

# SAN FRANCISCO

JOHN KAPLAN

Professor of Law, Stanford University

SAN FRANCISCO'S ETHNIC MINORITIES tend to be clumped in relatively small areas, with the Negro population being concentrated in three main districts. This concentration of ethnic groups leads, of course, to racial imbalance in the schools, a problem which is most serious in the elementary schools. If one considers the four main groups of the city to be Negro, Oriental (which includes the city's small Japanese and Filipino population as well as the Chinese), Spanish white, and non-Spanish white, in 1964, 36 of the 96 elementary schools contained 90% or more of one group. Of these, nine were Negro, five Oriental, nineteen Spanish white, and three non-Spanish white. In the junior high schools there is less racial imbalance, but still some: in 1964 two schools were 80% and 61% Oriental; two were 86 and 83% Negro; and two were 85 and 72% white.

In the high schools, until recently, there was little complaint concerning racial balance. As of 1964 only one high school was less than 50% white. That one, Galileo, was 55% Oriental and 33% white. However, the racial balance in some of the high schools is changing abruptly, and in 1965 Galileo was 25% white and 64% Oriental. Moreover, in the one year, Polytechnic High School fell from 56 to 45% white, while its Negro percentage rose from 39 to 45%. In addition, two other high schools, Washington and Wilson, have dropped in 1965 from over 60%

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EDITORS' NOTE: *Condensed by the staff of the Law & Society Review from a report to the United States Commissioner of Education ("Race and Education in San Francisco," 107 pp.).*

to close to 50% white. Washington is 52% white, 19% Negro, and 29% Oriental, while Wilson is 54% white, 39% Negro and 7% Oriental. Furthermore, the racial balance in San Francisco's public high schools appears even worse if one considers the Spanish surnamed as a separate category apart from the white.<sup>1</sup>

One would think that if any large city could solve its problem of racial imbalance, San Francisco could. Its Negro population is only 12% of its total, it is a relatively small and compact city, and it has a strong liberal tradition.

The school system is governed by a seven-member School Board appointed by the Mayor for staggered five-year terms. Since the School Board is a "volunteer" (they are paid \$100 per month) group of non-professionals in charge of running a large and complex school system, it is only natural that its members would come to depend for a large portion of their information and advice upon the professional head of the school system, the Superintendent of Schools. Since 1955, this position had been occupied by Dr. Harold H. Spears, who had previously been the Assistant-Superintendent in charge of elementary education. In general, Spears had kept the day-to-day workings of the school system within his own control and consulted the Board only on the broad questions of policy which the nature of its members' training and commitment would appear to place within their sphere. Even in this area, the Board, with very few exceptions, has followed the Superintendent's advice. This is only in part due to the high respect in which the Board holds its Superintendent. It is also a measure of Dr. Spears' ability to anticipate the feeling of the Board on issues. The Superintendent acknowledges that the Board is the policy-making body in the school system and makes it very clear that even if he should disagree with its policies, he would still carry them out. Nonetheless, it is hard to tell where the Board's policy ceases and the Superintendent's begins. In any case, during the past few years both have grown, overtly at least, considerably more liberal regarding the issue of de facto segregation. Despite this, Dr. Spears seems to be the main target of the integrationist forces in San Francisco, and the clamor against him would probably have been even greater were it not for the fact that he was scheduled to retire the following year

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1. In 1965 the percentage of nonwhite in the school population was 43% (44% of the K-9 students and 40% of the 10-12 grade). It is estimated that in 1971, 53% of the school population will be nonwhite (54% of K-9 and 51% of 10-12). *Population Projection to 1971*, prepared for San Francisco Unified School District by Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, March 31, 1967, p. 23.

(1966); the integrationist forces felt there was no point "going after" the Superintendent.

#### BEGINNINGS OF CONFLICT

In the winter of 1961 several spokesmen for the recently formed San Francisco chapter of CORE visited the Superintendent of Schools to protest the de facto segregated conditions in the San Francisco schools and to ask that something be done. The CORE representatives requested, among other things, a policy statement to the effect that de facto segregation was a problem in the schools and that the Board was going to do something to meet what the CORE spokesmen felt was the school's legal and moral duty and eliminate racial imbalance. Shortly thereafter, the Bay Area Human Relations Clearinghouse, a group of organizations concerned with civil rights—including the NAACP and the American Jewish Congress—entered the picture. Arguing that the time was not ripe for a confrontation over the issue and that it was pointless to steam up passions before the full facts were known (no racial survey had been taken in the schools and the dimensions of the problem were largely unknown), the Clearinghouse representatives persuaded CORE to withdraw its demands for immediate action in favor of the appointment by the School Board of a citizens committee to investigate the problem.

The de facto segregation issue was first publicly voiced at the Board of Education meeting on January 23, 1962. The CORE spokesman, after initially expressing confidence in the Board (and making clear that she did not feel that litigation would become necessary) asked the Board to appoint a citizens committee to examine the problem of de facto segregation in San Francisco's public schools. It was clear, however, that CORE did not believe this was really necessary, for its representative also asked the Board "to recognize officially the existence of de facto segregated schools in San Francisco; to declare that such schools are educationally undesirable; and to undertake a program for their elimination."

Although earlier in the meeting there had been talk that the Superintendent's participation should be primarily that of fact-gatherer and adviser to a committee, it was eventually decided that the Superintendent himself should make the report. Moreover, although the Board's proponent of this plan of attack made it clear that he wished the report quickly—in a few weeks—the Superintendent disabused those present of the idea that it would be possible to do anything like an adequate job in

such a short time. Finally, the Board instructed the Superintendent to complete the report as soon as possible and if necessary submit it to the Board in installments.

Signs of tension between Superintendent Spears and the civil rights organizations were already visible at the January 23 meeting. Upon being directed to file his report, the Superintendent pointed out what was clearly true: that *de facto* segregation existed to whatever extent it did because the schools reflected the racial population of their neighborhoods; but then he added, "Eventually on a question such as this . . . the Board would have to come around to the issue whether neighborhood schools in their present plan are undesirable." The civil rights groups were sensitive to the emotional impact the concept of the neighborhood school appeared to have upon many white parents. They were most anxious to soft-pedal this issue and to argue that *de facto* segregation could, by redistricting and by other means, be combatted within the framework of the neighborhood school. Not only did they not regard it as a choice between integration and the neighborhood school, but, more important, they felt that the Superintendent was garnering support for a stand-pat policy by rallying the forces of the neighborhood school against them.

At the March meeting, the Superintendent gave his report, which proved to be very inconclusive. He opposed a racial census,<sup>2</sup> and merely relied on 1960 Bureau of the Census statistics to give a reasonably accurate picture of the situation. About a month later the situation took a sharp turn for the worse. Although the civil rights groups had grown completely disenchanted with the Superintendent, they had at least succeeded in not stirring up a great deal of public opposition to their efforts. This was all changed in April when Robert Carter, the legal counsel to the NAACP, came to San Francisco from the main office in New York and held a press conference in which he threatened litigation if something were not done. He also suggested that if busing was necessary because of

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2. Superintendent Spears said:

In my own experience in the schools—and this has been true of principals and other people working in the schools—if you go out into one of our schools and ask the teacher or principal approximately what percentage of the children, say, are Chinese or Negro, that teacher would immediately stand back and show surprise and say, "I never thought of it before in those terms." In other words, when a teacher is teaching children in the situation that we have where our classes are of comparable size all over the city, she is not conscious of racial distribution. I'm sure of that because she is too busy teaching school to be thinking about something else.

overcrowding, race might be considered in deciding which schools should receive the bused children. Not surprisingly, Mr. Carter's remarks stirred up considerable opposition, and at the next meeting of the Board, the local NAACP leaders moved quickly to heal what they feared might become a breach in the community, asserting that the NAACP had "no present intention of advocating the busing of students from one neighborhood to another to achieve integrated schools in San Francisco."

At the June 19 meeting, the Superintendent gave his report, noting that "although the question of racial interaction in about any area of civic affairs has its emotional overtones, the subject can lend itself to rational and deliberate treatment." He outlined the many other societal problems which minority races face and mentioned their low socioeconomic status and their high birth rate. In addition to discussing the school system's compensatory education efforts, he underlined why they were necessary: "Many Negro children bring to school a speech pattern which reflects an incorrect phonetic conception of words. The inaccuracies . . . cause errors in spelling and constructions in their written language. Again, some parents do not recognize the value of answering their children's questions . . ." With respect to combatting de facto segregation, however, he drew a complete blank. He objected to busing,<sup>3</sup> and he insisted that there was no legal duty to lessen de facto segregation providing the school authorities did not go out of their way to increase it. So he proposed nothing: "I have no educationally sound program to suggest to the Board to eliminate the schools in which the children are predominantly of one race."

The civil rights advocates were, naturally, distressed to find the Superintendent asserting that nothing at all be done to ease de facto segregation, that any methods of doing so would be objectionable for one reason or another, and that it was not really the school's problem anyway. And, to add insult to injury, the rights groups felt Dr. Spears had gone out of his way to emphasize the low cultural backgrounds of the victims of this racial imbalance. At the meeting, it was decided that since the civil rights groups had not seen a copy of the report in advance, the Board should hold a special hearing in mid-September. Thus, for the present time, this aspect of the controversy ended in stalemate.

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3. Superintendent Spears said: "If we were preparing to ship these children to various schools, in predetermined racial allotments, then such brands would serve the purpose they have been put to in handling livestock."

## THE CENTRAL JUNIOR HIGH DISPUTE

At the first Board meeting in April 1962, the same meeting at which a local NAACP representative denied his organization contemplated such a drastic measure as busing, Superintendent Spears took up with the Board the question of what to do with the old Lowell High School building. Though located at the very northern end of the Haight-Ashbury district, Lowell High School had drawn its student body from the entire city and had been, at least in the academic sense, the pride of the school system. Nonetheless, over the years its physical condition had gradually deteriorated until it would have required a complete overhaul to put it in good condition. As a result in 1956, a bond issue had been passed providing funds for rebuilding Lowell in an entirely different part of the city, the Sunset District.

The School Board, faced at the time with a shortage of junior high classroom space, did the obvious thing with this empty high school building: it decided to renovate the old Lowell High School and reopen it as a junior high school to be called Central Junior High School.

At the time of the decision to use the old Lowell building as a junior high school two factors had been incompletely thought out. The first was the cost of renovation. After the Board made its decision, the estimated costs were adjusted upward: it would cost approximately \$1,400,000 to renovate the building—not only more than the administration had originally estimated, but more than it felt it could afford at that time. As a result, the Superintendent suggested that the most easily refurbished portion of the building should be put into shape—something that could be done for only \$75,000—and that this be used just for the entering class of seventh graders for that year. A bond issue was scheduled to be on the ballot a year and a half later, and the Board could then decide whether to undertake the cost of renovating the old Lowell building completely or to build space elsewhere and close Central down.

The second item that the school administration had not completely thought through was the racial balance in the new junior high school. After the initial commitment to turn old Lowell into Central Junior High came the difficult problem of carving out a new district. The boundaries suggested by the Superintendent would have included as elementary school feeders the predominantly Negro schools, which would mean that Central would open at least 50% Negro. This, as might be expected, raised the immediate interest of numerous area residents and in fact

escalated into a city-wide, highly controversial issue. The Haight-Ashbury area was trying hard to maintain the integration it had, and many of its residents felt the opening of a Central Junior High with such boundaries might accelerate the white movement out of the Haight-Ashbury area. The parents of Grattan Elementary School children (from predominantly white middle- and upper-income families, with a few well-to-do Negroes) were particularly interested and vocal in expressing their desires for a "stable," integrated junior high school, and objected to the estimated 50-60% Negro population at Central.

For the Grattan parents and their allies, May and June of 1962 were taken up with planning sessions, public meetings, meetings with various school officials, delegations to Board members, etc. When the Superintendent presented his above-mentioned report to the Board in early June, many complained with some bitterness that the school people refused even to discuss the racial composition of the new school. Shortly after this, Superintendent Spears met with a delegation representing the PTA's of several proposed feeder schools, the Haight-Ashbury Neighborhood Council, the NAACP, CORE, and several other civil rights organizations. At this meeting Dr. Spears continued to invoke a lack of authority to use race as a criterion for drawing attendance lines.<sup>4</sup> The delegation, however, with the Grattan parents still taking the lead, was by no means completely stymied. They protested to members of the School Board denouncing the Superintendent for his intransigence and for hiding behind specious lack of authority. The most obvious result of this was the fact that two weeks later the Superintendent called one of the leaders of the Grattan parents and proposed that they have another meeting—with a smaller delegation this time, however.

The parents were more pleased by the Superintendent's position at this second meeting, and actually believed something of an agreement was reached. To be sure of this, they afterward wrote the Superintendent a letter outlining their understanding of his position ("... we were heartened at your recognition that in the affirmative act of setting up a new school, the matter of sound racial balance must be considered"). Since no answer to this letter was received, the parents assumed they had the full concurrence of the Superintendent in their view of the problem of racial imbalance at Central. Accordingly, in a circulated news release

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4. Dr. Spears said: "You are asking me to do exactly what I have recommended to the Board of Education against doing. If we deliberately set up a school district according to race, I will have to have direction from the Board to do it."

they reported that “. . . for the first time Dr. Spears declared that ethnic factors would be taken into account . . . in planning the new school’s composition.” City newspapers, in checking this release with Dr. Spears, quoted him as saying, “They are committing me to a policy and we have no policy on this. They are going further than I said.”

This publicity had the effect of widening the controversy and enlarging both the scope of the issues and the number of participants. As a result, the July 23 meeting of the Board was well attended and took on a belligerent tone. The president of the local chapter of the NAACP threatened pupil boycotts and picketing as a method of bringing the Board into line on the issue, and for the first time mentioned seriously the possibility of a lawsuit. Following this meeting the issues seemed to be polarized. The *Chronicle* editorialized for a city-wide plan of two-way busing for dispersing Negroes and whites equally in the schools. However, the city’s other newspaper, the *Bulletin*, vigorously opposed the plan, stating “. . . it would be folly to gerrymander the district out of all semblance of administrative sanity.” Mayor George Christopher attempted to minimize the differences and magnitude of the controversy by attributing more moderate positions to both Dr. Spears and the NAACP and CORE spokesmen.

At the stormy August 7 Board meeting Dr. Spears continued to argue that under the circumstances a 60% nonwhite student body at Central was the best that could be done; while the Grattan children would move from a predominantly white elementary school, children from two all-Negro schools would move into Central with only 60% nonwhite. The Board, saying that it would consider policy on racial and ethnic composition on September 18, urged the Grattan parents “to give Central a chance.” After this ineffectual meeting, the controversy continued to grow; CORE held a sit-in and picketed the Superintendent’s office, and the NAACP again publicly reiterated its contemplation of litigation. The Mayor attempted to bring peace by meeting with the Superintendent and the members of the Board of Education, but no tangible results came of this.

Mid-August was a frantic time. Since neither the School Board nor Dr. Spears had proposed alternatives for Central’s racial composition, the NAACP brought suit on behalf of nine Grattan children scheduled to attend Central, seeking an injunction to prevent the school’s opening. It was alleged that a 60% nonwhite student body violated the guarantee of equal protection in the fourteenth amendment, since such a ratio dif-



ferred widely from the city's overall racial composition. That same week the education chairman from the national offices of the NAACP arrived in San Francisco and charged, at a press conference, something which none of the participants in the Central Junior High dispute had even hinted at—that the San Francisco school authorities were deliberately segregationist; that it was not merely a case of not being willing to do anything to overcome racial imbalance, but rather that the authorities had deliberately drawn their district lines so as to maximize racial imbalance. Also during this period a “preserve the neighborhood schools” group was formed in a white neighborhood.

For the first time, the dominant talk shifted from redistricting Central to closing it entirely. At the August 21 Board meeting, which according to the press was the most heavily attended meeting in the Board's history, Dr. Spears recommended—to no one's surprise—the “rescission of the resolution which established the Central School.” After a long, acrimonious discussion, the Board unanimously decided not to open the school.

Although the representatives of Haight-Ashbury referred to the closing of Central as “tragic,” the Grattan parents (whose children would be rezoned to a predominantly all-white junior high school), CORE, and the NAACP all thought the solution satisfactory. For the following two years, Central was not opened as a junior high school, and students who had been scheduled to attend it were distributed to surrounding schools, often into crowded classrooms. In some instances this involved busing over considerable distances to schools where there was room.

At the September 18, 1962 meeting of the Board, the “Ad Hoc Committee of the Board of Education to Study Ethnic Factors in the San Francisco Schools” was established. This Committee, composed of three Board members, was instructed to make a report at the first Board meeting in April of 1963.

In October, the NAACP filed another suit against the School Board. While the first suit of August 15 concerned itself solely with the Central Junior High issue, this suit—a class action listing over one hundred Negro students as plaintiffs—attacked the entire San Francisco school system, charging the Board with violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The litigation was never carried to a full conclusion, the plaintiffs' attorney allowing the suit to be dismissed for want of prosecution on December 4, 1964—two years and two months after it had been brought.

Meanwhile, the Ad Hoc Committee had gone about its task seriously. One of the Grattan parents and the educational chairman of the NAACP reported that the Committee attempted to do a fair and honest job, but criticized the Committee in a Newsletter, stating that:

The Committee seems almost desperately committed to extracting from the administration evidence that the San Francisco School District does not discriminate against minority groups. In doing so, they are not dealing with the central issue, which is the effect of a policy which manifests itself in the existence of schools composed largely or totally of minority group children. Thus far the Board of Education and the Ad Hoc Committee seem to take the position that the racial separation that results after impartial application of non-racially oriented policies is not a phenomenon that should merit their attention . . .

The report of the Committee as finally submitted to the Board at the meeting of April 2, 1963, had a defensive time. However, it did suggest that within the neighborhood school plan, attention might be given to ethnic factors in an attempt to secure racial balance in the schools, but noted that this would probably have little effect in alleviating natural racial concentrations. The report made only one flat recommendation—that a Human Relations Officer be appointed for the school system. The Board did appoint the Human Relations Officer, but he has concerned himself with more detailed problems and with speeches on race relations.

#### THE RACIAL CENSUS DISPUTE

During the 1963–64 and 1964–65 school years, although the Board produced few concrete proposals which satisfied the integrationist forces, it was finally persuaded to conduct and to publish a racial census of the school population.

On the surface, it would seem that if one is interested in combatting racial imbalance, the way to begin is to find out its extent. Most cities interested in the problem have long since done this, and though there is a jurisprudence that the government should remain color-blind in all its activities, most lawyers would probably not apply this to purely informational programs. At the very least, everyone would admit that had the Census Bureau remained color-blind, the problem of planning to reduce de facto segregation would be a great deal more difficult.

Probably the first discussion of a racial headcount took place at the Board of Education meeting of March 6, 1962, when Dr. Spears presented the first installment of his report on de facto segregation. Although Dr. Spears conceded that the mere superimposition of the census data on the

school districting map was not as accurate as a headcount in the schools, he stated, "I have felt that this is generally enough to give the Board an idea of its racial distribution." The Superintendent went on to point out that if the Board wanted more specific information than he had given, the Board would have to order him to undertake a racial census.

With the exception of some inconclusive discussions at one of the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, more than two full years passed before any serious consideration was given to the possibility of a racial headcount in the schools. During that period dozens of requests had been made to the administration, but the authorities flatly refused not only to reveal but also to collect data on the racial composition of any school. Then, at the Board meeting of April 7, 1964, mounting pressure forced Dr. Spears to give his first full statement on the issue:

I would recall that this Board has never adopted the policy of having a racial count in the schools. . . . In none of those cities in which there has been a racial count has there been any indication that this retarded the movement of white people from those cities into the suburban areas. . . . Just as soon as that count has come in there are people in that community, in that particular school, because of its count, they think it's a down-graded school, and therefore they better move their children out of it. Now, that is what has happened. I have the same idea about de facto segregation as you people. . . . I do not like it, but two wrongs cannot bring about a right in the particular situation that we are talking about. Now, if this Board ever asked that the race be counted in schools, we'll make the count, but teachers do not think in terms of race of children. Somebody else is asking the teacher to think in terms of race, and if some count was made, I would hate for the teacher to have to determine what race the children are. I would rather go to the parent to ask because the teachers, up to this time, have never had to think about what race the child is.

At the next Board meeting on April 21, 1964, the discussion was continued with more intensity. A representative of CORE began by demanding a racial headcount but it was apparent that the Board was prepared unanimously to side with the Superintendent against any racial census. Nonetheless, the Board was beginning to come around. Finally, at the Board meeting of June 16, 1964, much to the surprise of those present, it was reported that the racial census had already been taken and now the only question was whether the Board would permit it to be made public. Repeatedly, the administration was asked without result for data on the racial makeup of the schools.

On April 13, 1965, Dr. Spears appeared before the Board to request that he be permitted to cooperate with a pending investigation of the

San Francisco school system by the California Fair Employment Practices Commission which was moving in response to allegations of discrimination against Negro teachers. This time no objection to "thinking in terms of race" was raised and the Superintendent without discussion was given the permission he requested.

On August 3, 1965, the Superintendent finally yielded and asked the Board for permission to make public the administration's racial headcount. The Board was now involved in several different investigations, including two separate ones under the auspices of the U. S. Office of Education. It had apparently become obvious to the Superintendent that, whatever his feelings about the desirability of making public such a headcount, it would sooner or later be published and he was better off yielding gracefully. Accordingly, he asked permission to reveal the statistics. At the same time, the Board, in response to the growing pressure, reactivated the Ad Hoc Committee which had been dormant since the filing of its report somewhat over two years before.

#### THE HAIGHT-ASHBURY PLAN

About the time the renewed pressure for a racial census arose in the city-wide battle over racial imbalance, another area of conflict was beginning in the Haight-Ashbury district. In March of 1965, Daniel Knapp, a Professor of English at San Francisco State College, was becoming most dissatisfied with the educational situation in the Dudley Stone Elementary School. Seven years earlier when he moved into what was then an optional district between Dudley Stone and Twin Peaks, he decided to send his eldest children to Dudley Stone because he felt that it was just as good a school educationally, and that its higher degree of integration would give his children a more meaningful experience.

Over the years, Mr. Knapp saw Dudley Stone change from an integrated middle-class school to a predominantly Negro, lower-class one. Moreover, he had seen what to him appeared to be an unpleasant racial climate developing in the school, a climate which he might have been more willing to accept had he felt the school authorities were combatting it sufficiently. Apart from race, he was most disturbed about the education in the Dudley Stone School. It appeared to him that it lacked sufficient technical teaching aids, that the widely disparate socioeconomic status of the student body had caused an enormous range of abilities in

individual classrooms, and most of all, that the over-rigidity<sup>5</sup> of the elementary school teaching lacked the necessary flexibility to take advantage of a student's interest when it arose and often prevented them from spending enough time on the things that were most important for their students' continued development.

Knapp consulted with others in the Haight-Ashbury district who were also dissatisfied with the educational situation in the schools and proceeded to draw up a plan. In essence, it called for a Princeton Plan for the top three grades of the elementary schools in the Haight-Ashbury district: the Grattan and Laguna Honda Schools would be considered as a unit and operate with Dudley Stone. The Dudley Stone fourth and lower fifth grades would be divided and bused to Grattan and Laguna Honda while at the same time the Grattan and Laguna Honda upper fifth and sixth graders would be bused to Dudley Stone. Knapp saw many advantages to such a plan: it would unfreeze the curriculum and thus permit increased specialization; it would enable a clearer differentiation by ability; it would equalize the opportunities of the relatively rich and poor; and it would mix racial populations after age nine. As far as Knapp was concerned, the only disadvantage to such a plan was that it would involve "a fair amount of busing, about one-half again, perhaps twice as much as is now going on."

On May 21, 1965, Knapp and several other members of the community appeared in the administration office for a meeting with the Superintendent of the Elementary Division. Apparently the meeting accomplished little, and Knapp later said, "We wanted to talk about education and all they could talk about was the political situation in San Francisco and what one could get away with." In a memo a participant noted:

They need supporting data. Spoke of "no precedent" for this type of plan in urban areas . . . They indicated their sensitivity to community pressures and stated that they must do what the community asks them to do . . . They made a strong point that however they might feel about our plan, they could do nothing about it without strong pressure, and popular support and demand.

That summer, when racial figures were released, both the Haight-Ashbury parents and the School Board began playing the numbers game. Rather than using the racial balance attained in the last three grades of the

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5. The story is told of a former Assistant Superintendent who looked at his watch one morning and said proudly, "It's 9:35 in the morning. In every fourth grade in the city—fractions."

three elementary schools involved, which were the only grades subject to Knapp's plan, the Board used the entire school enrollment as a basis—thus minimizing the effect of Knapp's plan in those areas where it was actually to be tried. Thus, the Board claimed that Knapp's plan would reduce the Negro enrollment at Dudley Stone from 66 to 56% (instead of 43%, which would be the percentage in the upper three grades), increase Grattan percentage from 37 to 41% (instead of 50%), and increase the Laguna Honda percentage from 5 to 18% (instead of 40%).

The Haight-Ashbury group was, of course, outraged by the Board's figures. In addition, they resented the Board's commenting only on the racial aspect of the Knapp plan thus implying that race was the only thing the group was interested in.

The Board meeting of November 16, 1965, was scheduled to be the occasion of the Haight-Ashbury Council's big push for the adoption of Knapp's plan. They prepared and duplicated a written statement which Knapp planned to deliver to the Board. However, the group received a rude jolt, for the first item on the Board's agenda was the discussion of whether to apply ESEA (Elementary and Secondary Education Act) money from the state of California for a compensatory education program in deprived areas whereby class size would be sharply cut and special helps brought in. The Board voted to apply for the funds.

Last on the agenda was to be Dr. Spears' report entitled *A Progress Report of the Administrative Staff Committee on Efforts to Correct Racial Imbalance*, and then Dr. Knapp's presentation would be heard. But things did not happen this way. Before either of these presentations could take place, another dispute erupted—one which shows the complexity of the racial problem in San Francisco.

The dispute involved the parents of the Bayview section whose school was in atrocious repair and although it was 80% Negro, they wished a new neighborhood school. The Board, however, took the view that any school built on that site would become a de facto segregated school and that they not only did not want to build one there but felt that perhaps they did not even have the legal authority to do so. This the Bayview parents looked upon as discrimination. They carried placards and threatened demonstrations if they did not get their school. All in all it was a noisy and time-consuming discussion. As a result, Knapp did not get to present his report, and as the Haight-Ashbury delegation was preparing to leave the auditorium, someone from the audience asked whether the school administration's (Dr. Spears') report

was already printed. The answer was yes, and the Board agreed to distribute the report for study before the next meeting. The report disapproved the Knapp plan, stating:

The Staff does not recommend the adoption of this plan. It is felt that in principle the plan has some characteristics of merit but Staff is not recommending any plan requiring the interchange of pupils. This plan calls for planned interchange of pupils among the schools affected, thus resulting in what the Staff considers unnecessary movement of children from their neighborhood schools.

As if this were not enough of a blow, the report spelled out the details of the ESEA program noted earlier that evening. Essentially, it involved cutting class size at four schools drastically and as a result, since classrooms would then of course be in short supply, busing out the "excess" children. Since this busing was to occur because of "overcrowding of schools," both Board policy and the California Regulations implementing the ESEA program required that the busing increase racial balance in the city.

The Haight-Ashbury parents could take this news with equanimity. They had heard of compensatory programs and they knew this was the sort of thing that was done. However, they were surprised, indeed astounded, when upon reading further they discovered that one of the four schools selected for the ESEA program was Dudley Stone. The nearby and heavily Negro Twin Peaks annex to which the sixth grade was already being bused was to be discontinued as a receiving school, and the fifth as well as the sixth grade from Dudley Stone would now be transported to four other schools. These were Francis Scott Key, a 3% Negro school in the almost all-white Sunset District, about as far from Dudley Stone as it was possible to get in San Francisco; the Laguna Honda School nearby which had figured in Knapp's plan; the Lawton School which was 1% Negro adjacent to Francis Scott Key, and the Miraloma School, a 6% Negro school on the other side of Twin Peaks, a long drive from Dudley Stone over winding roads.

At the next Board meeting on December 7, 1965, after the official submission of the staff report, Mr. Knapp rose to address the Board. He was no longer attempting to persuade the Board to adopt the Haight-Ashbury plan—the time had passed for that. Now he was attacking Dr. Spears' plan pointing out that it destroyed all hope for improvements in teaching, and that it would discriminate against the poorer and least-equipped children by making them the sole victims of a profitless busing

program. Furthermore, Dr. Spears' plan under the ESEA required more than three times as much busing as his Haight-Ashbury plan.

The advocates of Knapp's plan did not confine their entreaties to the Board of Education. Since the Board had only applied for ESEA funds, it was still possible that the application might be rejected, thus allowing a reconsideration of the Haight-Ashbury plan on its merits. The Haight-Ashbury group made telephone calls, wrote letters, and exerted as much pressure as they could, but to no avail. The ESEA funds were approved in time to be put into effect at the beginning of the spring term in February.

The implementation of the ESEA program in Dudley Stone by no means ended the contention there, and irate parents even organized a "demonstration boycott" for the first day of the new term. Despite what everyone agrees to have been strenuous effort on the part of the school administration to make sure that the bused children were well-received in their host schools, many of the Dudley Stone parents felt their children were ill-treated. The parents resented the fact that only their children were bused while no white children were; they resented the label of culturally-deprived and what they considered the patronizing host-guest relationship in their children's new schools; and they felt that the long bus trip (approximately three-quarters of an hour in most cases) deprived their children of being a part of the schools to which they were sent. Perhaps all of this could have been tolerated if they really believed the Board was out to secure them the benefits of integration. The term, however, that they used was "token integration"—all they thought the Board wanted was to have their black bodies adorn the otherwise lily-white schools so that the school district could point to racial statistics.

As for Daniel Knapp, shortly after the complete defeat of the Haight-Ashbury plan, he and his five school-age children moved from San Francisco to the overwhelmingly white suburb of Mill Valley.