

Alps, to describe a prayer that had *become* silent, and that (c) efforts made by Bosseut and Battifol (and incidentally taken over by Dom H. Leclercq in his very inadequate article on the subject in *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie et de Liturgie*) to explain the matter by speculating on derivations from *secernere*, are unnecessary and unsupported by any documents. It is in this way that Fr Jungmann is able to say the last word on certain matters (the *Kyrie* is another instance) that have long been disputed.

Finally, Fr Jungmann shows a complete mastery of liturgies other than the Roman, and is in the line of great comparative liturgiologists such as the late Dr Baumstark (it was a weakness in Edmund Bishop that his knowledge was narrow if deep) who insisted that many matters concerning the Roman rite could not be understood without reference to other liturgies. We are happy to note that Dr Adrian Fortescue's study on the Mass, which is in the same tradition, gets honourable mention although it is now forty years old.

To review *Missarum Sollemnia* properly one would need an erudition as great as the author's, and scholars are already discussing minor points and no doubt checking his references. We wish them joy of it. But perhaps we have said sufficient to show the unique value of this study of the Mass, and in particular the usefulness of the French translation. In this we regret to note a large number of misprints, principally of proper names. It has the tremendous advantage, however, of being cheaper than either the German or the English editions.

J. D. CRICHTON

JOHN LOCKE. By D. J. O'Connor. (Penguin Books; 2s. 6d.)

BERKELEY. Philosophical Writings, selected and edited by T. E. Jessop. (Nelson's Philosophical Texts; 10s. 6d.)

In many respects Mr O'Connor has written an excellent introduction to the philosophy of John Locke. The fact that he restates Locke's arguments in contemporary terminology is in the main an asset, as it relates Locke's position to the kind of problem the modern student discusses. This means that Locke impinges in a vital manner on the reader and that he is not treated as a mere period piece. None the less, in Mr O'Connor's hands the method has two serious disadvantages. First, it leads him to dismiss as unimportant the historically interesting development of Locke's treatment of substance which begins from a pure phenomenological analysis in the 'First Draft' of the Essay and later shows evidence of an increasing 'metaphysical' interest. Secondly, Mr O'Connor has his own very strongly expressed philosophical opinions. These intrude themselves into his interpretation in a very dogmatic manner. We are told that Aristotle's subject-predicate logic has been 'disposed of'; this is hardly the case; see, for instance, 'On the Philosophical Interpretation of Logic' (by P.

Banks. *Dominican Studies*, Vol. III, No. 2). Again, the discussion of terms by appeal to ostensive definition or conventional rule has proved valuable, but it can only be philosophic if it does not assume a dogmatic form which rejects as trivial or uninteresting topics which, rightly or wrongly, engage the attention of other thinkers. Mr O'Connor falls very frequently into the trap to which the use of such words as 'trivial' exposes philosophers.

The volume on Berkeley contains a number of selections (with useful notes) from Berkeley's major works. As one would expect, Professor Jessop has selected these passages with discrimination. His Introduction is of great value, especially in its discussion of Berkeley's realism.

IAN HISLOP, O.P.

TIME AND ETERNITY. An essay in the philosophy of religion. By W. T. Stace (Princeton University Press; Geoffrey Cumberlege; 20s.)

The central point of this essay is that the conflict between science and religion can be resolved if it is denied that religious language has a conceptual content. All statements about God are false when understood in a naturalistic (literal) sense; but they symbolise the intuitions of religious men and enable these to be communicated somewhat as aesthetic experience is communicated. 'The symbol does not mean, but evokes, the experience. For a meaning is, in strictness, a concept; whereas here there is no concept.' Professor Stace reaches this conclusion after examining the elements common to Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam: a process that would drive anyone to symbolism. A study of one of the mystics in our own Western tradition, or even a more careful reading of St Thomas (whose support for the opinion is so oddly claimed in the Preface of the book), would have cleared up this confusion, and perhaps many others, in Professor Stace's thought.

We have to grasp that the mode in which things exist in reality is not that in which we are bound, by our human limitations, to think of them. This is especially necessary, insists St Thomas, when we speak of God: we use many concepts to signify a being whom we know to be utterly simple. (*S.T.* I, 13.) The concepts are drawn from our knowledge of created beings, but there are some which can be freed from reference to creatures and said of God, though this does not bring us a step nearer to having a concept of him, or to comprehending him.

Such analogical thinking is possible because there is a bond between creatures and their creator; this is an 'intuition of religious minds' that Professor Stace is unwilling to accept. Hence his rejection of metaphysics and theology, which lie (in the orders of nature and grace) between naturalism and the direct experience of God—'the literalist error', he says, 'has been an almost universal phenomenon among philosophers in all ages'. It is certain that image and symbol have a large part to play in the communication of revelation, and no doubt some mystical experience is