

“Haloes even in Hell”: Chesterton’s Own Private “Heresy”

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“Philosophy is merely thought that has been thought out.... What do modern men say when apparently confronted with something that cannot ... be naturally explained? Well, most modern men immediately talk nonsense. When such a thing is currently mentioned, in novels or newspapers or magazine stories, the first comment is always something like, ‘But, my dear fellow, this is the twentieth century.’ It is worth having a little training in philosophy if only to avoid looking so ghastly a fool as that. It has on the whole rather less sense or meaning than saying, ‘But, my dear fellow, this is Tuesday afternoon.’ If miracles cannot happen, they cannot happen in the twentieth century or in the twelfth. If they can happen, nobody can prove that there is a time when they cannot happen.”

G. K. Chesterton, “The Revival of Philosophy – Why?”

The Common Man (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950), 177.

“When I fancied that I stood alone, I was really in the ridiculous position of being backed up by all Christendom. It may be, heaven forgive me, that I did try to be original; but I only succeeded in inventing all by myself an inferior copy of the existing traditions of civilized religion. The man from the Yacht thought he was the first to find England; I thought I was the first to find Europe. I did try to found a *heresy of my own*; and when I had put the last touches to it, I discovered that it was orthodoxy.”

G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*.

Collected Works (San Francisco: Ignatius, [1908]1986), I, 214. *Italics added.*

“I have much more sympathy for the person who leaves the Church for a love-affair than with one who leaves it for a long-winded German theory to prove that God is evil or that children are a sort of morbid monkey.”

G. K. Chesterton, *Catholic Church and Conversion, General Works* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, [1927] 1990), III, 123.

I.

In the first chapter of his Autobiography, appropriately entitled, “Hearsay Evidence,” because, chiding modern scientific method,

Chesterton candidly admits to having no personal proof of his own first appearance on earth. Rather, he confesses, he must rely entirely on “mere authority and tradition of the elders,” which does, however quite illogically, to be sure, leave him with the “firm opinion” that he was “born on the 29th of May 1874, on Campden Hill, Kensington.”¹

In this chapter, Chesterton speaks of his maternal grandfather, “a Keith from Aberdeen,” a Scotsman, a Wesleyan lay-preacher. Chesterton never saw this grandfather but had memorable images of him from his grandmother, a “vivid personality,” who long survived her husband. Chesterton saw something of himself in this grandfather. He “was involved in public controversy, a characteristic which descended to his grandchild.” Chesterton adds, however, that “he was also one of the leaders of the early Teetotal movement; a characteristic which has not” also descended to his grandchild.²

Chesterton recalls hearing of a controversy between this Scottish grandfather and his sons about “the General Thanksgiving in the Prayer-Book.” One of them remarked that “a good many people have very little reason to be thankful for their creation.” On hearing this pessimistic comment, the old man, “who was so old that he hardly ever spoke at all,” suddenly came to life and out of his silence affirmed, “I should thank God for my creation if I knew I was a lost soul.”³ Lost souls even in Hell, perhaps they above all, know that creation is good in spite of themselves, otherwise there would be no point to be in Hell, to losing one’s soul.

This paradoxical combination of gratefulness for our existence with an awareness that we can lose our souls in a good world is the inheritance that Chesterton received from a grandfather Keith in Aberdeen, to pass on to us. That we receive such truths third hand from two figures we have never seen does not make such insights less wondrous or less true. How should we react to such unexpected, even slightly unorthodox sounding, insight from, what must be in the modern world, an improbable source stemming from Aberdeen to Campden Hill, Kensington, in 1874, and finally to us in the early years of the twenty first century?

In July, I received an unanticipated e-mail from a student from one of my past classes who told me that she was not from Cincinnati, as I had thought, but “from a charming little beach town in Rhode Island.” I had sent her a brief passage from Chesterton, I forget now what. She replied, “I am actually reading *Orthodoxy* right now. I can only say that I am enchanted.” This is the perfect word about Chesterton, isn’t it? “Enchantment.” As I shall suggest, even when he talks of “lost souls,” or “heresies,” or “Hell,” or “pride” or “Original Sin,” there

remains a certain enchantment about Chesterton, a wonder that can see the order of things even in things that are completely disordered.

II

The most ironic of paradoxes would be to maintain, as I do maintain, that Chesterton himself was the ultimate “heretic,” the one who did reject the prevailing intellectual fashions of his day in order to formulate his own private “heresy.” He was the one man who was not saying what everyone else was saying. How so? The ultimate heretic in a fallen world would be someone who, in the end, was so odd, so “illogical,” so contrary to prevailing propositions, as to find that an “order” did run through all the philosophical and religious systems, especially in those systems that maintain that there is no order or system.

This order in disorder, as it unravels itself, is found by examining the positions that men hold or claim that they hold about both ordinary and ultimate things. The raw material from which we begin is not belief, but prevailing opinion, the opinion which attempts to explain things, the opinion that underlies and presumably justifies our actions.

The method presupposes, of course, the validity of the principle of contradiction. That is, it holds that something cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same circumstances. On the validity of this principle, which to deny is likewise to affirm, depends all human discourse, indeed human existence. Chesterton, if you will, was delighted by contradictions wherever they were found, for they hinted that not all was contradictory, that something was in fact true and stable.

Let us suppose, for example, that the principle of contradiction is not true, that a thing can be and not be at the same time, in the same way. Let us suppose, furthermore, that someone stands before me and affirms that he exists, or even that I exist. Since, in this hypothesis, the principle of contradiction is not true, I have no idea whether the man is really there in front of me, since he can “not be” at the same time that he is. The denial of the principle does not allow me to distinguish his existence from his non-existence. Nor can I be sure that he affirms anything at all. His affirming that he is standing before me could be likewise a not-affirming that he stands before me. Indeed, on the same hypothesis, I cannot even be sure that I exist or that I have a mind bothered by any principles whatsoever.

Chesterton, as he tells us, does not arrive at the frontiers of Christianity though some vibrant preacher, even his Wesleyan grandfather. He did not read his way into the Church through a philosopher, say, Newman or Augustine or even Aquinas, each of whom he admired. He was not present at some miracle that compelled

his soul. Nor was he, like St. Paul, knocked off a horse after a busy spell of persecuting hapless Christians. Chesterton does not seem to have been a bible reader. He was convinced that rather few Protestants in his time believed the exact same doctrines that the founders of Protestantism held. He was not willing to take any Protestant position seriously until it took itself seriously. "There are Catholics who are still answering Calvinists," he remarked, "though there are no Calvinists to answer."⁴ "The genuine Protestant creed is now hardly held by anybody – least of all by the Protestants. So completely have they lost faith in it, that they have mostly forgotten what it was. If almost any modern man be asked whether we save our souls solely through our theology, or whether doing good (to the poor for instance) will help us on the road to God, he would answer without hesitation that good works are probably more pleasing to God than theology. It would probably come as quite a surprise to him to learn that, for three hundred years, the faith in faith alone was the badge of a Protestant, the faith in good works the rather shameful badge of a disreputable Papist".⁵ Chesterton tells us himself that he mainly read modern thinkers, writers, apologists, scientists, historians, philosophers, theologians. In his early book, *Heretics*, he called his intellectual contemporaries, using the word in its broad philosophical and theological sense, precisely "heretics." Much of what he learned, he read in the papers. In fact, he considered the daily newspapers, for which he indeed wrote all his life, to be stocked full of reality, especially the actual vagaries and varieties of the human condition. They at least were real, but needed sorting out.

Reading such sundry sources, Chesterton came to a sudden realization. One way of putting the matter was contained in this famous line: "The Catholic Church is the only thing which saves a man from the degrading slavery of being a child of his age."⁶ He found that the thinkers of his age often contradicted themselves, especially on important issues, because they had no standard against which to compare what they came to hold. One writer would say one thing of some topic and another would maintain just the opposite, or the same man would hold one thing one decade and another the next without ever noticing the difference.. Both positions could not be true. This was "multi-culturalism" before its official appearance.

III

As time went on, what Chesterton found even more curious was that the most egregious contradictions appeared to have something to do with describing Christianity and the Church, what it held and why it did what it did. He was puzzled by this array of contradictory charges and

affirmations made against Catholics. It might be true that Christ performed miracles. It might be true that He did not. But it could not be true that He both did and did not. Christ, for example, was said by some critics to be too harsh, by others too gentle. Too tall or too short. Some thought He was only man, others that He was only God. All seemed to have had before them the same evidence about the same person.

Gradually, it dawned on Chesterton that Christ could not be all these things at once. The mind would not allow it. He could not be too tall and too short at the same time. But, Chesterton reflected, if He were pretty normal, more or less average, then to those who were short, He would look tall. To the tall, he would look short. Strange as it may seem, the reason why all these differing estimates made sense was that He was pretty much what He said He was. He could not be explained by making Him either God or man, but by acknowledging that He was both. Chesterton was astonished that it was precisely the Creeds that made this acknowledgment.

In seeking to understand the logic behind such contradictions, Chesterton discovered an alternative that made sense. His mind could not rest content with contradictions, but contradictions pointed to the truth. To himself, Chesterton seemed to be odd man out. He was the “heretic”; he was the one who said something really different, not just that Christianity was true, but that it was reasonable in its truth. “Amid all these anti-rational philosophies, ours will remain the only rational philosophy,” he wrote.⁷ As he admitted later, he admired toughness of mind. “A convinced Catholic is easily the most hard-headed and logical person walking about the world today.”⁸ Notice that Chesterton does not appeal to revelation in the name of revelation, but to revelation in the name of reason. He makes his case, almost as if to say that revelation is itself addressed to reason, which indeed it is.

Chesterton was not “converted” by Christians to Christianity. He was converted to Christianity by heretics and non-believers explaining, often to themselves, what they held, especially what they held about Christianity. “Here I am only giving an account of my own growth in spiritual certainty,” Chesterton wrote near the end of *Orthodoxy*. “But I may pause to remark that the more I saw of the merely abstract arguments against the Christian cosmology the less I thought of them. I mean that having found the moral atmosphere of the Incarnation to be common sense, I then looked at the established intellectual arguments against the Incarnation and found them to be common nonsense.”⁹ Notice that here Chesterton is not using reason to “prove” the fact of the Incarnation – that would indeed be “heresy” – rather he is using reason to examine the arguments proposed against

the Incarnation, itself something revealed to us. These counter arguments were, as he quips, generally found to be “common nonsense.”

Chesterton gained a further insight into what goes on in such intellectual analysis by following the drift of those who think that they do have adequate arguments against Christianity. Chesterton’s life, of course, was filled with happy argument. He thrived on it and, such was the pleasantness of his character, even those who were subject to his witty and often devastating criticisms, seemed still to love him. He delighted in controversy and thought that the brain was given to us so that we could arrive at the truth through argument. Moreover, he thought we should express this truth precisely in dogmas, in clear statements we can examine, even when they referred to the highest mysteries which no purely human mind could completely comprehend.

Chesterton remarked in his book on St. Thomas that the trouble with most arguments is that they are unfair, because they end too soon, before the logical consequences can be drawn out of them.. He hinted that this very unfairness was often part of a strategy to prevent the truth from being confronted. The other side of this concern about long arguments is related to why Chesterton loved camaraderie and long nights of drink and discussion in local pubs when there would be time to see just where argument really went, when no one would be allowed to hide behind a rank contradiction without knowing it is a rank contradiction.

But something even more sinister seemed to be at work here. “This is the last and most astounding fact about this faith,” Chesterton wrote, again in *Orthodoxy*, “that its (Christianity’s) enemies will use any weapon against it, the swords that cut their own fingers, and the firebrands that burn their own homes. Men who began to fight the Church for the sake of freedom and humanity, end up by flinging away freedom and humanity if only they may fight the Church.”¹⁰ This passage indicates just why it is important to have, in the Church itself, intelligence, to notice precisely that point when an objection is answered but a movement against truth goes on in bad faith either because it does not want to admit its error or because it does not want to live the truth. It is from this source that discrimination and even persecution originate. The world, alas, does not only contain “errors.” It also contains “bad will.” This combination of error and bad will also requires philosophical explication, an explication rooted in the very nature of will.

IV

Let me take two basic instances wherein Chesterton tells of discovering his own religion only to find it a) contrary to what was being held in the culture at the time and b) in conformity with what Christianity historically taught. On September 18, 1920, still a few years before he became a Catholic, Chesterton wrote: "Men do not believe in Original Sin because they believe in the Book of Genesis. They are ready to believe in the Book of Genesis, because they already believe in Original Sin."¹¹ Chesterton often came back to the question of Original Sin or the Fall. He maintained that it was the one Christian doctrine that did not need theological proof. All we needed to do was to go out into the streets and open our eyes. Strictly speaking, this explanation is probably an "heretical" position. But Chesterton meant what Aristotle meant when he was perplexed by the "wickedness" that kept recurring in human experience and the futility with the economic, political, or religious efforts devised to eradicate it from our lot in this life. Original Sin is not intended to excuse our sins, but to locate their origins and reasons. It is intended to warn us about proposing solutions for its presence that by-pass the human soul, with its free will. The intellectual world is structured so as to allow no escape from free will to determinism.

Chesterton's understanding of Original Sin was not "morbid," but it was "realistic" in the sense of Augustinian realism, that things do go wrong, even among the faithful, perhaps especially among the faithful. Murphy's famous law, "if a thing can go wrong, it will go wrong", and the Peter Principle, that "a man rises to the level of his incompetence," are but amusing observation on some uncanny disorder in our universal experience. Original Sin, the experience of its presence in all times and cultures, points not to Utopia but to Incarnation, not to a place where it is "cured," but to a place where it is redeemed. Incarnation, however, points not to a this-worldly paradise but to the Resurrection of the Body. One of Chesterton's abiding themes is that we are, in fact, created for a joy that is too good to be true. The trouble with humanist alternatives is not that they are necessarily ignoble, but that they do not offer to us what we really want.

Thus, we can even find a certain "cheerfulness" about this often troubling doctrine of Original Sin. This is how Chesterton put the issue in *Orthodoxy*:

All the real arguments about religion turn on the question of whether a man who was born upside down can tell when he comes right way up. The primary paradox of Christianity is that the ordinary condition of man is not his sane or sensible condition; that the normal self is an abnormality. That is the inmost philosophy of the Fall. In Sir Oliver

Lodge's interesting new Catechism, the first two questions were: 'What are you?' and 'What, then, is the meaning of the Fall of Man?' I remember amusing myself by writing my own answers to the questions: but I soon found that they were broken and agnostic answers. To the question, 'What are you?' I could only answer, 'God knows.' And to the question, 'What is meant by the Fall?' I could answer with complete sincerity, 'That whatever I am, I am not myself.' This is the prime paradox of our religion: something that we have never in any full sense known, is not only better than ourselves, but even more natural to us than ourselves.¹²

This is a remarkable passage, well worth spelling out in some detail. We are born upside down. Our problem is to learn to recognize what is right side up.

Take for instance the question of surveys or polls designed to discover what men "do" – they steal, commit adultery, lie, kill, as it turns out. Lo and behold, we find that a certain percentage in any society – it may vary in times and places – do these very things, some of which, at least, we think ought not to be done. What happens next is to discover "scientifically" that it is "normal" that we find such sins or disorders among us. Josef Pieper, in his book, *The Concept of Sin*, has an interesting chapter on how touchy we are about using the word sin for any of these "faults," except maybe in jest.¹³ Some historic sins are now, in fact, called "rights," a fact that forces the question on us of whether human nature changes over time and place, even whether it changes so much as to approve in one generation the opposite of what it approved in a previous generation..

If we analyze all of this information carefully, however, we see Chesterton's very point. The fact that we are sinful and do sinful things – statistics prove it, whatever we call it – suggests that somehow our "normal" condition – the one most of us display – is, by another criterion, abnormal. We "do" not what we want or ought to do, to recall a famous phrase of St. Paul. The fact that a culture or society wants to call what is sinful "normal" thus does not mean that it is in fact normal. It only means that it is frequent. But by another standard we cannot avoid pondering, it may very well be "abnormal." The normal, in the sense of what is proper to human nature, is not what we actually do, but what we ought to do. "The ordinary condition of man is nor his sane or sensible condition." This seems to be exactly right. We are precisely "heretics" today if we maintain that the order of the Commandments is the order that is best for us. We conform to the culture, we are slaves to our time, if we say that what we do "do" is what is "right" for us to do.

A second area in which Chesterton discovered his own “religion,” because of which he was a “heretic” in the culture, was in the area of marriage and what it means. Again, we live in a society in which monogamous marriage designed for a life-time together amidst one’s own children is not the “norm.” That is, most people do not live in such a permanent marital situation. What Chesterton wants to know, however, is “what do I really want, if I could have it?” In *What’s Wrong with the World*, Chesterton remarks that most people would want a home, property, family. This is the material foundation that establishes the family in some sense free from, independent of, the state. The family is beyond law in the sense that love is beyond law.

Chesterton rejected the Platonic or socialist ideal of all men, women, and children living in common houses or messes or care institutions. “That all men should live in the same beautiful house is not a dream at all; it is a nightmare.”¹⁴

Having what is one’s own is part of the adventure of the distinctness of creation itself, the fact that not all things are the same. “The perfect happiness of men on the earth (if it ever comes) will not be a flat and solid thing, like the satisfaction of animals. It will be an exact and perilous balance; like that of a desperate romance. Man must have just enough faith in himself to have adventures, and just enough doubt of himself to enjoy them.”¹⁵ Faith is the origin of joy, while humility is the source of romance.

Chesterton maintained that he could found his own religion, the one in which he was and is still precisely a “heretic” to the culture, because of his understanding of love and marriage. The first thing we need to know about is that marriage is a metaphysical thing. We want someone to love who is not ourselves; that is, we want the world to be so structured that we are not the only ones in it. We want the other to be the other and to remain the other. We want, as Chesterton wrote in his book on St. Thomas, a metaphysics that guarantees the diversity of things. We do not want all things to be the same, even when we want them to have their fair due. “Without vanity,” Chesterton wrote, “I really think there was a moment when I could have invented the marriage vow (as an institution) out of my own head; but I discovered, with a sigh, that it had been invented already.”¹⁶ Chesterton recognizes what a relief it is that we do not have to create our own world, that it may well be better made than anything that we could come up with.

What was it about the marriage vow in particular that interested Chesterton? “I do not know if the reader agrees with me in these examples; but I will add an example which has always affected me most.

I could never conceive or tolerate any Utopia which did not leave to me the liberty for which I chiefly care, the liberty to bind myself. Complete anarchy would not only make it impossible to have any discipline or fidelity; it would also make it impossible to have any fun.”¹⁷ That the marriage vow also had something to do with the protection of discipline, fidelity, and fun is something that perhaps only Chesterton could have seen. One might well argue, on empirical grounds, that the violation of the vows is precisely what has caused widespread lack of discipline, lack of fidelity, and a kind of sadness among us.

There is one more thing about the marriage vow that is worth recalling. In his famous essay, “In Defence of Rash Vows,” which appeared in *The Defendant* in 1901, Chesterton not only linked the vow to the notion of love and permanent friendship but also to the ever present threat of Original Sin even in the best of marriages. A vow, after all, is a solemn promise to stay together, not merely when times are good, but especially when times are bad.. “There are thrilling moments, doubtless, for the spectator, the amateur, and the ascetic; but there is one thrill that is known only to the soldier who fights for his own flag, to the ascetic who starves himself for his own illumination, to the lover who makes finally his own choice. And it is this transfiguration of self-discipline that makes the vow a truly sane thing.”¹⁸

It is the “freedom to bind oneself,” as Chesterton put it. Love wants to bind and to be bound, but mutually and freely. The revolt against vows has been carried in our day even to the extent of a revolt against the typical vow of marriage. It is most amusing to listen to the opponents of marriage on this subject. They appear to imagine that the ideal of constancy was a yoke mysteriously imposed on mankind by the devil, instead of being, as it is, a yoke consistently imposed by all lovers on themselves. They have invented a phrase, a phrase that is a black and white contradiction in two words – “free-love” – as if a lover ever had been, or ever could be, free. It is the nature of love to bind itself, and the institution of marriage merely paid the average man the compliment of taking him at his word.¹⁹ Chesterton thought that the adventure that marriage puts into the world, the freedom to bind oneself to someone, was “democratic,” that it was open equally to the rich and the poor, the great and the ordinary. This position meant that there was drama all around us, especially if we had homes formed by this mutual binding.

VI

At the end of *Heretics*, we find the following almost prophetic prediction about the relation of reason and revelation, faith and philosophy. It remains the one of the first and probably the last and finest statements of Chesterton about what he saw of the modern mind

when left to itself. It is his statement of where the heresies that deviated from orthodoxy would ultimately lead.

The great march of mental destruction will go on. Everything will be denied. Everything will become a creed. It is a reasonable position to deny the stones in the street; it will be a religious dogma to assert them. It is a rational thesis that we are all in a dream; it will be a mystical sanity to say that we are all awake. Fires will be kindled to testify that two and two make four. Swords will be drawn to prove that leaves are green in summer. We shall be left defending, not only the incredible virtues and sanities of human life, but something more incredible still, the huge impossible universe which stares us in the face. We shall fight for visible prodigies as if they were invisible. We shall look on the impossible grass and the skies with a strange courage. We shall be of those who have seen and yet have believed.²⁰

Chesterton was right. Modern philosophy has not only doubted the order, even existence of the world, but it has doubted its own mind. It does take “courage” to affirm the grass is green and that we can know what is. It was Christ himself, after all, who said to the Apostle Thomas, “blessed are they who have not seen but who have believed.” What Chesterton saw one hundred years ago was that it would be revelation that finally ends up defending reason and its ability to reach a real world that is not ourselves, though we are in it, yet not wholly at home in it.

In a chapter entitled, “Is Humanism a Religion,” in *The Thing: Why I Am a Catholic*, the book Chesterton wrote in 1922 to explain his conversion, we find this passage, with which I shall conclude

There are, as a matter of fact, any number of old pictures in which whole crowds are crowned with haloes, to indicate that they have all attained Beatitude.. But for Catholics, it is a fundamental dogma of the Faith that all human beings, without any exception whatever, were specially made, were shaped and pointed like shining arrows, for the end of hitting the mark of Beatitude. It is true that the shafts are feathered with free will, and therefore throw the shadow of all tragic possibilities of free will, and that the Church (having also been aware for ages of that darker side of truth, which the new sceptics have just discovered) does also draw attention to the darkness of that potential tragedy. But that does not make any difference to the gloriousness of the potential glory. In one aspect it is even a part of it; since the freedom is itself a glory. In that sense they would still wear their haloes even in hell.²¹

Freedom is itself a glory even for those who abuse it. Chesterton’s private “heresy” would allow “haloes in Hell” because no glory is to be taken away from the potential glory in which we are made, exactly made.

Chesterton's grandfather Keith would still thank God even if he lost his soul. There are many who do not want to face the terms of glory, the fact that we must choose it. The ultimate "heresy," Chesterton thought, was not his invention, though he did come to a pale shadow of it by pondering the contradictions of the heretics of his time. The ultimate heresy was already in existence and Chesterton found it. "We need so to view the world," Chesterton wrote at the beginning of *Orthodoxy*, "as to combine the idea of wonder and the idea of welcome."²² These were philosophical ideas that rang true to him. What astonished him and enchants us is that this wonder and this welcome are the essence of revelation.

The "haloes of Hell" and the heresies of modernity, each in their own way, attest to the fact that Chesterton had it right. "How," he asked, "can we continue to be at once astonished at the world and at home in it?"²³ Only, he thought, if we accepted this "ultimate heresy" that contradicted all the contradictions lodged against it. This is what happened, at least once in our era, when an honest and insightful man sets out "to found a heresy of his own."

- 1 G. K. Chesterton, *The Autobiography, Collected Works* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, [1936] 1988), XVI, 21.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 29.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 29-30.
- 4 *Catholic Church and Conversion, ibid.*, 41.
- 5 G. K. Chesterton, *The Thing: Why I Am a Catholic* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), III, 185-86.
- 6 *Catholic Church and Conversion, ibid.*, 110.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 68.
- 8 *The Thing, ibid.*, 286.
- 9 *Orthodoxy, ibid.*, 347.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 344.
- 11 G. K. Chesterton, "Modern Vagueness about Theology," *Illustrated London News, Collected Works* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 91.
- 12 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy, ibid.*, 363.
- 13 Josef Pieper, *The Concept of Sin* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2001).
- 14 *Orthodoxy, ibid.*, 327-28.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 318.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 327.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 328.
- 18 G. K. Chesterton, "In Defence of Rash Vows," *The Defendant* (London: Dent, [MCMII] MCMXIV), 26.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 23.
- 20 G. K. Chesterton, *Heretics, Collected Works* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, [1905] 1986), I, 206-207.
- 21 G. K. Chesterton, *The Thing: Why I Am a Catholic, Collected Works* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, [1926] 1990), 150.
- 22 *Orthodoxy, ibid.*, 213.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 212.