

documentation and presents a beautiful and rare collection. (Mark Nuttall, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, Lensfield Road, Cambridge CB2 1ER UK.)

THE SOUTH AMERICAN WAY

STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHERN OCEANS. A SOUTH AMERICAN VIEW. Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. 1989. London, Pinter Publications (Studies in Contemporary Maritime Policy and Strategy). 155 p, maps, hard cover. ISBN 0-86187-017-4. £32.50.

Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, an Argentinian, read Latin American Studies and Strategic Studies in the UK, taught Military Strategy to the Argentine War Schools and Joint Chiefs of Staff 1984–87, and has been a visiting professor in the USA and at King's College London. Examining strategies of South American countries in relation to each other and to Antarctica, she stresses their own interests in the south, which are neither widely known nor generally understood outside the sub-continent.

Implications of two important maritime issues are analyzed; Bolivian efforts to obtain an outlet to the Pacific Ocean, and the long-lasting dispute over the South Atlantic islands (including the Falklands/Malvinas Islands) and Antarctica. The latter is an important factor in Argentinian-Brazilian relationships. Brazilian geopoliticians support the 'frontage theory' (*defrontação*) of Brazilian geographer Therezinha de Castro, which postulates that each South American country facing the Antarctic should own the sector of Antarctic territory facing its unobstructed coastline. Understandably this appeals also in Uruguay, Peru and Ecuador, which would gain Antarctic territory from its implementation, but is vehemently discredited in Chile and Argentina, who would lose large portions of their present claims.

The Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 represented competition with an outside country for influence and control of the South Atlantic and Antarctic Peninsula. Latin American treaties important in this area are the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty of 1947) and the (1967) Tlatelolco Treaty, which excluded nuclear weapons from Latin America. As the Rio Treaty covers the South American sector of the South Atlantic as far as the South Pole, Argentina, and Chile can reasonably claim that their treaty responsibilities extend into the Antarctic. So can Brazil argue its responsibility under the Treaty to defend a sizeable portion of the South Atlantic and Antarctica.

Other South Atlantic conflicts considered by Gamba-Stonehouse include (1) The struggle for presence and influence in Antarctica, because the South Atlantic controls access to important sections, especially Antarctic Peninsula; (2) The Argentine-Chile Beagle Channel dispute, in which Argentina strongly resists Chilean penetration into the South Atlantic; Vatican mediation secured uneasy peace in 1985; (3) Law of the Sea disputes among littoral states over new Exclusive Economic Zones. The

author argues that international relations may return to a system balancing South Atlantic states (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) against South Pacific (Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador).

The book concludes with a consideration of perceived strategic values of the Western South Atlantic. The sea is beginning to represent a new dimension for South America, of high strategic value. This is a highly recommended review, and a good source-book for comparative research in Latin America policies. The maps will be invaluable to lecturers on Latin American relations and Antarctica. (Julie Schmied, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, Lensfield Road, Cambridge CB2 1ER UK.)

THE FALKLANDS WAR

THE LITTLE PLATOON: DIPLOMACY AND THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE. Charlton, M. 1989. Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 230 p, hard cover. ISBN 0-631-16564-9. £14.95.

For his title Michael Charlton drew on Edmund Burke: for the text of this inspired book he interviewed some 40 people — diplomats, civil servants, ministers of state and humbler politicians, service chiefs of staff, international gurus, UN officials and many others — who were closely involved in events leading up to the Falklands war of 1982 and the conflict itself. His recordings were made in 1985–86 in the UK, Argentina and USA, while memories and alibis were still fresh, and edited down to eight BBC Radio Three programmes. The book uses more of the material, and to excellent effect; the author asked sensible questions, and the answers, whether sensible or not, make a fascinating study of history and legend in the making.

Charlton discloses remarkable facts — for example that the first-ever visit of a British Foreign Secretary to Latin America was made in 1966 — and a deal of muddled thinking among all who were most closely involved in the dispute from the 1960s onward. Did responsible Britons *really* doubt Argentina's determination to acquire the islands, or only their willingness to use force? Did responsible Argentinians *really* expect Mrs Thatcher and the Brits to allow them a successful invasion? Hindsight favours the Americans, whose predictions appear sharpest throughout, and the common-sense view of the British parliament comes over surprisingly strongly. Britain's shambling foreign policies contrast with the professionalism of its armed forces. Admiral Lord Lewin sums it up on the last page: after the invasion 'The chiefs of staff, I think, would have been perfectly within their rights to have said, 'I'm sorry, prime minister, this is the war [the politicians] told us we would not have to fight, and there is nothing we can do to help you''. The author's conclusion that: 'Britain fought a war ... for islands it had spent the better part of twenty years suggesting it did not want' is inescapable. So is his dictum that '... political leaders who avoid the difficult choices face harder ones in the end'. This is an excellent book, strongly recommended