

Theology's historical task: the problem of the disciplines

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John Henry Newman came to see the need to frame what was in effect a new discipline of the history of theology, with rules and subject-matter which would make it a practical working instrument, but with a flexibility which would allow for insights about the interconnectedness and coherence of a living body of knowledge which was sustained in a vital community. This recognition, and Newman's own response to it are instructive because, *mutatis mutandis*, we stand in much the same need now. Unlike the history of (say) philosophy or science, the history of Christian theology deals with subject-matter which is understood to be of its nature continuous and *semper eadem*. But it clearly changes within that continuity. And that poses special problems historiographically.

We can get a glimpse of the way one thing led to the other in Newman's arriving at these perceptions in a letter written in 1826. Newman begins by suggesting that it might be put to the test whether the Anglican divines from the sixteenth century onwards, if read so as to eliminate the adversariality of the polemic in which many of them had been engaged, had amongst them set out an account of their beliefs which formed a coherent and harmonious whole.

'My dear Rickards,—In our last conversation I think you asked me whether any use had occurred to my mind to which your knowledge of our old divines might be applied. Now one has struck me,—so I write. Yet very probably the idea is so obvious that it will not be new to you, and. . . I begin by assuming that the old worthies of our Church are neither Orthodox nor Evangelical. . . now it would be a most useful thing to give a kind of summary of their opinions. . . if, then, in a calm, candid, impartial manner, their views were sought out and developed, would not the effect be good in a variety of ways?'¹

Here he began to feel his way towards a principle perhaps fully explicated only in our own day, when (within certain limits), diversity tends to be seen as a theological good.² He perceives that variety can be complementary, that theology forms a system on the model of a jig-saw

puzzle, where pieces of many different shapes make one picture, as well as on the model of a catalogue which is to include all truths which it is necessary to salvation to believe.

'I would advise taking them *as a whole* . . .—the English Church—stating, indeed, *how far* they differ among themselves, yet distinctly marking out the grand, bold, scriptural features of that doctrine in which they all agree. They would then be a band of witnesses for the truth, not opposed to each other (as they now are), but one—each tending to the edification of the body of Christ, according to the effectual working of His Spirit in everyone, according to the diversity of their gifts, and the variety of the circumstances under which each spake his testimony.'

Rickards replied less enthusiastically. 'I do not quite agree with you in thinking that much can be done in these times of ours, through the weight of old authorities.' Newman proved to be right in general, that the result of studying earlier Christian authors in their contexts would be to show that they are a band of witnesses to the same truth. he was also right that readers would be captured by the exercise because it would show them the earlier Church (and the Church in other places), as a living community.

But for our purposes perhaps the most important discovery of all by Newman and his friends in this area of the framing of the 'new discipline' was that a past which must be respected teaches about a present which must be respected. Froude wrote to Newman on July 31, 1835, 'I forget whether I told you how much my father was taken with the historical part of your "Arians", and particularly its bearing on the present times.' That would not be striking if it meant only the realisation that the present stands on the shoulders of the past. But the way in which the point is here put acknowledges that, for those who live in any given present, that present has powerful claims. Respect for the present in its own right was a relatively new departure and it set up new tensions of continuity and change. There is precedent in every age for looking back to what earlier, and especially the earliest, Christian authorities have said as a reference-point for what has been argued since. (Vincent of Lérins⁵ was already able to state in the fifth century the principle that the test of truth is whether all in all ages everywhere teach the same faith: the *semper, ubique et ab omnibus* which was to alter the course of Newman's life when he perceived its implications.) But here it was being stressed that the needs of the present are themselves a reference-point against which the teaching of the past can be measured.

There was a very long tradition of the writing of the 'history' of Christianity, in terms of the story of the working out of God's

providential purposes, to which Augustine had given a sturdy foundation in *The City of God*. But there was something new afoot here, in at least two respects. The first was this recognition that the present will have its own insistences. It is not merely the servant of the past. The second was the realization that the history of theology is not ultimately an account of the triumph of one view over another, but of the infinitely patient collective reflection of the whole people of God upon the sometimes seemingly opposed views of spokesmen and parties, which must in the end—however long that takes—result in a *consensus fidelium* in one truth. Newman and others made an attempt to look back over periods of division and controversy, when it would seem that there has not been concurrence, and when God's intention can be hard to perceive; with the purpose of finding these patterns of common faith and life.

'I would wish to ask Lady W. whether she uses such words as Pelagian historically or not,'⁶ says Newman acerbically. This was to begin from a fresh *point d'appui*, to see the problems historically, starting from their reading of the earlier authors in their historical contexts, and the contexts were seen to matter in the interests of the accuracy of portrayal of the issues. Newman began to argue that what was needed was an instrument for drawing conclusions from the history. He pointed out how absurd it was that 'instead of profiting by the sample of past times, we attempt to decide the most intricate question, whether of doctrine or conduct, by our blind and erring reason.'⁷ 'It seems to me a question of history', said Newman in a letter to his sister Harriet on March 19, 1827 on the Catholic Emancipation Question. 'How *can* I decide it by means of mere argument—theoretical argument?'⁸

From Keble Newman considers that he learnt two principles of use here, which he links closely with what he had gleaned from his reading of Joseph Butler.⁹ The first principle:

'was what may be called, in a large sense of the word, the Sacramental system; that is, the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of real things unseen,—a doctrine, which embraces in its fullness, not only what Anglicans, as well as Catholics, believe about Sacraments properly so called; but also the article of "the Communion of Saints;" and likewise the Mysteries of the faith'.¹⁰

The second intellectual principle:

'which I gained from Mr. Keble . . . runs through very much that I have written, and has gained for me many hard names. Butler teaches us that probability is the guide of life. The danger of this doctrine . . . is, its tendency to destroy . . . absolute certainty, 'leading people to consider every conclusion as doubtful, and

resolving truth into an opinion, which it is safe indeed to obey or to profess, but not possible to embrace with full internal assent' . . . 'I considered that Mr. Keble met this difficulty¹¹ by ascribing the firmness of assent which we give to religious doctrine, not to the probabilities which introduced it, but to the living power of faith and love which accepted it. In matters of religion, he seemed to say, it is not merely probability which makes us intellectually certain, but probability as it is put to account by faith and love. It is faith and love which give to probability a force which it has not in itself.'¹²

Newman is feeling in these two constellations of ideas for a principle which would have had a more natural and immediate force for a Western mediaeval thinker, or for the Orthodox in any age. He is reaching for the nature of the link which exists between things seen and things unseen, between subject and analogue, image and reality, which is grasped by a sense of fittingness (mediaeval Latin *convenientia* or *decentia* is much stronger than the modern English here, and carries all the connotations of 'harmony', of 'coming together in a whole', which it lacks). That link is more easily perceived by the eyes of faith, by spiritual routes, Keble assured him, and thus by faculties of mind and soul beyond the rational.

For some generations, scholars had been much exercised about the relationship between natural and revealed theology. This was, too, in many respects old ground. Boethius in the sixth century and the mediaevals during the thousand years after him, had divided topics into those which could be treated by reason—the existence of God, the divine nature, Trinity, creation—and those which could be known about only because a historical account survives in Scripture—incarnation and redemption. A major concern was always to settle how much of Christian faith could be supported by reason alone, and could therefore be made convincing to unbelievers not prepared to accept the historicity of the 'revealed' truths or their implications.

Newman was not ultimately satisfied even by what he drew from Keble's account to complement and enlarge upon Butler's, because he saw the danger that reason would come to hold too small a place. . . 'It was beautiful and religious, but it did not even profess to be logical'.¹³ The sense that there was more to be said prompted Newman to try to develop his thinking in the *University Sermons*, the *Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles* and the *Essay on Development*.¹⁴ He came to the conclusion that convergence was the key factor in making for conviction about religious truths, that 'that absolute certitude which we were able to possess . . . was the result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities.'¹⁵ This is again in tune with his growing realisation that Christian doctrine must cohere, that there is ultimately, despite

differences of expression, one faith in every age. And it is where, for Newman, the historiographical evidence meets the philosophy methodologically speaking.

He himself comments on his evolving sense of the historical complement to this,¹⁶ the awareness of living as a Christian in a world of thought which, while remaining sensitive to the concerns of each age, does not draw actual boundaries between the teaching of one age and those of the next. This he sees as under the providential umbrella of grace.

'Moreover, the argument from Analogy, on which this view of the question was founded, suggested to me something besides, in recommendation of the Ecclesiastical miracles. It fastened itself upon the theory of Church History which I had learned as a body from Joseph Milner. It is Milner's doctrine, that upon the visible Church come down from above, at certain intervals, large and temporary effusions of divine grace. This is the leading idea of his work.'¹⁷

Grace works in this by interweaving evidences, by hint, by gradual degrees:

'The main difference between my Essay on Miracles in 1826 and my Essay in 1842 is . . . that in 1826 I considered that miracles were sharply divided into two classes, those which were to be received, and those which were to be rejected; whereas in 1842 I saw that they were to be regarded according to their greater or lesser probability, which was in some cases sufficient to create certitude about them, in other cases only belief or opinion'.¹⁸

It is important that in moving from working by reason alone to this freshly-conceived 'convergent' theological historiography, Newman was anxious not to abandon strict intellectual rigour. He is suspicious of unrestrained feeling. He insists that 'religious doctrine is knowledge'.¹⁹ In an illustrative attempt to trace one sequence of interactive development Newman contrasts religion as feeling or sentiment with

'the old Catholic notion . . . that Faith was an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge. Thus if you look into the Anglican Prayer Book you will find definite *credenda*, as well as definite *agenda*; but in proportion as the Lutheran leaven spread, it became fashionable to say that Faith was, not an acceptance of revealed doctrine, not an act of the intellect, but a feeling, and emotion, an affection, an appentency; and, as this view of Faith obtained, so was the connection of Faith with Truth and Knowledge more and more either forgotten or denied . . . Religion was based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment, that nothing was objective, everything subjective, in doctrine . . . Religion was

useful, venerable, beautiful, the sanction of order, the stay of government, the curb of self-will and self-indulgence . . . Religion was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty, on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many, many things, but not at all on reason.²⁰

He goes on to infer later shifts from the effects of the first:

You see, Gentlemen, how a theory or philosophy, which began with the religious changes of the sixteenth century, has led to conclusions, which the authors of those changes would be the first to denounce, and has been taken up by that large and influential body which goes by the name of Liberal or Latitudinarian; and how, where it prevails, it is as unreasonable of course to demand for Religion a chair in a University, as to demand one for fine feeling, a sense of humour, patriotism, gratitude, maternal affection, or good companionship.²¹

Above all, he tests the model on the pulses of the experience of the individual:

'subtle and mysterious are the variations which are consistent or not inconsistent with identity in political and religious developments' 'The same man may run through various philosophies or beliefs, which are in themselves irreconcilable, without inconsistency, since in him they may be nothing more than accidental instruments or expressions of what he is inwardly from first to last'.²²

'The life of doctrines may be said to consist in the law or principle which they embody . . . doctrines expand variously according to the mind, individual or social into which they are received' . . . 'principles are popularly said to develop when they are but exemplified'.²³

A sign of the difficulty of this new enterprise in framing for teaching purposes a 'historically aware' account of the coherence of Christian doctrine, was the fact that it was hard to know what to call it. Pusey was scathing about the 'so-called history of doctrines'.²⁴ Newman wrote to Bowden on July 11, 1839²⁵ about plans for what he was then describing as 'ecclesiastical history'. This he clearly conceived as a history of theology or Christian *thought*, as much as of events and institutions involving the Church.²⁶

Newman's letter to Rogers the next day describes his own programme of reading his way into the history of the ideas in their context.

'I have got up the history of the Eutychian controversy, got hold of the opinions of Eutyches, and the turning-point of the controversy (no easy matter in theology) . . . have read through the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, have got up St. Leo's works . . . Now that I

am in the Monophysite controversy, I think I shall read through it, and then back to the Nestorian²⁷

The search of the past was, then, for Newman at this time, supremely a search for the origins of Christian theological ideas, 'the religion of primitive Christians' which had so stirred him as a boy, in their relation to the whole history of the faith since.²⁸

Origins he understood in two senses. Origins were sources. He thought it important to go back to the sources. He held that 'An Ecclesiastical History . . . ought to be derived from the original sources, and not be compiled from the standard authorities.'²⁹ He says in a letter to J.W.Bowden, August 10, 1834, 'Nothing is a greater temptation in writing such a book as the 'Arians' than to take facts and Fathers at second hand, and I wish to withdraw myself as much as possible from it.'³⁰

Origins were also what came earliest. Newman faced at the outset the problem of simply not knowing how things began and what came next. That meant starting at the beginning.' In my present line of reading . . . 'I am doing what I can to remedy this defect in myself'.³¹

Looking back, Newman is conscious of a definite progression in his developing views which gives a linearity of a different sort to the chronological progression of the course of his reading, and one not always coherent with it. He experienced shifts of what can only be called preference and prejudice. In 1827, 'I had not read Bishop Bull's *Defensio* nor the Fathers,' he notes, but 'I was *just then* [my italics] very strong for that ante-Nicene view of the Trinitarian doctrine, which some writers, both Catholic and non-Catholic, have accused of wearing a sort of Arian exterior.'³²

The result could sometimes be that he was diverted from the line of his work, and even doubted the principles he had seen as its foundation. This happened in the late 1820s. 'My criticisms were to the effect that some of the verses of the former Creed were unnecessarily scientific. This is a specimen of a certain disdain for Antiquity which had been growing on me now for several years. It showed itself in some flippant language against the Fathers in the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*, about whom I knew very little at the time, except what I had learnt as a boy from Joseph Milner.'³³ So not only was there a difficulty about what to call the subject of study; there was also a good deal of trial and error about the rules the student ought to follow, and every possibility of going astray.

Newman admits on occasion to searching for evidence to prove a hypothesis, rather than allowing conclusions to emerge unforced from the texts. He says that he has 'at length, by further reading and hunting about, *proved*, as I think, what I have long believed, that the word *Persons*, or *Prosopon*, was not a technical word in the controversy of the

Incarnation till after 350–360. This last hit enables me at once to finish Dionysius.’³⁵ A less flexible and open mind than his own, that of Sir James Stephen, taught Newman the false quantity implicit in this pursuit of a desired conclusion by trying to find evidence to lead to it.

‘He wanted Christianity developed to meet the age—he thought that the Gospel had a kingly sway, and of right might appropriate all truth everywhere, new and old. . . . He is perplexed; wishes for an infallible guide; made the most impressive remarks on life not being long enough for controversy; said he would be a Papist if he could, and listened with great interest, though not clearly taking me in when I brought forward the argument of tradition’.³⁶

He also discovered on his own account that one thing led to another in sometimes unexpected and disturbing ways in the complex interactive historiographical process. Newman wrote to Froude on August 23, 1835, ‘The more I read of Athanasius, Theodoret, etc., the more I see.’³⁷ On this intellectual pilgrimage foreseen conclusions were overthrown and prejudices had to be revised. . What Newman saw in the previous comment was ‘that the ancients *did* make the Scriptures *the basis* of their belief, as he had not realised before.’³⁸ Newman wrote to Rogers on Sept 22, 1839:

‘R.W., who has been passing through, directed my attention to Dr. Wiseman’s article in the new “Dublin”. I must confess it has given me a stomach-ache. You see the whole history of the Monophysites has been a sort of alternative. And now comes this dose at the end of it. It does certainly come upon one that we are not at the bottom of things. At this moment we have sprung a leak.’³⁹

A conversation with Newman is reported by H.W. Wilberforce, October, 1839, on a walk in the New Forest. Two things have made him think, the position of St. Leo in the Monophysite controversy, and the principle *securas judicat orbis terrarum* in that of the Donatists.’ He added that he felt fully confident that when he returned to his rooms, and was able fully and calmly to consider the whole matter, he should see his way completely out of the difficulty. But he said, ‘I cannot conceal from myself that, for the first time since I began the study of theology, a vista has opened before me, to the end of which I do not see.’⁴⁰

There was a third development, a result rather than in itself a project, which hinted at solutions to these difficulties. We have already stressed that Newman and others were beginning to perceive the existence of the repeating patterns in theology which the study of the coherence of the history of ideas could reveal. Pusey observed that schism tends to go with disproportionate emphasis on one or a few points:

'I have made some observations . . . on the Inspiration of the Church; and, as if justifying Irenaeus, have said that there was nothing harsh in supposing that those who wilfully, etc., separated from the Church, excluded themselves from some of the benefits intended by God for us . . . ; and I have said proof might be brought from the partial manner in which Christianity has generally been embraced by separatist bodies.'⁴¹

Newman wrote to the Rev. S. Rickards, July 30, 1834, trying to take an overview in a similar way.

'Blessed is he who is not corrupted by his age . . . ! . . . Even Hooker, I should think (I speak under correction), but gradually worked his way out of his Puritanic education, but he *did do* so. The spirit of Puritanism has been succeeded by the Methodistic. (Of course, I do not use the word reproachfully, but historically.) We, the while, children of the Holy Church, whencesoever brought into it, whether by early training or afterthought, have had one voice, that one voice which the Church has had from the beginning.'⁴²

In this discovery of pattern, things Newman had thought new or recent proved to be equally phenomena of the ancient Christian world, or of other centuries. 'Two things are very remarkable at Chalcedon—the great power of the Pope (as great as he claims now almost), and the marvellous interference of the civil power, as great almost as in our kings. Hence when Romanists accuse our Church of Erastianising, one can appeal to the Council, and when our own Erastians appeal to it, one can bring down on them a counter-appeal to prove the Pope's power, as a *reductio ad absurdum*'⁴³ There are seen to be 'generations or centuries of degeneracy or disorder, and times of revival . . . one region might be in the mid-day of religious fervour, and another in twilight or gloom.'⁴⁴

Development of ideas can imply their expansion. Froude became suspicious of this. He wrote to Newman (Aug 1835), 'You lug in the Apostles' Creed and talk about expansions. What is the end of expansions? Will not the Romanists say that their whole system is an expansion of the Holy Catholic Church and the Communion of Saints?'⁴⁵ It is of the first importance to the system Newman and his friends were discovering that development should be seen, if paradoxically, as convergent, not divergent. In *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845).⁴⁶ He speaks of 'the intimate connexion, or rather oneness, with primitive Apostolic teaching, of the body of doctrine known at this day by the name of catholic, and professed substantially'⁴⁷ both by Eastern and Western Christendom. That faith is undeniably the historical continuation of the religious system, which bore the name of Catholic in the eighteenth century, in the seventeenth, in the sixteenth, and so back in every

preceding century, till we arrive at the first . . . The only question that can be raised is whether the said Catholic faith, as now held, is logically, as well as historically, the representative of the ancient faith.⁴⁶

'But we have to ask whether 'it is . . . enough that a certain large system of doctrine, such as that which goes by the name of Catholic, should admit of being referred to beliefs, opinions and usages which prevailed among the first Christians, in order to my having a logical right to include a reception of the later teaching in the reception of the earlier; . . . an intellectual development may be in one sense natural, and yet untrue to its original, as diseases come of nature.' . . . 'the causes which stimulate the growth of ideas may also disturb and deform them.' . . . ; Christianity might indeed have been intended by its Divine Author for a wide expansion of the ideas proper to it, and yet this great benefit hindered by the evil birth of cognate errors which acted as its counterfeit.⁴⁹

I began by saying that, *mutatis mutandis*, we face Newman's problems now. But Newman was a pioneer in an age when a number of the ideas which have become familiar ecumenically since Vatican II were not yet in play as assumptions of the debate.

Newman had different anxieties about 'unity and diversity' from those which profoundly affect for us what we want to say about continuity and change. He did not conceive of the coming together of separated Churches in a mutual respect for one another's ecclesiality which colours our sense today of the character of the living community. He did not see the historiographical task in terms of the writing together of a common history of shared events to replace the histories written from confessional vantage-points in a hostile separation. Nevertheless, he had some things of importance to say about the discipline of the history of theology which it is important for us to be aware of as we tackle the task in our own ecumenical age.

- 1 November 26, 1826. *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 1. pp. 143–5.
- 2 See my *The Church and the Churches: Towards an Ecumenical Ecclesiology*, (Cambridge, 1994) chapter 3.
- 3 November 26, 1826; *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol.1.pp. 143–5.
- 4 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 117.
- 5 Died before 450.
- 6 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 60.
- 7 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 129–30.
- 8 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English*

- Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. I. p. 162.
- 9 Joseph Butler (1692–1752), author of the *Analogy of Religion* (1736), and see *Apologia*, p. 10.
 - 10 Newman, *Apologia*, p. 18. 11 In *The Christian Year*. 12 *Apologia*, p. 19. 13 *Apologia*, p. 20. 14 He lists these himself in the *Apologia*, p. 20.
 - 11 In *The Christian Year*.
 - 12 *Apologia*, p. 19.
 - 13 *Apologia*, p. 20.
 - 14 He lists these himself in the *Apologia*, p. 20.
 - 15 *Apologia*, p. 20.
 - 16 'I do not know what was the date of this change in me, nor or the train of ideas on which it was founded'. *Apologia*, p. 21.
 - 17 *Apologia*, p. 22.
 - 18 *Apologia*, p. 22.
 - 19 Newman, *The Idea of a University*, 11, 'Theology a branch of knowledge', para. 8. (given in Dublin, 1852)
 - 20 Newman, *The Idea of a University*, 11, 'Theology a branch of knowledge', para. 3. (given in Dublin, 1852)
 - 21 Newman, *The Idea of a University*, 11, 'Theology a branch of knowledge', para. 3. (given in Dublin, 1852)
 - 22 Chapter 5, Section 1,4 (on 'preservation of type').
 - 23 Chapter 5, Section 11, (on 'continuity of principles').
 - 24 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891), Vol.1. p. 238.
 - 25 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891), Vol. 11. p. 156.
 - 26 Rather than the history of ecclesiastical institutions and the outward aspects of Church life which it has since come frequently to be.
 - 27 Newman to F. Rogers, July 12, 1839, *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891), Vol. 11. p. 156.
 - 28 *Apologia*, p. 7
 - 29 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891), Vol. 1. p. 235.
 - 30 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891), Vol. 11. p. 61.
 - 31 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891), Vol. 11. p. 129–30.
 - 32 *Apologia*, p. 13.
 - 33 *Apologia*, p. 14.
 - 34 Newman to F. Rogers, July 12, 1839, *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 156.
 - 35 Newman to Froude, January 17, 1836 on Sir James Stephen. *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11 p. 156.
 - 36 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 126.
 - 37 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 126.
 - 38 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 286.
 - 39 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English*

- Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 287.
- 40 B. Pusey to Newman, 1829. *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 1. p. 212.
- 41 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 59.
- 42 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 156.
- 43 *Apologia*, p. 23.
- 44 *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church*, ed. Anne Mozley (London, 1891) Vol. 11. p. 127.
- 45 Newman never finished this work. It was interrupted by his conversion on Oct. 9, 1845.
- 46 A term of interest because of modern ecumenical talk of substantial agreement'.
- 47 Chapter 5, p. 1
- 48 Then developments might just be corruptions.

Authentic Relationships: Justice, Love, and Christian Spirituality

Mark O'Keefe OSB

The Letter of James reminds Christians that an authentic Christian faith cannot be completely separated from works:

What good is it, my brothers and sisters, if you say you have faith but do not have works? Can faith save you? If a brother or sister is naked and lacks daily food, and one of you says to them, "Go in peace; keep warm and eat your fill," and yet you do not supply their bodily needs, what is the good of that? So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead (James 2:14-17 NRSV).

Similarly, a number of theologians have recently suggested that an authentic Christian spirituality cannot be separated from an active concern for and pursuit of justice.¹ These theologians argue that a Christian cannot truly strive to grow in a relationship with God without a real concern for the well-being of other persons. One cannot hope to