

cantly, metaphorical. If we say that the 'Background' provides the context for the 'Foreground', we have said something. But not enough. It is in the 'Background' that the cognitional theory first built up in *Insight* is summarized and developed (*Insight* said a great deal about experiencing, understanding, affirming, but comparatively little about the 'fourth level of consciousness': the level of choice, decision, commitment). The eight functional specialties correspond to the four levels of consciousness, operating in each of the two 'phases' of theology. (Without going into detail, the four specialties of the first phase represent stages in 'hearing' the Word; the other four represent stages in 'proclaiming', or 'witnessing to' the Word.) The question concerning the relationship of 'Background' to 'Foreground', therefore, becomes: to what extent is the distribution of theological tasks between Lonergan's eight 'specialties' dependent, for its coherence, on the adoption of a specific cognitional and epistemological theory?

My second question arises from an uneasiness concerning Lonergan's apparent conception of theological autonomy. It seems to be assumed that there exists something called 'theology' which is autonomously generated and articulated (albeit in collaboration with other intellectual tasks), and then 'communicated' to other people. Lonergan conceives of the eight functional specialties as 'distinct and separable stages in a single process from data to ultimate results' (p. 136). That sounds reasonable. But the starting-point is crucial. My question is: what are the data for theology? It is not the case that theological questions, insights and affirmations are generated and tested within the life, language, memory, prayer and suffering of a community? And yet Lonergan seems to take it for granted that the data for theology consists, exclusively, of

texts. Accordingly, he devotes only *two pages* to the 'first functional specialty', 'Research'.

My third question concerns the crucial role played by the concepts of 'conversion', and religious experience. (I would hazard a guess that much of the debate which, it is to be hoped, this book will open up, will concern the move from the first to the second 'phase' and, specifically, the functional specialty 'Foundations'.) 'Faith', says Lonergan, 'is the knowledge born of religious love' (p. 115). But, endorsing Pascal's remark that 'the heart has reasons which reason does not know', he immediately proceeds to generalize this theorem and to acknowledge that, 'besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgements of value of a person in love' (p. 115). While I welcome the emphasis on decision, on love, on religious experience, as foundational in theology, I confess that—against the background of thirty years of Lonergan's development of his cognitional theory—I am amazed at the almost casual manner in which the admission is now made that 'there is another kind of knowledge' (p. 115). To put it another way: from the point of view of cognitional theory, is it really adequate to describe experiences as fundamental as the love of God and other people as being, respectively, the 'major' and 'minor exceptions' to the principle '*Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*' (p. 122)?

There is no doubt, in my mind, but that this is an exceedingly important book. To ignore it would be irresponsible. The intelligent thing to do is to accept it as a challenge which, if critically and reasonably met, should—by agreement, disagreement and debate—raise the level of any theologian's attentiveness to his task.

NICHOLAS LASH

BARON FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL AND THE MODERNIST CRISIS IN ENGLAND, by Lawrence F. Barmann. *Cambridge University Press*. 1972. 278 pp. £6.

Professor Barmann has contributed a fascinating and valuable study to the literature of the modernist movement. He is clear and readable without shirking the complexity of the questions which inevitably arise. He quotes at length, but often in the footnotes so that his account never loses its momentum. At the same time, the footnotes repay careful scrutiny, for there he unravels many points of interest which in the text would have been an unnecessary hindrance. In general the balance between

text and footnotes is most satisfying.

The author states his intention in the Preface: 'Both the limits and the theme of this book are expressed in its title. I have not undertaken to write a comprehensive history of the modernist crisis. I have studied von Hügel's involvement in the movement in its specifically English setting and circumstances, (p. xi). He fulfils his intention admirably. In the process he first outlines von Hügel's intellectual growth. Then he sets the scene,

discusses the first conflicts with Rome, describes his contacts with a wide range of modernists, particularly his friendships with Loisy and Tyrrell, and presents the *denouement*, 'thunderbolts from Rome' and the 'triumph of Vatican policy'. He could perhaps have acknowledged more explicitly the perverse accuracy of *Pascendi*, but that is a relatively minor detail. He concludes his study by emphasizing the consistency of the Baron's views to the end of his life. This judgment has, of course, been disputed.

Some say that von Hügel flagged once Tyrrell was dead. His letter to Maude Petre in 1918, in which he distinguished two kinds of modernism, is regarded as illustrating the change in his views. But Barmann quotes it (p. 243f.) in support of the Baron's consistency. Surprisingly he makes no reference to the contrary opinion. Had he done so, however, he would not have been forced to alter his judgment.

It is clear from his account that von Hügel always sought the truth. Furthermore, he recognized that its attainment involved sound critical scholarship. Whether it was a matter of Anglican Orders or a question of biblical interpretation, he was for ever anxious that it should be approached correctly. For example, Barmann writes: 'Whether or not Anglican Orders were valid by Roman criteria of validity von Hügel did not know. What he did know was that the question was primarily posed as an historical one rather than a theological one, and that consequently it must be determined by historical methods, without a *priori* deter-

minations from scholastic theology' (p. 55). The Holy Office decree on 1 John 5, 7 (cf. *AAS*. 29. (1896-97) p. 637) illustrates what happens when sound scholarship is ignored (cf. pp. 64-68).

At the same time, he realized that scholars make mistakes, in fact that only by risking mistakes could worthwhile research be carried out at all. Consequently he saw that it was vital to treat scholars with a large degree of tolerance. This explains the energy he put into his defence of Loisy and Tyrrell. He did not think that they were always right in their conclusions, but he saw the need within the Roman Catholic Church for an official tolerance of intellectual horizons broader than scholasticism. He regarded the autonomy of the scholar as part of the whole process of seeking the truth. The whole was safeguarded by 'reverent ecclesiastical attachment'. And it was this attitude combined with 'sound critical scholarship' that he especially prized (cf. p. 31).

Barmann shows, therefore, that scholarly freedom was the fundamental issue for von Hügel, not the particular rights and wrongs of Loisy's or Tyrrell's ideas. Only when this freedom is guaranteed can there be any right or wrong at all. Thus the lesson to be learnt from this book is an important one, and one which some of us still need to take to heart: it is not neo-modernism to ask a serious critical question; it is the service of truth. From the sad turmoil of the modernist years, von Hügel emerges as our surest guide in that service.

RODERICK STRANGE

THE SPANISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, by Peter Linehan. *Cambridge University Press*. Cambridge, 1971. 389 pp. £6.20.

The absence of serious treatment of the Spanish Church in the thirteenth century has long been one of the most serious difficulties facing anyone hoping to make a convincing statement about what the Western Church was really achieving at a time when its visible influence seems to have been very great. We must look to Dr Linehan's book to find out what effect the Lateran reforms had in a country very different in its political and social organization from the England described by Gibbs and Long (*Bishops and Reform*, 1215-1272, Oxford, 1934). The relationship between the leaders of the Church, both in Rome and in Spain, and the Spanish government was complicated by the fact that the Christian kingdoms there were more obviously working to expand the Christian Church than their contemporaries elsewhere in

Europe. Dr Linehan argues that the state was the beneficiary of this alliance and continued to exploit an endowment which had originally supported the bishops and clergy of Spain long after there was any serious military activity on the Moorish frontier to justify such as re-allocation of resources. The ineffectiveness of papal efforts to rouse the Church in Spain to resist action by governments it thought morally or politically unsound would seem to follow from this earlier defeat.

In his discussion of these questions, Dr Linehan is concerned mainly with the bishops. This is a wholly reasonable limitation in the scope of a book which sets out to cover an eventful century in two very different political societies. However, it must mean that any political conclusions we are tempted to draw