

As the author himself explains, this book should be read 'as a defence of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation, the two-natures view of Christ, against contemporary philosophical attacks' (p. 16). In Morris's view, orthodox belief in the Incarnation can be explicated and defended 'against all extant criticisms of a philosophical nature' by means of 'a few simple metaphysical distinctions and a solid dose of logical care' (p. 9).

The orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation asserts that Jesus was identical with God the Son, the Second Person of the Trinity. With respect to identity, Morris appeals to the indiscernibility of identicals. For him, therefore, the truth of the doctrine of the Incarnation depends on whether Jesus could have shared all the properties constitutive of deity while having all the properties essential to humanity. Jesus must have been all that it takes to be God and all that it takes to be human.

A standard objection to orthodoxy is that nothing can have more than one nature. But Morris denies this opinion. Nothing can have more than one *individual* nature, he concedes. Yet, so he argues, something can have more than one *kind* nature. In other words, something can have a shareable set of properties which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership of more than one kind. And this, says Morris, could have been the case with Jesus. If he was God, he would have been much that human beings are normally not. But, so Morris urges, a member of a kind can be more than what others of the kind are as a rule. Jesus could therefore have been *fully* human without having been *merely* human. He may have had all the properties needed to make him a man. He may also have had all the properties needed to make him divine.

In that case, however, how are we to conceive of the Incarnation? A model which some have favoured is that of the Kenotic theory, according to which God the Son temporarily divested himself of certain divine attributes. But, though Morris discusses kenoticism with some sympathy (pp. 89–102), he finally rejects it in favour of what he calls 'the two minds view of Christ'. In the case of God Incarnate, 'we must recognise something like two distinct ranges of consciousness'. There is 'the eternal mind of God the Son, with its distinctively divine consciousness'. There is also a 'distinctively earthly consciousness that came into existence and grew and developed as the boy Jesus grew and developed'. 'The divine mind of God the Son contained, but was not contained by, his earthly mind, or range of consciousness' (pp. 102–103).

In Morris's view, this conclusion is not ruled out because it is true both that God is necessarily good and that Jesus was genuinely tempted (Chapters 5 and 6). Nor is it disproved by various reflections on the size of the universe and the possibility of rational life within it other than that of human beings (Chapter 7). It is, however, a conclusion which one might reasonably believe (Chapter 8). And, though it does not entail it, the two minds view of Christ coheres with Social Trinitarianism, to which Morris is personally attracted and which leads him to think of the Trinity as a kind of society (Chapter 9).

In spite of its difficult subject matter, Morris's book is clearly and attractively written. And it can be recommended on many other grounds. Its arguments, for instance, are often rigorous and decisive, and it demonstrates that there are serious flaws in many published critiques of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation. It also succeeds in highlighting some important foundations for Christology in general. Chief among these are the distinctions noted above: the distinction between *individual* and *kind* natures, and the distinction between being *fully* human and being *merely* human. These distinctions are not new, but they are well drawn by Morris and they are applied by him effectively.

In other ways, perhaps, the book is more open to question. What, for example, is implied by Social Trinitarianism as Morris conceives of it? On his account it holds that God is three individuals or three persons, and, given familiar trinitarian formulae, this conclusion

might seem perfectly in order. But Morris does little to explain what he means by terms like 'person' and 'individual'. In his discussion of the trinity he treats them as equivalent to the expression 'centre of consciousness', which is itself opaque but which encourages the supposition that the persons of the Trinity are, for Morris, something like three human beings. In that case, however, Morris, is defending tritheism, which is a curious option for a spokesman for christian orthodoxy to favour. Is tritheism what we are led to by Social Trinitarianism? Remarks made by Morris could be taken to mean that the members of the Trinity are persons in the sense envisaged by Aquinas in his discussions of the Trinity and the Incarnation. But the persons of the Trinity are not, for Aquinas, three centres of consciousness in any sense of that expression that I can imagine. And Morris rejects the notion of divine simplicity (p. 94) by which Aquinas's use of 'person' is governed when applied to God. Other remarks of Morris seem to suggest that a person is something which can *have* a state of consciousness without being merely identical with it (p. 102) and that a person can be distinguished from its body (p. 90). But this is not to say what a person is or what we are to think of when told about a divine one.

Another cause for concern is Morris's depiction of the mechanics of the Incarnation. Since his use of words like 'person' raises more questions than it solves, it is hard to know what is really involved in his 'two minds' view of Christ. And on his account the Incarnation is an event in the history or biography of God. Thanks to the Incarnation, God in himself comes to have states of consciousness which he previously lacked and which he does not have simply by being divine. Yet can that really be so? One might take leave to doubt it, though this is not the place to try to argue in favour of God's total immutability and timelessness, the significance of which for talk of the Incarnation has already been usefully sketched in a recent number of this journal (cf. Herbert McCabe O.P., 'The Involvement of God', *New Blackfriars*, 66, November 1985). Suffice it to say that Morris's position on these matters is basically one which he just takes for granted. He refers to alternatives in Chapter 4, but his treatment of them is perfunctory and does not amount to more than a statement of his conviction (admittedly a common one nowadays) that they can be rationally rejected.

Be all that as it may, however, the thing to stress in the end is that there is much more in Morris's book to praise than to grumble about. It is, on the whole, a very impressive piece of work and it can be strongly recommended. By comparison with much that currently passes for serious and important Christology, it stands in a class of its own.

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EVOLUTION AND CREATION, ed. Ernan McMullin. University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.

After an introduction by the editor this collection of essays consists of three parts. In the first part, entitled 'Evolution' F.J. Ayala surveys recent biology, John Leslie examines modern cosmology and the creation of life, and P.R. Sloan discusses the question of natural purpose. In the second part, entitled 'Creation', D. Bergant, D. Kelsey and W.P. Alston write on these topics: creation according to the Old Testament, the doctrine of creation from nothing, and God's action in the world. In the third part entitled 'Evolution and Creation' J.F. Ross discusses the place of human nature in evolution, W.H. Austin examines attempts to 'explain away' religion in evolutionary terms, N. Lash offers some reflections on Christian hope and original sin, and C.F. Mooney sums up the thought of Teilhard de Chardin.

This is a valuable symposium that deserves study by anyone wishing to have an informed grasp of this complex subject in the light of the most recent research in the biological sciences. Although for someone unfamiliar with the latter the scientific summaries are sometimes too technical and condensed, the following facts become plain.