

Human Rights (OHCHR), and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (SRRTF) have mandates that require them to focus more narrowly on the food security of poor states and of vulnerable populations within states. Trade liberalization in agriculture can lead to higher food prices and a decline in the supply of food aid, thereby increasing food insecurity, particularly in the developing world. The negotiations at the WTO are therefore antithetical to the goals of the other four non-trade IOs, which have subsequently inserted themselves into the agricultural negotiations at various points.

The author demonstrates that by intervening, these IOs have reshaped the agenda, changed the discourse, and influenced the outcome of these negotiations to reflect the priorities of the populations they each serve. Although none of these four organizations has advocated an end to trade liberalization at any point, they all have proposed and fought for carveouts that would preserve food security within the overall framework of the negotiations. Among strategies these organizations have used, the case studies highlight FAO's actions in mobilizing states, WFP's naming and shaming states whose success in the negotiations would reduce the availability of food aid, OHCHR's invocation of an alternative legal framework, and the SRRTF's role in tipping the balance in the negotiations by taking sides.

Although IOs are known to take self-directed action with respect to their own members, little is known on how they behave when they engage with other IOs. Margulis points out that the four UN IOs undertook action on their own and often at potential cost to themselves. In behaving this way, these IOs act as "shadow negotiators" behaving much like the actual ones who negotiate on behalf of their states. In highlighting this behavior, the book adds to our understanding of the actors and processes through which global norms are shaped.

Margulis's research is carefully crafted. The four IOs he focuses on vary in the scope of their mandates, the size of their membership, their resources, and their modes of financing. Even though all four organizations focused on the issue of food security during past WTO negotiations, their basic mandates vary widely: whereas the FAO focuses on collecting and sharing information on food and agriculture, the WFP's mandate is to deliver humanitarian assistance, and both OHCHR and SRRTF are mainly human rights organization, with the latter focused on the right to food. This variation suggests that the behavior Margulis observes is evident across a wide range of IOs. Beyond careful case selection, the research is strengthened by its reliance on nearly 90 semistructured elite interviews with key participants, as well as a range of primary documents.

Even as the book makes a clear contribution in describing a type of behavior by IOs that has not received attention in the literature, it raises a few intriguing

questions for future research. First, in each of the cases, personalities—specifically, the heads of the respective IOs—played an important role in the decision to intervene. Would another officeholder have led the IO in a different direction? Would an OHCHR head other than Mary Robinson have led the organization with similar focus and determination? Second, the author argues that these organizations intervened often at great cost to themselves. Other than backlash from some powerful states, the book, however, does not present clear evidence of cost. It is also important to ask in this context whether inaction might also have been costly. For organizations such as the SRRTF and WFP that are tasked with protecting access to food and delivering humanitarian assistance, ignoring the possibility of rising food prices and reduced access to food for poor people would render them irrelevant; in the case of the WFP, it would have posed serious challenges to fulfilling its mandate. It is important to further acknowledge that the organizations' core identity was tied to their decision to intervene in at least some cases. Third, although the author takes care to show that the actions undertaken by these organizations were self-directed, I would have liked to see the role played by developing countries in advocating for themselves. Indeed, most small developing countries lack resources to engage in research and develop strategies to protect their interests; but in the WTO, these countries form coalitions to push their preferred positions. Some discussion of the agentic role of developing countries would not have detracted from the central message of the book. Finally, it is important to at least note that, within these cases, the role of power stands out: the WFP chief was perhaps able to take the unprecedented step of publicly naming and shaming countries that opposed the American food aid regime in part because powerful American interests were as much the beneficiaries of his actions as were poor countries that needed emergency food aid.

**Compound Containment: A Reigning Power's Military-Economic Countermeasures against a Challenging**

**Power.** By Dong Jung Kim. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 200p. \$70.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

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The concept of containment is central to the study of great power politics. IR scholars have traditionally sought to understand how a dominant power can maintain its supremacy when facing a peer challenger: this question has returned to center stage in recent times due to the growing competition between the United States and China. The last two US administrations have deployed a

range of countermeasures against China, a country perceived to be the most ominous challenger to US primacy.

This book by Dong Jung Kim addresses these issues head-on, focusing on this question: When does a reigning great power of the international system supplement the military containment of a challenging power by restricting its economic exchanges with that state? Kim seeks to provide a theoretical foundation for a containment strategy that brings together both military and economic aspects; hence the title of the book, *Compound Containment*. The book also brings together IR perspectives with economics, adopting a historical approach to a select number of cases ranging from the Anglo-German rivalry in the run-up to World War I, US containment of Japan before the attack on Pearl Harbor, US containment of the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War and then during the first half of the 1980s, to US-China policy under Obama (chap. 7).

Kim's work is built in a way that the last case study examined, US-China policy, weaves together the main points raised in previous chapters, making the book an interesting and useful read for those US experts and policy makers seeking to devise ways to restrict China's power projection. Thus, *Compound Containment* makes a valuable contribution not only to the IR literature on great power competition but also to that on US-China relations, providing intellectual ammunition to those advocating in favor of containment.

The debate whether China's power projection should be restricted—and to what extent—is not confined to academia but cuts across party lines. Advocates of containment point to China's accumulation of military power, its growing economic strength, and its increasingly nationalistic and adversarial postures on regional issues—control of Taiwan and the territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas—as reasons for a firm policy of restricting the projection of such power. To those arguing for such a policy of containment, lenient initiatives undertaken with the aim of supporting China's transformation or changes in the domestic arena merely embolden the Chinese Communist Party in its authoritarianism at home, encourage further nationalistic posturing abroad, and, by facilitating the growth of China's trade surplus, provide resources for additional arms development.

A tiny minority continues advocating in favor of engagement, arguing that China spends less as a proportion of GDP on defense than the United States and that China cannot rely on a system of alliances as can Washington, though they recognize that the People's Liberation Army has made some dramatic improvements in recent years. Those who support an engagement policy argue that the United States and its allies should continue to cooperate with China on issues of global concern, such as climate change and energy security.

Since President Trump took office in 2016, the reasons for engagement have thinned, preparing the ground for a more hostile US-China policy that is also based on the assumption that Beijing is pursuing a long-term strategy to displace, if not replace, the US-led global democratic order with a Communist China-led global authoritarian system. To this perceived challenge, Trump responded by unleashing a trade and technology war, seeking to subordinate Beijing to US interests, an approach that has not changed with the arrival of Joe Biden in the White House.

The publication of *Compound Containment* thus could not be timelier. In the book, Dong Jung Kim provides a theoretical foundation for the need to marry military and economic countermeasures if the dominant power of the day wants to retain its supremacy over the challenger: a reigning power makes its military containment of a challenging power “compound” by simultaneously using restrictive economic measures. Kim argues that “economic measures for compound containment try to weaken the material foundation for the challenger's military power and impede translation of latent power into military power” and that these economic restrictions “would be viable options when the reigning power can inflict relative economic losses on the challenging state” (3). Moreover, the ability to impose relative losses is “deeply affected by the availability of alternative economic partners for the two competing states” (137). Reading these lines, one cannot but think about the current US strategy of “friends shoring” or ally shoring—the act of manufacturing and sourcing from countries that are geopolitical allies—and of Washington's efforts to restrict Beijing's access to semiconductors by pressuring European and Asian allies to decrease their investments in China in critical technologies and to limit the export of chips to the Asian giant.

Kim's book seeks to contribute to IR studies by challenging the way great power politics has been studied. He argues that the nexus of security and economy in a reigning power's response to a challenging power cannot be explained by traditional theories that dominate research in international security. *Compound Containment* convincingly shows that IR conventional studies are flawed without a sound understanding of the multilayered aspects of containment strategy in great power politics, making the argument that because economic capacity and military power are intimately linked to one another, countering a challenging power requires addressing both economic and military dimensions. By doing so, the book provides an original and plausible explanation of the failed attempts by some reigning powers in the past to contain the challenging power of their day, as in the case of Britain's inability to successfully contain Wilhelmine Germany—and thus avoid the Great War—as discussed in chapter 3.

Subsequent chapters provide evidence of successful cases where the United States was able to contain the

challenge posed by Japan before World War I and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, the most compelling case study is chapter 7's examination of US-China policy between 2009 and 2016. The author argues that there was a glaring absence of compound containment against the Asian giant under Obama, which allowed Beijing to increase its overall power and become an ominous challenger to US primacy. There is no doubt that this claim will be welcomed by the Trump and Biden administrations that have indeed adopted a series of countermeasures to contain China not only militarily but also in terms of economic and technological exchanges.

Today, "de-risking" the US economy from China has become the guiding principle of Congress and the White House. The Biden administration is making an increasing use of economic tools from sanctions to export controls. These economic measures, coupled with Washington's efforts to restrict China's access to emerging military technologies such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and robotics, seek to contain Chinese power both in the military and economic realms. This containment strategy can be aptly called "compound," to use the term put forward by Kim's book. Unfortunately, the book ignores the growing US-China rivalry that began under the Trump presidency. One hopes that a second and revised edition of Kim's work will redress this shortcoming.

Overall, however, the volume is a welcome addition to contemporary IR debates on great power competition, although its theoretical claims are a bit overstated. *Compound Containment* offers valuable insights to scholars and policy makers on how past hegemony successfully adopted countermeasures to contain the challenging power of the day.

### **The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush.** By Tizoc Victor Chavez.

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*The Diplomatic Presidency* sets out to explain and chronicle how "the [US] presidency, as an institution, resorted to diplomacy at the highest level" (2); that is, How did personal diplomacy, through face-to-face meetings, correspondence, and telephone calls, come to dominate both the role of the US presidency and the conduct of the country's postwar foreign relations? It does this through a variety of historical case studies from the administration of FDR to that of George H. W. Bush and the end of the Cold War. The result is a meticulously researched history of diverse aspects of the personal diplomacy of individual

US presidents, an analysis of why personal diplomacy developed, and its consequences for the presidency and US foreign policy.

To explain the growth of what he calls "presidential diplomacy," Chavez cites the fear of nuclear Armageddon, domestic politics, an eagerness for personal contacts among foreign leaders, and a desire for control. The huge amount of time spent in such meetings led to the American president becoming a counselor to a whole variety of world leaders who all craved, to some extent, the prestige of contact with him and the opportunity to direct American attention to specific policy concerns.

Given the book's historical sweep, it is not possible to detail all the personal diplomatic engagements of all presidents. Instead, Chavez discusses aspects of the meetings and contacts that each administration undertook. The chapter on FDR overlooks Roosevelt's contacts with Stalin and Churchill while examining his relationships, through correspondence and meetings, with leaders from the United Kingdom, Canada, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Americas. Although the details of these meetings illustrate how the demand for personal contact increased with the growth of America's global role, readers are left wondering whether the omission of the great power "conferences" missed a main driver of the source of presidential diplomacy. Thus, the chapter had the flavor of a meal without a main course. Similarly, the chapter on Carter is very good at outlining his efforts to bring about Middle East peace through the Camp David process with Sadat and Begin but neglects his failed efforts to save détente with the Soviet Union at his summit in Vienna in 1979. The choice of focus, one begins to suspect, is driven by a desire to show the positive achievements of personal contact and not always to point out its pitfalls and blind alleys.

The chapter on Truman's and Eisenhower's approaches offers a more balanced account of these administrations. It also details the reluctance of these presidents to meet all the demands for presidential diplomacy. It is here where Chavez's archival work offers insightful gems, such as Eisenhower's letter to Dulles lamenting the "agony of the state dinner" (56); Eisenhower also quoted Khrushchev that Berlin was the "testicles of the west" and that whenever he wanted a reaction, he would "give them a yank" (59). The Kennedy chapter includes JFK's admission that Khrushchev "beat the hell out of me" in their first meeting and that he viewed Adenauer as "a bitter old man" (69). In this chapter, Chavez also illustrates the advantages of using ceremonies and meetings as a form of flattery. For example, the US ambassador to Iran, Julius Holmes, explained, "The Shah should be treated not as an anachronism—which he is—but as a chief of an allied state whom we respect... By such a flattering approach we can help encourage the Shah to be the kind of monarch that he says he is, and he wants to be and that we want and need him to be" (80).