values in social studies. The distinction between value-free and value-relevance proved to be only a ploy and not a solution. The main point in the Marx-Freud line of reasoning remained curiously unexamined, namely that ideologies operate unconsciously (or subconsciously) and are therefore not subject to auto-regulation by the investigator. Indeed, the very "exposure" of an ideology tends to render it impotent and inoperative. Weber and Durkheim improperly assumed that methodology, procedural rules, can replace motivations. The recognition of a valuational dimension to social research is not a sign of dishonest pedagogy, but is a consequence of interest factors

³⁷ Cf. Irving L. Horowitz, *Philosophy, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge*, p. 64.

³⁸ Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. New York, Doubleday & Co., 1960, pp. 455-56.

and action orientations which are situationally determined rather than methodologically deleted. The unmasking tradition could adopt the axiological position of Weber and Durkheim without feeling pinched as to its fundamental convictions.

I should like now to contrast the work of Mannheim and Scheler to the methodological school of sociology to illustrate the above point. Certain conclusions of the Durkheim-Weber school appear in the work of the early sociologists of knowledge, e. g., the treatment of ideas as facts for analysis, the relativist view of truth, an awareness that the meaning of propositions is related to the functional uses of these propositions, and an antipathy towards the materialist philosophy underlying much of the unmasking tradition. But when we examine what Mannheim and Scheler stood for, we can see that the main threat is considered to stem from the methodological, positivist tradition. Indeed, it has been noted that the work of Mannheim and Scheler was in good measure understandable as a desiccated, academically respectable type of Marxism.³⁹ It was in revolt not simply against the idea of social science as a natural science, but science as a sufficient and inclusive instrument of analysis that the main energies of the two were directed.⁴⁰

Scheler and Mannheim represent essentially similar lines in social theory. This is not an arbitrary lumping together since Mannheim himself categorically says that "we completely agree with Scheler, then, that metaphysics has not been and cannot be eliminated from our world conception, and that metaphysical categories are indispensable for the interpretation of the historical and intellectual world."⁴¹ If anything, Mannheim was a "purer" metaphysician than Scheler, since "according to our view (Mannheim always liked to speak of himself in the plural), God's

³⁹ Cf. Marvin Farber, *Naturalism and Subjectivism*, pp. 297-329. See also, Howard Becker and H. Otto Dahlke, "Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. II, 1940, pp. 310-22.

⁴⁰ Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*. Darmstadt, O. Reichl, 1928, p. 112; *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik*. Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1927, p. 412.

⁴¹ Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952, p. 175.

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eye is upon the historic, i. e., it is not meaningless, whereas Scheler must imply that he looks upon the world with God's eyes."⁴² And lest we imagine that this is intended simply as a pun, Mannheim elsewhere admits that "we are somehow guided by a 'plan,' and 'intelligible framework' of history whenever we put the seemingly most isolated particular fact into a context."⁴³ Mannheim's contextualism, like Scheler's phenomenalism, is brought into play as a direct attempt to transcend empirical sociology. This truncated Hegelianism is resuscitated for the purpose of once again throwing social research back on the mercy of a *deus ex machina*.

The Scheler-Mannheim style of thought adds an additional element to this restoration of social metaphysics, namely, the rejection of both the materialist distinction between science and ideology,⁴⁴ and the rejection of a methodology offering but partial results and pragmatic solutions.⁴⁵ The principle of social engineering in Mannheim and divine engineering in Scheler disguised an anti-scientific quest for certainty. In the name of preserving values, this line of thought managed to recreate the gap between facts and values. Durkheim's sacredness of facts is magically transformed into Scheler's sacredness of values. One was left with the prospect of choosing between the false alternatives of narrow empiricism and grand-scale metaphysics.

The tendency in American sociology during earlier generations of this century was to bypass rather than move beyond these various European currents. This might be put more exactly by saying that we tended to reproduce the various lines of argument between a value-oriented and a value-free sociology at a lower level of sophistication. The efforts of Parsons, Gerth, Mills, and Knight to make the work of Weber available in English, and the parallel efforts of Wirth, Shils, Keckesmeti, and Lowe to do the same for Mannheim, quickened the pace of

⁴² Karl Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁴³ Karl Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁴⁴ Karl Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 184.

⁴⁵ Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft: Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens*. Leipzig, Verlag Der Neue Geist, 1926, pp. 48, 64.

our discussions of value theory in the social sciences. With the possible exception of Ward and Cooley (who maintained close ties with continental currents), analysis of this problem in the formative period of American sociology, 1900 to 1930, was virtually non-existent. The decade between 1930 and 1940 was fateful for American studies in sociological theory in several ways: (a) it initiated the use of sociological studies and briefs in governmental and private business institutes, (b) it was the period of widespread dissemination of European trends in academic sociology, (c) it was the age in which honest social research was subverted by totalitarian regimes, and thus a time of migration for intellectuals in particular. American sociology during this decade digested and disseminated a hundred years of European intellectual experience. In order to fully understand the current status of discussions of value theory in sociology it might prove helpful to briefly review the main lines of thought distinguishing this earlier period.

The entrance of Marxism into academic life coincided with the depression period and the consequent search for an alternative to the "reform" sociology of Giddings, Ogburn, and Sumner. A good example of how this functioned in relation to the problem of values in anthropology is provided by Calverton.

The existence of cultural compulsives makes objectivity in the social sciences impossible ... No mind can be objective in its interpretation and evaluation of social phenomena. One can be objective only in the observation of detail or the collection of facts—but one cannot be objective in their interpretation. Interpretation necessitates a mind-set, a purpose, an end. Such mind-sets, such purposes, such ends, are controlled by cultural compulsives. Any man living in any society imbibes his very consciousness from that society, his way of thought, his prejudice of vision. The class he belongs to in that society in turn gives direction to his thought and vision.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ V. F. Calverton (editor), "Introduction," *The Making of Man: An Outline of Anthropology*. New York, The Modern Library, Random House, 1931, p. 29. For a sociological statement akin to Calverton's see, Behice Boran, "Sociology in Retrospect," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 52, January 1947, p. 312 *et passim*. The Freudian side of the unmasking tradition has also received noticeable attention, see C. C. Bowman, "Hidden Valuations in the Interpretation of Sexual and Family Relationship," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 11, October 1946, pp. 536-44; and also "Cultural Ideology and Heterosexual Reality," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 14, October 1949, pp. 624-33.

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The unmasking tradition however, never served as more than a peripheral reminder that there exists more than one way to treat the problem of fact and value in social theory. The dominant view, perhaps best expressed by MacIver, amounted to a positive assesment of the Durkheim-Weber tradition. Since the present crop of sociologists were weaned on his *Society*, it is perhaps useful to recount the conclusions offered.

(1) Science is concerned not with the establishment of ultimate ends or values, but only with the relation between means and ends; the ends can never be demonstrated, but only the relevance or adequacy of means to postulated ends. (2) Science is concerned with what *is*, not with what in the last resort *ought* to be; and it must always avoid the confusion of the *is* and the *ought*, of the fact and the ideal. (3) Social science has *as part of its subject matter* the valuations operative in social institutions and organizations, but not the valuations of these valuations on the part of those who investigate them. (4) Social science in investigating the instrumental character of institutions and organizations, that is, their services and disservices as means to postulated ends, must always guard against the danger that the bias of the investigator will magnify those aspects of service or disservice which give support to his own valuations.⁴⁷

MacIver's statement of the functional-methodological school of social thought, and the discussion preceding his conclusions, are far less dogmatic than the European version. Altogether new influences had settled in: Dewey in philosophy, Mead in social psychology, and Hobhouse in moral theory. American pragmatism in particular felt its keen social role, and took the idea of moral mandates far more seriously than continental positivism. Indeed, English and American pluralism distinguishes itself precisely in its ultimate faith in the morality of rational men.

If there is a strong moral impulse felt even by "neutralists" like MacIver, this impulse realized itself amongst those sociologists more directly involved in community studies, propaganda analysis, and studies in crime and social disorganization. The most coherent expression of this came from the "Chicago School" of which Louis Wirth is a brilliant example. The firmness of the distinction between fact and value, aimed as it was against revolutionary and reactionary social doctrines, nonetheless effectively stifled reform theories as well. The problem became how to

⁴⁷ Robert M. MacIver, *Society: A Textbook of Sociology*. New York, Rinehart & Co., 1937, p. 520.

bring values back into social science without again conjuring up the daemons of Marx or Sorel. The work of Mannheim was eminently suited to this enterprise.

The fact that in the realm of the social the observer is part of the observed and hence has a personal stake in the subject of observation is one of the chief factors in the acuteness of the problem of objectivity in the social sciences. In addition, we must consider the fact that social life and hence social science is to an overwhelming extent concerned with beliefs about the ends of action. It would be naive to suppose that our ideas are entirely shaped by the objects of our contemplation which lies outside us or that our wishes and our fears have nothing whatever to do with what we perceive or with what will happen. It would be nearer the truth to admit that those basic impulses which have been generally designated as "interests" actually are the forces which at the same time generate the ends of our practical activity and focus our intellectual attention.⁴⁸

Wirth hoped that by making explicit the valuational elements in social science, we would be better able to cope with the elemental needs of men. The purpose is not the unmasking of opponents, but rather the revelation of our own interests, attitudes, and ambitions, which might raise us out of the abyss of ideological boundaries. The same sort of viewpoint was expressed by Benedict in anthropology in her strong plea for cultural relativism as a position making possible that social tolerance and political pluralism which is the hallmark of the liberal inheritance.⁴⁹ Values are thus viewed as a practical handmaiden to social science activities. But in the hands of the relativism and pluralism of Wirth and Benedict remained a philosophic preference rather than a social scientific necessity—and philosophic tastes are fickle.

For the post-War, post-Depression generation of American sociology, all talk of the valuational ground of social science seemed part of a watershed long-since crossed. There came into focus a strong current that identified social science not only with value neutrality, but with scholarly aloofness from moral issues. Whereas MacIver tempered and qualified his acceptance

⁴⁸ Louis Wirth, "Preface" to Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1936 (Harvest edition), 1955, p. xxii.

⁴⁹ Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934 (Penguin edition, 1946), pp. 256-57.

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of the disjunction of fact and values, we now find Bierstedt turning this disjunction into a veritable law of sociology. His position "considers sociology 'value-free' in general and politically neutral in particular, and one finally that emphasizes, rather than erases, the distinction between sociology on the one hand and social and political philosophy on the other."⁵⁰ Goode and Hatt give vigorous assent to this, informing us that we cannot, even in principle, provide an accounting of value alternatives. "Science can only tell us *how* to achieve goals; it can never tell us *what* goals should be sought."⁵¹ This, of course, marks a profound retreat even from Weber's disclaimers. Methodology, instead of being considered as a heuristic device informing value theory, comes to be a substitute for values as such.

With Lundberg we reach the epitome of current efforts to make sociology a natural and pure science. He exhibits not just indifference to values, but an open hostility to the existence of a plurality of values. He succeeds in making Ogburn's unfortunate culture-lag doctrine conform to his own reductionist image of society. He says: "The fact that there are differences of opinion in a large society as to what these values are (present-day values - ILH) itself represents an unnecessary social lag. For in such recent developments as scientific public opinion polling, the values of a population and the unanimity and relative intensity with which they are held can also be determined."⁵² The confusion between consensus and conformism is made complete. We are left with the impression that we ought not to be laggards, that resistance to a social consensus is tantamount to being backward, if not deviant. This "natural science" approach reduces morality to making sure that the number of police does not lag behind population shifts.⁵³ Berelson, in an otherwise useful mono-

⁵⁰ Robert Bierstedt (editor), *The Making of Society: An Outline of Sociology*. Revised edition. New York, Random House (Modern Library), 1959, Preface, p. v.

⁵¹ William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, *Methods in Social Research*. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952, p. 27.

⁵² George A. Lundberg, C. C. Schrag, and O. N. Larsen, *Sociology* (rev. ed.). New York, Harper & Bros, 1958, pp. 722-23.

⁵³ George A. Lundberg, C. C. Schrag, and O. N. Larsen, *Ibid.*, p. 721.

graph on higher education in the United States, seems to equate objectivity in matters of degree requirements with what administrative deans believe to be necessary. Discontent with certain standardization procedures recommended, e.g., the transformation of the doctorate into a "technical degree," becomes an aspect of academic deviance.⁵⁴ The echoes of this neutralist posture are well illustrated in recent RAND studies of nuclear war. The question of moment it seems, is not the feasibility, desirability or necessity of nuclear conflict, but rather how rapidly it will take the survivors of such a war to reconstruct their former social patterns. The cupidity of this view is to complete that the possibility that people might actually have learned something from a total hydrogen war (aside from ways of preventing it) is not raised.⁵⁵ As Von Wiese prophesied: "Value judgments, adieu."⁵⁶ The truth of course is not that values have actually dissolved into game-theory, rather that the social scientist has become so identified with the going values of the Establishment that it *seems* as if values have disappeared.

TRENDS IN THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL OBJECTIVITY AND VALUE THEORY

We have now turned the full circle of theory. The main lines of discussion and disagreement over the status of values in social science have been presented; and while those minor currents and counter-currents necessary for a full statement have been omitted, we can afford the liberty of certain projections and predictions. What I am about to present is first a tabulation of practical barriers, and second a listing of current attempts, concerning new ap-

⁵⁴ Bernard Berelson, *Graduate Education in the United States*. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960, esp. pp. 233-60.

⁵⁵ Cf. in particular, Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960; and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960. In this connection see, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 89, No. 4, Fall 1960.

⁵⁶ Leopold von Wiese, *Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), New York, 1932, p. 8, also pp. 64-8.

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praisals of the relation of fact and value in social science research. The reader will note that I say practical barriers. By this I do not wish to minimize theoretical objections, only to indicate that such abstract objections seem directly connected to a complex of practical factors.

(1) *Recruitment policies and practices*: It is clear from an investigation of professional social science journals annual listings of higher degrees in progress and awarded that while there is a sharp numerical rise over the years, there is no corresponding growth in the number of higher degree granting institutions. By far the highest proportion of degrees granted in social science, and in science generally, is made by a highly selective and restrictive group of universities. This observation is confirmed by the work of Wilson, Barber and Berelson.⁵⁷ Thus the power and prestige of these selective universities, and more specifically, the departments in which this power is directly lodged, shows a growth pattern far in excess of the increase in higher education as such. "Team work" the drive for consensus, the pressure to state findings in quantitative terms only, are reinforced by the practical problem of the graduate student to get his degrees. This power of the large department is not diminished after graduation. The chain of communications are kept open in terms of grants and awards, university press publications, journal articles, efforts of promotion and re-location—all of which in some measure require the sanction of the major institutions and their various departments. Barr offers this interesting account in "fictional" form. "The fact that his desk (the head of the economics department—ILH) was a clearing house for teaching posts with swank research organizations and private business corporations gave him absolute control of his graduate students. They knew they would be taken care of if they won his favor. They knew likewise that, if they failed to win it, they would not even get a degree, no matter how strong a dissertation

⁵⁷ Cf. Logan Wilson, *The Academic Man*. New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1942, p. 33; Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order*. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1952, pp. 142-43; and Bernard Berelson, *Graduate Education in the United States*, p. 226.

they wrote.⁵⁸ With such a situation, the younger men are under an obvious restraint not to do violence to the group consensus that prevails. Thus, the most serious criticism of value premises is confined to the upper echelons of the discipline, or to those scholars working in different areas of social science from the one under scrutiny.

(2) *Educational orientations*: There is an excessive concentration, in sociology in particular, on experimental efforts as something apart from theory construction. Specialized techniques of questionnaire design, coding, and compartmentalizing, allow for the interviewing process to become the end of research rather than an instrumentality. The spate of literature on survey design and sampling techniques, leads to a strict methodological view of the purposes of sociology. That this is not confined to any one branch of social science is confirmed by a UNESCO survey of political science. The editor of this survey indicates that "a good deal of political research carried on in universities today is aloof from the real problems of political life. Too often research seems to be conducted for the sake of research. The topics chosen have no apparent significance, and the investigation does not throw light on any contemporary problem of importance. There is no driving force behind such research, no vital motives inspiring the work, no useful potentialities in the conclusions which emerge."⁵⁹ There seem here to be two intertwined problems: establishing criteria of significance, and no less, an unwillingness to break through the data barrier. There are obviously a multitude of reasons for this, but I believe that Lerner and Hilgard have caught the essence of the problem when they note that "the prestige of the natural scientist is high in American culture, where the developed industrial civilization and high standard of living are commonly attributed to scientific advances. This fact may lie behind the self-conscious wish of social scientists

⁵⁸ Stringfellow Barr, *Purely Academic*. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1958, pp. 51-2.

⁵⁹ William A. Robson, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Political Science*. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1954, p. 116.

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to become scientists like other natural scientists (chemists, physicists, biologists). Hence, those in the social disciplines turn to the natural sciences for their models of system-building. They wish to attain the generally accepted criteria of good science: objective and reproducible observations; precise and valid instruments for refining observations; hypotheses that help to initiate inquiry and to direct research; general theories; and laws that satisfy the esthetic demand for an articulated and harmonious system.”⁶⁰

(3) *Status strivings of social scientists*: Policies and orientations in social science are clearly related to the reconstruction of the image of sociology held in the past. While Lerner and Hilgard have indicated some of the major reasons for the attempt at mimetic reproduction of natural science methods, there remains the matter of the lingering identification of sociology with social reform. The peer group in sociology has thus felt a special obligation to cleanse the word of its inherited connotations. And this could be done either through the substitution of methodology for actual useful results, or by direct appeals to members of the profession to rethink any moral residues or biases which still persist—especially any bias against the business and industrial world. The manipulative values of sociology, which for a while were viewed as a necessary, if discomfiting by-product of research, has now become something of a matter of principle. In his “Reflections on Business,” Lazarsfeld bemoans the lack of interest, if not the historic antipathy, of the professional social scientist for the business calling. Drawing attention to the mutuality of interests between sociologists and businessmen, Lazarsfeld points out that it is the businessmen who have done most of the work. This he shows through a content analysis comparing the *Harvard Business Review* and the *American Journal of Sociology*.⁶¹ There can be little question that a parallel analysis of the

⁶⁰ Ernest R. Hilgard and Daniel Lerner, “The Person: Subject and Object of Science and Policy,” *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method* (eds. D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell). Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1951, p. 38.

⁶¹ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, “Reflections on Business,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXV, No. 1, July 1959, pp. 1-26.

contents of the *American Journal of Sociology* for the corresponding decade beginning with 1960 will show an appropriate response to Lazarsfeld's plea for tolerance, understanding and fair-play. As social research begins to take place in an atmosphere resembling International Business Machines Corporation, the status possessed by the latter is presumably going to rub off on the former, whether this is so or not remains to be seen.

(4) *Professionalization of the field*: The process of professionalization, which involves a gamut of sub-processes—from being *au courant* with the vernacular of the moment, to an appreciation of the number of variables the latest IBM calculator can deal with in a single computation—serves the classic purpose of distinguishing peer-group membership from outsiders. Fossils and deviants of older generations, or those who have come through the educative process with a concern for value questions intact, must still face the prospects of the highly organized professional societies. An English sociologist has pointed out the situation with respect to professionalization: “A professional association seeks privileges at the expense of the common good. It attaches more importance to respect for seniority, conformity to professional rules of conduct and the growth of tradition than it does to individual freedom and inventiveness. Its members are conditioned to interpret their duties more in terms of professional skills than in terms of the needs of clients.”⁶² Clearly, the basis of professionalization has increasingly come to rest on a notion of consensus that often carries over into conformism. The social scientist is asked to comport himself as a physicist or physician, yet unlike the former he dare not establish a *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* lest the charge of meddling in political affairs come back to haunt him; and unlike the latter he is not authorized to make prescriptions (only descriptions and perhaps recommendations) lest the charge of moral concern in survival questions be raised.

What is required is the knowledge that the investigators of society are themselves a very definite part of that society, with

⁶² Paul F. Lazarsfeld, “Reflections on Business,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXV, No. 1, July 1959, pp. 1-26.

specific value preferences and ideological moorings. Opler, in examining values in group psychotherapy, indicates some of the benefits which might accrue in the employment of a culture anthropology notion of field work. It would overcome the unreal homogeneity of the group session, end the insularity of therapist's values as the only ones which count, put the therapist in the environmental situation faced by his patients.⁶³ This very accounting for values would thereby strengthen the scientific claims of the psychotherapist. For as Riessman and Miller have pointed out, it is by no means certain that the values of the psychiatrist or psychologist are superior than those of the patient. Indeed, they include value preferences which may be downright handicaps in the performance of psychiatric services. Among those mentioned are: the congeniality of therapy with middle class values; a priori dismissal of non-psychiatric solutions—particularly where this may entail an alternative value scale, such as punishment, discipline, routine work, physical exercise, and other traditional techniques of modifying behavior; therapy based on conscious efforts to "cure" rather than unconscious auto-revelations; and methods which like traditional religions seek symptom remission rather than self-actualization as the final result.⁶⁴ What this line of research emphasizes is the importance of discovering the ethical perspectives within which each social science operates not for the purpose of purging these values, but quite the reverse, of deepening these values by testing them against competing value systems. Here then lies the crux of any future social science of values, i. e., the extent to which they can be enlisted to deepen social research, and latterly, the extent to which they can be replaced by other existential perspectives in so far as they impede such researches.

The forging of a social science of values itself depends on a value, however. And here we come to the greatest impediment, and one which we have made allusions to in earlier portions of

⁶³ Marvin K. Opler, "Values in Group Psychotherapy," *The International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, Vol. IV, No. 4, Spring 1959, p. 297.

⁶⁴ Frank Riessman and S. M. Miller, "Psychotherapy for Whom?," *Bard Psychology Journal*, Vol. I, No. 4, Spring 1959, pp. 12-14. See in this connection, Melvin Tumin, "Some Social Requirements for Effective Community Development," *Community Development Review*, No. 11, Dec. 1958.

the paper—the continued refusal to view the social sciences as essentially a human enterprise bound at one end by the biological-psychological constitution of men, and at the other by the historical career of mankind. Redfield, in a most important statement, has summed up the reasons for considering anthropology a human science. His observations, which I shall paraphrase, seem to me to hold true for the other social sciences (particularly sociology).⁶⁵ (a) However clever the design of an experiment there is a clear difference between humanity and non-humanity, between history at the upper level and physics at the lower level. (b) To reduce culture to physics is to decompose humanity into parts, and thus into something other than the study of man or society. (c) The dominance in the social sciences of natural science models and methods is not matched by any corresponding success in executing studies based on these models and methods. (d) The basis of any one social science is the study of some portion of humanity. It thus shares first with the other social sciences, second, with the humanities, and third, with philosophy a common frame of reference. (e) The development of an explicit concern with values, with the values of that portion of man being studied and concurrently, of the values of those doing the studying themselves, makes even the striving, much less the realization of a pure “natural” science of man devoid of value functions and value orientation quite out of the question.

I do not believe that discussions of the relation of fact to value, the is to the ought, the scientific to the evaluative, are perennial questions in the Platonic (i. e., non-developmental) sense of the word perennial. The issues herein raised are by no means pendulum-like in character. The structure of social science shows real progress, a progress no less authentic because of its irregularities. In each of the stages blocked out, there is revealed a genuine winning of new territory for the social sciences, and a steady coming closer to a scientific account of values.

Specialization has to a large extent been a consequence of these methodological and theoretical gains. A science of economics would not have been possible without the incorporation

⁶⁵ Robert Redfield, “Relations of Anthropology to the Social Sciences and to the Humanities,” *Anthropology Today: An Encyclopedic Inventory* (ed. A. L. Kroeber). Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1933, pp. 728-38.

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of a Newtonian view of man as an extension of the natural order. Political science would not have been possible without a clear notion of the artificial, that is, humanly created artifact called the State. Psychiatry could not have come into existence without a clear separation of science and "common-sense," that is without differentiating latent and manifest motivations. A workable cultural anthropology could not come into existence with a functional and relativist approach to the plethora of peoples, cultures and societies, the human specie reveals. The comparative view of man and his institutions required a scale of values recognizing the worth of difference for its own sake.

Specialization and the attendant multiplication of branches of learning, entail genuine risks, which we will doubtless, be reminded of by the humanistic disciplines. However, specialization is a far less dangerous problem for the social sciences than trivialization through data mongering. We are on the threshold of a social science of values. Psychiatry and anthropology have paved the way for this. It is now time for other social science disciplines, particularly sociology, to devote the necessary time, energy and funds, to once and for all remove the false duality of science and values, objectivity and interests, society and mankind.*

* This theme was the subject of two lectures by Professor Irving L. Horowitz at the Universities of Buffalo and Syracuse in 1961.