

Schryer's hypothesis would need to explain far more, including the weakening in recent decades of medicine, law, accounting, and most other professions.

Second, how does Schryer think this explanation articulates with what sounds like a more decisive one: the big bourgeoisie's regrouping, from around 1980, its power and its aggressiveness toward the liberal university? As he puts it, "the old class . . . survived and flourished in the decades after Gouldner's prophecy," and, through the New Right and the Republican party, "gutted what was left of the welfare state and launched an all-out attack on the educated liberal morality of the intellectuals" (664). Does Schryer think this episode of class warfare somehow followed or fed on the specialization of professionals? More than on our irritating critiques of white supremacy, the Vietnam War, corporate rule, and so on?

In my view, an economic project of the old class outweighs even that assault. Specifically, its unrelenting dispersal of the Fordist working class easily spread after 1970 into an invasion of professional-managerial class territory that many of us had thought secure. Look at the commercialized university—at its outsourcing, privatization, use of an increasingly contingent labor force, and other practices that sap new class strength and cohesion right smack in the middle of the university. I doubt that the logic of specialization did much to prepare the way for this reorganization of labor and class. I'd be glad to know what Schryer thinks.

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*Reply:*

I would like to thank Donald Lazere and Richard Ohmann for their thoughtful responses to my essay. To reply, first, to Lazere's comments, I agree that Gouldner's *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* does not fit into the tradition of Parsonian, "Harvard" sociology. Gouldner's earlier book, *The Coming Crisis of Sociology*, offered a devastating

critique of Parsons's work that put the final nail in the Parsonian coffin. In particular, Gouldner and other New Left sociologists argued that the Parsonian paradigm excluded social conflict and historical change. At the same time, insofar as Gouldner saw the new class as the universal class of the late twentieth century, he had much in common with consensus sociologists from the 1950s and 1960s. Gouldner's vision of the new class disseminating the culture of critical discourse from its home in the academy does not seem fundamentally different from Parsons's Durkheimian model of professional education. In both, the professional's job is to spread values and attitudes latent in the culture and practice of professionalism to a broader public.

Lazere admires this model of new class agency, which in his terms involves "progressive educators and other intellectuals" engaging in cultural politics to enable "students and other citizens, whatever their class identity, to evolve from restricted to elaborated codes." I am not particularly comfortable with Basil Bernstein's distinction between "restricted" and "elaborated" codes. This distinction came under fire from subsequent sociolinguists like William Labov for underestimating the complexity of lower-class speech and the extent to which professional discourse can itself function as a restricted code. However, I agree that the institutionalization and elaboration of the culture of critical discourse in the university scored significant successes in the United States. It contributed to many of the progressive changes that have taken place since the 1960s—in particular, the still-incomplete project of breaking down cultural prejudices against individuals and groups overlooked by the 1950s liberal consensus. However, this project has been markedly unsuccessful in addressing problems of class inequality and uninterested in eliciting enthusiasm for governmental efforts to regulate the free market. In this sense, humanistic intellectuals would benefit from reappraising the welfare state idealism of an earlier professional era.

Richard Ohmann takes issue with my article from another standpoint, arguing that my

account of disciplinary specialization overlooks or downplays the old class's "unrelenting dispersal of the Fordist working class," which ultimately culminated in the proletarianization of the professional-managerial class itself. I would argue that the old-class project that Ohmann describes was only possible because of internal divisions within the new class, which facilitated the eclipse of social-trustee professionalism. Gouldner's prophecy and others like it hinged on humanistic intellectuals' teaming up with the technical intelligentsia to overthrow the old class. The technical intelligentsia (engineers, managers, practical scientists, etc.) was crucial to this equation, insofar as the old class depended on its expertise. In fact, as Steven Brint

documents in his study of attitudes among different professional groups (*In an Age of Experts*), the two sides of the professional stratum have drawn further apart since the 1960s. Instead of aligning itself against the old class, the technical intelligentsia increasingly embraced free-market principles and conceived of expertise as a commodity for sale to the highest bidder—an attitude against which, as noted above, humanistic intellectuals rarely developed an effective critique. The old class's economic project, in short, was only possible because significant portions of the new class eagerly colluded with it.

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