

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE AMERICAN SCENE : A REAPPRAISAL

For many people in the United States the designation of the first part of the twentieth century as the Age of Analysis does not seem strange or even overstated. They know immediately that the phrase refers to psychoanalysis and not spectrum analysis or content analysis or market analysis. Psychoanalysis as a therapy, as a way of looking at the world, undeniably caught on in this country and in this hemisphere to a far greater extent than it has anywhere else in the world. Yet today many signs indicate that its influence has leveled off and perhaps even declined, while in Europe and Japan the boom may be just getting under way. This current disparity between the Old World and the New provides fresh impetus for speculation about the forces that implemented the acceptance of psycho-

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analysis in this country and for illustration of how this acceptance became in part a silly infatuation. Some of these factors should be outlined both from the point of view of psychoanalysis as a cultural phenomenon and from the point of view of psychoanalysis as potentially the most inclusive general psychological theory. To spell out some of the conditions that did and do obtain in the United States in regard to psychoanalysis may supply a baseline from which to study the similarities and differences in the growth, in other countries, of psychoanalysis as an institution and as a system of thought, as well as a part of medicine along with its barely legitimate offspring, dynamic psychiatry. This vast task can be undertaken here only in the broadest possible terms. Hence historical, sociological, and psychological generalizations will be offered without the necessary noting of ever-present exceptions and disagreements.

I

How can one characterize the United States of those decades during which psychoanalysis was introduced? The first point made by many students of our social history is usually that the United States never had a traditional social structure of the kinds that Europe, Asia, and Africa had. The heritage of pioneer and melting-pot orientations never permitted the development of a rigid, stratified class structure, the emphasis on the individual prevented the development of strong family-connected guilds, and the great physical mobility interfered with the permanence of extended families. In fact, one could characterize this traditionless vacuum as having been filled by a tradition of the new.

Another point made consistent about America and Americans concerns their materialism. The consciousness of money and possessions and the wish to display and consume them conspicuously have been noted by every native and foreign observer of this country since de Tocqueville. In a similar way education, even a university education, was looked upon as a possession that this egalitarian society insisted could be had by all, resulting in a proliferation of institutions of higher learning of all sorts. This last, incidentally, seemed part of an even more

essential form of materialism, which we cannot even begin to assess, that concerns children in general and their worth and potentially unlimited value. Every observer of our culture has noted that parents in this country have shown a remarkable permissiveness in child rearing,¹ connoting the consideration of the child as a treasure. As de Tocqueville² put it in 1835 about American families: "...paternal authority, if not destroyed, is at least impaired." The American youth, "...master of his thoughts,...is soon master of his conduct. In America there is, strictly speaking, no adolescence: at the close of his boyhood the man appears and begins to trace out his own path."

Thus, American culture is characterized by a traditionless, loose social structure committed to individualism and materialism. Probably because of these characteristics, Americans have always been concerned with "finding themselves," both personally and socially, as if the secret of just who they are had gotten lost in the active, aggressive movement of an expanding country. Into this maelstrom, in the autumn of 1909, Professor G. Stanley Hall invited Sigmund Freud to lecture in honor of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of Clark University. Freud was a typical representative of many aspects of a class-bound, traditional, European social group, now much at odds with many of his contemporaries because his work had led him into most unorthodox paths of thought. For some years before 1909 in the United States a number of famous professors of neurology and neurologic psychiatry had expressed a need for a more organized theory of mental illness, so that the way for his warm reception had been well prepared. Dr. C. L. Dana, noted Professor of Neurology at Cornell, for example, had said repeatedly, as early as 1904, and in all probability before he had ever heard of Freud: "Clinical psychiatry is in fact only morbid psychology."

Others besides Hall and Dana, as Oberndorf³ points out, had prepared the way. Morton Prince published, in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, which he had founded, the first papers on psychoanalysis to appear in this country. Frederick Peterson, Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia, whose role in fostering and launching psychoanalysis is almost forgotten, persuaded A. A. Brill in 1907 to transfer his postgraduate studies from Paris to

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Bleuler's clinic in Switzerland, which was the only psychoanalytically-inclined clinic in Europe outside of Vienna. For his great interest in sex and childhood development, Hall, who was offering Freud the distinction and endorsement of a university rostrum for the first presentation of his work in this country, had like his guest suffered severe criticism. However, his idealism and honesty were sufficiently respected to guarantee the presence at Clark of men like Adolf Meyer, Edward Titchener, James J. Putnam, and William James, the group who so warmed Freud by their distinguished presence and acceptance.

Freud's delight at this reception—"...in Europe I felt myself to be an outcast—here I perceived myself accepted by the best men as an equal"⁴—was relatively short-lived. In fact, the five Clark lectures on psychoanalysis,⁵ now considered classics, did not greatly impress many in the audience and Freud quickly cooled towards the United States in general. He later referred to Hall as the type of enthusiast who liked to "make and unmake kings." The disaffection was mutual, as Hall lost interest in psychoanalysis. But another whose initial respect turned to skepticism, William James, was more important to Freud who was correctly impressed with James' importance in American thought, even though he was probably unaware of just how much James prepared the way for psychoanalysis. In any case, Freud was put off by those American national characteristics mentioned earlier, and while he grasped some of the possibilities for the spread of psychoanalysis, he was more concerned with the possibility of "dilution" and the loss of rigorosity.

He could not foresee the rather paradoxical situation which gradually developed in psychology and medicine following, and partially as a result of, his visit. The psychologists, Hall and James, who were responsible for the invitation, lost interest, but some of the physicians, notably James Jackson Putnam of Harvard, but including William A. White, Smith Ely Jelliffe, and Nolan D. C. Lewis, accepted the revolutionary precepts of psychoanalysis and never wavered. In 1910 Putnam used his position as President of the entirely unsympathetic American Neurological Association to present a laudatory paper on "Personal Experience with Freud's Psychoanalytic Method." How-

ever, in spite of the constant efforts of these doctors and, especially, A. A. Brill, a tireless proselytizer from the time of his return from Vienna until after the Second World War, they were unable to make a significant place for psychoanalysis in the medical school curriculum. The paradox is that it was, ultimately, psychology and the behavioral sciences in which psychoanalysis concepts came to be accepted and used, and which provided the base from which psychoanalysis spread like a prairie fire.

Once the base was established, our national character created the need and the climate for the acceptance of the new psychology. Lacking the European extended family which so often went beyond the home and into the choice of craft, trade, or profession, and which supplied a sense of external order to people's lives, it is no wonder that Americans sought out the internal order of integration of the personality offered by psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic emphasis on the freedom of the individual to have and to make choices appealed strongly to the children of both the pioneer and the immigrant. The national norm of equality, the democratic tradition, was reinforced. Each person could investigate his emotional, not his social, origins and be emancipated by resolving his overwhelming internal doubts about who he was.

II

Interest in mental illness and the plight of the mentally ill had already been aroused before Freud came. Oliver Wendell Holmes and the crusade of Dorothea Dix to remove the stigma of mental illness and free the mentally ill almost literally from chains had stirred the popular imagination and convinced the active American public a new way of treating mental illness was needed. Therefore, the idea of a treatment even as radical as the one Freud suggested, which offered the possibility of a more effective cure, offended far fewer than it had in Europe. For the dynamic, newly rich materialist of this country, everything is repairable. Money can buy health and happiness. Moreover, there were other gains from trying this procedure.

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Unquestionably, psychoanalysis per se demands a kind of wealth, not always of money, but rather of time and psychic energy, that cannot be expected of people struggling for survival. Once it was acceptable to be analyzed, the ability to afford it was in itself a triumph and certainly knowledge of one's self is a great possession. Furthermore, in a remarkably short time, the jargon of psychoanalysis, albeit misused, became fashionable with the avant-garde. A special, influential segment of the populace ruminated about the unconscious or subconscious, as it was so often incorrectly called, dreams, and Oedipal complexes, and displayed their privity before Mr. O'Neill's early, murky plays dramatized this lore.

Freud deeply mistrusted such self-conscious materialism and once expressed his bitterness towards both sides of the Atlantic by saying,⁴ "I learned that the Old World is ruled by authority as the new is ruled by the dollar." In part, this remark was prompted by another factor, the academic hierarchy, which also differentiated Europe from America. In Europe the academic tradition was a rigidly structured, static system in which a professor was surrounded by disciples who carried on his work. Although much could be accomplished in such well-organized structures, the rate of change and acceptance of new ideas was slow. With the exception of Bleuler, Freud's work had won few adherents among the powerful professors of Europe who controlled the universities. In the United States, however, where so many colleges and universities were being founded, students felt free to differ from their professors because they might still obtain teaching jobs elsewhere. There was a constant growth which broke down hierarchies, and anyone who thought that psychoanalysis might add a dimension to his work was free to investigate it. In fact, it could be argued that the later, easy acceptance of psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychiatry as a form of therapy was based on the early exposure of so many generations of college students to psychoanalytic concepts in their college courses.

Another social factor, which is difficult to assess but undoubtedly has some bearing on the differing receptions of psychoanalysis in Europe and the United States, is anti-Semitism. In Europe, psychoanalysis was indelibly associated with the

fact that Freud and many of his early followers were Jewish. At that time anti-Semitism was strong in parts of Europe, and it is well known that Freud, in 1910, insisted on Jung's being made President of the International Psychoanalytic Association at least partially because he wished to dispel the idea that it was an all-Jewish organization.⁶ In the United States there was also anti-Semitism, but it does seem that parochial Americans saw psychoanalysis more as European, which gave it status, than as Jewish.

III

However important, materialism and a traditionless society alone do not entirely explain the spread of psychoanalysis in this country. The tendency to overemphasize these considerations is especially strong today because a prospering middle class in Western Europe and Japan, breaking with a traditional society, and inevitably materialistic, is developing an interest in psychoanalysis. A lesson can be learned from the popularity in this country, in the years after the Civil War, of the form of psychotherapy propounded by S. Weir Mitchell. No treatment could have been more tangibly "consuming." Mitchell believed that emotional disturbance was caused by physical exhaustion. The cure consisted of the patient's going to bed for a considerable period of time under the supervision of a nurse, with no visitors, no reading, and no writing. In fact, the only activity that Mitchell encouraged was the consumption of large quantities of rich food. Mitchell himself, in his book, *Hints for the Overworked*,⁷ commented with concern on how few people could afford this cure, and mentioned the bitterness aroused because this hope of relieving emotional disturbance was open only to the rich. However, the appeal to privilege and corporality was not enough, as Mitchell provided no basic organized theory of mental illness, and the fact that the treatment, like any individualized psychiatric treatment, was expensive was not enough to preserve its popularity either here or in Europe.

In spite of the factors working in favor of psychoanalytic doctrines, such as their efficacy in therapy and their confirmation

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in the intuition of many writers and the experience of laymen, even true doctrines must spread and grow popular by proximal means, as Donald Fleming indicates. His paper on "Freud in America,"⁸ shows convincingly how the intellectual positions in American psychiatry and academic psychology at the time that Freud's work was introduced provided the proper medium for its acceptance. It is always curious to think of William James as preparing the way for Freud. James, when devoting himself to a rehabilitation of the religious posture and when attempting to translate the transactions of the soul into scientifically respectable terms, could hardly be less congenial to Freud. Nevertheless, James' focus upon consciousness and the scientific validity of the individual's internal experience could stand as a vindication of the psychoanalytic method. It was James and his followers who were directly attacked by J.B. Watson and the behaviorist school of thought. Watson characterized the introspectionists by saying that they "do not tell us what consciousness is, but merely begin to put things into it by assumption; and then when they come to analyze consciousness, naturally they find in it just what they put into it." The displacement of James by a doctrine that confined attention to the overt behavior of the organism was roughly contemporaneous with the upsurge of psychoanalysis. When academic psychology abdicated its interest in introspection, Freudian psychiatry, with the most searching form of introspection ever practiced, was available to take up the slack. Fleming⁸ suggests that psychoanalysis was, in a sense, the residual legatee of classical psychology in America.

Contemporaneous with these developments in psychology, there was in medicine the already-mentioned increasing dissatisfaction with the lack in neurological psychiatry of a comprehensive theory of mental illness or therapy for it. This discontent followed the period of about 1870-1900 when Virchowian pathology, both in America and Europe, was the paramount system of thought. Virchow believed that impairment of structure within the body produced impairment of function. An anatomist of sufficient skill could *always* discover the anatomical seat of a functional disturbance. It was, according to Fleming,⁸ the ready availability of any quantity of lesions caused by the

explosive armaments of modern warfare in comparison with the relative superficiality of the saber thrust, that, during the Civil War in America and the Franco-Prussian War in Europe, influenced the medical profession. The doctors were impressed by the intricacy and importance of the nerve fiber connection, and this led to the complete capture by Virchowians of the psychiatry of the neurologists. These men thought of mental illness in terms of a clean-cut emotional-physical basis. To use Dr. Mitchell once again for an illustration of typical Virchowian thinking, he not only tied mental disturbance to a physical condition of the body, namely, exhaustion, but believed that even this might some day be shown to have a specific locus by the anatomists. Dr. John P. Gray, who was probably the foremost neurological psychiatrist of his time and superintendent of the State Hospital for the Insane at Utica, N. Y., went so far as to eliminate entirely the category describing patients as suffering from "mental or moral causes." "The mind," he said, "cannot become diseased, only the body. In all so-called mental derangement there must be an anatomical lesion of the brain. An insane man had either been physically ill or he was not insane."

An increasing dissatisfaction with so narrow a view won and kept many important adherents for psychoanalysis. But the overpowering strength of the hope for anatomical precision has never lessened for many physicians, and their suspicion has always interfered with the standing of psychoanalytic psychiatry in medicine. There is a striking parallel between the old, neurological psychiatry and behaviorism. If you thought the patient's problems were entirely physical, you did not have to take into account what he may think or feel about them. In fact, a relatively recent statement by John C. Whitehorn,⁹ essentially a proponent of the Virchowian school, when he was Professor of Psychiatry at Johns Hopkins Medical School, to the effect that "Last year the analysts wanted sex so the patients told them about sex; this year they want aggression so the patients give them aggression," is a remarkably exact echo of Watson's statement quoted earlier.

There is considerable irony in this situation. Brucke, one of the originators of the same physicalist point of view in biology,

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directly influenced Freud. Freud's correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess¹⁰ shows him to have been a zealous adherent of this school, and, although in practice Freud enormously enlarged upon the autonomy of man's inner life, he never gave up the hope that a neurological or biochemical substratum for psychiatry could be established. But, with the abdication of academic psychology and the inadequacies of neurological psychiatry, it was Freud who, almost in spite of himself, supplied the necessary revelations of the inner life that led to a better form of psychotherapy and to a new scope for classical psychology.

IV

The American national character, the social and intellectual climate of the country when Freud came here, the unwavering support of powerful adherents, and the disaffection in medicine and academic psychology with the dominant doctrines of the time, have been attributed an important role in the upsurge of Freudian psychology in this country. Another, more philosophical, speculation may be added to this list. The two most important bodies of thought in the first part of the twentieth century may have been Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism and Karl Marx' economic determinism. In a broad, oversimplified version, Spencer's philosophy saw human existence in terms of struggle and competition, each man for himself, survival of the fittest without mutual assistance. The Marxist view of society, where each must care for the others and relinquish his individual aspirations for the greater goals of the society, was embodied in the idea that each person diffuses his identity in the state or even in the factory. Psychoanalysis as a philosophy lies between these two views. The first of these social theories seemed too close to the unbridled primitive aggressions of mankind, while the second, although shiny with idealism about man, seemed too restrictive of personal aspirations. Psychoanalysis, which allowed for conflict between the basic nature of man and his environment, but which—although pessimistic about the basic nature of man when compared to Marx—did not despair of resolution, offered a middle way.

Given all of these factors, it is not surprising that analysis took hold. However, it did more than prevail in academic and medical circles; it became almost a national craze. No one has described the situation better than Erik Erikson in *Young Man Luther*,¹¹ when he says about the spread of psychoanalysis, "...even as we were trying to devise, with scientific determinism, a therapy for the few, we were led to promote an ethical disease among the many." The most important thing about the acceptance of psychoanalytic thought, however, is its inconsistency. Certain of Freud's ideas were accepted en bloc at the same moment that basically interrelated hypotheses were being rejected. Lately a tendency has developed to accept—often without knowing it—some of Freud's empirical discoveries and to concentrate criticism on the Freudian concepts and hypotheses. The soil was fertile, but the growth has been remarkably incongruent, gigantism alongside of dwarfism, choice flowers from the same plants as rank growth. Some of the problems came from the public to whom psychoanalysis addressed itself; some of them came from the analysts.

When one considers the multiple factors that played a part in the American public's acceptance of psychoanalysis, it might be assumed that the implicit values of psychoanalysis would be consonant with many of these forces. Surprisingly, this does not seem to be the case.¹² Any investigation of the value system of psychoanalysis—the way of thinking or the structure of beliefs—reveals little in common with much of American culture. The entire implicit and explicit value system of psychoanalysis has never been thoroughly delineated, but some values that conflict with the culture should be mentioned.

In no area has there been more conflict between culture and psychoanalysis, or has Freud been more thoroughly and more consistently misunderstood, than on the topic of candor about sex. Freud outlined a broad definition of sexuality that began with birth and was intended to convey concepts of psychic energy and of genetic development which he called the libido theory. Naturally, such a theory concerns itself with what a

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person is and how things work in him or for him. It does not concern itself with the "right" and "wrong" of behavior, and in that sense is a rejection of conventional morality. In considering behavior, however, psychoanalysis as a therapy or as a theory of development views the relationship of the person to himself and to his culture in adaptive terms. The emphasis on culture recognizes limitations on absolute individual freedom, and this is, in a sense, conformism. But the emphasis on the person's relationship with himself takes individual gratification into account, and in that sense opposes conventional Christian morality. This attempt to be truly inclusive led early psychoanalysts to be seen as libertines espousing sexual profligacy and modern ones as conformists who subscribe to middle-class morality. In both cases the general cultural attitude expressed by cartoons and jokes has often been scornful.

Right and wrong in the conventional moral sense may be translated into strong and weak as well as into good and bad. In such an orthodox view the ethic embodied in realistic concepts of strength and virtue is misapplied. The awareness of our inner, secret lives erroneously becomes synonymous with giving in to and acting on the anxieties and passions of childhood.¹¹ Psychoanalysis, and for many people a psychiatric referral or consultation, has the unpleasant connotation of weakness and lack of control, as if license would be granted to indulge repressed biological urges.

The very insistence of psychoanalysis on biological, primitive instincts existing in a timeless unconscious where the law of the jungle holds sway¹³ and permits conscienceless thinking revolts many people. They wish to believe that man can become "good" in thought as well as deed. They feel that the psychoanalyst, in his insistence on this instinctual life, is looking for what is "bad" and that he overemphasizes that part of human personality. Also, the rejection of instinctual life has a counterpart in the response of many people to the insistence of psychoanalysis on the existence of conflict. The belief that one cannot love without hate and that the continuation of this opposition of intense feelings throughout life results in, rather than interferes with, the development of a mature identity, is abhorrent to many people. The belief that conflict is forever

part of life sadly cannot be fitted together with Thoreau's idyll of contentment and tranquillity, so treasured by Americans.

Another aspect of the belief in conflict which arouses opposition is its insistence on the necessity of individual choice. A person chooses what he does with some kind of awareness that other possibilities, no matter how painful or shameful, are open. Psychoanalysts are well aware that, although life from the moment of birth changes and narrows the sequence of choices open to each individual, some choice always remains. This psychoanalytic concept of responsibility differs markedly from the stereotype of the analyst as totally permissive and indulgent. The limits of a person's responsibility is essentially an old moral question: the psychoanalyst is not so concerned with whether it is right or wrong as with the fact that you have chosen it. Once chosen, the decision is yours to live with. By assigning a place to unconscious motives and ideas, psychoanalysts feel that the responsibility for them, too, has to be accepted.

This belief in choice accompanies the basic psychoanalytic proposition that insight—greater intellectual and emotional understanding of self—is good. The more you know and understand about yourself, the more information you can bring to bear on decisions and, therefore, hopefully make choices that will be for your own and others' well-being. A fair percentage of the population is otherwise convinced, believing that what you don't know won't hurt you. Many people think that it is easier to adjust if doubts and uncertainty are denied. It is really in this general area that psychoanalysis in psychiatry often finds itself separate from other branches of medicine.¹⁴

VI

The next point, and one of the most basic, concerning what has resulted in fundamental hostilities and misunderstanding about psychoanalysis in this country, revolves around attitudes of both the public and the analysts. For many people, especially the social and behavioral scientists, Freud presented the individual as isolated from society, his personality almost irrevocably molded by the early family relationships before he even begins

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a social existence. Erikson¹⁵ discusses the tendency of psychoanalysis to subordinate the later stages of life to those of childhood. Such emphasis, especially on the part of early analysts such as Abraham, Sachs, etc., cast doubt not only on the efficacy of social reform, but also on the relevance of such studies to an understanding of human society. This presentation of the position of psychoanalysis is unquestionably distorted. Freud's interest in the impact of the culture on the organism, his early concepts of ego psychology, are certainly contained in the Fleiss letters.¹⁰ However, his preoccupation with the great discoveries of the unconscious, of mental structures, of the uses of psychic energy in development, is understandable, and the later work, as he said, he hadn't gotten around to yet.¹⁶ And certainly neither Freud nor psychoanalysis as a whole is responsible for the fixation of some analysts on a single phase of Freud's thinking. Nevertheless, it was this position more than any other that led to the proliferation of so-called neo-Freudian revisionists after 1930. Perhaps the best example and most influential of these was Harry Stack Sullivan who, as Fleming⁸ points out, was directly indebted in his thinking to the social psychologists, Charles H. Cooley and George Herbert Meade, and perhaps indirectly to John Dewey. Sullivan's emphasis on the self as consisting of the "reflected appraisals" of other people included the nuclear family as part of the basic interpersonal relations, but only as the start of the social network. In this he translated into psychiatric terms Cooley's process of self-elicitation by exchange of perspectives with others. These culturists, who also owed a debt to Alfred Adler, were dealing with many of the same theoretical problems and personal struggles as were the classical Freudian analysts, as will be discussed shortly. But the direction of their efforts to translate the findings of psychology into a therapy for the benefit of humanity won them an important place on the scene no matter how puerile their thinking, as was Erich Fromm's attempt to unite Freud and Marx.¹⁷ When Erikson speaks of analysts as promoting an ethical disease, he assigns responsibility not just to the public's clutching at any straws, nor to Freud, but to much of the analytic movement.

Freud's attempt to explain the creative origins of a great

man or even of the development of civilisation itself in the terms of basic instinctual impulses represented the imaginative genius of a man busy formulating and reformulating new ideas. Often, in fact, Freud did not bother to show when or where new thinking supplanted earlier concepts, or more importantly, where psychoanalysis as an empirical science separated from the philosophical systems. Not that he did not believe in the necessity for systematization, but he also believed that all horizons must be explored. His colleagues did not always have the same excuse. Psychoanalysts expressed themselves about history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and every form of the arts and literature in the most primitive way. Their efforts to make psychoanalysis a *Weltanschauung* must be taken into account in considering their responsibility for the distorted image of psychoanalysis in this country. The psychoanalysts themselves have a kind of identity problem about what they do. Are they primarily attempting to help people get better (whatever that is conceptually): Are they using a technique, a research tool, by which the processes of the mind are investigated? Or are they building with their daily experiences a broad psychological theory intended to explain health as well as illness?

Analysis is a long procedure and analysts need to come to terms with the fact that they can treat relatively few people in their lifetimes and many of those, either because of the degree or nature of their illness, with only relative success. The analyst, during his professional childhood, his analytic training, is taught to wait, to tolerate doubt and therapeutic uncertainty, and to stand the frustration of a slow treatment whose gains are hard to determine on a day-to-day basis, and whose recipients by the nature of the situation express frequent dissatisfaction, anger, and criticism about the therapy and the therapist. It is not surprising that therapists, even with this training and with the natural inclinations that led them into this field, want to broaden their horizons and see the potential of psychoanalysis realized in other, less restricting fields.

VII

Furthermore, a strong, understandable urge towards scientific respectability plagues analysts. Invariably, this leads them into comparisons with the physical sciences, particularly in recent years when the rate of growth in some areas promises prestigious "break-throughs" that may answer questions centuries old. Analysts long for some area in their work of exact measurement, nonqualified predictions, and hypotheses that can be experimentally tested. As Maxwell Gitelson¹⁸ points out in his Presidential Address to the International Psychoanalytic Association, this has led them out of their area of scientific focus, the analytic situation, into "applications" of psychoanalysis which are in reality extrapolations based on analogies and assumed continuities. Using the reasoning of George Simpson,¹⁹ a biologist, about what makes science and scientific procedure, Gitelson persuasively presents the case for science as "an interconnected series of concepts and conceptual schemes that have developed as the result of experimentation and observation and are fruitful of further experimentation and observation." This definition provides a role for speculation and intuition, and as a method encourages, as data, observations that can be repeated and observed. The need here is not for exact measurement or proof but for the establishment of probability within a certain range. Gitelson also mentions the work of Gregg and Benjamin, who call attention to the constant doubt with which all evidence dependent on interpretation must be viewed. By quoting Claude Bernard and Richard Tolman, Gitelson indicates that complete objectivity or objective validity is no more available to the physical scientists than it is to the psychoanalysts. These men speak of the subjective needs of the scientist plagued by the emotions, prejudices, and biases of man which influence his choice of problem and his perception, which in turn affect his results.

This argument indicates strongly that the psychoanalyst, in his specific area of competence in individual psychology studying "the peculiar psychological phenomena which come into view in the context of a peculiar dyadic relationship," need not be

so defensive nor reach out so far. The fact that he has points to another issue which has already been touched on: the feeling of social responsibility of the psychoanalyst. It is not that the individual psychoanalyst is guilt-stricken because he cannot cure the mentally ill of the world. He must accept such limitations early and thoroughly, or he could not practice. However, Freud stated firmly that it was not the actual patients analyzed but the influence of psychoanalysis as a system of thought which would affect the world.²⁰ This belief, along with the personal hope of many analysts to extend the positive contributions they have made to individuals as therapists, has led them out of their offices and into situations which offer a broader social scope for psychoanalytic concepts.²¹

Certainly in the United States the psychoanalyst has been encouraged to take this step. The psychoanalyst and psychoanalytic psychiatrist are called upon in every organized attempt at the rectification of social difficulties. He is asked to work with children's courts, criminal courts, domestic relations courts, prisons and reformatories, and to consult with social agencies, churches and educational institutions of every level from nursery school to graduate school. He is increasingly asked by industry for help with personnel problems and with the allocation of men to appropriate tasks and work loads. Sometimes his aid is sought on larger issues of national and international import, and he participates today in many federal organizations. This list does not yet touch on his prime function as a physician and part of the medical profession. He shares here the work on medical and surgical wards and the specialty services with adults and children in every outpatient clinic, and especially in institutions devoted to chronic disabling impairments. Not yet mentioned are his important duties as a teacher and administrator in medical schools and general hospitals. And last, but far from least, are the needs for his services in the psychiatric hospitals, in the psychiatric outpatient departments, in the psychoanalytic institutes, in the supervision and training of psychiatric residents, and in the actual clinical practice of psychiatry. Even if it were agreed that psychiatry is capable of attempting all of these duties, certainly the number of well-trained psychiatrists necessary to answer all the calls is impossible to supply.²²

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In his zeal he has tried to answer many of these calls, usually with great success, as indicated by the constant increase in the number of requests, but sometimes, inevitably, with disappointment. The disappointment is frequently because of excessive expectations, as in the college health field, but occasionally because the analyst overreached himself. No opprobrium rests on the analyst because his social conscience led him to try many things. However, he must bear a share of the responsibility for the overpopularization of psychoanalysis in this century, and face the possibility that, in having succeeded too well, he runs the risk of fulfilling Freud's 1909 fear of the vulgarization of his work.⁶

VIII

The arguments for a broader application of psychoanalysis seem overwhelming, but in its clash with the value system of the general public and in the search among analysts for their own definition of their most important job, distortions have occurred in the mass culture's and to a certain extent, high culture's view and use of psychoanalytic thought. Let us document some more of this distortion.

The social sciences were the academic disciplines most closely connected to psychoanalysis, because of their goals and their need for a theory of personality. In psychology, from the time Hall introduced Freud to the present, much use has been made of psychoanalytic concepts, but there has also been extensive opposition. The sociologists in the 20's and the 30's were interested in great social issues and social reforms on the one hand, and demography with its early use of mathematics and statistics on the other, and had no special interest in a comprehensive study of the individual. So it is anthropology which best exemplifies the trends and uses of psychoanalysis in the social sciences. Before 1920 anthropology was nonpsychological. The advent of people like Margaret Mead, Sapir, and Benedict, who were interested in the relationship between culture and personality, introduced psychoanalysis. In 1920 Kroeber,²³ perhaps the best known anthropologist at the time,

published a highly critical review of *Totem and Taboo*.²⁴ He attacked what he saw as Freud's belief that the origins of culture and society were dependent on the Oedipus complex. This attack, instead of ending the use of psychoanalysis in anthropology, as many expected it would, only made it not respectable to become a *bona fide* student at psychoanalytic centers. Freud's terminology quickly began to appear in anthropological publications. In a short time, words like regression, repression, dream symbolism, oral, anal, and phallic, as well as Jung's introvert and extravert, were commonplace, *without*, however, a careful concern with whether they were used in contexts consonant with Freud's original intentions. Malinowski, in *Sexual Repression in Savage Society*²⁵ in 1927 and *Sexual Life of Savages*²⁶ in 1929, made a somewhat more knowledgeable attack than Kroeber's on the question of whether Freud's discoveries were genuinely universal or were applicable only to the Viennese society of the time. The Trobriand Islanders are among the best-known primitive tribes in the world because Malinowski asserted that he could prove that they did not go through an Oedipal conflict. The fame of this discussion—which to this day stirs college students to argument pro and con psychoanalysis—of a tribe where the mother's brother rather than the biological father stands *in loco parentis*, represents the essence of the distortion of Freud's aims. An important academic discipline used psychoanalytic concepts and terminology frequently but loosely, and then created a major controversy about a detail, devoting much less attention to the whole idea of a general theory of development including energies, structures, dynamics, and integrative functions of the mind. No wonder that what filtered out to the general public was a prurient concern about the sexual attractions between mother and son, or father and daughter.

Incidentally, Malinowski was not solely to blame, for Freud, in his own use of Frazer's *The Golden Bough*²⁷ as data to reinforce clinical observations, placed himself squarely in the same untenable position of making anthropological evidence valid data for psychoanalytic theorizing. But whoever the culprits, the mass culture and academic disciplines got a distorted picture.

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Later, by 1930, with Lasswell's book, *Psychopathology and Politics*,²⁸ sociologists as well as psychologists, social psychologists, and anthropologists, began to care about the individual and his personality as related to his culture, and made more and more use of psychoanalysis. In fact, as these disciplines were joined by social anthropology, there began to be an enormous overlap of function and interest. Increasingly, they tried to move away from polarities of thought, from a dichotomy of theory and empiricism, towards what Merton²⁹ calls "theories of the middle range." To avoid such polarities, a linking concept that was of broad range and not specific to any of the interpenetrating disciplines was supplied by psychoanalysis. Perhaps the prime example of this use of psychoanalysis as a necessary link was the formation at Harvard of a Department of Social Relations, just after the Second World War, which included psychology, sociology, social psychology, and anthropology. Henry Murra, who represented psychology, was himself a psychoanalyst and the originator of the Thematic Apperception Test; Talcott Parsons continues as the foremost sociologist using psychoanalytic concepts; W. Gordon Allport, the social psychologist, was not himself very much interested in psychoanalysis but his concept of "functional autonomy"³⁰ is constantly referred to by the ego psychologists as showing striking similarity to ego autonomy in psychoanalytic theory; and Clyde Kluckhohn, the anthropologist, not only used psychoanalytic theory to understand his observations of American Indians but also had made a pilgrimage to Vienna for a brief and unsatisfactory meeting with Freud. These were certainly people who by training and inclination would make the best use of psychoanalytic concepts. The effect of such a popular department on graduate and undergraduate students is another question. Just how often the students carried away, not the complex and rigorously interrelated hypotheses of classical psychoanalysis, but the oversimplified catch phrases which were later reinforced by popularization, is not known, but can, from casual observation, be suspected.

One of Freud's greatest interests was history. But history, as a formal, academic discipline, tried to study events on the basis of known facts which could be placed in the stream of

long-range trends without consideration of individual motives based on personal conflict—that is, conflict which came from deeply placed, often unconscious feelings rather than from differences in political or economic ideas. William Langer,³¹ in his Presidential Address to the American Historical Society in 1957, called attention to this lack and asked for greater use of psychoanalytic theory. He warned, however, that unwise or excessive speculations about motives from historical data would result in a travesty. At the moment of showing that for a comprehensive view of the world the one inclusive psychological theory should be considered, he recognized the fine line that separated use from abuse.

Leon Edel in "The Biographer and Psycho-analysis," an address presented at a meeting to honor the memory of Edward Hitschmann, one of the first analysts, other than Freud, to be interested in the contributions psychoanalysis could make to the understanding of biography and literature, sounded the warning even more sharply. He had justification, because the abuse of psychoanalytic concepts in literary criticism had become overwhelming. He said:

I need not tell you that in a strange, pervasive, subterranean way, the teachings of psycho-analysis have filtered down to the literary critics often in distorted form. These have brought about a veritable revolution in scholarship, not to speak of an exuberant chase for myth and symbol which is developing into a national literary marathon. When a professor in an American college writes a paper, seriously published in the most authoritative of our learned journals, to prove that Virginia Woolf's heroine in *To The Lighthouse* is a bad mother because she empathizes with her boy in a given situation and, (says the professor) thereby reinforces his 'Oedipus complex,' we have reached some new strange level of myth and dogma; some new measurement of human behaviour. And when my students persist in seeing only the 'sexual symbolism' in a work and are in perpetual pursuit of it at the expense of the work's substance and artistic and moral purpose, I quietly wonder sometimes whether all the cultured gentlemen who gathered with Freud in Vienna, among them Hitschmann, would not be rather horrified at what has come to pass.

The relationship of psychoanalysis to medicine as an academic discipline and as a therapy and its distortion has been

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treated elsewhere.¹⁴ Suffice it to say that there has been an essential clash of values which does not minimize the importance that individual doctors have placed on the use of psychoanalytic concepts to help in the psychological management of all patients. Further, most medical schools have found a place in their curricula for some form of dynamic psychiatry. However, the marriage between psychological medicine and physiological medicine continues to be uneasy. One of the many paradoxes surrounding the whole impact of psychoanalysis on American culture is that where it may be needed most, in medicine, it is least employed.

One last example in academia where the demands of human suffering led to the exploitation of psychoanalysis for good purpose, but probable ultimate distortion, is social work, particularly psychiatric social work. Always a helping profession, whose unfortunate image remains closely tied to Lady Bountiful with a basket of food for the poor, social work attempted to establish itself as a practical discipline by adapting psychoanalytic principles to casework. Just what casework is and how it is similar to or different from psychotherapy^{33 34} remains for many a mystery. However, the need was great, and the dedication of those workers who chose this field was unquestioned. Family agencies, in and out of general and mental hospitals, and later child guidance clinics, exerted yeoman efforts to influence the environment of patients by helping relatives either materially or by increased understanding of their feelings. But the social worker's role became more unclear as it became more complex. Can anyone arrange taxi service for patients unable to travel to an orthopedic clinic, arrange for the mother of a psychotic patient to bring in a favored book or picture, try to help a rehabilitation agency find someone a job, do family or marital counseling (whatever that is), and regularly interview a woman whose husband beats her in order to help her stand her ground less self-destructively and maintain the treasured marriage? Would not there be confusion in trying all these things for even the best-trained psychiatrist with analytic training?³⁵ Yet social workers are asked to do all of this with only an M. A. earned in most schools in two years. In the last few years social workers, recognizing the impossibility of

being appointment maker, job getter, helping hand, advisor on child rearing, and therapist, and tiring of feeling like the psychiatrists' handmaidens, have turned to sociology in their search for a professional definition. Nevertheless, social work epitomizes as well as anything the warp that often occurs with "applied" psychoanalysis.

IX

To estimate the currency of psychoanalysis in the arts seems impossible; it is everywhere. Robert Lee Wolff³⁶ illustrates this very well in his discussion of diary-keeping and novel-writing in the nineteenth century. Before Freud, people like Carlyle, Ruskin, etc. kept extensive diaries in which they freely described odd dreams and symptoms, such as impotence, and the thoughts and feelings that accompanied them. This unself-consciousness came from the conviction that the symptoms were purely physical and, as such, inflictions to be borne. Dreams were curious manifestations of sleep unconnected to the consciousness and character of the dreamer. Many Victorians like Harriet Martineau not only kept diaries, but wrote novels which portrayed their own conflicts and inner desires with simple directness. Wolff contends that once Freud revealed the connections between men as parts and man as a whole, no one could quite so freely expose himself again. Writers question the "why" of their characters and also question the personal revealingness of their themes and ideas. Once Freud existed he had to be taken into account, just as Ibsen could not ignore, if he were to rewrite "Ghosts" today, the findings of modern sypphilology.

Whenever such facts are pointed out, many mourn our lost innocence. But the other side of the argument is given by Stanley Edgar Hyman,³⁷ writing in *Freud and the Twentieth Century*. His interest is in the concept of heroism and tragedy. There is little scope in our modern world for the classic concept of the tragic hero, which requires greatness of deed to make downfall moving. Hyman feels that Freud, in expounding man's struggle with himself, with his own instincts, has renewed

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tragedy and offered a new, unlimited vista for heroism and struggle. For analysts, the capacity to doubt and still act with resolution and spontaneity is a miracle to be exercised all the days of our lives. In his discussion Hyman offers the inner struggle of man as a study in literature that can never be exhausted.

Clearly, the contribution of analysis cannot be judged as good or bad. We can only ascertain whether it has been used validly and with care. In any case, it is hard nowadays for a literary critic to discuss a novel or a play without thinking of the characters or themes in motivational concepts borrowed from analysis. Writers, when they concern themselves with questions of the consistency of a character or the reality of a symbol, think in analytic terms whether they know it or not. In novels, where thoughts can be conveyed, this often results in great subtlety. A writer like Cozzens, probably only indirectly influenced by psychoanalysis, understands the bitterness and the necessity to choose both inside oneself and in the world. Other writers, such as Herman Wouk, too often more directly influenced by psychoanalysis, come out sounding like a primer on Freud. A writer as great as O'Neill sounds terribly dated today in some plays because of the heavyhanded use of the theme of the Oedipus or Electra complex. In one season on Broadway "The Dark at the Top of the Stairs," "Look Homeward, Angel," and "Winesburg, Ohio" showed three young men crawling piteously across the stage trying to escape in dramatic form the chains of their attachment to a possessive, sexualized mother. No wonder many critics rose up in righteous wrath against oversimplified Freud. Unfortunately, most advocated throwing out the baby with the bath water and failed, like Brooks Atkinson, to differentiate the use of psychoanalysis from such misuse.

The writer's ambivalence about psychoanalysis shows itself in the extreme difficulty of portraying an analyst or psychiatrist at work, considering how often it has been tried. A rare exception which shows that it can be done is in Philip Roth's *Letting Go*.³⁸ Many others, like Herman Wouk,³⁹ Mary McCarthy,⁴⁰ or Joseph Kramm, simply introduce a new stock figure—a fool, a man out of touch with genuine human feeling, or a blackguard.

In *Vertical and Horizontal*,⁴² Lillian Ross uses the psychoanalyst to caricature sterility and emptiness, which seems appropriate in the Age of Analysis, as does the creation of a wildly comic figure in Elliott Baker's *A fine Madness*.⁴³ But these last aim at a different goal; the writer's difficulty in knowing who the analyst is and what he stands for in the culture is clearer when he tries to present an analyst in a "realistic" play or novel.

Music, painting, and sculpture as art forms have come closer to escaping this overwhelming involvement. Not so art and music critics, because many have tried to explain abstract art in instinctual terms and pop art as the statement of social-psychological revolution. Contemporary music too gets discussed as part of the Age of Analysis, but the abstractedness of any real music needs a far stretch for a symbolic interpretation.

One other art form deserves special mention because of its impact and because in many ways it is a bridge between high culture and mass culture. For a young person to be taken to a play in modern America is something of an event, but the movies are ubiquitous. (TV, an even more ubiquitous medium, is still too recent for a careful assessment.) Very few can remember the first movie they saw, but for many people the movies became a regular part of their lives at an early age. It is difficult to assess the movies and the people who made them because so much is hearsay, but to understand the impact on the viewer we must think about the medium and its concoctors.⁴⁴ The medium itself, with the audience seated in the dark before images greater than life, exerts an uncanny pull, especially on the young. The heart beats in rhythm to the background music and the imagination is sucked into and encompasses the screen. Also, the movies are made for groups, not individuals. One thing many motion picture technicians agree upon is the curious fact that you cannot judge as audience reaction the response of a single person when a movie is shown only to him. This sounds like an extension of a well-known group phenomenon which is described as the contagious spreading of emotions in groups, in contrast to the characteristic resistance to the same feelings by an isolated individual and may partially explain the movies' almost imperceptible invasive quality.

In some respects, because so many movies cannot be taken

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seriously either as to theme or characterization, the relentless influence increases. No conscious decision is involved in considering the characters as people or the theme as important, as it may be with a serious play. In the movies whatever childhood emotions respond, whatever fantasies stir in the dark, whatever ideals are typified, tend to be consciously dismissed as unworthy. During childhood and adolescence many parents demand this response by cutting references to "that trash." If one looks carefully at the movies over time, their capacity to judge and appeal to a psychological response just below the level of consciousness has been remarkable, which may be one reason for defensive dismissals. For example, from approximately 1940 to 1948, when the war hung over everyone like a great cloak, the characters in movies were entirely noble; even villains were generally redeemed; heroes and heroines invariably walked off into the sunset, and doubt, confusion, and uncertainty were banished forever. Things had to turn out well without exception. An incredible number of movies in the 30's showed how much happier the poor were than the rich. Until the early 1950's, when, almost overwhelmed by television and influenced by Europeans, the motion picture industry turned to talented individuals who were permitted to originate and control their productions, the craft of moviemaking was usually a group effort. The big studio heads, virtual dictators, assigned production teams bound by long-term contracts who were responsible not just for the artistic integrity of the venture, but for the continued financial health of a huge operation dependent on the images of certain stars, supplying what the circuits wanted because of block booking, and the scheduling of a huge output. The result had to please everybody, in effect, by pleasing a Louis B. Mayer or a Harry Cohen, and had to have in it something for everyone. The love interest, the sex, the action, the family trade, the distaff afternoon crowd, the adolescents, the churches, and after the early 1930's the omnipresent censors—all had to be considered. No one could be offended. Movie writers and story editors found in simplified, cleansed psychoanalysis the broad universal human themes they sought. Moreover, for whatever reason, there is some evidence that personal psychoanalysis as a treatment found a ready market among the harassed members

of an industry who found their inner lives a disconcerting contrast to the celluloid and press-agent glamor. Unquestionably, the personal searchings of actors, writers, directors, producers, and, less well known but perhaps equally important, film and story editors, led indirectly to the ways in which themes, characters, and motives were conceptualized and presented. In these ways, in remarkably shapeless forms, the American public—and incidentally Europe too, where American movies were popular—got a very heavy dose of disguised, popularized psychoanalysis.

With academia, high culture, and mass culture so thoroughly preparing the way, it is not surprising that one of the best-selling long-playing records of 1962 was devoted mostly to jokes about analysis by the brilliant satirists, Mike Nichols and Elaine May.⁴⁵ This record followed an almost incredible procession of psychiatric jokes by the entire entertainment industry. But this too must be viewed as a reflection of the dissemination and acceptance of this speciality as part of the national scene and consciousness. One of the first to see this bandwagon and put it to more or less practical use was advertising. The whole concept of motivational research derived from psychoanalytic theory. The study of the consumer, and the attempt to deduce what latent or unconscious associations induced him to prefer one product to another, delved deep into the depths of the mind. In recent years this approach to selling has somewhat lost favor, probably because the potential buyer grew aware that a cigarette smoked by a cowboy was supposed to appeal to his desire for total maleness and, by knowing, resisted the appeal. A recent book by Ernest Dichter, a motivational psychologist⁴⁶, referred to by Russell Baker of the *New York Times*⁴⁷ as the most depressing book of the year, states the case for motivational research in the most simple-minded possible terms. For instance, in a discussion of spaghetti, Dr. Dichter says that fresh cooked it provides the housewife with “emotional approval and ego satisfaction, suggests family fun and conviviality,” while canned spaghetti becomes “a blatant symbol of their lack of efficient planning,” resulting in “guilt feelings and fears of rejection.” According to Dr. Dichter, it is almost impossible to eat anything without risking emotional trouble. Soup induces “moods of nostalgic reverie, especially around mother’s love”; prunes “are

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a symbol of old age: they are like dried-out spinsters" (decrepitude, sterility). No matter how much good psychoanalysis may do for the world as a therapy, or in research, if it is responsible for Dr. Dichter's view of the world, it has a lot to answer for.

Another use of psychoanalytic theory which must also give rise to mass ambivalence, if not outright hostility, is in public relations. Fascinatingly enough, public relations' most successful practitioner, who originated both the term and the concept, is a 72-year-old, Vienna-born nephew of Sigmund Freud, E. L. Bernays. Stanley Walker in *City Editor*⁴⁸ wrote of Bernays' prowess. "Bernays has taken the side show barker and given him a new awesome language: 'conditioned reflexes,' 'continuous interpretation,'..." Bernays himself says,⁴⁹ "The public relations counsel must have in mind three elements: adjustment, information, and persuasion." He must, to be successful, "know about power structure, motivations, symbols, sublimations, projection and folk ways." This insistent emphasis on the jargon and the tenets of psychoanalysis without a certain recognition of its scope and subtlety must contribute to the gross public misunderstanding of psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts as prurient or manipulatory, as simpletons or mercenaries, but in any case as unable to see the importance of any motives except the primitive impulses.

The newspapers present another absorbing indication of the spread to the mass media of psychoanalytic ideas. The great wire services now often report things like slips of the tongue simply as news. The implication of these stories is that the speaker was revealing the existence of another, usually opposite, feeling from the one he intended to convey. The best examples of this came from the political campaign of 1960, because Mr. Nixon was subject to parapraxes. His most famous comment was his reference to his running mate, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, as "my distinguished opponent" shortly after Mr. Lodge had made a speech in the South, deemed politically unfortunate, promising a cabinet post to a Negro if elected. Mr. Nixon's use of the phrase, "We can't stand pat," during a speech in which his wife Patricia was by his side, elicited chuckles throughout the nation when reporters of the wire services proved sufficiently psychoanalytically aware to report it. News analysts might be

unable to discuss the world if they were deprived of phrases like "emotional climate," "agressive intent," "personal ambition," and many others. The remarkable thing about the constant use in newspapers of ideas stemming originally from psychoanalysis is that there is no longer any need to refer to them as specifically psychoanalytic or Freudian. They have been completely accepted as part of the national language.

X

Further documentation of the adoption and vulgarization of psychoanalysis, in innumerable magazine articles, short stories, paperback books, comic strips, and television programs, seems unnecessary. Let me turn then to a pernicious result of infatuation without basic understanding, the creation not of just stereotypes but of codified categories.

The development of stereotypes of anything well known is virtually inevitable. Stereotypes change, as a research on the public's attitude toward doctors showed a few years ago. *Arrow-smith*⁵⁰ had given way to an image of a kind of machine composed of hypodermics, pipettes, and test tubes which wouldn't make night calls but did dispense prescriptions for expensive drugs. Certainly, all of the dissemination of psychoanalysis created a stereotype of the psychoanalyst and of his concepts and even of his therapy. What does it mean now to go to an analyst? It is all too often like joining a club. You may be ashamed of it and want out as soon as possible, or you may become a member of the club and make being a patient a way of life. How many people defer consulting a psychiatrist at the most propitious moment because they don't want to become one of "them"? In his capacity as a doctor, the psychoanalyst's efficiency and effectiveness have been impaired by the odd development of these group formations. At one time to go to a psychoanalyst was shameful to many and indicated a moral taint. With its acceptance, fewer felt the shame, but with the formations of the group "patient," "analysand," "neurotic," or "just sick, man," there developed another more pervasive division of psychoanalysis as a stereotype from psycho-

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analysis as a form of therapy.⁵¹ When someone consulting a psychiatrist feels he is joining a group, the acceptance of the standards and mores of a group with the accompanying pull towards group cohesion and fear of disruptive urges reduces the freedom and individuality of the therapy. This unconscious compliance to a rigid, socially structured role can in many patients form an alliance with that part of their own personality that fears certain disruptive or destructive impulses.⁵² This alliance results in the patient's feeling caught, bound in a strait-jacket that can often be represented by the analysis itself. At best it requires time and care to work through this combination of forces that makes his search for freedom itself, the analysis, the jailer.

The Social Relations Department at Harvard mentioned earlier as an example of the use of psychoanalysis as a linking, conceptual schema, shows signs of trouble at least partially because of this distortion of Freud's legacy. In 1964, when the Department was to move to a grand new building, the question whether the various specialty sub-sections should not now be geographically separate arose. This wish for a return to parochialism and specialization, although unsuccessful, resulted in part from the question of whether one was for or against psychoanalysis. The question should be, in what way do you use what aspects of psychoanalytic theory—a far less argument-provoking issue. The consideration of psychoanalysis as a category, as an ism, cannot be conducive to the free spread of ideas, to good, inclusive research, just as it is not conducive to good therapy.

The trend towards the polarization of psychoanalysis indicated by its isolation in the Social Relations Department, the disillusionment about motivational research and the move in many medical schools from a psychoanalytic to a psychopharmacological orientation, satisfies many analysts. They do feel that in most of these cases, the medical schools' particularly, premature disappointment with psychoanalysis for irrational reasons prevents its full potential. However, they do not in the least mourn the loss of advertising as a fellow traveler and, in general, prefer the tempering of the mass infatuation. The possibility that all this activity by and about psychoanalysis has

had a slanting effect on the theory itself is probably the greatest source of worry.

XI

Freud's work characteristically contained reformulations and radical new departures which were consistently interrelated to previous hypotheses but were not consistently systematized. The shifting hierarchical position, in terms of theoretical relevance and emphasis on clinical observation, of the instincts and their derivatives as contrasted with the nature of the forces opposing the drives and directing their discharge, constitutes the key vector for a study of psychoanalytic theory. In his remarkable early work, *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, of 1895,¹⁰ although he used to a certain extent the language of physiology, Freud not only expressed an explicit interest in the defenses against drives which could be culturally determined, but specified the study of other, environmentally related functions such as reality testing, perception, memory, attention, judgment, and thinking. Later, in a comparison of his interest with Breuer's in their study of hysteria, Freud said, "...everywhere I seemed to discern motives and tendencies analogous to those of everyday life."⁵³ Also, in *The Interpretation of Dreams*,⁵⁴ Freud stressed the role of purposive ideas, and on the topic of the controlling function of everyday reality and the dream censor on dreams he placed environmental forces high on the psychoanalytic hierarchy.

However, towards the end of the last century and the beginning of this one, Freud turned predominantly to the exploration of the unconscious and the great inner antagonists to the role of experience in human development, the biological drives. During this period, Freud discovered that it was not real sexual experience during childhood that resulted in neurosis but sexual fantasies, probably universally present, arising from a genetic, developmental, instinctually determined sequence. Perhaps more than anything else this discovery that the sexual behavior he had supposed occurred between parents and children, and which had so shocked him, was only subjective reality,

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discouraged his interest for a time in behavior per se. His respect for the powers of the drives, especially the sexual ones, on the mind, increased, perhaps to awe. The great, comprehensive case histories of that period, still unmatched in their scope, show this bias. His followers too reflected in their papers this interest in the sexual development of the individual as determined by the drives and their effect on personality.

After this period of exploration of his momentous discoveries, Freud's interest in the relationship of behavior to the drives returned. In a series of papers, he began to include aggressive drives on a par with sexual ones and, in so doing, moved to what we now call ego psychology.⁵³ In fact, in a later work⁵⁶ Freud wondered how he could have for so long overlooked the role of nonerotic aggression, whose importance seemed so central to his theory. In the first of the papers that showed a re-emergence of Freud's interest in the ego, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,"⁵⁷ he spells out the state of mind which is dominated by the primitive drives and operates on the basis of pleasure, and opposes the state of mind which is receptive to the demands of the world and operates on the basis of reality. From then on, in ever broader and more precise strokes, he defines an abstraction which, still influenced by his physicalist beliefs, he calls the mental apparatuses. These mental structures came to be called the now famous Id, Ego, and Superego. With the delineation of the so-called structural approach in psychoanalysis by Freud⁵⁸ and further detailed by Anna Freud,⁵⁹ Hartmann,⁵⁵ Rapaport,⁶⁰ and many others, the difference between normality and neurosis became less marked in analytic theory. For instance, defenses were no longer regarded as pathogenic per se but as part of the normal development of a psychic system. Freud⁶¹ called attention to the parallel between the defense mechanism of isolation and the normal process of attention.

This foment in the mainstream of psychoanalytic theory, which puts a more obvious weight on social structure, has been clearly and concisely discussed by Merton Gill.⁶² He points out that these changes constitute a refutation to the charges of orthodoxy so often leveled at psychoanalysts. By becoming a psychology of the surface as well as of the depths of the human

mind, analysis comes much closer to its goal of being an encompassing theory of general psychology. He makes a valiant effort to maintain psychoanalysis' encompassment of social considerations, recognition of such autonomous variables in the personality structure as perception, motility, etc. which are not directly related to either basic or derived motives, and emphasis on adaptation and cognition, without relinquishing adherence to the theory to motivations stemming from primitive, biological drives. As Gill puts it, "However much derived motivations are recognized, psychoanalytic theory still views behavior as essentially motivated by and occurring in the context of bodily drives. Drives for security, success, prestige, status seem, relative to these basic drives, 'superficial' to the psychoanalyst. He thinks rather of castration fear, Oedipal wishes, cannibalistic impulses, homosexuality, or a drive to rend and destroy. It is often said that the analyst's preoccupation with these primitive impulses stems from his almost exclusive concern with disturbed personalities. But the analyst believes that the normal person too is occupied with dealing with such impulses. The difference between the normal and the neurotic he sees not in the root of the tree of the motivational hierarchy but much closer to its crown."

There are at least two implications of Gill's presentation which he does not go into. One is the probability that a greater emphasis on the relationship between social considerations and basic motivational ones results in better and more consistent therapy. But the other, and from the tone of the paper, the one he feared, is that the balance between the two emphases may be so difficult to maintain that the seesaw will swing away from those more unpleasant ideas stemming from drives. The farther psychoanalysis moves from those ideas, the more acceptable it becomes in many circles. And when acceptability becomes a wish in itself, the more likely is analysis to give up what makes it special and be swallowed up by its popularity. The documentation of the perversion and distortion of psychoanalysis in so many areas of our culture reflects the very real possibility of such an occurrence. Psychoanalysis is not a theory of the middle range or a linking concept for the behavioral sciences; it is an encompassing general theory, as

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yet incomplete but still the most inclusive to be presented. However, it is an enormously complex theory rooted in experience with people, many of whom came as patients. If we minimize the theory's complexities, or if we reject, even by emphasis, its roots in deep unconscious motivations, the resulting approval will be short-lived.

Current psychoanalytic theory makes any dichotomy between biological drives and social strivings unnecessary. The variations on the great themes are infinite and specific to a time, place, and person; the same basic, underlying conflict or motive can be expressed in ways determined exclusively by the society and culture. Therefore, the scope for research and theoretical elaboration is not limited by the retention of what makes psychoanalysis unique and special. What may be limited is the extent of the relationship of psychoanalysis to other fields and to various aspects of the culture. In discussing the misuse of psychoanalysis in so many places I have also attempted to show its relatedness to high and mass culture, to academic psychology and education, to sociology and anthropology, and to medicine. The result of such relatedness may of necessity be misunderstanding. The practice of analysis, the hour after hour spent in an intense relationship with individual patients, is a hard, passive, and, in an odd way, lonely occupation.¹² The chances to teach, to work with other disciplines, represent a surcease from this isolation and are easily justified as intellectually meaningful. There will be many analysts who will wish unwittingly to compromise the basic theoretical structure of psychoanalysis in order not to lose the hard-won contacts in the intellectual community and to retain adherents. The cost may be too great. The present concern of psychoanalytic theory with the impact of the social structure on the developing organism seems, to many medical scientists, sociological, social-psychological, or even political. They see the possibility of a cure for mental illness as remote when dealing with forces of such magnitude and complexity, and turn to psychopharmacology and psychophysiology. The social and behavioral scientists react in the opposite way. To them, the psychoanalytic insistence on biologically based motives proves unacceptable and pessimistic, and they insist on still more emphasis on the environment and

social reform. If we retain our individuality, our middle way, we must be willing to accept the isolation that may go with it.

In Gitelson's already-mentioned paper,¹⁸ he proposes a counsel of modesty for psychoanalysts which he regards as a counsel of self-respect. He understands full well the analyst's wishes for validation in the eyes of the scientific community, but he asks each analyst to continue the traditional and invaluable study of his own motives in his activities. He does not plead for the abandonment of teaching, training, or research activities which increase the psychoanalytic knowledge and understanding. And above all, there is no hint of a plea for the retention of the status quo. Freud's capacity to accept and review new evidence, clinical or otherwise, and to use it to formulate and reformulate ideas, reviving what had once been rejected, editing what remained, and adding what was needed, constitutes a great example. However, Gitelson calls for psychoanalysts to restrain themselves in areas of social and intellectual commitment, despite their undoubted appeal, in the same way that analysts must learn the more or less paradoxical necessity for controlling the impulse which expresses itself as therapeutic ambition. We must resist the promotion, in Erikson's sense, of our discipline. We may at this time come close to having a second chance. It is hard to be patient, but perhaps by our example we can help the burgeoning analytic institutes in Europe and Japan to avoid our mistakes and spare their countries so many bad jokes.

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