

CITIZEN INTERVIEWS, ORGANIZATIONAL FEEDBACK, AND POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS DECISIONS

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POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS

Police-community relations programs are intended to be long-range, full-scale efforts to acquaint the police and the community with each other's problems and to stimulate action aimed at solving problems; they have been criticized, however, as being concerned mainly with raising the professional image of the police in the minds of the public (President's Commission, 1967a: 100). In some ways, they seem to have functioned to slow down change and to maintain present police policies and practices.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967b: 178) has indicated that some of these policies and practices cannot be justified. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968: 158) comments that some activities of even the most "professional" police departments may heighten tension and enhance the potential for civil disorder.

Although some professionals differentiate between programs such as public relations and crime prevention and "true" community relations, the main thrust has not been on this last

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category, i.e., city-wide advisory councils, neighborhood advisory committees, youth discussion groups, human relations commissions, police-community relations store fronts, etc. Rather, it has been on stop-crime programs and traditional public relations. The effect seems to have been to convince whites that riot contingency plans and anti-riot protections are available or necessary in increased budgets and that crime fighting technology is being improved. For blacks, the police-community relations programs seem aimed at cooling and calming tempers and alleviating frustration. These programs have even been interpreted as reestablishing the "power structure's" value system in the ghetto and politically demonstrating that something is being done for minorities in the city (Robinson, 1969). However well intentioned the personnel involved in these programs may be, the structure of police-community relations programs is often such that real issues are begged.

Program Organization

Generally, police-community relations units or divisions are organized as separate operating units within departments. This arrangement tends to mean that police-community relations are handled by this unit and not on the street by the officers. It also means that police policies that directly contradict, make necessary, and aggravate the work of these special units or programs are not challenged. Further, it means that the patrolman on the street feels "they do the police-community relations; we do police work."

Therefore, by and large, police-community relations programs are criticized as not significantly intertwined with or reactant upon police operations or everyday street policies. No matter how good these programs are, the officers on the beat are the ones that count (Germann, 1968: 27; Bordua, 1968). However, it is not only these patrolmen and their manner, but the tasks and operations they are instructed to carry out as "their job" that are significant (President's Commission, 1967b: 178-193). Police-community relations are in large measure a result of the everyday actions of patrolmen carrying out their duties on the street.

Organizational Feedback Problems

Not only have social scientists paid little attention to analyzing police-community relations, i.e., attitudinal effects of various police practices and policies, but police administrators and planners either have little concern for these consequences

or are ignorant of them. Part of this seeming ignorance or indifference results from the fact that this type of detailed information and feedback is for the most part structurally invisible to police department executives. Only the unorganized public affected has access to this knowledge (Tift and Bordua, 1969). The most basic change necessary for police departments is to conduct research or to create a departmental role which can discover and present detailed information concerning the effect of various police practices on community attitudes so that policy decisions can be made rationally and knowledgeably. The information can make possible decisions which weigh the "costs" and the "gains" of each practice or policy as it is actually operationalized on the street.

THE FIELD STUDY

Since 1967 we have been involved in a descriptive-comparative analysis of the control structures and environments within which police tasks are carried out, and the effects of these systems on the activities and performances of police officers. In our research we have analyzed the control structures of five different units within a large municipal police department. Briefly, we found that alternative control mechanisms (supervision, formal rules, training, etc.) vary in their influence depending on the nature of the task, the social environment of the work, etc., so that the organization, utilizing all of its control mechanisms, must be viewed as having limited and varying weight in influencing members' behavior.

Moreover, we recognized very early in the research that there was such great variation in police operations and attendant divisional and work unit structures that no generalizations about "police supervision" would likely prove meaningful. The entire range of work unit structure described in the organizational literature as obtaining between organizations was observable within a single large department (Tift, 1968). We also realized that non-members of the department (citizens) were also important in influencing the policeman's behavior. All of these considerations led us to focus on observing police-citizen encounters in assessing the implications of alternate modes of supervision and control.

The same strictures concerning variation apply to police-citizen encounters. Whether for purposes of social science analysis or of policy recommendation, the complexity and variety of encounters must be reflected in research procedures. For this reason, observation instruments were constructed which varied

across the five divisions studied: Patrol, Tactical Force, Vice, Traffic, Detective.

Data gathering on these encounters involved the systematic observation of policemen carrying out their everyday activities. Although this observation was carried out in five different departmental divisions, we were particularly interested in the activity of regular patrolmen and Tactical Force officers. This report will focus on these two divisions. In addition to observation of encounters, the study involved interviewing a sample of the individual citizens who had come into actual contact with police officers of the Patrol and Tactical Force in the encounters we observed. Again, slightly different interview instruments were used.

These interviews, which were conducted in the summer of 1968, were intended to provide data on: 1) the kind and degree of selective perceptions of the observers; 2) citizen perceptions and evaluations of the encounter; 3) the kind and degree of behavior-monitoring by citizens; and 4) the effects of different types of police contact and handling on the attitudes of citizens toward the police. It is the latter of these issues that will be dealt with in this paper.

Interview Content and Contact Populations

In addition to requesting a detailed account of what occurred in the observed incident, we also asked interviewed citizens to respond to general "police-community relations" questions which had previously been asked in two separate victim surveys (Reiss, 1967; Biderman, et al., 1967).

Because of our method of selecting interviewees, we were able to identify specific contact populations. The populations contacted by different kinds of police differ greatly and in order to provide information of use to police *line* officials it is necessary to distinguish these contact populations. For such general questions as whether the police are highly reputed in the neighborhood or receive the respect they deserve, it is important to note the difference between populations. Different populations may vary in their attitudes and opinions of the police. In addition to questions of police unit differentiation and consequent creation of different contact populations, the *manner* of the police in these encounters is also crucial.

Similarly, it is important to distinguish different sub-populations of policemen, even though the public often does not make distinctions between uniformed officers assigned to dif-

ferent specialized units within the police department. For example, the citizen stopped for a traffic violation may be dealing with a special traffic officer, a tactical force officer, or a patrolman. Yet from our larger study we noted that the traffic stop is viewed differently by the *officers* assigned to these various units, is handled differently and for different purposes by these different units, and reflects different policing policies.

Patrol and Tactical Force Operations

Patrol officers are involved in the bulk of police-citizen contacts and are the largest segment of any police force. These officers are engaged in patrolling a neighborhood and in answering calls for service. They rarely see a crime in progress. Most of their activity involves handling disturbances between neighbors, domestic disturbances, loud parties, and social service type activities such as aiding sick persons and drunks, etc. In addition, about 20% of their work requires the preliminary investigation and report-taking of a crime that is "cold"; no offender is on the scene. Although Patrol is to some extent involved in traffic violation activity and aggressive preventive patrol, these are mainly left up to other units in the department studied.

In the city studied, the Tactical Force handled aggressive preventive patrol among its other duties. As in other cities, this police department has adopted aggressive preventive patrol in which tactical officers are encouraged *routinely* to stop, question, and search persons on the street or in cars who are unknown to them and who are suspicious looking or acting suspiciously. This type of practice has presented a major problem in police-community relations in several cities. In San Diego, for example, where officers engaged in this type of activity are instructed specifically and at length to give the citizens an explanation and to act courteously, a University of California study found that an explanation is not frequently given (President's Commission 1967b: 158).

Interview Procedure

Citizens who had been involved in observed encounters with patrol or tactical force officers were interviewed—generally in their places of residence. In no case were the observer and the interviewer the same person. The interviewers had had prior experience in observing police operations and were familiar with the city neighborhoods where most of the interviewing was completed. Almost all the interviews in Patrol were con-

ducted by two black interviewers, as the respondents were also mainly black persons. Black persons who had contact with Tactical Force operations were also interviewed by these black interviewers. White respondents contacted in Tactical Force operations were interviewed by white interviewers.

The names and addresses of persons to be interviewed were obtained from the observer's work sheets, compiled during observation periods with the officers. From these sheets a list was compiled of persons whose names and addresses we had, whose encounter was not of an arrest nature, who was not a known criminal, and where the encounter's substantive content was not thought to be of such a personal nature that the interview should be excluded. These strictures resulted in the exclusion of seven Patrol and 27 Tactical Force encounters from the sampling list.

There were and are serious ethical problems involved in doing this interviewing even when making the exclusions mentioned. There are any number of consequences that the interviews might have had such as embarrassment and interference with a respondent's personal life, possible encouragement of further police contact through rekindling their feelings and causing a "beef" to be made against policemen involved, or revelation of knowledge about a police contact to others, e.g., parents of young adults. We strongly attempted to avoid these consequences.

The interviewers made personal contacts—generally within 30 days after the originally observed encounter—and carried a letter of identification, introduction, and authorization with a phone number to call if the interviewee doubted the interviewer's identity and legitimacy. In addition, the interviewer was instructed *not* to pressure anyone into an interview.

In accordance with the larger study's major emphasis on control structures and styles of supervision, the selection of the specific interviewees from the list of those available was made by constructing separate lists of persons observed under different styles of supervision. Because of limited time, a quota sample of persons observed under each different supervisory style observed in the larger field study was drawn. Care was taken to insure that a variety (rather than a select few) of officers were represented in the contacts with interviewees. Table 1 gives the breakdown for the divisions (Patrol and Tactical Force) and the reasons interviews were not completed.

TABLE 1: INTERVIEW COMPLETION BY POLICE DIVISION

| <i>Interview Status</i> | <i>Patrol</i> | | <i>Tactical Force</i> | |
|--|---------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|
| | No. | % | No. | % |
| Sample list | 93 | 100.0 | 120 | 100.0 |
| Persons interviewed | 56 | 60.2 | 42 | 35.0 |
| Refused to cooperate (shut door in face, said, "hell no, none of business") | 4 | 4.3 | 1 | 0.8 |
| No such address; building demolished; non-residential | 4 | 4.3 | 20 | 16.7 |
| Moved; didn't live at address; couldn't locate | 4 | 4.3 | 24 | 20.0 |
| Lived at address but not home; no answer; on vacation | 16 | 17.2 | 12 | 10.0 |
| Didn't remember incident; couldn't speak English | 1 | 1.1 | 2 | 1.7 |
| Address not in city | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 3.3 |
| No contact attempted as quota filled | 8 | 8.6 | 3 | 2.5 |
| No contact attempted as interviewer felt location was too dangerous; feared for his safety if he entered | 0 | 0.0 | 12 | 10.0 |

As is obvious in Table 1, interviews were relatively easy to obtain from the persons observed in Patrol encounters; very few of these persons refused to participate. The cooperation of this group of respondents may be based on the fact that most were women and that most resided at the place where the Patrol encounter occurred. The Tactical Force contactees were, on the other hand, very hard to find and interview; most had been stopped on the street or in their cars and not at their residences. The address for the sampling list was obtained from the driver's license—which could be up to three years old. This sub-population was largely made up of young men who were very mobile. No fewer than 48 persons of 120 on the list were not at the given address. In some cases, no such address existed. In others, the building had been demolished. In other cases, persons had been drafted, moved to another city, etc. With this select population, then, the driver's license is a weak source of information.

We then had an interviewed sample completion rate of 60.2% (56 of 93) in Patrol or a 21.1% sample of all our 266 observed Patrol encounters. In Tactical Force we had an interviewed sample completion rate of 35.0% (42 of 120) or a 12.0% sample of 349 observed encounters.

Comment on Numbers and Procedures

The totals of 56 and 42 completed interviews are painfully small. As will soon be apparent, cell frequencies can fall well below usual limits. We felt, however, that because of the special

nature of the research problems involved and because of the special implications for police policy and administration we should proceed nonetheless. It is for this reason that we have described our procedures in some detail. Adaptation of these procedures for more routine use will pose considerable difficulty.

RESULTS: TACTICAL FORCE ENCOUNTERS

First let us deal with the reactions to Tactical Force activity or aggressive preventive patrol. Working mainly in the high crime areas, these officers (all in our sample were white) were mainly out to get in on felonies and to make arrests. One team stops a car for anything suspicious: wired-on plates, bored-out trunk lock, broken vent window, slouched-down driver, etc. The basic operation is to stop people, question and/or search them and their car, primarily for guns and narcotics.

The population in our *observational* study subject to this type of police contact was 99% males who were generally young—73% between the ages of 16 and 30. The percentage of black persons stopped varies with the areas in which the Tactical Force works in the city. Our study covered two different areas: the percentage of black persons stopped was 91% in one and 20% in the other. The sample interviewed were also young males, having some high school or having completed high school. The 18 minority respondents (15 black and 3 other) tended to be employed at unskilled occupations whereas the 24 whites were equally divided between these categories and white-collar jobs. Of the 18 minority young men, 15 were searched and/or had their car searched. The comparable figure for whites was 14 of 23. For those not searched, the encounter was much like a traffic violation for which they were warned and given a pass. But for those who were searched, this was quite a different experience.

The respondents were asked, "Do you feel the officers had a right to do what they did?" Of those who were searched, 60% of the minority persons said "No" as compared to 30% of the whites. The respondents were also asked what they thought of this type of activity and why the police did it. Of those searched, very few felt that it was "justified," "good," "OK," or "very good"—only four minority and four whites.

Respondents' opinions of the stop and search procedure were varied, but largely negative. Minority members felt: "I didn't like it"; "just one of those things"; "lousy"; "mostly harassment"; "it's O.K. to stop cars, but when they search you,

it makes you feel ashamed before your friends"; "very bad"; "they only do this to Negroes"; "very bad for poor people"; "it's right to check it out, but they went too far."

When asked, "Why they do it?", the minority contactees responded: "Because they have the power to take advantage of people"; "like to show the people that they can do what they want with them"; "because they can get away with it"; "because they think people are uninformed about the law"; "they seem to get a kick out of it"; "harassment, to cause me trouble"; "they enjoy acting and being rough and tough"; "one reason may be looking for people evading the law"; "a percentage is for meanness or a racial thing."

When asked what they thought of this type of activity, of the stop and search procedure, whites felt: "Should have a better reason for making the stop"; "pretty rotten deal, I hadn't broken a law"; "stupid and illegal"; "I didn't feel it is right"; "I don't know, it depends on the individual"; "very good for bad Negro neighborhoods, but I lost a half hour—all baloney"; "good, it could have been a stolen car, but I don't like being searched"; "it was a bit overdone, and humiliating to me being searched"; "don't mind stop and frisk if they explain what they are doing and why."

When asked, "Why they do it?", whites said: "They're paid for it—nothing better to do"; "to prevent an accident"; "probably thought I had done something wrong"; "maybe they could make a name for themselves on the force"; "if I got smart, they could take me in"; "harassment, to cause me some trouble"; "some are sincere in their jobs, feel it's their responsibility"; "cut down on stolen cars, accidents." While neither blacks nor whites liked the stop-and-frisk search incident, whites were more likely to see a possible legitimate reason for the procedure while blacks interpreted it more often as some form of harassment.

The respondents were then asked how they felt after the incident was all over. The data are shown in Tables 2-4.

TABLE 2: TACTICAL FORCE CONTACTS: HOW CITIZEN FELT AFTER THE INCIDENT WAS ALL OVER — BY RACE

| Citizen Felt | All Cases (42) | Race | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------|
| | | Minority (18) | White (24) |
| Satisfied; all right; relieved | 45.2% | 44.4% | 45.8% |
| Embarrassed | 2.4 | 0.0 | 4.2 |
| Frightened; scared; nervous | 14.3 | 5.5 | 20.8 |
| Unhappy; upset | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 |
| Very angry | 21.4 | 33.3 | 12.5 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The question put to the interviewees was open-ended and classification of the answers is not an easy matter. We were particularly concerned about staying as close as possible to the data, while at the same time classifying respondents along a continuum of less to greater "upset" or "anger." This required an ordering of emotional terms that do not fall on a single semantic continuum.

As Table 2 indicates, minority persons were much more likely to be very angry, unhappy, and upset about the encounter than whites. The reaction was also dependent on whether the person was searched or had his car searched, as is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3: TACTICAL FORCE CONTACTS: HOW CITIZEN FELT AFTERWARDS — BY WHETHER SEARCHED

| <i>Citizen Felt</i> | <i>Searched (29)</i> | <i>Not Searched (13)</i> |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| Satisfied; all right; relieved | 34.5% | 69.2% |
| Embarrassed | 3.4 | 0.0 |
| Frightened; scared; nervous | 10.3 | 23.1 |
| Unhappy; upset | 24.1 | 0.0 |
| Very angry | 27.6 | 7.7 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Because of the interrelationships of race and search in these data, Table 4 controls them simultaneously. Here the problem of small numbers becomes obvious because we have only three minority persons who were not searched. In line with our policy of pushing the data for all they may suggest, however, we present Table 4 anyway. The table indicates that being searched still seems to produce more "angry" or "upset" responses in both races. There is also a hint that the minority interviewees seem to react more negatively to search than do the whites, i.e., searched minority members are more likely to give the more angry responses than searched whites.

TABLE 4: TACTICAL FORCE CONTACTS: HOW CITIZEN FELT AFTERWARDS — BY RACE AND SEARCH

| <i>Citizen Felt</i> | <i>Minority</i> | | <i>White</i> | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | <i>Searched (15)</i> | <i>Not Searched (3)</i> | <i>Searched (14)</i> | <i>Not Searched (10)</i> |
| Satisfied; all right; relieved | 40.0% | 66.7% | 28.6% | 70.0% |
| Embarrassed | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.1 | 0.0 |
| Frightened; scared; nervous | 0.0 | 33.3 | 21.4 | 20.0 |
| Unhappy; upset | 20.0 | 0.0 | 28.6 | 0.0 |
| Very angry | 40.0 | 0.0 | 14.3 | 10.0 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The anger of blacks who were searched may be related to perceived racial overtones of the procedure. Sixty-seven percent of the blacks who were searched felt that if they were white, the officers would have treated them differently. It is interesting to note that a similar percentage of whites who were searched (67%) felt that if they were black, the officers would have treated them differently. Many of the whites either said they didn't know if race would have mattered, or agreed with the black respondents that blacks are given a harder time by white officers. Those blacks and whites who were not searched, and presumably viewed it as a traffic stop, almost unanimously felt there was no prejudice involved.

This kind of aggressive-preventive patrol involving search, then, seems to be a particularly costly tactic when employed with blacks. They are *more* likely to think negatively of it, *more* likely to see it as a raw exercise of power, *more* likely to be upset or angry about incident, and *more* likely to see race prejudice as involved.

Let us now turn to the general attitudes expressed by these persons differentiating by race and type of police action, i.e., searched or not searched. The respondents were read a number of statements and asked whether they agreed or disagreed with them. The data are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Because of the effects of both race and search, discussion will be limited here to Table 5 where both are controlled.

Though the numbers in the categories are very small, we believe inferences can be made from these data. Respondents who were not searched (as compared to those who were) and whites (as compared to minority members) were more likely to feel that the police have a high reputation in their neighborhood (Item 1). The lowest percentage agreeing with this statement was minorities searched—only 26.7%. These same findings hold true with regard to the statement that the police deserve more respect than people in the neighborhood give them (Item 3). It is evident that both blacks and whites who went through this process (stop and search) were less likely to feel that police deserve more respect than people give them. The effects of being searched are also readily visible with regard to the responses to Item 2, which asks whether the people in the neighborhood deserve more respect than the police give them.

TABLE 5: TACTICAL FORCE CONTACTS: PERCENT AGREEING WITH POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS QUESTIONS

| <i>Item</i> | <i>Cases (41)</i> | <i>Minority</i> | | <i>White</i> | |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | | <i>Searched (15)</i> | <i>Not Searched (3)</i> | <i>Searched (14)</i> | <i>Not Searched (9)</i> |
| 1. By and large, the police have a very high reputation in this neighborhood. | 43.7% | 26.7% | 100.0% | 42.8% | 55.5% |
| 2. The people in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the police give them. | 36.5 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 42.8 | 0.0 |
| 3. The police in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the people give them. | 46.2 | 26.7 | 100.0 | 42.8 | 66.7 |
| 4. There would be more cooperation with the police if there were more Negroes on the police force. | 19.4 | 26.7 | 33.0 | 13.3 | 11.1 |
| 5. There are just a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity the police department gets. | 72.9 | 80.0 | 66.7 | 57.1 | 88.8 |
| 6. The police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to. | 63.2 | 46.7 | 66.7 | 71.2 | 88.8 |
| 7. There seem to be many police officers who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time. | 58.3 | 86.7 | 33.3 | 50.0 | 33.3 |
| 8. People who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police. | 77.8 | 100.0 | 66.7 | 71.2 | 66.7 |

TABLE 6: TACTICAL FORCE CONTACTS: PERCENT AGREEING WITH POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS QUESTIONS

| <i>Item</i> | <i>All Cases (41)</i> | <i>Race</i> | | <i>Police Action</i> | |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | <i>Minority (18)</i> | <i>White (23)</i> | <i>Searched (29)</i> | <i>Not Searched (12)</i> |
| 1. By and large, the police have a very high reputation in this neighborhood. | 43.7% | 38.9% | 47.9% | 34.5% | 66.7% |
| 2. The people in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the police give them. | 36.5 | 50.0 | 26.1 | 51.8 | 0.0 |

| | | | | | |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|
| 3. The police in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the people give them. | 46.2 | 38.9 | 52.2 | 34.5 | 75.0 |
| 4. There would be more cooperation with the police if there were more Negroes on the police force. | 19.4 | 27.8 | 13.1 | 20.7 | 16.7 |
| 5. There are just a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity the police department gets. | 72.9 | 77.8 | 69.6 | 69.0 | 83.3 |
| 6. The police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to. | 63.2 | 50.0 | 74.0 | 55.2 | 83.3 |
| 7. There seem to be many police officers who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time. | 58.3 | 77.8 | 43.5 | 69.0 | 33.3 |
| 8. People who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police. | 77.8 | 94.5 | 65.3 | 82.8 | 66.7 |

What, then, are the solutions to the problem of lack of police-community respect (inferred here to be mainly a result of Tactical Force operations)? Definitely, the solution does not involve simply adding more blacks to the police force, according to our respondents (Item 4). The problem is clarified somewhat by respondents' feelings that there are only a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity that the police department gets—a statement which is supported by most blacks and whites, though only by 57% of whites who were searched (Item 5). Is it a solution to give the police leeway to act tough with people when they have to? Yes, to some extent, according to whites more than blacks, and those not searched more than those searched (Item 6).

Here again, however, we see the differential effect of search upon blacks. Additional evidence that Tactical Force activity produces great ill will is seen in the relationship between the citizen's being searched and his agreement with Item 7. Only 33% of whites and blacks not searched felt that there seem to be many police officers who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time, while 50% of those whites searched and fully 86.7% of blacks searched agreed with the statement. But the attitudinal effects do not end here. A higher percentage

of those searched, as compared to their race similars not searched, felt the whole justice system to be discriminatory; as indicated by their agreement with the statement, "People who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police" (Item 8).

RESULTS: PATROL ENCOUNTERS

The sample of interviewees from Patrol contacts is biased by the fact that the knowledge of the persons' names and addresses was usually attainable only in encounters such as crime calls or disturbances. Most of our sample, therefore, were blacks of low socioeconomic status from the ghetto. They are crime victims or complainants in a disturbance situation. They are generally an older adult group. Seventy-three percent were over 30 years old.

In our *observed* contacts, men were slightly more frequently the primary citizens in crime call situations and women almost exclusively the complainants in disturbance situations. In our *interview* sample, the crime complaint situation is over-represented and women are overrepresented in both incident categories. Further, 46 of the 55 interviewees were black and 40 of the 55 were women interviewed in their apartments. This population obviously differs from the population contacted and interviewed with regard to Tactical Force operations.

As Table 7 indicates, our analysis distinguished between two types of incidents—disturbances and crime calls (or crime complaint) incidents. For each type of incident, we also distinguished between two manners of handling by the officers—"as described by the citizen."

For crime calls, Manner #1 means that the officers made a thorough initial investigation of the crime scene and demonstrated concern for the person by a) informing him of what would happen after they left and/or b) by giving advice, counsel, or emotional support of some sort. Officers classified as handling an encounter in Manner #2 handled the encounter with an incomplete initial investigation—taking a report with no attempt either to investigate the scene or look for or talk to offenders, and with no concern demonstrated for the person.

For disturbances, we similarly attempted to differentiate the officer's handling of incidents. Manner #1 means that the officers a) attempted to learn the reasons for the disturbance, b) attempted to bring about a settlement of the problem by

making a decision themselves or letting the parties come to an agreement, even if temporary, and c) also showed concern for the persons involved and/or gave advice, counsel, or emotional support. In Manner #2, officers handled the disturbance a) by settling the problem and enforcing a decision without demonstrating concern for the person or problem involved, or b) by attempting to handle the situation as quickly as possible with little effort to delve into the nature of the problem or to bring about a settlement and without demonstrating concern for the parties involved.

Of the 19 disturbance incidents 16, or 84%, were handled in Manner #1. Of the crime incidents two-thirds (24 of 36) were handled in Manner #1.

After giving a detailed account of the encounter, the respondents were asked how they felt after the encounter was all over. The results are shown in Tables 7-9. Table 7 shows the citizens' reaction by the type of incident. There is some evidence here that disturbance incidents produce more negative reactions (or fewer positive or "appreciative" reactions) than do crime call incidents.

TABLE 7: PATROL CONTACTS: HOW CITIZEN FELT AFTERWARDS — BY TYPE OF INCIDENT

| <i>Citizen Felt</i> | <i>All Cases (55)</i> | <i>Disturbances (19)</i> | <i>Crime Calls (36)</i> |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Appreciative; satisfied with officers | 30.9% | 15.8% | 38.9% |
| Indifferent | 7.3 | 10.6 | 5.6 |
| Frightened; scared; nervous | 9.1 | 10.5 | 8.3 |
| Worried; upset; unhappy | 10.9 | 21.0 | 5.5 |
| Very angry at officers | 41.8 | 42.1 | 41.7 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table 8 shows clearly the effect of manner of handling. Almost unanimously those persons treated in Manner #2 are, at the conclusion of the encounter, very angry with officers. By contrast, only 22.5% of those treated in Manner #1 are very angry with the officers. Table 9 shows that the effect of manner shows up in both types of incidents, although the fact that only three disturbances were handled in Manner #2 makes for a weak case there. The data in Table 9 also provide clues to a differential significance of handling, depending on the type of incident. This can be seen first by comparing Manner #1 disturbances and Manner #1 crime calls. The disturbances are much more likely to result in negative reactions. We can look at this still another way by noting that of the eight disturb-

ances resulting in "anger," five were handled in Manner #1; while of the 15 crime calls resulting in "anger," 11 were handled in Manner #2.

TABLE 8: PATROL CONTACTS: HOW CITIZEN FELT AFTERWARDS — BY MANNER OF POLICE HANDLING

| <i>Citizen Felt</i> | <i>All Cases (55)</i> | <i>Manner No. 1 (40)</i> | <i>Manner No. 2 (15)</i> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Appreciative; satisfied with officers | 30.9% | 42.5% | 0.0% |
| Indifferent | 7.3 | 10.0 | 0.0 |
| Frightened; scared; nervous | 9.1 | 10.0 | 6.7 |
| Worried; upset; unhappy | 10.9 | 15.0 | 0.0 |
| Very angry | 41.8 | 22.5 | 93.3 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

TABLE 9: PATROL CONTACTS: HOW CITIZEN FELT AFTERWARDS — BY TYPE OF INCIDENT & MANNER OF POLICE HANDLING

| <i>Citizen Felt</i> | <i>Disturbances</i> | | <i>Crime Calls</i> | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | <i>Manner No. 1 (16)</i> | <i>Manner No. 2 (3)</i> | <i>Manner No. 1 (24)</i> | <i>Manner No. 2 (12)</i> |
| Appreciative; satisfied with officers | 18.8% | 0.0% | 58.3% | 0.0% |
| Indifferent | 12.5 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 0.0 |
| Frightened; scared; nervous | 12.5 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 8.3 |
| Worried; upset; unhappy | 25.0 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 0.0 |
| Very angry at the officers | 31.2 | 100.0 | 16.7 | 91.7 |
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

These results fit well with our own and others' observations that disturbances, particularly domestic disturbances, are especially problematic for the police, whereas crime calls are more straightforward. It might be a clue to police administrators, however, that less adequate handling of crime calls (Manner #2) can produce a frequency of citizen dissatisfaction comparable to the generally more difficult disturbance situations.

Of course, some of this ill feeling comes from inordinate and impossible demands on the officers by the citizens with regard to the service expected. But, on the other hand, it also emanates from other, legitimate, expectations. In some of these cases (especially in crime call incidents) the officers, according to the respondents, made out the report and "didn't even look at the apartment" or "they said they couldn't handle the incident."

These citizens had greater expectations than were met by the officers' actions. To paraphrase some of the respondents, they felt that the officers could have: investigated more thoroughly; looked for the suspects; at least talked to the offending

kids who had thrown the rocks; tried to be an arbitrator or counsel the two parties; made an effort to look for the kids; at least looked for some clues; shown more concern for the little man and not given up so easily or have been so easily discouraged; looked for the car; been a little more patient and understanding: "Here I have lost a \$3,500 car and am nervous, and they are unconcerned."

Part of this dissatisfaction with the encounter also stems from perception of the officers' attitudes as well. When asked what they thought the officers expected *them* to do, citizens' responses included: Nothing except maybe don't bother them; ignore the situation; forget the incident; ignore the incident since it was so trivial; they could care less; pick up the broken glass and buy new windows; "He seemed to think I should find my own car, look for the suspect myself"; he said, "What's wrong this time?"; the officer said, "What happened? Did your boyfriend break out your window?"

Of course this is a one-sided listing of opinions. On the other hand, it illustrates the realization of ghetto residents and especially ghetto females as represented by this sample that the police do not especially like to handle domestic disturbances or minor incidents like rock-throwing, resulting in broken windows. Moreover, at least some have the feeling that this same attitude carries over to the handling of thefts of cars and other serious matters.

There is further evidence of an interaction of incident and manner in the matter of race differences. When asked whether they felt that if their race were different the officers would have treated them differently, about a third of disturbance respondents, regardless of manner, answered affirmatively. For crime calls, only about 20% of those handled by Manner #1 responded affirmatively; *but a full 67%* of those crime reporting respondents who were handled in Manner #2 responded affirmatively.

The majority of all respondents felt that one's own attitudes and those of the officer usually determines the type of treatment. Thus, to quote: "There are good and evil cops"; "they did the only thing they could do in this case"; "depends on the incident." Some stated that they didn't know about effects of race.

Others, generally those who were the victims of crime and handled in Manner #2 by the officers, felt that if they were white (mainly), the officers would have: put forth more effort; given more attention and have been nicer; shown more concern;

taken me around to look for the car; spent more time and handled it differently; would not allow the people to be harassed by the gangs as they do here; if we were white we would get some action; would have taken me around the block to look for the suspects; investigated the scene, and said "Yes, Madam"; given me more respect; wouldn't have jumped to conclusion; white officers are better than Negro officers who don't seem to care; for sure they seem to think they (whites) are better than us; they seem to characterize the people by areas of the city—much better service in white and other black areas than here; if the officers were black, they would know how I feel about losing a brand new car.

The complexities in the relationship of incident, manner, and citizen reaction in Patrol contacts show up in our analysis of the general police-community relations attitudes, the data for which are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Here the relationships are much less clear than they were in the comparable analysis of Tactical Force contacts. If we focus on the first three items—those most directly of a community-relations sort—there is at least partial support for the earlier analysis of Patrol contacts.

TABLE 10: PATROL CONTACTS: PERCENT AGREEING WITH POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS QUESTIONS

| <i>Item</i> | <i>All Cases</i> (55) | <i>Disturbances</i> | | <i>Crime Calls</i> | |
|---|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | <i>Manner No. 1</i> (16) | <i>Manner No. 2</i> (3) | <i>Manner No. 1</i> (24) | <i>Manner No. 2</i> (12) |
| 1. By and large, the police have a very high reputation in this neighborhood. | 29.1% | 18.8% | 33.3% | 50.0% | 0.0% |
| 2. The people in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the police give them. | 82.7 | 62.5 | 66.7 | 58.4 | 91.7 |
| 3. The police in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the people give them. | 56.4 | 56.3 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 41.7 |
| 4. There would be more cooperation with the police if there were more Negroes on the police force. | 34.6 | 43.8 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 16.7 |
| 5. There are just a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity the police department gets. | 61.8 | 6.2 | 66.7 | 91.7 | 75.0 |
| 6. The police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to. | 56.4 | 25.0 | 100.0 | 70.9 | 58.3 |

| | | | | | |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|
| 7. There seem to be many police officers who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time. | 85.5 | 93.7 | 66.7 | 83.4 | 83.3 |
| 8. People who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police. | 89.2 | 95.8 | 66.7 | 91.7 | 83.3 |

TABLE 11: PATROL CONTACTS: PERCENT AGREEING WITH POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS QUESTIONS

| Item | All Cases (55) | Incident | | Police Handling | |
|--|----------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | | Disturbances (19) | Crime Calls (36) | Manner No. 1 (40) | Manner No. 2 (15) |
| 1. By and large, the police have a very high reputation in this neighborhood. | 29.1% | 21.1% | 33.3% | 37.5% | 6.7% |
| 2. The people in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the police give them. | 83.7 | 63.2 | 69.3 | 60.0 | 86.7 |
| 3. The police in this neighborhood deserve more respect than the people give them. | 56.4 | 52.6 | 58.2 | 62.5 | 40.0 |
| 4. There would be more cooperation with the police if there were more Negroes on the police force. | 34.6 | 47.4 | 27.7 | 37.5 | 26.7 |
| 5. There are just a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity the police department gets. | 61.8 | 15.8 | 85.9 | 57.5 | 73.4 |
| 6. The police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to. | 56.4 | 36.8 | 66.5 | 52.5 | 66.7 |
| 7. There seem to be many police officers who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time. | 85.5 | 89.5 | 83.1 | 87.5 | 80.0 |
| 8. People who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police. | 89.2 | 89.5 | 88.6 | 92.5 | 80.0 |

For Items 1 and 2, the citizens who made crime calls which were handled in Manner #2 gave the most negative answers. Also, in both of those items, the citizens who made crime calls handled in Manner #1 gave most positive attitudes toward the police. For Item 3, there is indication of the same pattern. Citizens who made crime calls handled in Manner #1 are again most positive, though citizens who made crime calls handled in Manner #2 are third rather than last.

Further clues to the effect of incidents can be seen in Item 4 and Item 6. Disturbance contacts are *more* likely to feel that more blacks on the force would produce more cooperation with the police, and also *less* likely to feel the police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to. The only pattern worth remarking in Items 5, 7, and 8 is a tendency for crime call interviewees to agree in Item 5 that there are just a few policemen responsible "for the bad publicity the police department gets."

Disturbance contacts, perhaps, feel the cultural savvy of black officers helps them in handling these situations, whereas it is not so salient a property in handling a crime incident. As with Tactical Force contacts, however, there is no evidence here that *merely* adding more black policemen would be a solution to police-community relations in so-called ghetto areas. It is particularly important to note that 78% of these patrol contacts involved black policemen working singly, with a white partner, or a black partner. Thus we are generally talking about the black policeman handling incidents involving black citizens.

Throughout the paper we have stressed the significance for police-community relations of the type of police action taken in the three situations we have discussed—street stops by the Tactical Force and disturbance and crime call incidents by Patrol. We consider this kind of analysis to be necessary if social science is to help police administrators respond to the maxim that the core of police-community relations is what happens on the street. This is not to assert that other police-community relations efforts are irrelevant or unavailing, or that other stages in the criminal justice process are unimportant. We *do* assert, and the evidence supports the assertion, that police tactics and officer behavior are very important, indeed, to the point where other efforts may be seriously jeopardized thereby.

We should also qualify our conclusion concerning employment of black policemen. Our evidence points strongly to the

conclusion that employing black policemen probably would not overcome the effects of hostility-producing tactics or handling. At the same time, it is clear in these data that minority group citizens (almost all black) are more likely to attribute what they consider inadequate or inappropriate service to racial factors. At the very least, the presence of black policemen may prevent this feeling from becoming even stronger.

Leaving these contact-related matters aside, however, increased employment of minority group officers can be justified from a police-community relations viewpoint on more general grounds, e.g., the symbolic function of having members of one's group occupy visibly powerful and important roles, improved understanding and relationships between police and black community organizations, and provision of significant employment opportunities.

COMPARISON WITH VICTIM SURVEY STUDIES

Although there are significant differences in method and focus, it is interesting to compare the findings of our interview study with those of the recent victim survey studies (Reiss, 1967; Biderman, et al., 1967). In order to do so, the samples must be carefully contrasted. The Chicago and Boston victim survey respondents were drawn from two high crime district populations, one predominantly black and the other predominantly white in each city. By type of contact, 30% of these respondents had no official contact with the police. Other types of contact were as follows: victims of crimes against persons, 10%; crimes against property, 18%; disturbances, 9%; other service requests, 8%; traffic, 17%; all other and can't remember, 7% (Reiss, 1967: 62).

The Washington sample was 82% black, had a high proportion in white-collar and service occupations, and was more highly educated than either the Chicago-Boston sample or the respondents in our study. This is an important fact as education and pro-police attitudes were positively related in the Washington survey (Biderman, et al., 1967: 47). This sample also was composed of 177 black men, 234 black women, 28 white men, and 72 white women (Biderman, et al., 1967: 137).

Several conclusions of the Washington study are generally supportive of our findings despite the differences in method and focus. The Washington data indicate that the black men who have been victims express less respect for the police than those who say they have never been a victim of any crime

(Biderman, et al., 1967: 141). It was also pointed out that the attitudes of the black men toward the police were affected by factors in addition to educational level, most notably the kinds of experiences they had with individual policemen. In contrast, the respect for the police which was expressed by the white respondents appeared to be an abstract, impersonal attitude, not dependent upon personal contact (Biderman, et al., 1967: 142). Black men who know at least one policeman well enough to call him by his first name were usually more respectful and friendly. On the other hand, black men whose last official contact with the police had been as a reporter of an offense were less pro-police as a rule than black men in general. Contacts in which the respondent had asked for police help in the case of an accident or emergency, or even had asked for directions tend to be associated with more pro-police sentiment among blacks (Biderman, et al., 1967: 143). Biderman, et al. (1967) conclude that the lack of respect shown by black men toward the police is not an attitude which is unchangeable. If attitudes are influenced by concrete events and conditions in the first place, they might also be altered by changed conditions. The black man's experience as a victim of crime is one of these factors. One of the most important determinants of his respect or disrespect is what happens when he and policemen meet (Biderman, et al., 1967: 143).

We can turn now to a comparison (where possible) of general attitude responses in our study and the victim survey. As noted earlier, those in our sample having Patrol contact (55) were disproportionately females about the same age as respondents in the victimization samples described above. Most are black and all live in high crime areas. The Tactical Force sample of respondents is heavily young black or white males.

TABLE 12: CITIZEN RESPONSES TO POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS QUESTIONS: PRESENT STUDY AND TWO VICTIM SURVEYS^a

| | |
|--|-------------------------------|
| (1) By and large, the police have a very high reputation in this neighborhood. | |
| Boston and Chicago | (Doing a very good job) 29.0% |
| Washington | No Data |
| Patrol Contact | 29.0% |
| Tactical Force Contact | 44.0% |
| (2) There are just a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity the police department gets. | |
| Boston and Chicago | No Data |
| Washington | 78.0% |
| Patrol Contact | 85.5% |
| Tactical Force Contact | 73.2% |

| | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| (3) There seem to be many police officers who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time. | |
| Boston and Chicago | (Many or quite a few) 25.0% |
| Washington | 47.0% |
| Patrol Contact | 85.5% |
| Tactical Force Contact | 58.6% |
| (4) People who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police. | |
| Boston and Chicago | No Data |
| Washington | 50.0% |
| Patrol Contact | 89.2% |
| Tactical Force Contact | 78.1% |
| (5) The police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to. | |
| Boston and Chicago | No Data |
| Washington | 73.0% |
| Patrol Contact | 56.4% |
| Tactical Force Contact | 63.4% |

^a Boston and Chicago data from Reiss (1967: 39, 44). Washington data from Biderman, et al. (1967: 137, 146).

These sample differences make comparison hazardous, but it seemed worthwhile to see what the results would be. Table 12 indicates that the reputation of the police is not high in the high crime areas (black or white) of major cities (Item 1) and that most respondents believe that there are just a few policemen who are responsible for the bad publicity their police department gets (Item 2). Moreover, the majority of the respondents in each population feel that the police ought to have leeway to act tough with people when they have to (Item 5).

By contrast, it appears that those with greater contact with the police—our respondents—more often feel that people who know the ropes and have the money to afford good lawyers don't have anything to worry about from the police (Item 4) and also that there seem to be many policemen who enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time (Item 3).

Problems of Interpretation

There are difficulties in the interpretations we have given our data over and above the ones discussed in connection with the problems of sample size and sampling bias. Even though the data available do not enable us to fully resolve these difficulties, it is particularly important to point them out in a paper which purports to make policy recommendations.

Basically we have assumed a simple causal-temporal sequence from type of police action to type of citizen response to (much less clearly) citizens' general attitudes on issues of police-community relations. We believe this interpretation to be causally valid, though partial. More important, it has implications for police administration, even though incomplete.

The objections to this rather simplistic interpretation involve the interrelated issues of level of analysis and time ordering. Our analysis has been largely microcosmic, i.e., centered on the discrete encounter between officer and citizen. On the macrocosmic level, police-community relations derive from great historical-structural features of the society such as racial segregation. For example, the historically produced context accounts for the existence of minority group "high crime" areas and also plausibly helps account for what seems a differential response of blacks in our data.

On a less macrocosmic level, historical developments have led to the creation of particular police deployment and intervention strategies as illustrated by the Tactical Force organization and procedures we have described. On a more immediate level, these police strategies may create different expectations on the part of policemen in certain contacts as opposed to others. Police expectations, in turn, can lead to initial "presentations of self" which may trigger off hostile responses from citizens. These effects of historical-structural context presumably operate on the citizen as well as on the police.

Although we have largely treated them as outside the system of variables considered in the paper, these broader matters of level of analysis are relevant both to social science explanation and social policy formation. Considerations at a more macrocosmic level do not, however, invalidate policy recommendations designed to change day-to-day police-citizen interchanges. They do, however, remind us that action at this level has limits. Thus the raid on the Black Panthers by the state's attorney's police in Chicago or the shootings at Jackson State College, although rare and non-routine events, probably undermine the most sedulous efforts to improve routine police service in black areas. Consideration of broader structure also can remind us that some police-community relations efforts such as recruitment of minority officers are efforts to change structural contexts as well as to change contacts.

There are issues of time order that do affect our interpretations. The most significant of these is the relation of citizen attitude to officer behavior in the contact situation. If our "angry" respondents were angry or hostile at the beginning of the contact then this might increase the likelihood of a search in Tactical Force or of acting in a way codeable as Manner #2 in Patrol and, presumably, the citizen would still be angry at the end of the encounter.

The problem of the likelihood of anger, indignation, or hostility on the part of the citizen is an extremely complex one involving the nature of the citizen, the type of encounter, and the course of the interaction in the encounter independent of the aspects of police procedure discussed in this paper. The interview data do not permit us to deal with this problem in any detail beyond the material we have presented. More detailed analysis will be possible with the observational data which provide a larger sample, a wider variety of encounters, and a more detailed description of process.

Analysis of observer descriptions thus far in Patrol indicates that initial citizen "anger" or antagonism toward the officers is not related to the likelihood of the officer behaving in Manner #2. Of the citizens interviewed who had been involved in Tactical Force contacts, four were described by the observers as initially antagonistic. Of these, two were searched and were coded as "angry" from the interview. The other two were not searched; one responded in the interview as frightened and one as satisfied. These results do not weaken the causal interpretation employed in this paper.

Two more questions of time order in the contact situation are more strictly technical in nature because they concern the interview instrument. If respondents were angry or dissatisfied with police action, would they not describe that action as inadequate? This is not a problem with the search-nosearch distinction used in the Tactical Force section. We attempted to guard against this kind of contamination in the Patrol interviews by asking the citizen to describe rather than evaluate the officer's action. This description came before the questions dealing with how the citizen felt about the contact. We also have a check in the form of the independent observer's description of the officer's action. Coding of the observer descriptions into the manner category yielded agreement in 80% of the 55 Patrol cases. Significantly, in these categories disagreements were about equally divided into cases in which the interviewee's description indicated Manner #1 and the observer's description indicated Manner #2, and cases in which the interviewee's description indicated Manner #2 and the observer's indicated Manner #1.

Finally there is the problem of time order in relating encounter responses to answers on the general police-community relations questions. These items were last on the interview schedule in all interviews. We preferred to risk having these

“general” responses prejudiced by previously recalled reactions to specific encounters than the other way around. The small number of cases made it impossible to use alternate forms of the instrument. This section of the findings is therefore open to the time order criticisms more than the others.

It is extremely difficult to solve these causal or time order problems in any research but especially in single interview survey research. By having two independent measures—observation and interview—we believe some of the key objections have been met. The larger questions of causal order invoked when shifting from micro- to macrocosmic interpretations do not invalidate our interpretations but do indicate their limits.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our data support previously expressed doubts concerning aggressive patrol and the use of field interrogation (National Center, 1967: 95, 328). They also support earlier suggestions that attitude surveys would be useful tools for police planning (National Center, 1967: 113). The data go beyond general surveys of public opinion or the more special studies of police-minority relations (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969) in an attempt to relate sources of citizen hostility more closely to specific police practices. The data also indicate that samples drawn specifically to represent the varying publics-in-contact generated in different police operations are necessary to make more meaningful the data produced by the victimization surveys.

The kind of social science procedure which utilizes interviewing of specific individuals involved in contacts need not be oversold as the only basis for decisions leading to meaningful change. During the time this study was in the field, the department involved developed District Tactical Units designed to achieve some of the routine law enforcement objectives of the Tactical Force but to be under the control of the local district commanders and to be more attuned to variations in local community response. Some type of systematic survey-oriented evaluation comparing the two systems could be a valuable aid in the process of organizational change. The same department has ambitious plans to develop a program of Community Service Officers as recommended by the President's Commission (1967b: 122-124). Similar needs for feedback arise in connection with that program.

Though our analysis is not conclusive, it does make a strong case for much greater need on the part of police departments to evaluate on a continuing basis *all* of their operations via this

type of feedback interviewing of the contacted citizen, the objects of their organization's work. We suggest that local supervisory officers do this type of work on an extended and systematic basis, or that the police department planning unit carry out this research on a systematic basis especially in problem districts. Deciding whether or not they even want the Tactical Force to operate there, or what policies can be made and enforced affecting the practices of handling disturbances and/or crime call incidents, can be based on concrete and detailed assessment of the hostility costs of various procedures.

Despite the work of special programs of police-community relations workshops, etc., a fundamental problem concerns the on-the-street officers and their operations or a whole type of police activity such as, in our study, Tactical Force operations. Executives must be able to use this feedback information in conjunction with other performance indicators such as arrests and clearance rates.

As we have pointed out, simple measures such as adding more minority group members or using black policemen to police the black community are not in themselves sovereign solutions. The problem goes deeper than race and lies at the base in a lack of feedback information, or one-sided feedback information, with regard to what is going on in the street—how officers are handling various incidents and what effect these practices and policies have on the citizens subject to them. Closely linked to lack of feedback is the lack of sophisticated direction, role definition, and goal specification of police practices and operations. These need to be placed on the balance sheet assessing police practices.

Perhaps we can put this basic conclusion in the now fashionable language of cost-benefit analysis. Police planners should be more aware that all police operations carry with them potential hostility costs. Sophisticated operations analysis—of which this paper is only a precursor—could enable police to routinely enter such costs in their planning.

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