

national movements by the time unification occurred, and despite the absence of anything seriously resembling a capitalist class at this time in the aspiring “nations” of Central and Eastern Europe. In reality, the challenge to the European feudal and autocratic order had a much broader social base than he suggests. It simply cannot be equated with “bourgeois” interests, neither can the involvement of the popular classes simply be explained away in terms of ethnic and linguistic particularism. The common feature of all these struggles was the quest for new modes of political organisation and new principles of legitimacy based on popular consent. In a Europe of vast territorial empires and subordinate statelets, this required a redefinition of state frontiers, which in turn gave a fresh salience to ethnic and linguistic issues which had previously lain dormant.

The democratic impulse which inspired these early nationalisms can only be understood if attention is paid to the process of social class formation, something which Hobsbawm surprisingly neglects, not only in the 19th-century European context but also in more recent examples elsewhere. In societies where capitalist class differentiation was not very far advanced, where a nascent bourgeoisie was as yet unable to impose class-conscious leadership on other social groups, the challenge to feudalism and autocracy was socially heterogeneous, and was indeed likely to be expressed in terms of an idealised “general will”, in terms of a socially undifferentiated *peuple*, in terms of equal citizenship in a self-governing community.

This aspiration to “unite all individuals sharing a particular set of criteria of nationality under a common regime based on the notion of popular sovereignty”⁵ may have been a sentimental illusion in terms of later historical development, destined as it was to founder on the emerging class contradictions of capitalist society. But placed in their real social context, it is surely untenable to identify such movements with the ideological hegemony of a self-conscious bourgeoisie.

In conclusion, Hobsbawm is right to see nations as political artefacts, to see language and ethnicity as raw material rather than as the essential catalyst, and indeed to recognise the eventual utility of nationalism as an ideological instrument of the bourgeois state. However, his tendency to regard nationalism in all its phases of development simply as an adjunct of bourgeois interests is surely teleological. Professor Hobsbawm is at his most interesting and illuminating in his discussion of how the theme of national identity was reworked into an instrument of social cohesion and control, but less persuasive in his analysis of “state-aspiring national movements”.

Brian Jenkins

FARHI, FARIDEH. *States and Urban-Based Revolutions. Iran and Nicaragua*. University of Illinois Press, Urbana [etc.] 1990. x, 147 pp. \$ 29.95.

When Theda Skocpol published her *States and Social Revolutions*, she explicitly cast

⁵ B. Jenkins and G. Minnerup, *Citizens and Comrades: Socialism in a World of Nation States* (1984), p. 61.

it as an account of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions rather than as a general theory of revolution wherever and whenever it might occur. That self-denying ordinance did not keep her successors, including Skocpol herself, from trying repeatedly to extend her framework to other instances involving violent, viable transfers of state power. Applying, testing, challenging, or modifying Skocpol through analysis of other revolutions has become a standard enterprise for social scientists who aspire to historical comparison. Farideh Farhi, a political scientist at the University of Hawaii, joins the parade with an unlikely comparison between the revolutions of 1979 and thereafter in Iran and Nicaragua. Working almost entirely with English-language sources (she knows no Spanish, and cites nothing in Persian), she compares and contrasts the two national experiences by means of a checklist of variables drawn from Skocpol: conditions favoring class coalitions against the regime, circumstances promoting the mobilization of those coalitions for revolutionary action, factors making the state vulnerable to attack, and so on. The enterprise resembles using a Shakespeare war play as a guide to analyzing contemporary armed struggles – unlikely in principle, but possibly rewarding.

In this case, alas, the rewards are meager. Despite enthusiastic endorsements from Walter Goldfrank and Jack Goldstone, the book fails both to create fresh views of the two revolutions and to formulate clear ideas about where and when revolutions are likely to occur elsewhere. Not that Farhi's analyses of Iran and Nicaragua lack sense. She describes rulers (the Shah and Anastasio Somoza) who govern through combinations of patronage and repression, draw on export revenues to sustain their rule, receive protection from the United States, intervene actively in their domestic economies, unwittingly promote the expansion of salaried, entrepreneurial, and professional classes that chafe under authoritarian rule. Rulers in the circumstances, she argues, become vulnerable to any crisis that hurts their followers, mobilizes their enemies, incapacitates their armies, and neutralizes their external protectors.

In the last half-century, such rulers have, indeed, frequently faced major rebellions, and those rebellions have sometimes toppled their regimes. What is more, Farhi properly points out differences between the two countries: that Iranian oil revenues were greater and easier for the state to capture than were Nicaraguan coffee revenues, that the Iranian military were more bureaucratized than Somoza's National Guard; these differences had, as she said, significant impacts on the distinctive revolutionary processes and outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua. She emphasizes, furthermore, the importance of Islamic nationalism and of Christian radicalism as bonds among opponents of the two regimes. But all these observations already belong to the lore of political analysts.

Farhi's most original and controversial claim concerns the place of cities in the generation of contemporary revolutions. She sees cities as rough equivalents of the solidary peasant communities whose capacity for rebellion Skocpol emphasizes, with the strategic difference that they contain the loci of central power and sustain contact between potential dissidents and the agents of central power. In Nicaragua and Iran, she says, religious organizations fostered connections within the urban population that promoted mobilization during crises. All this seems reasonable. On the other hand, it does not apply very neatly to the other revolutions and revolutionary situations with which, at the end, Farhi compares her cases – those of

Mexico, Cuba, the Philippines, and El Salvador. Closing the book, therefore, we wonder to what domain its findings apply. For a quick summary and comparison of Iran and Nicaragua, for thoughtful consideration of the implications of Theda Skocpol's analyses for contemporary revolutions, and for interesting reflections on the place of religion in those revolutions, Farhi's book serves well. For renewal of general ideas about revolutionary processes, please look elsewhere.

Charles Tilly

Revolutionary Syndicalism. An International Perspective. Ed. by Marcel van der Linden and Wayne Thorpe. Scholar Press, Aldershot 1990. xi, 260 pp. £ 32.50.

This useful volume will fill a real need. In the first two decades of this century industrial unrest swept much of the world. In most countries the unrest was associated with "syndicalism", industrial unionism, revolutionary socialism and anarchism. In Europe syndicalists and anarchists spearheaded the charge; in North America "impossibilists" and Wobblies (members of the Industrial Workers of the World). In South America and Australasia men (and less often women) responded. In both the Old and the New World the leaders preached class war, direct action, organisation at the point of production, and some form of One Big Union as the means for liberating labour and achieving a socialist society. The "movement" rarely survived the post-War period although small cadres of men and women continued to dedicate their lives to the old dream and resisted the appeal of Bolshevism. Until the publication of this volume there has been no analysis of either syndicalism or the great wave of industrial unrest from an international perspective. Marcel van der Linden and Wayne Thorpe deserve congratulations and thanks for recognising the need for some such study.

As the dust-jacket claims, "Fourteen scholars from eight nations offer [...] the widest-ranging study yet undertaken of the revolutionary syndicalist alternative in the workers' movement in the half century before the Second World War". The editors commissioned twelve essays on the relevant movements in most countries where syndicalism had "a significant impact". In some countries, notably Holland and Germany, syndicalism was never more than a minority movement. Unfortunately there is no essay on Australia or New Zealand although the Industrial Workers of the World enjoyed considerable influence in both countries before and during the First World War. For all that the editors provide a useful trans-national explanation for "The Rise and Fall of Syndicalism" and Thorpe has written an overview of "Syndicalist Internationalism Before World War II". The book fills a large gap and will undoubtedly prove useful for courses in Labour History. The introductory essay, something of a *tour de force*, distils from the various case studies a powerful explanation which is likely to prove more useful than the rest of the book.

The appearance of this volume allows some reflections on the great wave of industrial unrest which occurred in many countries between 1910 and 1922. The editors hoped that the various essays would contribute to an explanation of syn-