

On Literary Subjectivity in the Seventeenth Century

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In psychoanalytic theory, the notion of the person inevitably evokes the notion of subjectivity.¹ Not that the former can be reduced to the latter; but if psychoanalytic theory is anything more a certain type of therapeutic practice, it is indeed a theory of the subject or a theory of the subjective relation. We should perhaps begin by specifying that the subjective relation must be understood as a complex whole: an *intrapsychic* relation, that is, a relation between the various instances that make up the subject, and at the same time an *intersubjective* relation, that is, a relation between (at least) two subjects. These two aspects are both inseparable and conflictual. They are inseparable because the self cannot exist, cannot construct itself without the other (whether this be a parental other or a peer). They are conflictual for at least two reasons. On the one hand, because the intrapsychic relation is by definition an arena of conflict: the conflict that opposes the Ego to the contradictory but equally tyrannical demands of the Id – which translates its attachment to the body and testifies to its inherent drives – and of the Superego, which represents its rootedness in the social and cultural sphere. And on the other hand, because this subject, which is thus divided within itself, must undergo the trial of bringing its desire face to face with the desire of the others with whom it is destined to live. The psychoanalytic theory of the subject is therefore the theory of a doubly heterogeneous relation: there is the heterogeneity of the components of the self, which go, once again, from their anchorage in somatic drives to the most ethereal expressions of the ideal; and there is the heterogeneity of the relation between this self and the self of the other. Moreover, this double heterogeneity is not limited to the matter of components: after all, these, one

might think, would ideally be open to reabsorption into the homogeneity of the individual. On the contrary, this heterogeneity gives rise to a double rationality or double logic. Psychic causality – to borrow André Green's expression² – is also driven by the conflict that opposes what in psychoanalysis are known as the primary processes, which Freud has described in chapter 7 of the *Traumdeutung* and which govern the formation and organization of the dream images, to the secondary processes, which are those processes that govern our daytime thoughts. Psychic causality is formed by the struggle for hegemony between these two logics, each of which is itself acted upon by an antagonism between what Freud, at the end of his life, called Eros and Thanatos, the urge for Life and the drive toward death or destruction.

By emphasizing the conflictual nature of the subject of psychoanalytic theory, I have attempted to bring to the fore a theoretical point of departure that might appear all the more paradoxical as the object that is to be submitted to it seems to be diametrically opposed to it. To speak of classical subjectivity is in effect to speak of an instance that everything leads us to believe conceives itself, dreams itself, as a site of homogeneity. Whether we speak of the hold that the character of a novel or play works upon himself, or whether we adopt the point of view of the novelist or playwright who conceives this character, it is striking to note that such a hold is constantly oriented, drawn as if magnetically, by a concern for unity – or even stronger, by a will to unity. Witness, in counterproof, this character's distress when confronted by the rupture of this unity. "She no longer recognized herself": the alarmed observation of the Princess de Clèves as she becomes retrospectively aware of a behavior that is, unbeknownst to her, guided by amorous desire is emblematic of the ideal of transparency – an ideal that is here defeated – that ought to characterize the character's relation to herself. And what is true on the level of the characters also applies to their conceiver. The unity of the literary work presupposes the unity of its subjective components. As Marc Fumaroli observes in a chapter devoted to the status of the character in Cornelian tragedy, "it is true that each *dramatis persona* seems to address his partners on the stage, and for the purpose he is endowed with all the resources of the art of oratory that the

playwright himself possesses. But on the other hand, the sum of these intersecting stage speeches in the end forms a single definitive speech, with a unique source, the playwright's *ingenium*, and a unique end, the listener-spectators in the theater, the audience."³ To confine ourselves to the level of intentions, it is as if the laconic Cartesian formula *cogito ergo sum* summed up the sought-after ideal of a personification that collects itself and points to itself simply through the suffix of a conjugation, in which the *Je, Tu, Il* or *Elle* were merely the interchangeable forms of a subjective affirmation reduced to the sobriety of a grammatical mode that is immediately and completely transparent to itself. And if moreover the act of memory by which the playwright or the novelist provides his subjects with the depth that will make them believable and interesting respects the complexity that comes to them either from the facts of the story, or from the richness of the fable, this complexity remains subject to an imperative of homogeneity, without which the author would inevitably feel the undertaking to be an incoherent one.

For all that, the great works written between 1630 and 1680, as we know, attain this ideal only imperfectly. The objective of these pages can be summed up as follows: to plot some of the ways in which two major works of this period have sought to resolve the opposition between inherently conflictual subjectivity (which, in accordance with psychoanalysis, I will pose as a sort of anthropological axiom) and the desire for unity and homogeneity that governs the conception of the self at this time. That our reflection begins with a double *petitio principii* is clear: the first is that the psychic character of *homo classicus* is identical to our own; the second is that an anthropological insight can be applied per se to a literary representation. Regarding the first point, I will say that human evolution is far too slow a process to require that we imagine significant differences over a period as brief as three or four centuries. The structure of the psychic apparatus of a man or a woman in 1650 is highly likely to have been the same as our own. The difference, of course, is that modes of behavior, the parameters of conduct through which a psychic conflict must be experienced and must seek a way out, present all the differences that are historically manifested between society in 1650 and our own soci-

ety. As for the second point, I will say that while it is of course impossible to move directly from a literary representation, governed by all the mediations that constitute the work as a work (and these are more important in the seventeenth century than in any other period), we cannot, conversely, evade the fact that, whatever model of subjectivity we choose to apply, this model is subject to an investigation in relation to which the analytic model remains unsurpassed as a reference. After all, it is not a matter of tugging classical works into the realm of psychoanalysis, for that would be as anachronistic as it is absurd; but rather, more simply, of bringing to the fore some phenomena that are internal to these works, to which a psychoanalytic mode of attention makes us more sensitive, in order then to recognize the function of these phenomena in the specific economy of these works.

I will begin with a passage from one of the inaugural works of French tragedy, Corneille's *Medea*, performed for the first time in the course of the 1634-35 season. What is specific about Corneille's *Medea*, in relation to its ancient models (Euripides, Seneca, Ovid) or to its contemporary sources (such as Natale Conti's *Mythologia*), is the playwright's complete and positive identification with his eponymous figure. Whereas the tradition laid more emphasis either on Jason as a figure of conjugal infidelity or, to the contrary, on the princess's magical powers, her "sorcery," Corneille deliberately and unilaterally aligns himself with a figure whose vengeance is in a sense made banal by the play's insistence on the abject betrayal she has been made to suffer. Moreover, it is not without jubilation that Corneille seems to choose as his first tragic figure a heroine whose evil force simply becomes an image of her greatness. This jubilation can be felt already in the play's dedication to an individual who is most likely imaginary:

Sir,

I give you Medea in all her wickedness, and for this I offer no justification. I give you her such as you agree to accept her, without attempting to warn you or to insult your feelings by a display of the precepts of art, which must be very poorly understood and very poorly applied when they do not bring us to the objective that art sets itself.⁴

How are we to understand such an identification? As the expression of a sort of ideal behind which is an intuition. This ideal is

most certainly the equivalence between a subjective identity and a power, or, better yet, between this identity and omnipotence. Medea warns us of this already in her first monologue (I.3), in which she says to Jason:

You are deluded, Jason, I am still myself.
All that my utmost love did for your sake
I will do out of hatred, and I want a crime
To sunder us just as it brought us close. (237-240)

To remain oneself is therefore to wield power, above all the power to destroy. But Medea does not stop here: in a rhetorical amplification of the Senecan text that serves as Corneille's model, he has her say the following lines:

Nérine
Shatter the blindness by which you've been seduced
To mark the state to which you've been reduced.
Your country hates you, your husband has lost faith.
In such a dire strait what have you still?

Medea
Myself.
Myself, I say, and that's enough.

Nérine
What? You alone, Madame?

Medea
Yes, in me alone you see both sword and flame,
Both earth and sea, both Hades and Heaven,
The scepter of the Kings, the lightning of the Gods. (313-320)

The extraordinary *hubris* reflected in these famous lines results from the implicit assimilation of Medea's being to the elements over which her magician's gifts give her full power. Medea is above all what she can do, and because she has power over everything, she thus becomes everything. This is no doubt the mark of one of the characteristics of Cornelian subjectivity: as if it were inhabited by, or saw itself as constituted by, an excess of energy that is both a mode of self-affirmation and a mode of amorous or destructive relationship to others. If Medea represents in such a cruelly jubilant way the ideal of Cornelian subjectivity – or, to be more cautious, let us say the expression of Cornelian subjectivity in its least mediated aspect – it is however for another reason,

which is complementary to the one just mentioned, and which has to do with what we will call the infernal nature of this figure: it is revealing that in the monologue cited above, the princess, after invoking the “sovereigns who protect the laws of Hymen,” addresses the “troops schooled in a thousand barbarities,/Daughters of Acheron, Plagues, Specters, Furies...” (205-206). These “Black Sisters” from whom she requests the poison that will consume Creon and Creusa at the end of the play are metaphors for the solidarity between subjectivity and a pandemonium that is simply a projection, in mythological terms, of the obscure or destructive power of the unconscious or of the death wish. Realizing this adds to our understanding, it seems to me, of both why Corneille identifies to this point with his spokesperson, and why, in his dedication, he does not hesitate to “give” (read: “impose”) her as she is. Medea’s wickedness would thus be no more than a sign of the ambivalence of a subjectivity whose representation would not be complete if it did not integrate this “infernal” aspect. Her being a sorceress (the word appears twice in the play) thus translates into the language of 1634-35 an intuition of the fundamentally ambivalent nature of the energy of passion that constitutes the Self.

It is doubtless no coincidence that *Medea* is the first of Corneille’s tragedies. When an author tackles a genre that is new to him, he often discovers himself more fully than when the mastery that comes from experience allows him to play more subtly with the possibilities of the genre. Corneille’s identification with Medea – which can also be felt in the theatrical and poetic registers she enlists to speak of her crimes – in fact poses a problem that is more properly dramaturgical: that of the balance or weighting of the play itself. Medea is such a disproportionate figure that she devours those who oppose her. A figure of totality, she dispossesses the other protagonists of any real depth. By the same token she also translates a theatrical problem: how to embody this larger-than-life energy or passion, in which Corneille intuitively recognizes a true identity, without monopolizing for herself all of the available space? Among the answers that the author will provide for this question, I wish to confine myself here to pointing out just one, because it also seems to me to signify the difficulty I am in the process of describ-

ing. Medea, as we have seen, makes her first appearance in a scene that is a monologue, even if this monologue is interrupted by a series of apostrophes: to the gods, to the creatures of the Underworld, to Jason, and then finally to the sun. A monologue is also the first appearance on stage of Cleopatra in *Rodogune* (II.1). But what is extraordinary in the latter play is that at first, rather than invoking another person as interlocutor, Cleopatra addresses her words to “fallacious vows” and above all to a sentiment – or, to speak the language of the period, a passion: in this case, hatred, which before our eyes becomes her real interlocutor:

False vows, salutary constraint
Imposed on me by force, accepted by my fear,
Happy disguises of an immortal rage,
Vains ghosts of State, away with you!
If terror of a pressing peril gave birth to you,
With this very peril you must be gone,
Like those vows formed in a storm
Effaced by quick forgetfulness when waters calm,
And you, so artfully concealed by this pretence,
The recourse of the powerless, dissembled hatred,
Virtue worthy of Kings, noble secret of the court,
Explode, now it is time, our day has come.
Let us show ourselves no longer as subjects,
But such as I am and such as you are. (395-407)⁵

From our vantage point, Cleopatra’s personification of hatred here is all the more spectacular and significant because it is accompanied by an equation of the subject (the I) to its dominant passion: “Let us show ourselves no longer as subjects,/ But such as I am and such as you are.” The autonomy ascribed to hatred, while thoroughly in keeping with contemporary anthropological reflections such as those found in Marin Cureau de la Chambre’s *Caractères des passions* (1640) or P. Senault’s *De l’usage des passions* (1664), nevertheless seems to me to translate the intuition of this conflicted nature of the self that we have already discussed. Even if Cleopatra is in some sense at one with this sentiment, this unity nevertheless remains the locus of an internal schism which is reflected as such in the very arrangement of the *mise en scène*. In other words, the very fact that Cleopatra coincides with her hatred is indicated through the division of the speaking agent into self and hatred. The conflictedness becomes the very mark of unity.

I have not thus far taken into account the historical differences that ought to be specified when a period of nearly half a century is under consideration. And yet it is probably not coincidental – if we compare the position of these two plays by Corneille, written respectively in 1635 and 1647, with what follows – to observe that the affirmation of totalizing subjectivity defined by its potential for destructive energy was produced in the years leading up to the Fronde. Not that we need make Corneille into the Frondeur that he was not. But whether or not one belonged to this movement, the Fronde was still the expression of a demand for the individual's rights to share in power, which in the years following 1652 was to become increasingly obsolete. In other words, if *Medea* and *Rodogune* are indeed the image of what characterizes Cornelian subjectivity, in its impetuously affirmative aspect, and if this character hinges on the equivalence of identity and power, it is not surprising that these figures belong to the period that leads up to the Fronde. The individual dimension is combined with a collective and historical dimension that it tempers, true, but that it also confirms.

The fact stands out all the more clearly when we compare these figures with a character such as *Alceste* in the *Misanthrope*. Without a doubt, the comparison suffers from the fact that he is a comic figure, or rather that he appears in a comedy. But the difference of genres here does not make the comparison fruitless. In fact, it would not be difficult to see *Alceste* as a tragic character. Not only does the *misanthrope's* language exhibit a vocabulary that points in the direction of the tragic lexicon, but its tension and above all its rigidity quite directly recall tragic attitudes, even if they produce comic effects. *Alceste* is not far from sharing *Medea's* opinion, even her ideology, as expressed to *Nérine*:

The more the threat the more the soul must steel
Itself, lower its head to challenge fate,
Charging it boldly, without fear of death,
Facing head-on its harshest exertion." (305-308)

All we need do is replace the term "fate" by the term "justice" for the magician's lines to define perfectly the attitude *Alceste* advocates with regard to his trial. Moreover, this proximity is no coincidence. *Alceste* is derived from a lesser known Molière character, *Don Garcie de Navarre*, the eponymous hero of a play from which

the *Misanthrope* lifts, word for word, several dozen lines. This *Don Garcie de Navarre* was a tragicomedy written in imitation of Corneille's tragicomedies, in particular his *Don Sanche d'Aragon*. It is not at all surprising that, in using the lexicon and numerous passage of *Don Garcie de Navarre*, Molière also assumed certain tonalities of the play. The difference, moreover, is less a difference of theme than one of perspective. What is revealing in the *Misanthrope* is the decision to treat in a comic mode a subject who is anything but comic. Here again, Fumaroli's remarks are most apt: "With the character of Alceste, Molière indulged in the supreme luxury for a playwright who is also a comic actor: to build a comedy around a character who challenges comedy and who, rising up as a tragedian against the very essence of fiction, becomes in his unease, his revolt, his stubborn rage, a comic power of the first order."⁶ This unease is historically tied to the changes that had occurred since the Fronde, as Louis XIV concentrated power exclusively in his own hands. A few remarks on the end of the comedy in question will illustrate this point.

The last scene of the *Misanthrope* is the scene of Célimène's undoing. The lesson of this demise is that social slander cannot be pursued without limits, that even if it allows the social circle to constitute itself as such – by speaking ill of an absent third party – one cannot lack respect for one's victims to the point of playing them recklessly against one another. If Alceste is too rigid, too close to a Law erected as absolute, Célimène, in contrast, is too far from this Law; her "scandalmongering wit" has gone too far, in the freedom with which she has exploited the destructive potential of conversation; her "coquettish humor" has above all pushed her to the serious offence of having consigned to paper – *scripta manent* – what should have remained oral – *verba volant*. This wit and humor led her to excessive tolerance for compromises that are to some degree excused by her position as a "young widow." However, it is possible that the figure of the young widow demands to be understood and interpreted less in itself than in relation to the one who is in love with her. From this point of view, the last scene should be read according to a logic other than the apparent logic of the action (which means applying the distinction made above between conscious and unconscious logic). By this I mean that what this scene

enables us to understand, rather than the condemnation of Célimène followed by the failure of Alceste, is the latter's true desire. What, indeed, is striking in the letters from Célimène that are the object of litigation? Scandalmongering? Of course – but also something else entirely. In these letters there is something that cannot help but fascinate Alceste: there is the trace of a superior panache. By her banter, Célimène proves that she does not depend on anyone's devotion, even if she desires to seduce the whole world, and that she is capable of preserving her coquetterie above the various expressions of respect or admiration that she elicits. No doubt the means she uses to effect her seduction are lacking in morals, but this immorality does not prevent her from being the cynosure, at the center of all gazes. She thereby realizes the unavowed ideal of her lover: she embodies the narcissistic success of which he dreams – "I want to be distinguished" – a dream of nothing less than exclusivity. As the queen of this salon, this little coterie, Célimène dialectically reveals Alceste's secret desire, which is to occupy in others' opinions of him the place that is exclusively reserved for the King. And it is because this recognition is impossible that he will react by turning it back into what could pass for its twofold negation: since it is impossible for him to realize this secret ideal in this world, Alceste will require the one who is its female embodiment to follow him into his "desert," that is, into a place where he would be the sole object of this coquette with whom he pretends to be in love. After *identifying* with Célimène, Alceste endeavors by this proposal to *appropriate* her to himself in a somewhat desperate attempt to take over her power of fascination. And it is because Célimène refuses to let herself be stripped of her power that, in a reversal that is less a change in humor than the result of a spite that is quite understandable in someone as fragile on the narcissistic level, Alceste leaves both the theatrical stage and the stage of worldly society to seek a solitude that he can at least fill with his fantasies of sovereignty.

The figure of Alceste nevertheless betrays an unease, the unease that affects the social life of the courtier. This unease stems from the rift that separates the social *persona*, the external, social figure, from the inner person. No doubt Molière is convinced of the necessity of the social availability that expresses each individ-

ual's calling to live in society. But he also knows that this sociality is but *one part* of human nature, in which there also exists – as for example in him, Jean-Baptiste Poquelin – a no less profound dimension that is resistant to all sociality. The extremism of Alceste's critique is like a protest by the non-social part against the (overly) social part, or better yet, the inner, melancholy man's protest against the excesses of the social game. And this is where we find the meaning of a comment that every commentator has noted, one that is not unrelated to the misanthrope's roots in the figure of Don Garcie de Navarre, who himself was made up after the Cornelian model. From the first scene on, Alceste appears as an "old-fashioned" person. Philinte points out to him, for example, that this "great rigidity of virtues of olden times/ Clashes too much with our century and our common customs" (153-154). Eliante, the reasonable woman, speaks of his "noble and heroic" virtue, which she says has become "rare in our day." Likewise, in the scene of Oronte's sonnet, Alceste seeks to defend an old song, king Henry's song – that is Henry IV the Vert-Galant, against the precious sonnet that is typical of the genre currently in vogue. As Ralph Albanese has rightly noted, Alceste is thus a sort of a living anachronism, a partisan of the values of the regency of Marie de Medicis or the values of Louis XIII in the time of Louis XIV. It should be understood that Molière is by no means nostalgic for the values of his parents' generation. He is too complicit with the society of the Sun King to set himself apart from it. But just as, in order to confront an unease that he cannot directly resolve, an individual may choose to regress to a previous stage of his development, signifying his current unease through this regressive choice, likewise one can hypothesize that Alceste's anachronism can be decoded as the symptom of an unease characteristic of society in 1666. Then the extreme pride expressed by the misanthrope, who I would hypothesize has his sights set on nothing less than a symbolic usurpation of the King's place, can be understood along with a protest by the 1666 courtier who lives in a society in which the King has confiscated power for himself: this is a protest made in the name of Louis XIII's values, that is, the heroic values of an individual who sees himself as the potential equal of the monarch, the latter being merely the *primus inter pares* of the kingdom's

great men. The misanthrope's egocentrism, couched in his heroic convictions, would be the clumsy, desperate expression of a class of courtiers reduced to serving as the sovereign's beautifying mirror, and thereby deprived of autonomy or power of their own. Alceste, in other words, would be a latter-day Frondeur, and his excessive pride the psychological or humoral expression of the type of rebellion that led to the Fronde. Thus *Le Misanthrope* presents two contradictory levels to our understanding. By vainly staking his own claim to the King's place, Alceste, in spite of himself, unwittingly serves as an instrument of flattery in Molière's own relation to Louis XIV, to whom the playwright says implicitly: "You see, Sire, only you can be the cynosure at the center of all gazes, since my misanthrope, who would like so much to attain for himself a similar exclusivity, fails miserably in his attempt." However, upon this in some sense explicit level of a relationship of allegiance, Molière superimposes a second, secret level at which, in solidarity with his hero, he uses the latter to criticize the King for monopolizing power.

What Paul Bénichou has aptly named the "demolition of the hero"⁷ is, as he has shown, accompanied simultaneously by an accusation of the self and the self's reduction to its material nature, subject to humoral fluctuations. The Self, in Pascal's famous *pensée*, "has two qualities: it is unjust in itself, in that it makes itself the center of everything; it is inconvenient to others, in that it wishes to subject them, for each self is the enemy and wishes to be the tyrant of all others."⁸ The Self is, ultimately, hateful, for the same reason that makes it so attractive to Corneille: as the seat of a volition, a dominating pride, that its fallen nature transforms into the creature's ultimate locus of resistance to grace granted by God. The denunciation is evident in another intimate of Port Royal, La Rochefoucault, whose aphoristic ambition attests to a fundamental concern for demasking, for a restrictive critique intended to liberate the Self from its illusions. With pride flushed out and dismantled, the effect is to humiliate a subjectivity whose legitimacy is battered to the point of finding itself practically stripped of any possibility of hiding. "What is the *self*?" Pascal asks, only to raise the stakes straightaway by redoubling a question intended to expose the emptiness, if not the nonexistence, of

the object being explored: "Where then is this *self*, if it is neither in the body, nor in the soul?"⁹ The *self* is a nothing whose specterlike nature would keep the Christian from pinning any hope whatsoever upon it.

If such an observation leads the partisan of Port Royal to the disinvestment that we know took place, it must be noted that this *self* deprived of consistency can nevertheless spring back when it is taken over by a *vis comica* that is enough to transform its inanity into theatricality. Such is the case with the second scene of the first act of Molière's *Amphitryon*:

Mercur: Who goes there?
Sosie: It is I.
Mercur: What I is that? (309)¹⁰

Molière's genius – the dimensions of which become all the clearer when compared to Plautus and Rotrou, his predecessors in the comic treatment of myth – lies in playing the fundamental gesture of subjectivation, the subject's enunciative assertion, against the universalizing nature of language or rather of the pronoun that is supposed to translate this subjectivation. Not only will *Mercur*'s superior power enable him to claim the "property" of the name (and the pronoun) of *Amphitryon*'s valet, but in addition the character's self-definition will serve only to make him revert to a purely universalizing dimension:

Mercur: Tell me, what is your fate?
Sosie: To be a man, and to speak. (310)

The Self, guaranteed by language, proves as impossible to grasp as it was for Pascal, even if – and this is the difference – *Amphitryon*'s valet counters with the painful evidence of his body: "And yet, when I pinch myself and I remember,/ It seems to me that I am myself." The perceptible evidence is no longer enough to ensure certainty: "It *seems* to me that I am myself." An evil spirit, in the form of Mercury, has come to dispossess the subject of his identity, reducing him to his mere function – a contingent function – as valet. Only the dynamics of theatricality make it possible to delineate the space of an identity that has much less to do with an ontological or sentimental assertion – not until Kleist's version, with its emphasis on the *Herz*, the heart, and *Gefühl*, senti-

ment, will such an assertion take shape – than with a highly socialized game.

As these examples show, the conflictedness that an analytic perspective places at the heart of its mobilization of the subject is also at work in the literary subjectivity of an age that can readily be described, with an allusion to Rousseau, as presubjective. What I have tried to sketch here could be extended to many other works – whether they belong to the theatrical, narrative, or lyrical genre. While differences are inevitable, the result of such explorations is not likely to cast doubt upon this conflictedness or tension, in which one can see the motor that is behind both psychic character and literary creation.

Notes

1. The following text has been reworked from a paper given at Royaumont in 1995, on the occasion of a conference organized by Robert Ellrodt on the notion of the person. The analytic perspective was chosen in accordance with the wishes of organizer.
2. André Green, *La Causalité psychique* (Paris, 1995).
3. Marc Fumaroli, *Héros et orateurs* (Geneva, 1990), p. 300.
4. Corneille, *Medea*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Georges Couton (Paris, 1980), vol. 1, p. 535.
5. Corneille, *Rodogune*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Georges Couton (Paris, 1984), vol. 2.
6. Marc Fumaroli, “Au miroir du *Misanthrope*. Le commerce des honnestes gens,” *Comédie française* 131/132 (Sept.-Oct. 1984), p. 44.
7. Paul Bénichou, *Morales du grand siècle* (Paris, 1948).
8. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Philippe Sellier (Paris, 1991), p. 384.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 407.
10. Molière, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Georges Couton (Paris, 1971), vol. 2.