



The frames imposed by the thematic focus of each of the core chapters go some way to addressing this. Finlay's treatment of the historiographical legacy of the past is thought-provoking, particularly his identification of Irish comparators and competing historical schools of thought in nationalist groups (e.g. Celticists, devolutionists, etc.). The chapter on nationalism wisely begins with Scottish nationalists' equivocation on their relationship with other European movements and highlights the nationalisms they embraced and eschewed (sometimes simultaneously). While fascinating, it does not get us any closer to a stable philosophical understanding of Scottish nationalism; indeed, it only serves to prove its contingent status. Similarly, the chapter on constitutionalism offers nourishing food for thought. Finlay, like other writers on this topic, asserts the significance of popular sovereignty arguments even among those nationalists and unionists who used the specific terms of the Union settlement to hold various governments to account. Beliefs in both popular and parliamentary sovereignty were not incompatible it seems. But which (if either) was simply a political tactic and which the goal? After all, the aim of most was a Scottish parliament, not a diffused commonwealth; an assembly, not anarchy. Bringing together questions of sovereignty, civil society, the legal system, and the Union makes sense, and it works here at least historically (the chapter covers the best part of a hundred years). But by demonstrating that the answers generated by nationalists did not always cohere, shifted over time, and were regularly contradictory again serves to undermine the idea that what we are dealing with goes beyond simple political opportunism.

One wonders if the historical narrative style adopted by Finlay is best suited to his aim to reframe the development of nationalism in philosophical terms. One waits for the unambiguous Q.E.D. moment that histories can seldom deliver. And yet, Finlay's objective is worthwhile. The Labour hegemony in Scottish politics along with the party's unionist presumptions, which lasted much of the twentieth century, became, in Colin Kidd's words in *Union and Unionism* (2008), "banal" (23), and generated a lazy historiography at times. The rise of the SNP in the twenty-first century promises to do the same, by either encouraging the re-writing of Labour's past as its own, or simply adding to various victimologies the 2014 Referendum as (yet another) wrong to be righted (yet another) so-called Scottish defeat to be revenged. Anything that takes analyses of Scottish politics, past and present, beyond that is to be welcomed.

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Kate Imy. *Faithful Fighters: Identity and Power in the British Indian Army*

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Kate Imy's *Faithful Fighters: Identity and Power in the British Indian Army* is a fascinating account of military policy and psychology in South Asia from 1900 to 1940. Imy demonstrates that the British were deeply concerned about the loyalty of the Indian army as the empire struggled to cope with escalating geopolitical and economic competition. The British understood that their rule in India ultimately depended upon the loyalty of the armed forces and that

this essential political resource could easily erode as it had in 1857–8. The difference was that in the 1900s the threats to that loyalty came from the region's political awakening, the advent of mass politics, and the increasingly clear sense that British power was waning.

The British strategy, brought out lucidly by Imy, sought to ensure the loyalty of the Indian military through three broad policies. First, the idea of the *loyal* and *honorable* Sikh and Muslim soldier, untouched by the subversive and unmanly proclivities of Bengalis and Biharis (who had rebelled in 1857) was fiercely propagated and reinforced. Second, within the context of colonial economic scarcity and enforced underdevelopment, the soldiers were a pampered class—with land allocations, priority in rations, medical care, and (eventually) educational opportunities available to them on terms far more favorable than the rest of the subject population. And third, as demands for reform intensified, and local leaders demanded Indianization of the officer corps, the British responded with periodic concessions.

It is, of course, a matter of some postcolonial embarrassment and more than a little amnesia, that the territories that presently comprise Pakistan along with the Sikhs, proved immensely helpful in crushing the 1857–8 rebellion. Indeed, without the support of the Muslim and Sikh notables of the Punjab, the British would probably have lost in 1857–8 and been driven out of large parts of South Asia. In the years after the British victory, major changes to the recruitment policy were made, built around the flattering myth of the naturally martial Sikh and Muslim soldier. This was, of course, complete nonsense given that the British had conquered India using primarily Hindu soldiers from Bengal, Bihar, and Madras, and that these men had bested the martial northwesterners in the Anglo-Sikh wars. But that didn't matter as the loyalty of the soldiery of the Punjab needed to be rewarded. This set the stage for concentrated recruitment of the post-1857 Indian army from select communities in and around the Punjab. The Sikhs were, proportionately, the greatest beneficiaries, as while they accounted for less than one percent of British India's population they became about twenty percent of the enlisted men in the peacetime Indian army. The Muslims came second after the Sikhs, accounting for about half of the enlisted men, with other communities making up the remaining one-third. Of the remainder, the Nepali Gurkha contingent was an elite force—a distinctly foreign legion set apart from the rest of the army including other Hindu soldiers.

This laudable exercise in affirmative action had tangible benefits as well. Other than the regular pay and pension, benefits like land allocations were to be had. But perhaps the greatest advantage was that the soldiers were often recruited from families who already had servicemen. Thus, the soldiers were able to protect their status along intergenerational lines, becoming a hereditary military caste of sorts. As Imy explains, the implications of loyalty to the salt, or, conversely, disloyalty, were severe. This was especially true of military families who had been on the state payroll for generations. For them, it was a matter of an almost personal loyalty to the British sovereign, whose salt they and their families had consumed for generations, to serve when called upon. To avoid doing so would be against family tradition and personal honor. The fact that the British went the extra mile to accommodate the cultural and religious sensitivities of their Muslim and Sikh soldiers (while bemoaning the fussiness of the Hindus) further reinforced this sense of loyalty.

While it was remarkable that the British were able to build an organizationally modern army using semi-feudal means of ensuring their soldiers' loyalty, things were changing from WWI onwards. Nationalism, mass-communalism, democracy, socialism, and liberalism, were all words that would have meant little to South Asians in 1860. But, by 1920, millions of South Asian had become sufficiently riled up in adherence to one or more of these concepts, that it was inevitable that the soldiers would be affected. Demands from local leaders for a broader-based recruitment and allowing Indians into the officer corps on equal terms could no longer be ignored. Imy explores in detail the debates around the

Raj's responses to these demands and the policy adopted of slowly accommodating the pressure in a manner intended to extend for as long as possible overall British control of the Indian military.

Where Imy's *Faithful Fighters* truly shines is in how it combines the micro with the macro. Without losing sight of the big picture, the details of soldiers' lives, their aspirations, and responses, are brought forth in vivid detail. In achieving this, Imy has made an enduring contribution to the historical literature on colonial South Asia. One hopes that Imy finds a wide audience and continues to excavate the colonial period.

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Helen Johnston, Barry Godfrey and David J. Cox. *Penal Servitude: Convicts and Long-Term Imprisonment, 1853–1948*

States, People, and the History of Social Change. London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2022. Pp. 272. \$130.00 (cloth).

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Penal Servitude: Convicts and Long-Term Imprisonment, 1853–1948 is an important book that will be essential reading for scholars interested in the history of punishment in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and how and why this history matters now. It adds nuance and depth to our understanding of incarceration and penal transportation by providing a detailed narrative and analysis of the operation and experience of the convict prison system under the Penal Servitude Acts of 1853 and 1857. As Helen Johnston, Barry Godfrey, and David J. Cox explain in their opening introduction, penal servitude was a sentence of long-term imprisonment during which prisoners journeyed through a progressive system, dependent on time served, behavior, and compliance. They moved from separate to associated confinement and labor, and ultimately conditional release. We learn that the acts owed a debt to the “towering figure” (25) of Joshua Jebb and were accompanied by a new prison estate in London and the south of England. They also enveloped older model prisons such as Pentonville, Portland, and perhaps most famously, Dartmoor. The 1853 Act came in the wake of the increasing employment of prisoners on public works labor and overlapped with other forms of punishment, including the continued use of transportation. The 1857 Act sounded the “death knell” (44) for the abolition of the latter, removing it as a judicial sentence. From this date on, prisoners shipped to the hulks of Bermuda and Gibraltar or to Western Australia were transported under sentences of penal servitude, not transportation. Note also that a key feature of penal servitude was the implementation of a system of release on license. Following a major review in 1878 (the Kimberley Commission), penal servitude continued, and though the Gladstone Commission of 1895 ushered in changes regarding the “balance between deterrence and rehabilitation” (182) it remained in use until 1948. A key proposition put forward by Johnston, Godfrey, and Cox is that the sentence and its infrastructure have left an “enduring legacy” in the criminal justice system today (9).