remember the curious likeness which empirical statements can sometimes bear to 'poetry'. Here again, it is the genius of Wittgenstein that stands behind the development which has taken place. Wittgenstein's stature refuses to allow us to classify him in any philosophical school; but if the earlier positivists could draw their inspiration from some remarks in the *Tractatus*, the newer philosophical analyst speaks in the accents of the *Philosophical Investigations*. ('Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.'—p. 8.) If to be influenced by Wittgenstein's thought is enough to make a philosopher a 'philosophical analyst', then it is difficult to see how philosophy can now ever be anything but 'analytic': for after the impact of a great philosopher, philosophy can never return to where it had been before.

R. A. MARKUS

SENSE WITHOUT MATTER OR DIRECT PERCEPTION. By A. A. Luce (Nelson; 12s. 6d.)

Professor Luce's aim is to state in modern language Berkeley's argument that 'matter is a meaningless concept; he does so with a vigour and clarity that make his book a pleasure to read. He has no difficulty in showing that this is not the paradoxical position it is often taken to be; Berkeley never attacked the common use of the term 'matter', which is equivalent to 'the sensible', but only the technical use which it had acquired in philosophy, of an unperceived 'support' to sense-data. By contrast Berkeley simply affirmed the view of ordinary men, that there is no need to postulate anything beyond the colours and sounds and tastes which are there for our senses to grasp.

Professor Luce has no difficulty in disposing of the argument that this makes the world unreal, a sort of dream; dreams and illusions are clearly distinguishable from ordinary perceptions, and are generally due to reliance on a single sense without confirmation from the others. When we have sensed the redness, roundness, and sweetness of the apple, what more could we require to assure ourselves of its reality? To double the sensible apple with a 'material' apple which cannot be sensed in any way does nothing to make it more real, and is indeed, as Professor Luce says, a philosophical monstrosity.

A second argument for 'matter' is that without it the world would be composed of colours, shapes and so on, but not of sensible things. Once again it is not difficult to show that 'matter' does not help; there is simply no room for it in the perceptual situation. The colours and shapes are there: 'what holds them together? Why *are* they together?

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Colour-touch-taste-smell-sound, why are they together? They are together in one thing. . . . That is the way the apple is; that is the way God made it.' It is at this point that the Berkeleian philosophy, though not paradoxical, though not even incorrect as far as it goes, seems rather too simple. For in talking about 'the apple', 'the thing', 'one', Professor Luce has ceased to talk the language of sense-data; he has begun to use the language of substance and accident, to talk analogically. This chapter on 'Perception of the thing' is an excellent, though unintended, demonstration of the necessity of different language-levels; 'matter' is a contradictory and useless concept precisely because it is thought of at the level of the sensible and yet can never be sensed.

The weakest part of this philosophy is its treatment of causality. 'Matter', it may be agreed, could play no part in energizing the objects of sense; but there is no need to think of causality in nature as merely apparent. It is true that if only mind or spirit is able to inaugurate change, the passivity of nature is immediate evidence for the existence of God; but here if anywhere is a paradox, from the point of view of common sense. An argument from the reality of secondary causality (closely bound up as it is with the notion of substance) is more difficult, but perhaps in the end more plausible.

LAURENCE BRIGHT, O.P.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE. By Jeremiah Newman. (Cork University Press and Mercier Press; 12s. 6d.)

Since the publication of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* there has been a spate of literature dealing with social justice. Not all writers on the subject are of one mind as to what social justice is and Fr Newman sets himself the task of defining the meaning, scope and foundations of this concept. His thesis is that social justice is identical with the thomistic concept of legal or general justice, the virtue which directs the acts of all the other virtues to the common good. Not every thomist will feel confident that Fr Newman understands the subordination of virtues nor that his exposition of the meaning of legal or general justice is entirely St Thomas. Nevertheless it is a thoughtful, if somewhat uneven, book which will well repay the study of any serious moralist or sociologist.

The whole thesis hangs on the relationship between law, justice and the common good. When the common good is defined as the ultimate end of all social life, which is the beatific vision, and law as the divine order of things towards their ultimate end, it is not difficult to conclude that social justice is that virtue which directs all human things to the common good, in the ruler by making and applying law, which is a reflection of the divine order, and in the subject by obeying. All this is

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