

but it is a paper worth reading. The William Earle paper ('Some paradoxes of private conscience as a political guide') is perhaps the weakest in the collection. There are four short editorial introductions, but no index has been provided, nor has a list been provided of the more important discussions of those articles in the collection which have been discussed. In this reviewer's opinion the provision of such items is not the least important service which the editor of a collection of articles can and should do for his readers. I repeat, however, that I think the present collection to be a useful one for students of moral and political philosophy.

And yet. The very fairness of this sample emphasises the point that conscience has not yet had, within the analytical tradition of the present century, the serious examination which it merits if it is of even half the importance commonly accorded it by non-philosophers. When St Thomas More spoke finally 'in discharge of [his] conscience' he did not give the impression that he was doing something of no great importance to him. When Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor speaks of taking possession of the consciences of men, he speaks as of something that is terrible. Most analytical moral philosophers, by contrast, content themselves with a relatively simple notion of conscience—with a long pedigree, it must be admitted—and in consequence allow no great moral significance to the activity of conscience. Thomists use another internally coherent notion, yet one which in view of the historical use of the technical terms it is positively misleading to call conscience. An intermediate notion, or conflation of notions, the liberal protestant view as it may be called (found as it is in Butler and Kant, with maverick anticipations

in Abelard and perhaps Pelagius) is left largely unexplored by philosophers: though it would seem to have had considerable influence on what modern non-philosophers have in mind when they appeal to conscience. The liberal protestant view is by no means obviously one unique, coherent view, but it has the merit of being by no means trivial either, and would seem to repay analytical effort spent on it.

As for historical studies, the best general survey of older theories is perhaps still a short Berlin dissertation, in Latin, from the second half of the 19th century. Fine monographs have appeared since, but good general works are slow in coming: students are still sent by helpful tutors to treatments by Sorley in *Baldwin's Dict.* and Joe Rickaby in the old *Cath. Enc.* What is first required is a thorough preliminary study of the liberal protestant view, made by a historically aware analytical philosopher. A good general historical survey of theories of conscience can then be made. Not until then is it likely that an informed analysis of conscience can be given which will be at once clear and capable of giving due weight to the impression that so many non-philosophers persist in having, to the effect that conscience is and ought to be of some considerable consequence in morality.

In the meantime the present collection can be commended, as a more than fair sample of recent or fairly recent writing on conscience from within the analytical tradition, and a bit beyond. If what it contains is nevertheless importantly dissatisfying, that is not through any editorial remissness. Before a notably better collection can be made, analytical moral philosophers will have to produce more satisfying material on conscience.

LAWRENCE MOONAN

FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS, by P. F. Strawson. *Methuen & Co., London. Harper & Row, New York, 1974. 214 pp. £3.20.*

One of the great sports involved in reading collections of previously published essays is trying to figure out if any one thing holds them all together besides a common index at the end. For, if one can discover some line running through all the essays, something about the author's overriding concerns, his style and method, becomes visible in a manner not otherwise available to a casual reader of one or other essay.

Most often, though, no such line can be found.

In the case of this latest collection of Professor Strawson's essays, bits of a common theme or common concern reveal themselves, but I could find none that held the entire collection together. But then, it seems, neither could Strawson himself. *Freedom and Resentment* is clearly a second harvest; the more connected essays from this period 1950-

1970 appeared three years ago in *Logico-Linguistic Papers*. This new collection is much more uneven than *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, not only because of the wide-ranging variety of theme but also because of the quality of the essays themselves. Of the eleven essays, nine have been previously published and a tenth is due for publication shortly. The first two essays deal with problems of ethics, and are followed by three on various aspects of perception; then essays on Ryle, Wittgenstein, and Descartes; and finally essays on aesthetic appraisal, existence as a predicate, and transformations in certain kinds of action sentences. A mixed bag, indeed. The most valuable essays in the collection are without a doubt the title essay, which deals with problems of morality and determinism, and the long review of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.

Nevertheless, some things do manifest themselves in this collection which are less evident in the individual essays. For one, Strawson's ability to keep a perspective and a firm hold on the important issues even in the most involved of discussions. Again and again he reminds us that the easiest *philosophical* solution to a problem may not be the best solution to the problem as such—a point indeed worth pondering. Also, the perspicacity of his argumentation could serve as a model to any philosopher.

But these are things that we have come to expect of Strawson. More interesting are new juxtapositions which this collection creates. Two important ones emerge. The first has to do with an issue raised in the first essay, about studying reactive attitudes like resentment. He points out that by so studying the attitudes of the receiver in human interactions, the complexity of the situation becomes apparent in a way usually missed by 'our cool, contemporary style' of philosophising. Unfortunately, the very next essay reverts to the great individualist tradition in British philosophy, with its visions of society and morality bereft of this very social sense.

The other juxtaposition is broader. Although British philosophy is more and more acknowledging and utilising the achievements of linguistics in its philosophy of language, it doggedly continues to ignore seventy years of research in physiology and psychology when it comes to talk of perception. Strawson's three essays on perception would have been greatly enriched, if rendered partially superfluous, had he been as aware of Gestalt psychology and general learning theory as he so admirably is of current trends in linguistics. To continue to depend so much on Hume and Kant (or even Wittgenstein) in matters of perception is like refusing to take discussions of time beyond Zeno's tortoise.

ROBERT SCHREITER

TO HEAVEN WITH SCRIBES AND PHARISEES, the Jewish Path to God, by Lionel Blue. *Darton, Longman and Todd*, London, 1975. 103 pp. £1.50.

Highly informative, at the same time as being light-hearted and extremely readable, this is a fascinating account of what makes a modern English Jew tick. It is chatty and even racy, but no less serious for that. No other account I have seen leaves one with such a whole and satisfying picture of the mind of religious Judaism today.

Rabbi Blue insists from the beginning that a Jew is not concerned with theology. It is a mistake to look for an orthodoxy, when what makes a Jew a Jew is orthopraxy. So much is commonplace, but he explains the thought behind this (I had almost said the theology behind it), that Jews regard themselves as co-workers in God's work of creation, and work as having a therapeutic function. This idea explains a lot in the conventional picture of the Jew, busy and active, usually making money; these

attitudes are not only the result of centuries of persecution and survival of the fittest by relying on their wits, but have a religious basis as well. History, of course, is never far below the surface, for Judaism is dominated by its history, whether it be the historical dimension of the Law, the memory of the various attempts at genocide it has survived, or the medley of cultures in the decoration of a synagogue (p. 50). The historical dimension dominates the future too, for hope and yearning for the Kingdom are integral to Jewish thought and action.

There is a very fine chapter on prayer, with some gentle and entirely justified criticism of some Christian attitudes to prayer, and another chapter on Jewish humour and its function: life has sometimes been so bitter that it is only humour that has enabled the Jew to live with defeat (p. 68), and on the