

Abstracting Passion: Hazlitt's Ideal of Power

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Hazlitt's writings as a whole are distinguished by his close attention to the structures of power, political power not excepted. In a *Morning Post* article of March 1800, he writes,

... power is the sole object of philosophical attention in man, as in inanimate nature; and in the one equally as in the other, we understand it more intimately, the more diverse the circumstances are with which we have observed it to exist.

(“Pitt and Buonaparte”, *Political Essays*; vii. 326)¹

“Power” in Hazlitt’s metaphysic refers to the mind’s innate faculty, its freedom from subjugation to external influences. His philosophy also connects power with liberty: the mind is free since it is subject only to the laws of its own innate constitution. By affirming innate “power”, Hazlitt refutes the empirical account of epistemology in which the mind, moulded from without, remains passive or subjected. He asserts in its stead that the process of knowledge is *ab intra*, directed by the mind from within. The creative genius celebrated in Hazlitt’s literary and artistic criticism exemplifies intellectual power in its highest degree, and so vindicates the core principle of his metaphysics.

The exercise of Hazlitt’s metaphysical power is frequently described in a quasipolitical language. The creative genius, for instance, is perceived as effecting a kind of rule by force, so that “The language of poetry naturally falls in with the language of power” (“*Coriolanus*”, *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays*; iv. 214). In Hazlitt’s philosophical writings, the doctrine of intellectual empowerment may be said to free the mind from the subject status to which it is assigned by empirical thought. In turn, when we locate Hazlitt’s political essays in the context of his entire corpus, an interplay emerges between imaginative and political, innate and assumed, involuntary and arbitrary power. Such interplay frequently highlights the diametric opposition between the two forms of power. This is especially the case in Hazlitt’s polemic against political absolutism, specifically monarchy, which contains the main tenet of his ideological position. “A king (as such) is not a great man.

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He has great power, but it is not his own" ("The Indian Jugglers", *Table-Talk*; viii. 84). The power invested in an individual by the doctrine of divine right is acquired *ab extra* and is hence arbitrary; it is inherently opposed to innate power, which is inwardly generated and involuntary. By virtue of our innate power, Hazlitt, like Rousseau, perceives men to be born free. The "free-born spirit of man" inevitably works against the fundamental assumption of monarchy that mankind is its property ("Whether Genius is Conscious of its Powers", *The Plain Speaker*; xii. 122). Thus the mutual alliance of liberty and power in his metaphysic becomes, in the political context, a polarity: "A King cannot attain absolute power, while the people remain perfectly free" ("What is the People", *Political Essays*; vii. 264).

For Hazlitt, the placing of our intellectual constitution under the control of external circumstances turns men into machines, because it denies the *ab intra* or innate process of the mind. Thus, just as he indicts the philosophical systems of Locke and Hartley, as well as Bentham's Utilitarianism, for their role in the progressive mechanisation of men, he shows the political system of monarchy as working to much the same effect. Since it is by virtue of our innate power that we are free, the curbing of our freedom amounts to a denial of that power. Political enslavement goes against the grain of intellectual empowerment; it allows only a condition of servility in which men are turned into machines. The essay "On the Character of Fox" describes "the wire-moved puppets, the stuffed figures, the flexible machinery, the 'deaf and dumb things' of a court" (*Political Essays*; vii. 317). Southey, as poet laureate, is a "stuffed figure", a "wretched phantom" and not "the living man" ("The Courier and 'The Wat Tyler'", *Political Essays*; vii. 185), while a *Morning Chronicle* article of December 1813, titled "The Political Automaton: A Modern Character", refers to the government stooge as "*the thing*" and "puppet" (*Political Criticism*; xix. 117). Arbitrary power renders mechanistic and impotent even the figure in which it is embodied; it is not only his subject, but the king himself who, lacking the innate faculty, is "a puppet to dress up, a lay-figure to paint from" ("On the Spirit of Monarchy", *Political Criticism*; xix. 256).

Their servility to arbitrary power makes men mechanical; Hazlitt's repeated association of servility with the support of the political establishment may be contrasted with his account of the egotistical genius, exemplifying the dominion or mastery granted to the empowered mind by its capacity for self-determination. If its originality — the tendency to remould and regenerate its object — marks the active character of the powerful imagination, equally, political absolutism creates a passivity, displayed in a mechanical resistance to innovation of

all kind. "Let a thing be new (though ever so true or good), the Tory cannot make up his mind to it, — he abhors it" ("Illustrations of Toryism: From the Writings of Sir Walter Scott", *Political Criticism*; xix. 288).

As regards power, Hazlitt's ideal in literary criticism is in every respect the reverse of his standards in political criticism. Where he celebrates the power of genius as bigoted, exclusive, and overwhelming, he condemns the power of monarchs as owning exactly those qualities. For instance, the verbal similarities between the description of tyranny in the "Preface" to the *Political Essays*, and of "greatness" in *Table-Talk* may readily be highlighted:

Greatness is great power, producing great effects ... To impress the idea of power on others, they must be made in some way to feel it. It must be communicated to their understandings ... or it must subdue and overawe them by subjecting their wills (viii. 84–85).

This is close enough to

... that sort of tyranny that has lasted for ever, ... that has struck its roots into the human heart, and clung round the human understanding like a nightshade; that overawes the imagination, and disarms the will to resist it (vii. 12).

The former passage describes the domination of the creative genius, the latter, that of the despot. Both subjugate our understandings and our wills. In this case, the language of literary theory carries a quite different import from the language of political criticism. Tyranny, "linked in endless succession to the principle by which life is transmitted to the generations of tyrants" (vii. 12) produces a hideous travesty of the associative chain generated by the powerful imagination. A similar comparison, of the "diverse circumstances" of power, can be made between Hazlitt's account of majesty, "blind and insensible to all that lies beyond that narrow sphere" ("On the Regal Character", *Political Essays*; vii. 282) and of genius, "blind to all excellence but its own" ("On Genius and Common Sense", *Table-Talk*; viii. 43). There is, of course, no contradiction here; Hazlitt perceives innate or imaginative power as the great counter-force, equal and opposite, to political absolutism. The arbitrary power invested in a single individual is by nature inimical to the innate power with which we are all endowed; yet there also exists between them a common character.

The paradox arises with the mutual affinity, "the connexion between toad-eaters and tyrants", that is brought about by that common

character: "The admiration of power in others is as common to man as the love of it in himself: the one makes him a tyrant, the other a slave" ("The Times Newspaper", *Political Essays*; vii. 145, 148). The absolute power embodied in the monarchy typically finds a response, by a kind of transference, in the sense of power in each individual:

Each individual would (were it in his power) be a king, a God: but as he cannot, the next best thing is to see this reflex image of his self-love, the darling passion of his breast, realized, embodied out of himself ("On the Spirit of Monarchy", *Political Criticism*; xix. 255)

In the first part of his essay on the political content of Hazlitt's literary criticism and epistemology, Terry Eagleton makes three categorical observations that rightly draw our attention to the close connection between Hazlitt's literary, philosophical and political thought. The first is that

Poetry itself is for him ... an epistemological mode ... [which] stands as a permanent phenomenological critique of that abstracting rationalism which Hazlitt rightly identifies as one powerful form of contemporary bourgeois ideology.²

Second,

What Hazlitt demonstrates, in fact, is a quite remarkable intuitive grasp of the internal relations between literary style, theories of knowledge, ideological consciousness and political practice³

Finally, "Hazlitt's language refuses a distinction between the literary and the political".⁴

None of these observations can be denied, yet I would argue that Eagleton's account of the internal relations between the different aspects of Hazlitt's thought - poetry, politics and epistemology - is somewhat oversimplified. By describing poetry as a "permanent... critique" to political conservatism, he conveniently bypasses the philosophical dilemma which Hazlitt is constantly addressing: the facility of alliance between poetry and established power. The "epistemological mode" embodied in poetry runs counter to the dictates of the prevalent ideology, but it is also successfully harnessed to that very ideological purpose. In this context, as much as Hazlitt's language "refuses" a distinction between the literary and the political, it also highlights, witness the comparison of majesty and genius, that distinction.

"But the best things, in their abuse, often become the worst; and so

it is with poetry when it is diverted from its proper end" ("Illustrations of 'The Times' Newspaper", *Political Essays*; vii. 142). The ambiguous status of poetry in Hazlitt's political vision arises from its moral neutrality. "The spirit of poetry is in itself favourable to humanity and liberty" (vii. 142), but not necessarily so. The poetic imagination, whose truth is entirely self-constituted, by its very independence of an external or objective material reality, lends itself to speciousness and deceit. The power by which poets "pour out the pure treasures of thought to the world" enables them also to "pass off the gewgaws of corruption and love-tokens of self-interest, as the gifts of the Muse" (vii. 143). Potentially the most powerful instrument in the cause of liberty, the imaginative genius is equally effective on the opposite side. Burke, for instance,

... had power to "make the worse appear the better reason"—the devil's boast! The madness of genius was necessary to second the madness of a court; his flaming imagination was the torch that kindled the smouldering fire in the inmost sanctuary of pride and power, and spread havoc, dismay, and desolation through the world. The light of his imagination, sportive, dazzling, beauteous as its seemed, was followed by the stroke of death.

("Arguing in a Circle", *Political Criticism*; xix. 271)

Hazlitt's hyperbole, deliberately evocative of Milton's Satan, is a tribute to Burke's genius. The perversion of power, the descent from life into death, and the destruction left in its wake, represents a fall that appears as monumental as Lucifer's: "Politics became poetry in his hands" (xix. 272).⁵

While no other writer has quite the standing of Burke in Hazlitt's eyes, the moral neutrality of the imagination, manifested in a want of principle in poets and writers, is the target of some of the sharpest of his criticism in the political essays. Hence his recurrent attacks upon the Lake School. The subversion of the cause of liberty by the defection of the poets represents to Hazlitt the defeat of genius, or the subsuming of innate by assumed power; it is, indeed, self-defeating: Southey "mangles his own breast to stifle every natural sentiment left there" ("The Courier and 'The Wat Tyler'", *Political Essays*; vii. 185).

The conversion of poetry into a mere or empty fiction by the sacrifice of its innate power is part of the general perversion of language for political ends: "... an inconceivably large portion of human knowledge and human power is involved in the science and management of words" ("Pitt and Buonaparte", *Political Essays*; vii. 327). A recurrent theme in Hazlitt's political writings is the manner in which the power of

language is put to use in the construction of a language of power. Words, which “alone answer...to the truth of things” (xii. 337) also alone distort reality. Truth is elided in the mechanical associations of language. Hence the efficacy of nicknames: “The history of modern politics is the history of nicknames. The use of this figure of speech is that it excites a strong idea without requiring any proof” (xix. 134). In a nickname, the extremity of the language substitutes for the truth of its allegation; it is “the *ne plus ultra* of Tory logic. Why? Because it implies a strong degree of mechanical hatred and contempt, without assigning any reason for it” (xix. 288). This kind of reduction of truth to verbal mechanism marks the speeches of Pitt, who “seemed not to have believed that the truth of his statements depended on the reality of the facts, but that the things depended on the order in which he arranged them in words” (“Character of Mr. Pitt”, *Political Essays*; vii. 323–24). Pitt’s skill in language, to which Hazlitt attributes his political prowess, is opposite to the “effect of nature and genius”; instead of the imaginative association of feelings and ideas, he gives us “Words on words finely arranged, and so dexterously consequent” that we may trace “in the effects of his eloquence the power of words and phrases, and that peculiar constitution of human affairs in their present state, which so eminently favours this power” (“Pitt and Buonaparte”, *Political Essays*; vii. 331).

Given the abuse to which all language is subject, it is a process of thought, not poetry, but abstraction, that embodies for Hazlitt the radical epistemological mode that is inherently and invariably opposed to political injustice. At the other extreme from Eagleton, critics such as John Whale have argued that a negative view of the imagination is necessarily entailed upon Hazlitt, by his position as a radical. Whale finds that for Hazlitt, “the problem with imagination arises when it moves beyond its limits: it has no proper place in questions of a political kind”.⁶ According to him, the imagination “figures...as the guilty party” in his metaphysical thought; it has a “dangerous affinity with abstraction”.⁷ I would argue, on the contrary, that it is precisely the tendency of the imagination towards abstraction that makes it the instrument and emblem of political justice.

To the claims of arbitrary power, Hazlitt consistently opposes an abstract notion: “the abstract right of the human race to be free”, “truth and abstract justice” (“Preface”, *Political Essays*; vi. 12, 14), “abstract reason” (“The Times Newspaper”, *Political Essays*; vii. 1S2). In *The Plain Speaker*, he claims to have “made an abstract, metaphysical principle” of the question of whether mankind is the property of monarchs (“Whether Genius is Conscious of Its Powers?”; xii. 122), and

in *A Letter to William Gifford*, he writes, "I suspect that the conviction of an abstract principle is alone a match for the prejudices of absolute power" (ix. 50).

That abstract principle is the "discovery" of the *Essay on the Principles of Human Action*, by which every individual is endowed with an innate power of self-determination. Abstraction itself is the culmination of that power, marking the deepening of perception beyond the merely local, and separating the ideal from that which is petty and personal. The abstract ideal is universal, where political absolutism secures the elitist interest, so that Hazlitt frequently links absolutism with an incapacity for abstraction:

The common regal character is then the reverse of what it ought to be. It is the purely *personal*, occupied with its own petty feelings, prejudices, and pursuits; whereas it ought to be the purely philosophical, exempt from all personal considerations, and contemplating itself only in its general and paramount relation to the State. This is the reason why there have been so few great Kings. They want the power of abstraction.

("On the Regal Character", *Political Essays*; vii. 284)

Elsewhere, he observes that "A Tory may be a poet, but no Tory can be a philosopher; for he has not even the capacity of conceiving an abstract proposition" ("Illustrations of Toryism—From the Writings of Sir Walter Scott", *Political Criticism*; xix. 288).

For Hazlitt, the process of abstraction, brought about by the fundamental and innate tendency (the powerful imagination) of the human being, attests to the authenticity of human ideals. Hazlitt's abstract ideal is not deontological or "objective" in the conventional sense, but a universal that must be elicited from particular experience, and it is therefore to that experience that he refers as the gauge of truth: "We appeal...to the innate love of liberty in the human breast" ("What is the People?", *Political Essays*; vii. 270).

However, although the abstract ideal is enabled, it is not guaranteed by the imagination, which is morally neutral. Disinterestedness and self-interest are produced alike from the imagination, yet the habitual mechanism of consciousness most frequently directs imaginative exercise towards the lesser end. By the same token, when the two manifestations of innate power — abstraction, which leads us to the universal good, and prejudice, which works against it — are pitted against each other, the second almost invariably prevails. The ideal, moving out towards the universal, is usually weaker than prejudice, which limits us to ourselves and which, in so doing, is corroborated by

the mechanical process of sensation that constitutes the material self:⁸

The love of liberty is the love of others; the love of power is the love of ourselves. The one is real; the other often but an empty dream.

(“The Times Newspaper”, *Political Essays*; vii. 152)

The moral neutrality of the imagination and the habitual limitation of the affirmative self brings about the great polarity of Hazlitt’s political criticism, that of liberty and power:

In general it may be said that the love of liberty makes but a faint impression on the mind of a great Statesman: the love of power sinks deeper into it, discolours every object, taints the source of every feeling, and penetrates, moves, and rouses into violent and dangerous action the whole inert mass.

(“The Treatment of State Prisoners”, *Political Criticism*; xix. 200)

Again, the closeness of the passage above to Hazlitt’s account of the egotistical power of genius is unmistakable. Liberty, encompassing the universal, is too often diffused and dissipated where power, perpetually and solely focused on the individual ego, acquires a concentrated and proportionately irresistible force:

The principle of tyranny is in fact identified with a man’s pride and the servility of others in the highest degree; the principle of liberty abstracts him from himself, and has to contend in its feeble course with all his own passions, prejudices, interests, and those of the world.

(“Preface”, *Political Essays*; vii. 19)

In Hazlitt’s account of the “true Jacobin”, therefore,

The love of truth is a passion in his mind, as the love of power is a passion in the minds of others. Abstract reason, unassisted by passion, is no match for power and prejudice, armed with force and cunning.

(“The Times Newspaper”, *Political Essays*; vii. 152)

The partisan, as opposed to “the bigot, or the mercenary or cowardly tool of a party”, “is a character that requires very opposite and almost incompatible qualities—reason and prejudice, a passionate attachment founded on an abstract idea” (“On the Spirit of Partisanship”, *Uncollected Essays*; xvii. 34). In other words, Hazlitt’s political criticism makes explicit that the abstract ideal or “good” which is the object of moral action can never be, for all its closeness to Kant’s

“duty”, entirely deontological. The good must not only be acknowledged, it must be idolised. Passion concurs with abstraction, the individual with the universal, in the idolisation of the good.⁹ If the denial of liberty is “moral atheism”, by implication, liberty is *theos*. Napoleon Buonaparte, as its representative, becomes “the God of my idolatry” (“Preface”, *Political Essays*; vii. 10). Hazlitt’s tendency to idolise is reflected in the fervour of his polemic, where the passionate idolisation of the abstract ideal refutes the servile idolisation of arbitrary power, described at length in the essay “On the Spirit of Monarchy” (*Political Criticism*; xix. 256ff).

Eagleton’s observation, that “In harnessing passion and generality, Hazlitt undercuts both rationalist and empiricist forms of conservative ideology”¹⁰ brilliantly summarises the link between Hazlitt’s philosophical and political thought, except in the implied subordination of his epistemology to a political purpose. While I would concur with Eagleton in viewing his epistemology and political radicalism as mutually corroborative, I believe it to be more accurate to focus on the metaphysic as a first premise rather than a corollary. The harnessing of passion and generality is not a political solution that can be validated philosophically, it is the *only* political solution admitted by the metaphysical construct to which Hazlitt is bound. The nature of power — imaginative and political — is self-affirmatory, yet it can and indeed must be directed towards a universal end. “All power is but an unabated nuisance, a barbarous assumption, an aggravated injustice, that is not directed to the common good” (“On the Spirit of Monarchy”; xix. 265).

In the socio-political context, the “common good” is usually identified with “the people”, not a quantifiable majority or “greatest number”, but a grouping of individuals, simultaneously the instrument and the end of Hazlitt’s radical purpose. Public opinion is the aggregate of individual judgements; it “expresses not only the collective sense of the whole people, but of all ages and nations”, but the “*vox populi* is the *vox Dei* only when its springs from the individual, unbiassed feelings” (“What is the People”, *Political Essays*; vii. 269, 272). In basing his standard for political justice on the collective force of individual feelings, Hazlitt appears in little doubt of their unanimity:

The people is the hand, heart, and head of the whole community acting to one purpose, and with a mutual and thorough consent...The will of the people necessarily tends to the general good as its end.

(“What is the People”; vii. 267)

We recognise an ideal in this account, the more so when we

compare it to the account of public opinion given in *Table-Talk*:

So far then is public opinion from resting on a broad and solid basis, as the aggregate of thought and feeling in a community, that it is slight and shallow and variable to the last degree — the bubble of the moment — so that we may safely say the public is the dupe of public opinion, not its parent. The public is pusillanimous and cowardly, because it is weak. It knows itself to be a great dunce, and that it has no opinions but upon suggestion. Yet it is unwilling to appear in leading-strings, and would have it thought that its decisions are as wise as they are weighty. It is hasty in taking up its favourites, more hasty in laying them aside, lest it should be supposed deficient in sagacity in either case. It is generally divided into two strong parties, each of which will allow neither common sense nor common honesty to the other side.

(“On Living to One’s-Self”; viii. 98)

Like the ideal of “natural disinterestedness” from the *Essay on the Principles of Human Action*, Hazlitt’s “the people” asserts not so much a fact about humanity, but a goal. “The people” is an “aggregate” (vii. 268) which represents the ideal symbiosis of particular and general, at once embodying Hazlitt’s strong sense of collectivism and his extreme individualism. In terms of practical social measures, the collectivist approach informs his arguments for the equitable distribution of resources (reiterated in various contexts, including in the discussion of war and taxation and the critique of Malthus), the rights of unionization of labour, and the necessity of welfare provisions (for instance, in the “Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal Legislation”, *Political Criticism*; xix. 309, 319). At the same time, in Hazlitt’s advocacy of perfect religious tolerance, including the emancipation of the Jews (*Political Criticism*; xix. 320–24), or in his denial of the concept of consensual crimes, such as drink or suicide (“Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal Legislation”; xix. 316), we see also a profound belief in the individual’s responsibility for his own destiny.

As a metaphysician first and then only a political moralist, Hazlitt’s critique is not only of the effects of social and political practices, but also of their implicit meaning. The mind or self becomes the locus of the struggle between the innate power of the individual and the arbitrary power exercised by the political machine; it is the site where a certain ability with which we are all endowed is linked with and pitted against the large-scale ramifications of social and political inequality. Hazlitt’s reference to the “principle of independent inquiry and unbiassed conviction” (“On Court-Influence”, *Political Essays*; vii. 240) or to “the greatest power of understanding in the community, unbiassed by any

sinister motive" ("What is the People"; vii. 268) in denouncing the abuses of power, may at first appear to assert exactly that detached intellectual stance, the universal prophetic voice, that we are warned against by the modern philosopher of power, Michel Foucault.¹¹ But his recognition of the alliance between power and poetry, and of a continuity between the principle of power in the individual and the abuse of power in the political community, attest rather to the consciousness, not of detachment, but participation, in the very structures of power that are the subject of his critique. Hazlitt's account of power is "from within", his analysis ringing true precisely because he is situated inside it. In this sense, he answers Foucault's demand, for "one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force".¹²

By rigorous philosophical standards, as Eagleton suggests, Hazlitt's appeal to the inner man as the instrument of social justice provides a foundation for his political theory that is far from adequate theoretically.¹³ The political writings are most persuasive, however, as the practical illustrations of Hazlitt's theory, themselves representing a passionate commitment to the "common good" that rarely, if ever, leads him astray in determining the rights and wrongs of specific social and political issues.

1 All quotations from Hazlitt are taken from *The Complete Works of William Hazlitt*, ed. P.P. Howe, 21 vols (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent, 1930-34). References are by volume and page.

2 Terry Eagleton, "William Hazlitt: An Empiricist Radical", *New Blackfriars* (1973), p. 109.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 110.

5 For an analysis of the tension between the literary and the political in Hazlitt's account of Burke, see J. Whale, "Hazlitt on Burke: The Ambivalent Position of a Radical Essayist", *SIR* xxv, no. 4 (winter 1986), pp. 465-481.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 476.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 476, 478.

8 It must be noted that although the intellectual self is the instrument of "good", the material self is the basis of "right", and self-interest, its guiding principle ("Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal Legislation", *Political Criticism*; xix. 303). Hazlitt defines the "right" of an individual as pertaining to his physical being: "... each person has a particular body and senses belonging to him, so that he feels a peculiar and natural interest in whatever affects these more than another can, ... imply[ing] a direct and unavoidable right in maintaining this circle of individuality inviolate" (xix. 310).

By defining "right" as sense-based, Hazlitt is actually placing intellectual expression outside the domain of legislation: "As to matters of contempt and the expression of opinion, I think these do not fall under the head of force, and are not, on that ground, subjects of coercion and law" (xix. 314). By the same token, since morality belongs to intellect, there can be no law for the enforcement of morals (xix.

- 315). "Morals...ought never to appeal to force in any case whatever" (xix. 304).
- 9 When poetry manifests the union of abstraction and passion, at once embodying a universal truth and an individual vision, then it is the poetry of genius, which indeed represents Hazlitt's radical epistemology. Emphatically, it is its abstract character that marks the distinction between the poetry of genius and what Hazlitt calls "mere" poetry ("Character of Mr. Burke", *Political Essays*; vii. 229).
 - 10 Eagleton, "An Empiricist Radical", p. 116.
 - 11 Michel Foucault, "Power and Sex: An Interview with Michel Foucault", *Telos* 32 (1977), p. 161.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, p. 161.
 - 13 Eagleton, "An Empiricist Radical", pp. 116–17.

Assumption

Mother of all on high, pray for us yet

Nothing is left me here. The world's a corridor,
vacant, echoing the great ones' passage through.
It is closed doors in rows: behind them, murmuring
of a second generation's other businesses.
Once I felt the kick of God within:
nothing else seemed great once that had been.

Your will is done,
and henceforth I will be
a silent smiling lady in a tapestry.

Your will is done,
and henceforth I am known
as a painted tiptoe figure in a pointed arch of stone.

Your will be done:
henceforth I watch with all
God's heroes in their sad unsleeping vigil
for earth's ball.

TIMOTHY CHAPPELL

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