

i.e., standing at attention). The decision to launch an uprising in Warsaw was prompted by the installation of the pro-Soviet Lublin committee, and it was directed politically at Stalin's aspirations.

Fifth, although I do not know how John Connelly got the percentages he provides (780), if we assume that they more or less represent historical realities, then, yes, I wish we could have improved the survival rate of Poland's Jews by 5 percent (this is, after all, more than 160,000 people!).

Sixth, extant sources dealing with the participation of Poles in the Nazi genocide have rarely been used by scholars. A rare exception is the first volume of *Wokół Jedwabnego*, edited by Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak (2002) and the article "Udział Polaków w zbrodniach na Żydach na prowincji regionu świętokrzyskiego" in the new journal *Zagłada Żydów*, no. 1 (2005): 114–47. According to authors Alina Skibińska and Jakub Petelewicz, everyday life in the rural areas differed much from the "heroic" picture painted by post-war historians. In fact, people were terrorized—but rather by the Polish Police who acted "very independently" from their Nazi German command; generally, the court files attest to a lot of demoralization.

Furthermore, if we look at the results of new research it seems that it was not simply (and not only) terror that made Poles want to cooperate but the expectation of making a financial gain or of harming someone out of envy (see Barbara Engelking, "Szanowny panie gispa" *Donosy do władz niemieckich w Warszawie i okolicach w latach 1940–1941*, 2003).

As to Piotr Wandycz's remarks, I would like to restate once again that in my opinion a neutral, scientifically useful "clear definition of collaboration" does not exist. The case of Poland shows that the debate was politically charged at the time and continued to be so in the postwar period. So let us instead deconstruct the concept of collaboration (and its alleged absence!). Historians would do better to integrate the persecution of the Jews into an overall social history of Poland, its regions and localities, during the occupation. Władysław Bartoszewski's standpoint is, it seems to me, fairly well known, so I did not feel the need to repeat it. But this does not mean that I do not appreciate his development from a very young adherent of Zofia Kossak and her views on Jewish affairs—to a later advocate of reconciliation between Jews and Poles! Also, the Nazis' persecution of the Roman Catholic Church has been dealt with extensively. The problem is that the picture is incomplete (see Dariusz Libionka, "Antisemitism, Anti-Judaism, and the Polish Catholic Clergy during the Second World War," in Robert Blobaum, ed., *Anti-Semitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland*, 2005, 233–64). A reader should also bear in mind that my article was essentially written in 2003 so that one should not expect to find references to texts published simultaneously (like the Polish historians' debate Wandycz recommends).

To sum it up: one gets the impression that the critics quoted above have stopped short in their perception of historical research many years ago. Their arguments do not differ from those put forward by Polish exile historian Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki in the late 1960s.

Let me end with a remark on Wandycz's charge concerning "mental predispositions." I think historians who reflect on their own position toward the subject of their enquiry do well. As a scholar born, educated, and (partially) trained in Germany, I actually feel the need to explain why I and some of my colleagues are so intrigued by Polish contemporary history and wish to compare developments there to those in Germany (see my "Deutsche Stimmen zur 'Jedwabne'-Debatte in Polen: Eine Bilanz," *Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung* 6, no. 2 (2005): 8–41). And I concur with John Connelly's appeal to "look beyond Poland"—but I insist on doing so only *after* we have re-examined the state of our knowledge and have formulated the right questions.

KLAUS-PETER FRIEDRICH  
Marburg, Germany

Professor Connelly replies:

Anna Cienciala is onto something when she writes that I dispute Poles' claim to "national pride." My piece was entitled "Why the Poles Collaborated So Little—And Why That Is No Reason for Nationalist Hubris," but I originally wanted to use the word *pride* rather than *hubris*. I held back because I imagined that there is something like "healthy national pride." Upon further reflection, however, I am convinced that there is no such thing.

In part I am returning to convictions inculcated in Catholic schools: that pride is foremost among the deadly sins and that the good we accomplish is inspired and enabled by the Almighty. But there are also mundane questions of logic: why should we feel pride for things other people have accomplished? And if we do, why should those other people happen to speak our language and share our background? I was born in northeast Philadelphia. Does that give me a special right to feel pride for a local hero, say Al Schmid, winner of the Navy Cross (played by John Garfield in the 1945 film *Pride of the Marines*)? Is it because Schmid and I walked the same sidewalks, spoke with the same Philly twang, ate the same local delicacies (if one can call scrapple a delicacy)?

More difficult questions follow: if I feel “proud” of “my” local hero, how much shame does common background oblige me to feel? This concern, in particular, arose recently when the Giants played the Phillies. But how much shame do I have to endure for Philadelphia’s notorious sports fans before getting back to feeling some healthy pride?

In practice of course, we tend not to dwell upon the shameful things produced by “our” group. The Kowalskis of the world derive their sense of group identity primarily from good things in the Polish past—like Polish resistance to the Nazis—just as the Smiths think of the Battle of Britain, and the Kovalevs of the victory at Stalingrad. But if this is “national pride” then, to put it mildly, the nation involved is not a civic nation: it is an ethnic nation, of people who imagine themselves within the same culture or bloodline. Helmut Kohl’s notion of “Gnade der späten Geburt” comes to mind—in a very different sense than he intended, but no less unfortunate. National pride involves selectively picking off the best fruits of a group’s past, while ignoring the less savory, or attributing those poisons to some other miscreants.

I am not saying that historians should ignore the heroic deeds of past generations. But we cannot simply honor and celebrate, we must also try to understand. What made the solidarity and self-sacrifice of those generations possible? Here we get to Cienfala’s question about choice: of course many Poles *chose* to resist the Nazis. (In my article I write: “Poland was the first country to say no to Hitler,” 773.) But they chose under conditions over which they had little control: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please” (“The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx Engels Reader*, 2d ed. [1978], 595).

The importance of historical context in shaping individual choice was inescapable in my comparative study of east European universities under Stalinism. In some national contexts academics showed greater solidarity in confronting the communist assault. In Poland professors were less likely to join communist organizations or denounce fellow academics than professors elsewhere. Why? Unless we imagine greater virtue inhering in the Polish ethnos—and I do consider failure to behave opportunistically a virtue—then we must search for contextual explanations.

In my piece I also sought to understand the context behind the Poles’ greater likelihood of resisting Nazism: an almost transcendent Polish attachment to sovereignty, and the cyclical dynamics of racial war unleashed by the Nazi attack.

None of this means that we should not honor Poles who defied Nazism and Stalinism. After all, they could have “lain low” as many other Poles did. But I do not see why some special national pride accrues to Polish-speakers born generations later. By this logic, we could *all* simply bow our heads when recalling events like the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. The same would apply, of course, to ethnic Jews and the “national pride” they may feel over the 1943 Ghetto Uprising: this was an event that should both inspire and be honored by every human being.

There is a practical argument for this ethical preference: less heroism will be required of future generations if, instead of swelling with pride at the mention of conationals’ heroism, they feel humbled. Humility is not threatening. National pride, by contrast, needs to be enforced and guarded. It is exclusive, and as such, bears the seeds of conflict. (I am aware that, human nature being what it is, people will begin arguing over who has cause for greater humility. That does not make pride a virtue.)

A postethnic—to use David Hollinger’s term—approach toward heroism is, by contrast, necessarily inclusive. We can all feel humbled by Al Schmid, or by fighters of the Home Army or the Jewish Fighting Organization. And why confine ourselves to the battlefield? John Garfield was kept out of the military because of a bad heart, but opposed

(and died an early death because of) McCarthyism. I myself feel humbled by the sacrifices of my grandparents in the Great Depression (at one point my grandfather sold apples while providing for eight children), or by friends in socialist Poland who managed to bring up sizable families in two-room (not two-bedroom!) apartments. And why exclude scholarship? Throughout the postwar period dozens of individuals from the Soviet Union and east central Europe arrived on our soil often with little more than the shirts on their backs, but as a rule with huge stocks of cultural capital. They have made our field, and two of them, who have now joined this debate on collaboration, continue to enrich it in special ways.

But unlike Piotr Wandycz and Cienciala, I continue to value the intervention of Klaus-Peter Friedrich that kicked off this debate. As in the case of Jan T. Gross's *Neighbors*, the person who unearths questions long buried by common assumptions will hardly do so in ways welcomed by the local community. Friedrich is a *Ruhestörer* in the best tradition of our profession.

JOHN CONNELLY  
University of California, Berkeley

Dr. Martin Dean chooses not to respond.

To the Editor:

In "Every Family Has Its Freak': Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943–1948" (*Slavic Review* 64, no. 4), Jeffrey W. Jones notes that "in the postwar years the line between heroes and villains in the Soviet Union remained unclear, with some unjustly repressed and several decorated heroes later revealed as betrayers of the Soviet cause" (749). Yet he goes on to note that "there were widespread anti-Soviet sentiments among the cossack population of Ukraine and the lower Don region" and that "many of them served as policemen for the Germans" (750–51n17), effectively negating his earlier perception of the difficulty of making any such assertion. Toward the end of his essay, Jones again notes that "there were strong anti-Soviet sentiments among the Don cossacks" (770). To support this contention, he relies entirely on one page of my book published in 1998, which does not in fact mention "strong," "widespread" "anti-Soviet sentiments" (*Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s*, 1998, 283).

That collaboration took place does not necessarily mean that "strong," "widespread" "anti-Soviet sentiments" existed. Based on what we know about collaboration, we can draw no direct link between repression and collaboration or between "anti-Soviet sentiments" and collaboration. This is a point that Tanja Penter makes in her contribution "Collaboration on Trial: New Source Material on Soviet Postwar Trials against Collaborators," referring to the same page of my book that Jones uses to reach a rather different conclusion! As Jones demonstrates, Soviet documents purport to show that many traitors were former kulaks or formerly repressed people or those whose relatives had been repressed, had fought in the Petriula (Ukrainian National) or White Armies, or had a history of anti-Soviet activity. Recent research suggests that some of these allegations were indeed true, for example, the case of S. (E.). V. Pavlov, a former Don cossack ataman (K. M. Aleksandrov, "Kazachestvo Rossii vo vtoroi mirovoi voine: K istorii sozdaniia Kazachego Stana [1942–1943 gg.]," *Novyi chasovoi*, no. 5 [1997]: 163–64) and another Don cossack, I. N. Kononov, a Communist Party member since 1929, three of whose brothers were executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918, 1934, and 1937 (K. M. Aleksandrov, *Ofiterskii korpus armii general-leitnanta A. A. Vlasova 1944–1945*, 2001, 174–77). Kononov, the only Vlasov army general who was able to escape Soviet capture, was a Communist Party member from 1929 to 1941 (K. M. Aleksandrov, "Kazachestvo Rossii v 1941–1943 gg.: Neizvestnye stranitsy istorii," *Novyi chasovoi*, no. 3 [1995]: 91). (Oddly, Jones does not even mention these cases.) Among the famous Vlasov army officers, there were also those who had been repressed under the Soviet regime, for example, T. I. Domanov (Aleksandrov, *Ofiterskii korpus*, 137–41). Yet recent research also demonstrates that the picture is much more complex than a simple "repression-collaboration" formula.

Take the case of the Vlasov army leaders. Only two of the twelve tried by the Soviet Union in 1946 with the famous Red Army general turned Nazi collaborator, A. A. Vlasov, had been repressed under the Soviet regime: V. F. Malyshkin and V. I. Mal'tsev who were