

RESEARCH ARTICLE

A brotherhood of nations: Imagining the nation-based order during the Springtime of Nations (1848)

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Abstract

Much like nations, the nation-based order and the domestic and international hierarchies it produces are imagined. Benedict Anderson and scholars in Historical International Relations have frequently approached nationalism and nations as a horizontal division of the world. By contrast, this article explores the imagined hierarchies within and between nations during the 1848 Springtime of Nations. Through an examination of fraternal images found in a variety of textual and visual sources, I investigate how the European national imaginary of 1848 translated into the nation-based order and its corresponding domestic and international hierarchies. The collapse of the 1848 Revolutions brought about a crisis in the national imaginary. The revolutionary fraternity was co-opted in a distorted form by dynastic regimes and opposed by socialists advocating for the international brotherhood of workers. The Springtime of Nations, with its successes and failures, was a pivotal chapter in creating, shaping, legitimising, and challenging the nascent nation-based order.

Keywords: 1848; fraternity/brotherhood; hierarchy; Historical International Relations; imagination/imaginaries/images; nation/nationalism

Introduction

International Relations (IR) and Historical IR scholarship have devoted significantly more attention to the 1648 treaties of Westphalia than to the 1848 revolutions and their nationalist demands. This choice of disciplinary benchmarks reflects the fact that, compared to nation-building, state-building has been heavily debated, including with regards to the historical significance of the Westphalian episode. The study of nationalism and nations in IR is not only scarce but also misleading. While IR historians have contested the myth of an international system characterised by anarchy and pointed to various forms of hierarchy among states, notably the ‘standard of civilisations’, they have often treated nationalism as a horizontal division of the world into nations, seemingly deprived of hierarchies. In contrast, this contribution extends the hierarchical turn to nation-building.

Nations are imagined communities, but how do we imagine the nation-based order? While Benedict Anderson’s work centres on determining national boundaries (who belongs, who does not, and on what grounds), he devotes little attention to analysing hierarchies within and between nations (who is where in domestic and international hierarchies), an essential part of what I call the nation-based order. Turning to the Springtime of Nations, often presented as a golden age of

nationalism,¹ this article argues that the 1848 revolutionaries who, on behalf of the brotherhood of nations, demanded the creation of nation-states in Europe *imagined* hierarchies within and among nations, forming the nation-based order.

Building critically on Anderson's perspective, I examine how images and imaginaries shape political orders, and in particular the nation-based order and its specific domestic and international hierarchies. Despite the success of Anderson's notion of 'imagined community', imagination, imaginaries, and images have seldom been conceptualised in Historical IR or in IR at large. Images serve to render communities, such as 'nations', representable, and thus emotionally resonant. While images have countless significations, their meaning is determined in relation to other images and within the context of a particular imaginary. Conversely, imaginaries are enriched and translated into political orders and hierarchies through images. Investigating the use of fraternal images within nationalist discourses offers a complementary perspective on nation-building.

The Springtime of Nations is an under-examined episode in the trajectory of European nationalism. Following the cancellation of a banquet in Paris, rioters erected barricades, overthrowing the July Monarchy on 24 February.² The revolutionary enthusiasm swiftly spread throughout Europe, challenging the established dynastic order. Nationalism ignited fervent debates in Italian and German states and gained sudden attention within the Austrian Empire. The usual narrative about the 1848 Revolutions usually goes as such: first, the 1848 revolutionaries claimed universal brotherhood and equality, both within and between nations; second, despite the collapse of the Springtime of Nations, resulting in incarceration, exile, and death for many revolutionaries, the nationalist imaginary they promoted would be taken over by dynastic regimes and, through them, would soon become predominant.³ Through a comprehensive examination of a diverse array of sources, including memoirs, manifestos, revolutionary songs, and engravings, this article addresses both points across four sections.

The first section defines the notions of imagination, imaginaries, and images. Subsequently, the article examines how the 1848 nationalists imagined domestic and international hierarchies through the fraternal images that Anderson thought were horizontal. The second section concentrates on domestic hierarchies, illustrating that while national brotherhoods were almost all-encompassing, they relegated women and formerly enslaved people to lower ranks. Shifting to international dynamics, the third section explores how the concept of the 'brotherhood of nations' influenced hierarchies among nation-states, stateless nations, and nationless populations. To a certain extent, this nationalist imaginary was specific to 1848. The collapse of these revolutions precipitated various changes, as showed in the fourth section. The nationalist and revolutionary use of fraternal images was appropriated under an alienated version by some dynastic regimes and opposed by socialists advocating for an international brotherhood of workers.

Conceptualising nationalist imagination, imaginaries, and images

An investigation into nation-building rather than state-building demands an alternative set of theoretical tools and empirical sources. Drawing on Anderson's insights, I explore the concepts of

¹Heinz-Gerhard Haupt affirms that 'exclusive, xenophobic, and aggressive nationalism, which considered the loyalty of the nation-state as the highest value ... did not exist in 1848'; see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, '1848 en Allemagne: une perspective comparative', in Jean-Luc Mayaud (ed.), *1848: Actes du colloque international du cent cinquantième, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23–25 février 1998* (Ivry-sur-Seine: Créaphis, 1998), pp. 463–76 (pp. 471–2). Except when I mention otherwise, all translations are mine.

²After the conservative Bourbon restoration (1815–30), Louis-Philippe, representing the Orléans dynastic branch, was perceived as a more liberal monarch.

³'Most of what the men of 1848 fought for was brought within a quarter of a century, and the men who accomplished it were most of them specific enemies of the 1848 movement'. Priscilla Smith Robertson, *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 412, quoted in Daniel M. Green, 'The revolutions of 1848', in Mlada Bukovansky, Edward Keene, Christian Reus-Smit, and Maja Spanu (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 602–16 (p. 608).

imagination, imaginaries, and images in relation to nationalism and nations and subsequently outline the methods and archival documents employed.

Imagined nationalism and Historical International Relations

Within IR, nation-states are crucial, but they are predominantly seen as *states*, sidelining the *nation* component⁴ – hence the stress on 1648 rather than 1848.⁵ Despite having discussed the Westphalian myth, IR historians have maintained more emphasis on state-building than on nation-building.⁶

The recent focus on the great transformation of the 19th century is an opportunity to further explore the role of nationalism, which emerged alongside liberalism and socialism.⁷ The reflections on nationalism and nations in the Historical IR scholarship are still significantly influenced by the founding fathers of nationalism studies, namely Ernest Gellner, Terence Ranger, Eric Hobsbawm, and, above all, Benedict Anderson.⁸ However, Anderson's heritage is paradoxical: despite the influence of his book, most references are limited to its evocative title or to a restrained set of arguments.⁹

Anderson defines the nation as 'an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.'¹⁰ The nation is *imagined* since all its members cannot know each other and must resort to an 'image of their communion',¹¹ through which 'the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship'.¹² This horizontal community has limits imposed by the existence of other nations, and, in comparison with other approaches, Anderson's project precisely revolves around the determination of these national boundaries. He identifies two historical trajectories. While European nations emerged based on print languages, colonial nations were also imagined through administrative and academic pilgrimages within colonial units. National boundaries are historically produced by the material processes of capitalism and colonisation.

⁴Jaakko Heiskanen, 'Nations and nationalism in International Relations', in Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), pp. 244–52 (p. 244).

⁵On the importance of historical benchmarks, see Barry Buzan and George Lawson, 'Rethinking benchmark dates in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:2 (2014), pp. 437–62. For a presentation of 1848 in IR, see Green, 'The revolutions of 1848'.

⁶Heiskanen, 'Nations and nationalism in International Relations', p. 244. On state-building, see, for instance, Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021); Claire Vergerio, *War, States, and International Order: Alberico Gentili and the Foundational Myth of the Laws of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022); Quentin Bruneau and Claire Vergerio, 'Three histories of the system of states', *International Politics* (2024), pp. 1–24, available at: [<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00566-9>].

⁷Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Quentin Bruneau, 'The long nineteenth century', in Mlada Bukovansky et al. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 454–68.

⁸Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Their modernist perspective has been discussed: see, for instance, Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁹John Breuilly, 'Benedict Anderson's imagined communities: A symposium', *Nations and Nationalism*, 22:4 (2016), pp. 625–59.

¹⁰Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.

¹¹Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.

¹²Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

Anderson's emphasis on boundaries has left many questions unanswered. For instance, the distinction between popular nationalism, which surged in the 1820s and culminated with the Springtime of Nations, and official nationalism, sponsored by dynastic powers in response to revolutionary unrest, appears as a mere shift of actors. Anderson does not analyse the content of national imaginaries, such as the images they use. As a result, he does not study whether different 'styles of nationalism' translate into different images. The articulation between the (supposed) horizontality of popular nationalism and the dynastic verticality behind official nationalism is not addressed either. His perspective is more concerned with national limits than with the nation-based order.

Unlike Anderson, IR historians have been increasingly sensitive to hierarchies and have importantly contributed to the ongoing shift from anarchy to hierarchy within IR.¹³ For instance, studies on the 'standard of civilisation' have underscored the existing hierarchy between civilised and uncivilised states in the establishment of sovereignty and international law.¹⁴ However, most IR historians disconnect nationalism from hierarchies and keep defining it as a mere horizontal division of the world into homogeneous blocs,¹⁵ rather than an order featuring hierarchies within and among nations. In contrast, this article aims to extend the hierarchy turn to nationalism. By focusing on national imaginaries and images, it traces the formation of hierarchies in various archival sources, including revolutionary songs, memoirs, and engravings.

A history of national images

This article investigates the nation-based order and its hierarchies through the study of nationalist images. Despite the success of Anderson's notion of 'imagined community', which has been applied to a diverse array of subnational, transnational, and supranational groups,¹⁶ his approach to imagination, imaginaries, and images has been little explored.¹⁷ In nationalism studies, Anderson's 'imagination' is usually contrasted with the term 'invention' privileged by Gellner, Hobsbawm, and Ranger. While both perspectives point to the artificiality of nations, invention suggests 'an elite project', whereas imagination results from 'a societal process', placing less emphasis on actors.¹⁸ Although significant, this distinction does not fully encapsulate the originality of Anderson's perspective.

Imagination is never properly defined in *Imagined Communities*, but Anderson's usage of the notion aligns with its classical definition as the cognitive faculty that reproduces or produces

¹³On the Historical IR scholarship and hierarchies, see Maja Spanu, 'The hierarchical society: The politics of self-determination and the constitution of new states after 1919', *European Journal of International Relations*, 26:2 (2020), pp. 372–96. On hierarchies in IR, see Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe Zarakol, 'Hierarchies in world politics', *International Organization*, 70:3 (2016), pp. 623–54; Ayşe Zarakol (ed.), *Hierarchies in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

¹⁴Gerrit Gong, *The Standard of Civilization in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Edward Keene, *International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), chapter 6, and the special issue on the 'standard of civilisation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 42:3 (2014).

¹⁵For instance, for Elie Kedourie, 'the doctrine [of nationalism] holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations'; Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), p. 9. Kedourie's definition or a similar one can be found in Heiskanen, 'Nations and nationalism in International Relations', p. 247; James Mayall, 'Nationalism', in Mlada Bukovansky et al. (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 306–19. For an exception, see Keene, *International Political Thought*, chapter 6.

¹⁶Breuilly, 'Benedict Anderson's imagined communities'.

¹⁷In philosophy, Charles Taylor engaged with Anderson; see Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). However, as his perspective differs from mine, I will not discuss it in detail. While the postmodern approach in nationalism studies has paid attention to nationalist discourses, they have not engaged with specific images as defined here. For a general presentation, see Gabriella Elgenius, 'Deconstructing nationalism: The cultural turn and poststructuralism', in Stefan Berger and Eric Storm (eds), *Writing the History of Nationalism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), pp. 155–69.

¹⁸John Breuilly, 'Modernism', in Stefan Berger and Eric Storm (eds), *Writing the History of Nationalism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), pp. 61–82 (p. 76).

mental images.¹⁹ Since nations cannot be directly represented, an image is required for the nation to mirror itself – the nation is, for instance, depicted as a band of brothers. Images offer a sensible content to abstract notions. These inadequate images (strictly speaking, the nation is *not* a band of brothers) are traditionally termed metaphors.²⁰ Although inadequate, these images are not arbitrary, as they reveal an analogy between two things, which informs our perception²¹ – the nation is *something like* a band of brothers.

Images are distinct from concepts. Unlike concepts, images ‘do not admit of verification,’ as Hans Blumenberg remarks, so that ‘the alternative already decided in them one way or the other is *theoretically* undecidable.’²² While the depiction of the nation as a band of brothers cannot be refuted, it shapes the way the nation is imagined. Fraternal images, are thus ‘more carnal than intellectual ... more spontaneous than contemplative,’²³ providing them with ‘powerful emotional charge.’²⁴ Images make the nation imaginable, and thus emotionally resonant. In that sense, images, imaginaries, and affects are intricately interconnected.²⁵ The diffusion of the nationalist imaginary through nationalist images produces and reproduces the ‘affective atmospheres’ of nationalism.²⁶

While nationalism is poor in concepts and systems, it is rich in images. Distinguishing between images and concepts provides a solution to the paradox pointed out by Anderson: ‘unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers.’²⁷ This assertion might hold true if we are looking for concepts but is more disputable concerning images. Nationalists have indeed crafted images with powerful effects. ‘It is this fraternity,’ Anderson notes, ‘that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of peoples, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.’²⁸

Images should not be studied as concepts. When examined purely as concepts, the distinction between ‘brotherhood’ and ‘friendship’ is minimal since both denote a close relationship.²⁹ However, when approached as images, brotherhood and friendship reveal distinct constellations of images. The nation as a brotherhood is related to other images, such as ‘fatherhood,’ ‘motherhood,’ ‘lineage,’ ‘family,’ or ‘blood’ – all images you would not find in relation to ‘friendship.’ While ‘brotherhood’ and ‘friendship’ may be equivalent on a conceptual plane, they are distinct images.

¹⁹Shen-yi Liao and Tamar Gendler, ‘Imagination,’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020), available at: {<https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=imagination>}.

²⁰Aristotle define metaphors as ‘applying to something a noun that properly applies to something else’; see Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1457b.

²¹Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, ed. Harvey Yunis, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1412a.

²²Hans Blumenberg, *Paradigms for a Metaphorology*, trans. Robert Savage (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 13. In response to Koselleck’s *Begriffsgeschichte*, Blumenberg analyses the role of ‘absolute metaphors’ within philosophical discourse, arguing that they are not ‘leftover elements’ but ‘foundational elements of philosophical language’ that elude reduction to concept (Blumenberg, *Paradigms*, p. 3).

²³Mona Ozouf, ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity,’ in Pierre Nora (ed.), *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, vol. 3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 77–114 (p. 86).

²⁴François Furet, Mona Ozouf, and Arthur Goldhammer, *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1989), p. 694.

²⁵Although the connection between imagination and affects has received scant attention, it was central in the philosophy developed by Spinoza, whose thought informed affect studies; see Benedictus de Spinoza, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), *Ethics*, part III, prop. 27, pp. 508–9.

²⁶Angharad Closs Stephens, *National Affects: The Everyday Atmospheres of Being Political* (London: Bloomsbury, 2022), chapter 1.

²⁷Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 5.

²⁸Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

²⁹On friendship and IR, see Simon Koschut and Andrea Oelsner, *Friendship and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Evgeny Roshchin, *Friendship among Nations: History of a Concept* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017).

Much like concepts though, images are a concentration of ‘multiple meanings’³⁰ with semantic continuities and discontinuities across time, space, and ideologies. The meaning of an image cannot be interpreted solely at the word level; rather, it demands discourse-level analysis to examine in what imaginary this image is inserted.³¹ An imaginary, which is never hegemonic or homogeneous,³² is the broader social context which determines the meaning of an image through its definition (what does it mean to be a brother?), uses (who refers to fraternity and why?), extension (who is a brother and who is not?), and articulation with other images. Conversely, an image enriches an imaginary and, through its uses, translates this imaginary into a political order. While an image may be transhistorical (the fraternal image can be found in Greek, Roman, or early Christian discourses), an imaginary is a historical and social product (the nation as a brotherhood originates in Europe in the late 18th century).

Opposite imaginaries can revolve around the same image, as exemplified by the revolutionary ‘nationalist fraternity’ and the reactionary ‘dynastic fraternity’. Both these imaginaries draw on the fabric of early modern European society, wherein fraternal images occupied a central position within dynastic diplomacy, religious and artisanal associations, and masonic groups.³³ Inheriting from masonic thought and Enlightenment principles, the revolutionaries of 1789 invoked fraternity to put an end to feudal hierarchies.³⁴ After the fall of the crown, the nationalist fraternity only recognised vertical relationships with allegorical entities like the Motherland. By contrast, the treaty forged by the reactionary forces of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, the Austrian Empire, and the Russian Empire) after defeating Napoleon lent renew vigour to ‘dynastic fraternity’:

ART. I. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which command *all men to consider each other as brethren*, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain *united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity*, and considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance; and, *regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of families*, they will lead them, *in the same spirit of fraternity* with which they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice.³⁵

Dynastic fraternity articulates two kinship images – the horizontal fraternity between monarchs (not states or peoples) and their vertical relationships as paternal figures to their subjects. This treaty, meticulously crafted by Klemens von Metternich, interweaves fraternity with Christianity and reactivates an erstwhile diplomatic motif.

Even though they both use fraternal images and associated images (the Motherland versus the royal father), nationalist and dynastic fraternities imagine polarised political orders. The nationalist fraternity established the legitimacy of popular Sovereignty in the third article of the Constitution des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen, making the nation the exclusive wellspring of political authority. On the contrary, dynastic fraternity reaffirmed the dynastic sovereignty emblematic of the Old Regime. The victory of the Holy Alliance over Napoleon’s forces in 1815 appeared to signal the wane of the nation-based order. However, during the eruption of the Springtime of Nations, the nationalist fraternity demonstrated resilience, even extending its reach across Europe.

³⁰Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 8 (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972), vol. 1, ‘Einleitung’, XXII.

³¹While Aristotle theorised the metaphor at the word level, several perspectives after him have examined metaphors at discourse level, such as Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor* (London and New York: Routledge, 1975).

³²Christian Reus-Smit, *On Cultural Diversity: International Theory in a World of Difference* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

³³Marcel David, *Fraternité et révolution française, 1789–1799* (Paris: Aubier, 1987); Alexandre de Vitry, *Le droit de choisir ses frères?* (Paris: Gallimard, 2023), chapter 1.

³⁴Brotherhood symbolised equality precisely when the law of primogeniture was abolished. On this point, see Catherine Brice, ‘Métaphore familiale et monarchie constitutionnelle: L’incertaine figure du roi “père” (France et Italie au XIXe siècle)’, in Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice, and Gilles Montègre (eds), *Fraternité: Pour une histoire du concept* (Grenoble: CRIHIPA, 2012), pp. 157–8.

³⁵Walter Alison Philipps, *Holy Alliance Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th edn, vol. 13, ed. Horace Everett Hooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), p. 621.

While almost ignored by the IR scholarship, revolutions are exceptionally fecund episodes.³⁶ The 1848 Revolutions developed, enriched, and diffused political imaginaries. Even though ‘most of these rebellions failed, they were not without effect ... For both absolutist regimes and their bourgeois challengers, nationalism proved to be a powerful vehicle of mobilization’³⁷ The nationalist imaginary found echoes across Europe. Investigating the uses of fraternal images in this period provides us with valuable insights into the nascent nation-based order and its domestic and international hierarchies.

A methodological approach to images and imaginaries

Images and imaginaries are studied through discourse analysis.³⁸ This first requires identifying relevant terms through which the image is conveyed – ‘brother’, ‘brotherhood’, ‘fraternity’, etc. In continuity with Anderson’s practice, there is no limit to the range of sources. Shifting from states to nations introduces IR historians to a great variety of voices and materials, beyond the legal and diplomatic sources they usually deal with.³⁹

Discourse analysis is enriched by including as many variations of an image as possible.⁴⁰ While archival studies, especially from the late modern period, are inherently incomplete, the selection of materials aims to reflect the semantic diversity of fraternal images across various social groups and genres. This article consequently engages with diverse sources, ranging from newspapers to songs and engravings. Although some of these documents are written by distinguished authors, like Karl Marx, I aimed to listen to more popular voices whenever possible. For instance, the newspaper, *Le Républicain lyrique*, published from June 1848 to July 1849, had a significant impact, with no fewer than 10,000 copies printed.⁴¹ These songs, some of which were well known at the time, are thus stimulating sources to explore popular imaginaries. The broadening of archival sources is not intended to exclude official actors or canonical materials, but rather to complement and juxtapose them with alternative discourses.

Like all methods, the historical study of images and imaginaries suffers from limits, among which I will name two. First, as historians know all too well, archival sources provide us with an easier access to the imaginaries of the powerful. Much less is known about other parts of the population. In 1848, rural revolts responded to urban riots.⁴² While regimes addressed both insurrections as part of the same revolutionary wave,⁴³ historians debate on the extent to which nationalism had spread to rural areas.⁴⁴ Did the peasants who were still the majority of European populations

³⁶William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). On revolutions in IR, see Fred Halliday, ‘“The sixth great power”: On the study of revolution and International Relations’, *Review of International Studies*, 16:3 (1990), pp. 207–21; Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

³⁷Buzan and Lawson, *The Global Transformation*, p. 116.

³⁸See Iver B. Neumann, ‘Discourse analysis’, in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 61–77; Kevin C. Dunn, ‘Historical representations’, in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 78–92.

³⁹See Edward Keene, ‘International intellectual history and IR: Contexts, canons and mediocrities’, *International Relations*, 31 (2017), pp. 341–56; Tomas Wallenius, ‘The case for a history of global legal practices’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 25 (2017), pp. 108–30; Jeppe Mulich, ‘International Relations in the archive: Uses of sources and historiography’, in Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez, and Halvard Leira (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), pp. 489–502; Quentin Bruneau, ‘Converging paths: Bounded rationality, practice theory and the study of change in Historical International Relations’, *International Theory*, 14:1 (2022), pp. 88–114.

⁴⁰Neumann, ‘Discourse analysis’, p. 62.

⁴¹While lexicometric tools, such as TXM, are helpful for identifying relevant passages within large corpora, I have read the sources as thoroughly as possible to familiarise myself with the documents.

⁴²Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 124.

⁴³Wolfram Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848–49* (New York: Macmillan, 1998), p. 59.

⁴⁴See Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848–49*, p. 59; Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 126; Mike Rapport, *1848: Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), pp. 88–9; Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 213.

imagine urban revolutionaries as their brothers? Given the difficulties of access to testimonies written by these populations and the wide diversity of local situations, one must humbly admit the inherent difficulty in responding.

Secondly, ensuring that a visual representation depicts the nation as a band of *brothers* – and not, say, as a band of *friends* – most often supposes a cross-reference with a legend or a text codifying what is represented as fraternal.⁴⁵ Textual sources also present us with diverse practices perceived ‘fraternal’ by contemporaries, such as public oaths or banquets. Rather paradoxically, the analysis of images and imaginaries is dependent on textual sources.⁴⁶

Nations as brotherhoods

National brotherhoods were imagined encompassing everyone, except for dynastic leaders. However, not everyone was included at the same rank. Fraternal images, which for Anderson were inherently horizontal, were employed to establish hierarchies within nations, disadvantaging, for example, women and formerly enslaved people.

The diffusion of the nationalist imaginary through fraternal images

The Springtime of Nations was a turning point in the history of European nationalism. The situation was variable: nationalism was already firmly established and official in France, well-known but rebellious for ‘Italian’ and ‘German’ populations, and barely nascent in Eastern Europe. For the last, nationalism before 1848 was little more than, in Jonathan Sperber’s words, ‘the experience of marching behind the tricolor flag, of large-scale collective singing (national anthems, naturally), of joining in a large public meeting or a small conspiratorial circle.’⁴⁷ The revolutionary events would precisely furnish opportunities for the masses to do so, leading to the formation of imagined communities.⁴⁸

While acknowledging the existence of clandestine societies prior to the revolutions, the revolutionary process favoured political involvement that resulted in the creations of clubs (70,000 in Paris and between 1 and 1.5 million in the German states, equivalent to 10–15 per cent of the male population),⁴⁹ cooperatives (15,000 members in the German workers’ Fraternalisation),⁵⁰ and newspapers (from 19 to 306 newspapers in 1848 in the Austrian Empire).⁵¹ While nationalism did not reach everyone in 1848, an unprecedented multitude imagined themselves as members of national communities.

The 1789 Revolution served as both a model and a counterpoint for the 1848 revolutionaries. Amid concerns of replicating the Terror, they embraced the nationalist imaginary forged by the 1789 revolutionaries. The fraternal images at the core of the French discourses in 1789 resonated internationally half a century later (Figure 1). Across Europe, nationalist rhetoric spoke the language of fraternity, making the 1848 Revolutions a ‘springtime of fraternity’.⁵² While this notion was barely used outside of France prior to 1848, fraternity became a central political tenet afterwards.

⁴⁵ On iconographic methods, see Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), chapter 2.

⁴⁶ Lene Hansen, ‘Theorizing the image for Security Studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad cartoon crisis,’ *European Journal of International Relations*, 17:1 (2011), pp. 51–74 (pp. 54–5).

⁴⁷ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 94.

⁴⁸ ‘I would argue that in many areas this was virtually constructed, and certainly greatly altered, during the revolution. Many people “learnt” that they were Czechs or Germans in Bohemia and Moravia, or that they were Magyars and Romanians in Transylvania.’ See John Breuilly, ‘1848: Connected or comparable revolutions?’, in Axel Körner (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution?* (New York: Springer, 2000), pp. 31–49 (p. 45).

⁴⁹ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, pp. 158, 163.

⁵⁰ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 179.

⁵¹ Hans J. Hahn, *The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), p. 66.

⁵² Marcel David, *Le printemps de la fraternité: genèse et vicissitudes, 1830–1851* (Paris: Aubier, 1992).




Figure 1. Charts on the use of *Brüderlichkeit* (fraternity) in German and Austrian historical archives.^a

^aFigures 1 and 7 have been produced using Gallicagram, an online program created by Benjamin Azoulay and Benoît de Courson, providing multiple databases available for lexicometric analyses.

A dissident nationalist fraternity

Nations encompassed all, except for dynasts. The 1848 revolutionaries' nationalist imaginary was inseparable from the experience of the barricades. While nationalist circles had hitherto been restricted to an elite in most European countries, the rioters were socially diverse⁵³ and served as a metonym for the nation. Despite all their differences, when the revolutionaries first gathered, 'the euphoria of unanimity was intoxicating.'⁵⁴ Contemporary witnesses and iconography highlighted the collaboration among petit bourgeois, shop-owners, and workers (Figure 2),⁵⁵ a phenomenon later confirmed by historians.⁵⁶

Whenever the uprisings succeeded, revolutionaries employed fraternal images to describe their relationship to each other.⁵⁷ For instance, Marie d'Agoult described the festivities during the night of 23 February: 'In the effusion of this common celebration, bourgeois and proletarians were holding hands, frock coats and overalls were familiarly getting closer. A feeling of joyful fraternity was pouring out of all the hearts.'⁵⁸ Fraternal banquets, a common practice in the French liberal repertoire by 1848, celebrated the national brotherhood, as illustrated by the French city of Meaux in June 1848.⁵⁹ In various German states, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews praised the united front they presented against their respective regimes.⁶⁰ In France, French priests, once ferocious opponents of the

⁵³Beyond national demands, rioters also asked for measures against inflation and the end of feudal rights.

⁵⁴Christopher Clark, *Revolutionary Spring: Fighting for a New World 1848–49* (London: Penguin Random House, 2023), p. 3.

⁵⁵Alain Pauquet, 'Les représentations de la barricade dans l'iconographie de 1830 à 1848', in Alain Corbin and Jean-Marie Mayeur (eds), *La barricade* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1997), pp. 97–122 (p. 104).

⁵⁶In France, see Mark Traugott, 'The crowd in the French Revolution of February, 1848', *The American Historical Review*, 93:3 (1988), pp. 638–52. In German states, see Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848–49*, p. 65.

⁵⁷James Jasper calls 'reciprocal emotions' the feelings experienced by protesters towards each other. Reciprocal emotions contribute to group identity and 'the pleasures of the protests'; see James Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 187. On the emotional impact of collective practices, see Randall Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁵⁸Daniel Stern [Marie d'Agoult], *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848* (Paris: Balland, 1985), p. 75, quoted in David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 183, but wrongly attributed to Charles de Rémusat (I thank Guillaume Lancereau for pointing that out).

⁵⁹Vincent Robert, *Le temps des banquets: politique et symbolique d'une génération (1818–1848)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2010), p. 400.

⁶⁰Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 123.



Figure 2. Defenders of the barricade.^a

^a*Illustrated London News*, vol. XII, 11 March 1848, p. 159. Source: Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848: l'Europe des images*, vol. 2, *Le printemps des peuples* (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), p. 66.

French Revolution and its legacy, offered their blessings for the planting of liberty trees, formerly deemed heretical.⁶¹ Fraternal images, present in both Christian and revolutionary imaginaries, were amalgamated in the 'Christ of the Barricades'⁶² (see the right-hand corner of [Figure 3](#)).

The boundaries of national communities did not always align with linguistic and ethnic divisions. In the Austrian Empire, the term 'nation' could still diversely refer to the nobility, the ethnic components of the empire, or all its subjects.⁶³ In Prague, Friedrich Sacher's verses exemplify the multiethnic and multilingual brotherhood:

Cheer brothers, make the jubilation ring
 Delighted in all the Bohemian lands
 Since Czechs and Germans wave together peacefully
 Hand in hand in their common fatherland.⁶⁴

Beyond ethnic and ideological divides, everyone could be included in national brotherhoods.

The nationalist fraternity was not, in Karl Marx's phrasing, an 'imaginary abolition of class relations'⁶⁵ but rather an abolition of class *conflicts*. The diverse social, ideological, and ethnic identities were not dissolved in the national community, as the emphasis in visual and textual

⁶¹ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 123.

⁶² Frank Paul Bowman, *Le Christ des barricades: 1789–1848* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987).

⁶³ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, pp. 85–6.

⁶⁴ Heiner Timmermann, *1848 Revolution in Europa* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), p. 186.

⁶⁵ Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France* (London: The Electric Book Company, 2001), p. 48.



Figure 3. The Christ of the Barricades calling for fraternity.⁶⁵

⁶⁵Anonymous, ed. Juliani, lithography by Langelot et Cie (Paris, 1848). Source: Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848: l'Europe des images*, vol. 1, *Une république nouvelle* (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), p. 107.

representations on social markers shows, but integrated into it. Despite the perceived differences among community members, they were all considered part of the nation, with few exceptions.

Dynasts were excluded from the nation. Whereas the insurgents lauded allegorical verticality, as in the German song proclaiming 'Germany, great fatherland, fraternity embraces you',⁶⁶ they refused dynastic authority. Nationalism was more than just 'popular', as Anderson termed it; it was distinctively dissident. Nationalist symbols were subversive. This was particularly evident for nations under foreign domination, like the Irish, Polish, and Italians, but even the black-red-gold flag symbolising a unified Germany carried rebellious connotations in many German states.⁶⁷ In

⁶⁶'Deutschland was im März errungen,' anonymous, quoted in Ulrich Otto, *Die historisch-politischen Lieder und Karikaturen des Vormärz und der Revolution von 1848/1849* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1982), p. 347.

⁶⁷The black-red-gold is possibly a reference to both the Holy Roman Empire and the Lützow Free Corps, a volunteer unit of the Prussian army fighting the Napoleonic occupation.

countries like France, in which nationalism was institutionalised, the insurgents employed alternative national symbols. Bringing back the spirit of the French Revolution, the 1848 revolutionaries sang ‘La Marseillaise’, the official national anthem since 1830, albeit informally replaced by ‘La Parisienne’. The tricolours, first embraced by France during the 1789 Revolution and subsequently by its ‘sister republics’ in the 1790s, proliferated throughout Europe in 1848, embodied in flags or cockades.⁶⁸

Dynasts were accused of having damaged the national brotherhood. Ludwig Pfau’s song, ‘Zum 18. März’, laments this fratricide orchestrated by the crowns:

Pain! People, from your own blood
Your hands are red;
The brother hit the brother,
To follow a Prince’s order.⁶⁹

However, when victorious the insurgents extended their brotherhood to the agents of repression.⁷⁰ Prussian workers sent a petition to ask for forgiveness on behalf of yesterday’s opponents: ‘The grave which has closed above our beloved heroes has for ever buried all hatred and fraternal strife. We demand that a brotherly hand of forgiveness should also be extended to our army.’⁷¹ While this fraternal appeal was dryly refused by the soldiers in Prussia, a similar demand in France led to common funerals and ceremonies for both revolutionaries and troops.⁷² Yesterday’s enemies were forgiven and embraced in the national brotherhoods.

National communities are imagined as limited. While linguistic boundaries were already structuring in 1848, national limits were mostly delineated by the barricades. On one side, a national brotherhood encompassing a great diversity of people; on the other, dynasts.

Hierarchies within brotherhoods

Pace Anderson, national brotherhoods, although largely encompassing, were not horizontal. Nationalist violence is usually conceived through the exclusion of individuals and groups from the nation.⁷³ However, nationalism is not mere *othering*; it is also *ordering*. Fraternal images established hierarchies within the nation. This is particularly evident for women and formerly enslaved people.

First, fraternity suggests a masculine community.⁷⁴ Were women brothers too? Although women were forbidden from participating in clubs before 1848, except in France, they played an active role in revolutionary endeavours (Figure 4).⁷⁵ Some invoked fraternity to advance women’s social and political status.⁷⁶ Addressing the French provisional government, the Comité des femmes stated: ‘Women ... ask, on behalf of fraternity, to make liberty and equality a truth for them as well as for their brothers.’⁷⁷ The revolutionary representations were divided about the

⁶⁸In the German territories, see Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz: Illustrated with Portraits and Original Drawings* (New York: Doubleday, 1917), chapter 5. In the Austrian Empire, see Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, pp. 181–3.

⁶⁹Ludwig Pfau, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart: Bonz, 1889), pp. 347–8.

⁷⁰For Hungary, see Paul Bouteiller, *La Révolution française de 1848 vue par les Hongrois* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), p. 75.

⁷¹Veit Valentin, *1848: Chapters of German History* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), p. 215.

⁷²Hahn, *The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe*, p. 95.

⁷³Citizenship studies have paid more attention to domestic hierarchies. On citizenship and IR, see Peter Nyers, ‘Citizenship and an international political sociology’, in Xavier Guillaume and Pinar Bilgin (eds), *Routledge Handbook of International Political Sociology* (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 115–24.

⁷⁴Koen Sloomaeckers, ‘Nationalism as competing masculinities: Homophobia as a technology of othering for hetero- and homonationalism’, *Theory and Society*, 48:2 (2019), pp. 239–65 (p. 243).

⁷⁵Gabriella Hauch, ‘Did women have a revolution? Gender battles in the European Revolution of 1848/49’, in Axel Körner (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution?* (New York: Springer, 2000), pp. 64–81 (p. 73).

⁷⁶The term ‘sorority’ only gained popularity in the twentieth century.

⁷⁷Quentin Deluermoz, *Le crépuscule des révolutions, 1848–1871* (Paris: Seuil, 2013), p. 35.



Figure 4. A female rioter in Prague (left);^a nuns taking care of German revolutionaries (right).^b

^a'Der Barrikadenkampf in Prag' by Anton Ziegler, 1848, Online Sammlung, Wien Museum. ^bAnonymous (Germany). Source: Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848: l'Europe des images*, vol. 2, *Le printemps des peuples* (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), p. 163.

involvement of women in revolutions. In consonance with the Madonna–whore complex, women were either exalted as heroines and icons of the allegorical Motherland or ostracised and mocked as Furies if they diverged from gender norms, including by participating in battles (see Figure 5).

Moreover, the memory of female revolutionaries was frequently erased from historical accounts,⁷⁸ and successful revolutions scarcely ameliorated their situations. For instance, the so-called universal suffrage in France was confined to male voters. The nationalist fraternity, which ignored women, contributed to their exclusion, not from the nation but from the civic community.⁷⁹ Women were imagined community members but as mothers, not as equal sisters.

Secondly, in spite of sporadic episodes of antisemitism in France and German states during the Springtime of Nations,⁸⁰ ethnic minorities generally found inclusion within national brotherhoods. Additionally, the principle of fraternity was employed in the calls for abolition. Although abolished in 1794 under the banner of 'universal fraternity',⁸¹ slavery had indeed been reinstated by the Napoleonic regime in 1802. Already before 1848, about a thousand Parisian workers sent a petition to Parliament in 1844: 'Obeying to the great principle of Human fraternity, we come here to advocate for our unfortunate brothers, the slaves....'⁸² This appeal was succeeded by a second one from Lyon in 1847. The February revolution ignited renewed ardour for the matter, culminating in abolition on 2 April. Formerly enslaved people were granted citizenship and tasked with their national service, emblematic of their 'fraternal assimilation to the motherland'.⁸³ Black slaves were brothers too.

⁷⁸Hauch, 'Did women have a revolution?'

⁷⁹On nationalism and masculinity, see George L. Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁸⁰Rapport, 1848: *Year of Revolution*, p. 173.

⁸¹David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 30.

⁸²David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 211.

⁸³*Le Moniteur universel*, 3 May 1848, quoted in David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 214.



Figure 5. ‘Toast raised to the emancipation of women by women already furiously emancipated’, in *The Prospective Divorcees* by Honoré Daumier.^a

^a*Le Charivari*, 12 October 1848. Source: Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848: l’Europe des images*, vol. 1, *Une république nouvelle* (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), p. 99.

However, fraternal images were dual, as they contributed to the construction of racial hierarchy in colonial spaces. In March 1848, Victor Schoelcher was entrusted with a delicate task: to ‘wait and prepare [the abolition of slavery in colonies] in an attitude of calm and fraternal concord’.⁸⁴ Indeed, the announcement of the abolition of slavery posed a risk of igniting violence in colonial spaces where the social climate was already tense. Enslavers were not only worried about losing their economical labour force but also dreaded insurrections. Sarda Garriga was thus sent by the Republic to La Réunion to handle this situation. Following the instructions he had been

⁸⁴*Moniteur universel*, 14 March 1848, quoted in Yves Perotin, André Scherer, Urbain Lartin, and Suzy Bachaud, ‘Notes historiques sur des sujets divers, t. 2’, N/A, 210–11, Archives départementales de La Réunion.

given, he consented to compensate enslavers for their financial losses and to delay the proclamation of abolition until after the sugar-cane harvest in December.⁸⁵ After these negotiations, Garriga claimed:

Yes, an appeal to all of you, Colonists already free and Colonists who will soon be, for God has created you as brothers and I merge you in my affection ... If those whom a sad classification had made masters must bring a spirit of fraternity and benevolence into their dealings with their former servants ... do not forget, you brothers who are about to be the new chosen of the city, that you have a great debt to pay to this society into which you are about to enter ... [I]f you remain at work having become free, I will love you; France will protect you. If you desert it, I will withdraw my affection; France will abandon you like disobedient children.

By contrast to the events in Martinique,⁸⁶ the fears of Reunionese enslavers were unfounded, as Garriga's speech caused minimal unrest. On 20 December, Garriga claimed the abolition of slavery and affirmed that enslavers and enslaved people were 'all equal before the law, [and] only [had] brothers around [them]'. Promptly, Garriga reiterated his counsel: 'you call me your father; and I love you like my children; you will listen to my advice: be eternally grateful to the French Republic that freed you.'⁸⁷ However, many enslaved people, apparently not so grateful towards their former enslavers, left the fields. Garriga issued a stern admonition on 17 February 1849: 'I am not pleased with you ... Children of the Motherland, I have come to grant you freedom in her name ... in her name, I will punish those disturb the order by abandoning work.'⁸⁸ In parallel, landowners had already turned to indentured labour (*engagisme*) and favoured immigration from Madagascar and India to replace their lost workforce.

Throughout his speeches, Garriga extensively employed fraternal images, evoking the national brotherhood. However, the specific use of fraternal images in colonial spaces reveals the racial organisation of the nation. The Motherland, nurturing and affectionate in Europe, proved to be a wicked mother to her racialised children. Furthermore, the representatives of the Republic, like Garriga, presented themselves as fatherly figures of authority. Fraternal images included the new citizens within the nation but portrayed them as perpetual minors, maintaining domestic hierarchies. All brothers were equal, but some more than others.

Fraternal images did not exclude women and formerly enslaved people from the nation and, on the contrary, integrated them within the community – at a lower rank. Beyond exclusion, nationalism resulted in domestic hierarchies.

The brotherhood of nations

The 1848 revolutionaries had an acute awareness of the international dimension of their struggle. While some aspired to a borderless world, many championed a brotherhood of nations representing a nationalist interpretation of internationalism. However, this brotherhood of nations established a hierarchy between nation-states, stateless nations, and nationless populations.

Socialist imaginaries: Brothers without borders

To begin with a caveat: even though the nationalist imaginary had an extraordinary impact, the nation-based order was not the only approach to the international. During the 1848 Revolutions, some radical republicans and socialists regarded nationalism sceptically.

⁸⁵Perotin et al., 'Notes historiques', p. 199.

⁸⁶Édouard Delépine, *Dix semaines qui ébranlèrent la Martinique: 25 mars–4 juin 1848* (Paris: Servédit Maisonneuve & Larose, 1999).

⁸⁷Jean-Claude Caron (ed.), *1848: Le printemps des peuples* (Paris: Société éditrice du Monde, 2012), pp. 46–7.

⁸⁸Perotin et al., 'Notes historiques', p. 211.

The so-called utopian socialists employed fraternal images to depict their internationalist world. In the first half of the century, Henri de Saint-Simon, a prominent French socialist, believed that a fraternal and peaceful unification of all peoples and nations would progressively arise from the process of civilisation.⁸⁹ The nationalist fraternity was transitory and would soon be overcome by international fraternity. Other socialists, including Étienne Cabet, who sought to establish a Christian variant of communism, maintained that fraternity was a fundamental principle of socialism.⁹⁰

Socialists, who gained popularity in 1848, remained a minority. However, some popular songs, called *goguettes*, echoed their perspectives. Victor Rabineau, from an anti-militarist stance, critiqued in ‘La gloire militaire’ (‘Military glory’) the excess of the nationalist fraternity:

The love for the fatherland
Will soon become too narrow.
Fraternity, your salutary flag,
Must melt the colours of the old flags.
Military glory should not be praised anymore,
All the laurels are tear-soaked.⁹¹

Certain singers transformed this pacifism into an anti-nationalist version of internationalism. Jules Chalory presented a new Marseillaise titled ‘La Marseillaise européenne et universelle’ (‘The European and universal Marseillaise’), which tempered the martial tone of the original song:

No more soldiers, no more borders,
People, no more bloody battles;
No more cries in our cottages,
No, no more kings, no more states, (*bis*)
In the field that your arm fertilises,
People, in which blood was poured,
Say it can still be treaded upon,
To cement world peace
People of nations, let’s walk, found our rights,
Drink, drink, fraternise,
And chase all the kings.⁹²

While using the melody of the ‘Marseillaise’ was common, employing this renowned war anthem to endorse the complete eradication of war, borders, and states carried a hint of audacity. Blood, once a nationalist rallying cry for warfare, turned into the binding force for international harmony. Via fraternal images, these radical revolutionaries imagined a new international order transcending nations and states.

The nationalist brotherhood of nations

In 1848, socialist imaginaries had less influence than their nationalist counterparts. Nationalists employed fraternal images to refer to foreign revolutionaries too. As word of the Parisian riots

⁸⁹Körner, ‘Ideas and Memories of 1848 in France: Nationalism, République Universelle and Internationalisme in the Goguette between 1848 and 1890’, in Axel Körner (ed.), *1848: A European Revolution?* (New York: Springer, 2000), pp. 85–105 (p. 93). On Saint Simon and IR, see Jan Eijking, ‘A “priesthood of knowledge”: The international thought of Henri de Saint-Simon’, *International Studies Quarterly* (2021), available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab089>.

⁹⁰Caron (ed.), *1848: Le printemps des peuples*, pp. 83–5.

⁹¹*La voix du peuple, ou, Les républicaines de 1848: Recueil des chants populaires, démocratiques et sociaux publiés depuis la révolution de février* (Paris: Librairie channonnière de Durand, 1848), p. 110.

⁹²Chalory, ‘La Marseillaise européenne et universelle (Air de la Marseillaise)’, 1848, B.N., cote 7185 (262).

disseminated, impassioned clubs and circles, some pre-dating the revolution and others emerging in its aftermath, sent fraternal letters to the provisional government:

Brothers! Coimbra students could not stay silent while witnessing your achievements ... your love for freedom and your devotion to the cause of the peoples. You have unchained France, you have prepared for the Italian and German unities, emancipated Austria, helped the Polish revolution, accelerated the fall of absolutism in Europe ... and we, from afar, we wish for the triumph of the holy cause that you defended, which is ours too, the cause of the Peninsula, of the nations, of the whole of humanity ... The Holy Alliance is dead and in our hearts the love for freedom grows stronger everyday ... Viva the Peninsula! Viva the freedom of all peoples! Viva our brothers in Paris, Italy, Berlin, and Vienna!⁹³

Immigrants in Paris formed impromptu delegations to felicitate the provisional government. Hungarians marched proudly alongside Parisians, singing both the 'Szozat' and the 'Marseillaise'.⁹⁴

Many 1848 revolutionaries imagined the nation-based order via Giuseppe Mazzini's image of 'brotherhood of nations'.⁹⁵ In *La santa alleanza dei popoli*, published in 1849, Mazzini asserted that 'nations are the individuals of humanity in the same way citizens are the individuals of the nation', so that the nation is 'an intermediary term between humanity and the individual'.⁹⁶ Nations were thus established as essential and natural units. This nationalist view translated into action through the Mazzinian Young Europe (Giovine Europa) groups, which collaborated but were structured around national foundations.⁹⁷ While nationalism and internationalism are often perceived as opposing forces, the brotherhood of nations embodied a nationalist form of internationalism.

Nations arose through international emulation, and nationalist repertoires traversed borders.⁹⁸ European nationalists imitated each other to achieve a widely recognised ideal and gain acknowledgement from other nations. Foreign revolutionaries embraced certain symbols linked to French nationalism, like Phrygian caps⁹⁹ and 'the Marseillaise', particularly in German states,¹⁰⁰ while others were tailored to local circumstances. Tricolour flags were prevalent among European nationalists, fostering aesthetic cohesion (Figure 6). These paralleled nationalist symbols illustrated the brotherhood of nations. In Vienna, Austrian French, Hungarian, Polish, Croat, Slovene, and Serb students fraternised by exchanging flags.¹⁰¹

The hierarchy of the brotherhood of nations

The brotherhood of nations implied aiding stateless nations. Nationalists endorsed foreign national aspirations prior to 1848, as seen during the Greek War of Independence (1821–9). This international empathy grew through the multitude of exiles traversing Europe in the 19th century,

⁹³Published on 18 April 1848, quoted by Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, 'Le Portugal et la Révolution de 1848', in Jean-Luc Mayaud (ed.), *1848: Actes du colloque international du cent-cinquantième, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23–25 février 1998* (Ivry-sur-Seine: Créaphis, 1998), pp. 527–48 (p. 531).

⁹⁴Bouteiller, *La Révolution française de 1848 vue par les Hongrois*, pp. 120–5.

⁹⁵Giuseppe Mazzini, *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 92. For an analysis of Mazzini's thought, see Martin Wight, *Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); for a historical perspective, see Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789–1848* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), chapter 7.

⁹⁶Giuseppe Mazzini, *Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe Mazzini*, XXXIX, Imola, 214, quoted in Ferdinand Göhde, 'La fraternité d'armes des peuples', in Catherine Brice (ed.), *Frères de sang, frères d'armes, frères ennemis: la fraternité en Italie (1820–1924)* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2017), pp. 129–47 (p. 133).

⁹⁷Göhde, 'La fraternité d'armes des peuples', pp. 132–3.

⁹⁸Anne-Marie Thiesse, *The Creation of National Identities: Europe, 18th–20th Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2022).

⁹⁹Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 80.

¹⁰⁰Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1917), chapter 5, n.p.

¹⁰¹Priscilla Smith Robertson, *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 221–2.




Figure 6. Union of the peoples.^a

^aLithography by Fasoli and Ohlman (Strasbourg). Source: Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848: l'Europe des images*, vol. 2, *Le printemps des peuples* (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), p. 63.

known as the ‘century of exiles.’¹⁰² After the failure of the November uprisings in 1830, thousands of Poles, especially from political and cultural elites, were compelled to emigrate. Polish immigrants held sway in the French capital, forging a distinctive cultural bond between both nations. Poets such as Alfred de Vigny and Victor Hugo, alongside popular singers, invoked the Polish tragedy and called for a French expedition.¹⁰³ Across Europe, exiles championed the cause of nations.

¹⁰²Sylvie Aprile, *Le siècle des exilés: bannis et proscrits de 1789 à la Commune* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2010).

¹⁰³Tabaki-Iona, ‘Chants de liberté et de solidarité, pour la Grèce et la Pologne’, *Mots: les langues du politique*, 70:3 (2022), pp. 45–62 (pp. 51–6).

The Springtime of Nations ignited fresh aspirations among these exiles. Songs glorifying fraternal sentiments towards ‘Sister Poland’, as it was termed, proliferated, including Louvet’s ‘Le Citoyen Mayeux en 1848; (‘The Citizen Mayeux in 1848’):

Brothers, so far away,
Your fate
Will be prompt and assured
When so many thrones fall
Close ranks.
Great peoples,
Overthrow the tyrants.¹⁰⁴

In March, an anonymous poster warned: ‘Don’t forget Poland! It is not just a nationality, it is a principle, the principle of fraternity, of national independence, that you just proclaimed and that you have to defend now.’¹⁰⁵

Outside France, numerous Italians, also under Austrian Empire occupation, resonated with the shared destiny of the Polish, evident in ‘Fratelli d’Italia’ (‘Brothers of Italy’), written in 1847 and gaining popularity amid the protests:

The Eagle of Austria has already lost its plumes.
The Italian blood, the Polish blood
It drank with the Cossack, but it burned its heart.

Remarkably, sympathy for Poland was also found in the countries that annexed it. The Polish delegation, received by the Austrian emperor for a dialogue, garnered fervent welcome from the Viennese populace.¹⁰⁶ In Berlin, Polish nationalist Ludwik Mieroslawski’s release from prison prompted a crowd to jubilantly hail Poland.¹⁰⁷ In the name of fraternity, the 1848 revolutionaries fought to establish their own nation-states and to support foreign efforts in forming theirs.

Nevertheless, the brotherhood of nations between nation-states and stateless nations led to a nuanced hierarchy. Charles Colmance’s song, ‘Appel à tous les peuples’ (‘Call to All the Peoples’), extolled the defence of martyred nations:

Hungarians, Saxons, Italians, to arms!
Peoples, let’s march under the same banner,
Join the French, your elder [brothers]
Beautiful Poland, forever dear to our hearts.¹⁰⁸

While all nations marched together towards a shared purpose, the French, after 1789, 1830, and February 1848, asserted their primogeniture. All nations held equal legitimacy for statehood but did not share an equivalent standing within this brotherhood – at least for now.

The French provisional government heightened the hierarchy within the brotherhood of nations as a measure to prevent exporting the revolution. As Fred Halliday observes, revolutionary regimes often adopt conservative foreign policies to avert adding international conflict to domestic upheaval.¹⁰⁹ In his March 1848 *Manifesto to Europe*, Alphonse de Lamartine, a prominent provisional government figure, aimed to restore confidence in France’s commitment to pacifism. Unlike the national disunity that led to war in 1792, the ‘fraternity, that we proclaimed and that the national

¹⁰⁴ *Le Républicain lyrique* (October 1848).

¹⁰⁵ *Le Républicain lyrique* (June, 1848). Anonymous song attributed to Colmance by Frédérique Tabaki-Iona; see Tabaki-Iona, ‘Chants de liberté et de solidarité, pour la Grèce et la Pologne’, p. 58.

¹⁰⁶ *Rapport, 1848: Year of Revolution*, p. 137.

¹⁰⁷ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*, p. 123.

¹⁰⁸ Alfred Delvau, *Les murailles révolutionnaires de 1848* (Paris: E. Picard, 1868), vol. II, pp. 449–51.

¹⁰⁹ Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, p. 135.

assembly [would] organise, [was] going to unify everyone' in 1848. This domestic fraternity would evolve into an international 'fraternity and peace'.¹¹⁰

While Lamartine employed the fraternal rhetoric, invoking 'over the peoples' borders ... the constitution of international fraternity on the globe',¹¹¹ his manifesto left uncertain to whom this international fraternity was directed: nations or crowns. On behalf of popular sovereignty, Lamartine asserted nations' entitlement to overthrow regimes, akin to the French. However, 'nations, like individuals, have different ages'¹¹² and 'a people would lose itself by forestalling the hour of its maturity as it would dishonour itself by letting this hour pass without seizing it'.¹¹³ Implicitly, French primogeniture validated the revolution in France while urging other nations to exhibit patience. The brotherhood of nations was indeed subordinated to France's desire to 'enter the family of institutionalised governments'.¹¹⁴ To appease European crowns, Lamartine relegated the younger brothers to beneath the French elder, and the brotherhood of nations to that of states.

French diplomatic moderation garnered varied reactions from foreign revolutionaries. While denying foreign backing, it averted an invasion à la Napoléon. French revolutionaries were possibly the most discontented. A popular movement urged the newly elected parliament to deliberate on the Polish issue by 15 May. On that day, a sizable crowd infiltrated the assembly, storming the building and demanding a Polish expedition and new elections – with limited success. Around a month later, the shift of the Second Republic towards conservatism would quash these aspirations. The popular brotherhood of nations was deceived by the fraternity of states proclaimed by the regime.

The brotherhood of nations omitted rather than explicitly excluded nationless populations. The conquest of Algeria, launched by French forces in 1830, was largely accomplished following Abdelkader's surrender in December 1847. The Algerian question was thus vivid for French revolutionaries. Here too, *goguettes* offer an interesting mirror to the nationalist imaginary. In 'Ne désespérons de rien' ('Let's Not Despair of Anything'), the same Rabineau who lamented the consequences of the love for the fatherland in Europe praised French conquest elsewhere:

But on the African shore
And in the Syrian desert
The republican France
Leaps with a sudden ardour:
Let's not despair of anything.¹¹⁵

Another singer, Victor Drappier, paid homage to the defeated emir ('Son of the desert, your name shall not die'), while celebrating French victory:

The time of epic battles is no more,
Progress walks hand in hand with nations...
To your country to restore a rank,
To dispel the powder of combats,
The arts, tomorrow, will preach their crusade
...
France is here, which in your arid fields
Recreates a soil full of nourishing juices,¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Alphonse Lamartine, *Manifeste à l'Europe* (Paris: Pagnerre, 1848), p. 5.

¹¹¹ Lamartine, *Manifeste à l'Europe*, p. 8.

¹¹² Lamartine, *Manifeste à l'Europe*, p. 4.

¹¹³ Lamartine, *Manifeste à l'Europe*, p. 5.

¹¹⁴ Lamartine, *Manifeste à l'Europe*, p. 3.

¹¹⁵ *Le Républicain lyrique* (October 1848).

¹¹⁶ *Le Républicain lyrique* (October 1848).

Via integration into France, Algerians were offered the opportunity to partake in national progress. Nevertheless, singers were not oblivious to the suffering arising from Algerian colonisation – at least from the perspective of the settlers, as depicted in Gustave Leroy's song: 'To finally live, we're expatriating ourselves / Farewell to France, farewell, Motherland.'¹¹⁷ The possibility of an Algerian Motherland or nation was, of course, never raised.

The nation-based order was imagined as segmented into bands of brothers. A hierarchy prevailed among these brotherhoods, distinguishing elder nation-states from young stateless nations. However, the nation-based order excluded most populations, those lacking nations and consequently popular sovereignty. Fraternal images thus contributed to shaping what Edward Said called the European 'imaginative geography'.¹¹⁸ Nationalism aligned with the 'standard of civilisation': the brotherhood of nations was implicitly a brotherhood of *civilised* nations.¹¹⁹

The collapse of the Springtime of Nations and imaginaries in crisis

European reactionary forces put an end to the Springtime of Nations. The previous divides resurged in various places. After the pope's initially ambiguous stance, he eventually excommunicated the Roman constituent assembly in December 1848, causing many Catholics to leave the revolutionary fronts.¹²⁰ The peasantry, once fervently involved in uprisings against Austrian forces in Lombardy, had by July become predominantly against a war they believed favoured the landlords, with some even cheering 'Viva Radetzky!'.¹²¹

The collapse of the Springtime of Nations turned into a crisis of the nationalist imaginary, visible in the uses of fraternal images. The revolutionary fraternity was appropriated under an alienated version by dynastic regimes and opposed by socialists advocating for the international brotherhood of workers. The demise of the 1848 Revolutions did not mark the end of fraternal images but rather led to the dominance of specific fraternal images over others.

Tu quoque, frater mi?

The June massacre in Paris was notably brutal. The closure of national workshops by the new parliament on 21 June prompted the Parisian proletariat to take once again to the streets. Cavaignac, who led the repression, portrayed the conflict as a fratricide, asking 'the brothers who are only misled' to surrender.¹²² However, the conflict was fierce, resulting in the death of 4,000 insurgents over four days, with an additional 4,000 deported to Algeria. Brothers slaughtered their brothers.

Nationalists, including the singer Loynel, were hopeful that the collective mourning after the massacre, would renew the 'holy union of the noble fraternity':

Why these tears in every eye?
 Brothers, a convoy is passing.
 Let's greet these noble remains,
 Victors or defeated, your brother,
 Today, must be hope.¹²³

¹¹⁷ *Le Républicain lyrique* (January 1849).

¹¹⁸ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), chapter 2. I thank the reviewers for suggesting this point.

¹¹⁹ On the 'family of civilised nations', see Edward Keene, 'The standard of "civilisation", the expansion thesis and the 19th-century international social space', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 42:3 (2014), pp. 651–73; Morten Skumsrud Andersen and Benjamin De Carvalho, 'The family of nations: Kinship as an international ordering principle in the nineteenth century', in Kristin M. Haugevik and Iver B. Neumann (eds), *Kinship in International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), pp. 21–42.

¹²⁰ *Rapport, 1848: Year of Revolution*, p. 350.

¹²¹ *Rapport, 1848: Year of Revolution*, p. 278.

¹²² 'Proclamation du 24 juin', quoted in Jean-Claude Caron, *Frères de sang: la guerre civile en France au XIXe siècle* (Seysssel: Champ Vallon, 2009), p. 176.

¹²³ David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 301.

Pierre Dupont, perhaps the most distinguished singer in Paris, conveys a similar sentiment in his song 'Les journées de juin' ('June Days'):

France is pale like a lily
 A crown of grey verbena around her forehead
 In the massacre of her sons,
 Her blood has flown out of her veins, ...
 Let's offer to God the blood of the dead
 From this awful slaughter
 And hatred and dissension
 Shall be sealed in their graves.¹²⁴

Both songs focus on mourning, deliberately sidestepping the episode of the massacre itself. Portraying France as a grieving mother underscored the fraternal connection between insurgents and repressive forces, while discreetly omitting details of who inflicted harm on whom and to what extent. The fratricide became a foundational sacrifice, perhaps reminiscent of the myth of Remus and Romulus.

This mythical standpoint, shaped by destiny rather than political decisions, is present in multiple *goguettes*. Dupont vividly depicted the battle: 'Guns and the brutal cannon / Abundantly vomited on the city / A furnace of metal / Ignited by civil war.'¹²⁵ Festeau, another singer, employed comparable phrases: 'Fire, iron, while riddling the walls / Break the fraternal network in our hearts.'¹²⁶ From these portrayals, the blame for the massacres was attributed to the weaponry rather than to those wielding it. Admittedly tragic, the fratricide should nevertheless not impede the establishment of the national brotherhood.

By contrast, socialists denied the nationalist imaginary after the massacre. Prior to the 1848 Revolutions, many were sceptical towards nationalism and its fraternal images. In a London speech in November 1847, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ironised about the 'brotherhood of nations', that is 'the brotherhood of the oppressors'.¹²⁷ Engels asserted that 'because the condition of the workers of all countries is the same, because their interests are the same, their enemies the same, they must also fight together, they must oppose the brotherhood of the bourgeoisie of all nations with a brotherhood of the workers of all nations'.¹²⁸ International worker fraternity would emerge to counter dual threats: domestic fraternity potentially pacifying social conflicts and the influence of the international bourgeoisie. However, other socialists were undeniably more sensitive to nationalism, like Mikhail Bakunin, who, incarcerated in the Austrian Empire, urged Slavic 'brothers' to offer 'a fraternal alliance to the Magyars' to achieve a 'Fraternity of Nations' through Slavic republics in Central and Eastern Europe.¹²⁹

The collapse of the Springtime of Nations confirmed the traitorous nature of the bourgeoisie. Marx accused the nationalist fraternity and the brotherhood of nations of being empty words. While Lamartine had prioritised France's internal development over Italy and Poland,¹³⁰ the June massacre exposed the class struggles within the nation:

¹²⁴Pierre Dupont, *Chants et chansons (poésie et musique)*, vol. 2 (Paris: Alexandre Houssiaux, Éditeurs, 1853), p. 29.

¹²⁵Dupont, *Chants et chansons (poésie et musique)*, vol. 2, p. 29.

¹²⁶David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 300.

¹²⁷Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 'On Poland: Speeches at the International Meeting held in London on 29 November 1847, to mark the 17th Anniversary of the Polish Uprising of 1830', in *Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), vol. VI, , p. 388.

¹²⁸Marx and Engels, 'On Poland', p. 388.

¹²⁹Mikhail A. Bakunin, *Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-Founder of World Anarchism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973), pp. 67–8.

¹³⁰Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. IX (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), *The Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 4 April, 1849, p. 191.

Fraternité, the brotherhood of antagonistic classes, one of which exploits the other, this *fraternité* which in February was proclaimed and inscribed in large letters on the façades of Paris, on every prison and every barracks – this *fraternité* found its true, unadulterated, and prosaic expression in *civil war*, civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war of labour against capital ... This brotherhood lasted only as long as there was a fraternity of interests between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.¹³¹

Marx's bitterness was echoed by socialist singers who, like Rabineau, rejected the false national brotherhood:

Their great word 'Fraternity'
Hides agrarian laws
As they are conceited enough
To cherish us like brothers
The bourgeois will never love
The ones who feed him.¹³²

Gustave Leroy reminded to the victors of June that, unlike those who shot the insurgents down, the February rioters 'Forgave their brothers [the troops] / Who followed their oath and their duties. / That's because they thought about their mothers.'¹³³

Fraternal images would serve a new imaginary based on classes rather than nations. The mistake was not to believe in fraternity, but to think that the latter could be extended beyond workers. The singer Charles Gilles, for instance, reserved the notion for the defeated of the June barricades:

In the gaols where our brothers languish
The 'holy hope' warms their hearts
They left many sons who are growing up
And martyrs generate avengers.¹³⁴

After the 1848 Revolutions, the nationalist imaginary had lost for many its suggestive power, but fraternal images remained evocative. Even someone as sceptical of 'brotherhood' as Marx resorted to it in the construction of the First International – possibly driven by strategical motives. In the report of the General Council, he affirmed, perhaps as a response to the 1848 Revolutions, that 'one of the main aims of the [International Workers'] Association [was] to develop amongst workers from diverse countries not only the *feeling* of fraternity but its *fact*.'¹³⁵ The international brotherhood of the workers would slowly emerge from the ruins of the Springtime of Nations and enrich the socialist imaginary of the second half of the 19th century.

Institutionalising the national fraternity

No less than revolutionaries, regimes were divided regarding nationalist imaginary and its fraternal images. While some rejected it completely, other European dynasties acknowledged the nascent nation-based order – and used it for their own purposes.

In France, perhaps because the nationalist imaginary was relatively stronger than in most parts of Europe, the president Louis-Napoléon, soon to be Napoléon III, avoided fraternal images, too clearly associated with the republican lexicon.¹³⁶ After the coup, the French motto 'Liberty, Equality,

¹³¹Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. VII (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), *The Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, 29 June, 1848, pp. 144–7.

¹³²*Le Républicain lyrique* (January 1849).

¹³³David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, pp. 302–3.

¹³⁴David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, p. 302.

¹³⁵Quoted in Nicolas Delalande, *La lutte et l'entraide: l'âge des solidarités ouvrières* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2019), p. 14.

¹³⁶Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 248–51.




Figure 7. Use of ‘fraternité’ in French newspapers from 1847 to 1852.

Fraternity’ was taken down from façades. Napoléon III himself seldom employed fraternal images in his speeches, reserving them for military contexts.¹³⁷ *Fraternité*, which peaked during the 1848 Revolutions, disappeared from discourses shortly after (see Figure 7). When Napoléon III staged his coup in December 1851, the term was no more in use than it had been prior to the Springtime of Nations. A subsequent revolution, the Paris Commune in 1871, would provide it with a renewed impetus, before it was reinstated into the French motto by the Third Republic.

Elsewhere in Europe, where the nation-states were still a project, fraternal images offered significant advantages. During the Italian Risorgimento, ‘the notion of fraternity was clearly associated to the revolutionary nationalist side.’¹³⁸ While the nationalist fraternity was abundantly used in the republican states of Rome and Tuscany in 1848–9, it was intentionally omitted from the Statuto Alberto, a constitution granted ‘with regal loyalty and fatherly’ by Carlo-Alberto, king of Sardinia. The latter, blessed by God, established indeed a fatherly vertical fraternity¹³⁹ with his subjects, affecting to be ‘more a father than a king’ (‘più Padre che Re’).¹⁴⁰

However, the kingdom of Sardinia relied on a syncretism of imaginaries between dynastic fatherhood and national brotherhood. Already in 1847, Giuseppe Bertoldi had affirmed in his ‘Inno nazionale’ (‘National Hymn’):

We are all the sons of Italy
[Our] arms and minds are strong and free,
More than death, we hate the tyrants,
We hate servitude more than death

¹³⁷See his speech in Satory on 20 September 1853 in *Discours, messages et proclamations de S. M. Napoléon III, Empereur des Français, 1849–1860* (Paris: Mirecourt Humbert, 1860), p. 106.

¹³⁸Simon Sarlin, ‘Frères contre la révolution. Discours et expériences de la fraternité dans l’anti-risorgimento’, in Catherine Brice (ed.), *Frères de sang, frères d’armes, frères ennemis: la fraternité en Italie (1820–1924)* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2017), pp. 183–97 (p. 183).

¹³⁹Gian Luca Fruci, ‘Un sentiment en action: La fraternité combattante du long 1848 italien’, in Catherine Brice (ed.), *Frères de sang, frères d’armes, frères ennemis: la fraternité en Italie (1820–1924)* (Rome: École française de Rome, 2017), pp. 89–128 (p. 99).

¹⁴⁰Fruci, ‘Un sentiment en action’, p. 113.

But, of such a king who rules with clemency,
We are the sons and enjoy obeying.¹⁴¹

While drawing on the nationalist fraternity and its struggle for freedom against tyrants, the song conveys a benevolent version of paternalism. While the paternal figure acknowledged the national brotherhood, the latter embraced a vertical relationship to the throne. The nationalist fraternity was institutionalised in a novel guise,¹⁴² supporting an altered form of the nation-based order. Contrary to what Anderson seemingly assumes, official nationalism reshaped the nationalist imaginary, as evident in its utilisation of fraternal images. This combination of fraternal nationalism and dynastic fatherhood served the nation-based order, while transforming it – and vice versa. *If we want everything to remain as it is, everything must change.*¹⁴³

Amid the downfall of the Springtime of Nations, the political visions of the latter half of the 19th century, particularly socialist and official nationalism, are already apparent. Through these reinterpretations of fraternal images, the nascent nation-based order underwent transformations, gained legitimacy, and faced new challenges.

Conclusion

The Springtime of Nations gave an unprecedented platform to nationalism across Europe. Revolutionaries proclaimed fraternity within and between nations, but this very fraternity produced domestic and international hierarchies. Women and formerly enslaved people, although included in nations, were not equal community members. Stateless nations, although legitimate in their aspirations, were not equal to their elder brothers and were asked to show patience. Nationless populations were not even part of the brotherhood unless they integrated into one of the existing European nations. The 1848 revolutionaries imagined the nation-based order as one with domestic and international hierarchies.

After the collapse of the Springtime of Nations, the nationalist imaginary dreamed by the 1848 revolutionaries entered into crisis. While some insurgents endeavoured to renew the nationalist fraternity after fratricides, socialists and regimes transformed in various ways fraternal images to establish new communities. Following 1848, fraternal images were used across the political spectrum to support, discuss, and refuse the nation-based order.

Exploring fraternal images introduces us to political imaginaries and the domestic and international hierarchies they produce, extending the hierarchy turn in IR to nationalism and nations. While historians have long studied sensibilities and imaginaries, Historical IR scholarship has so far mostly focused on states, and thus, on legal and diplomatic documents. Approaching nation-states as *nations*, and thus, as products of our imagination, broadens this perspective by including another range of sources and voices that have shaped political imaginaries. Incorporating nationalist imaginaries and images into our historical analysis broadens the scope of Historical IR scholarship and enhances its connection with Cultural History.

The historical investigation initiated in this article is far from exhausted. Studying how other images were used during the Springtime of Nations would complete and, perhaps, nuance the perspective developed here. Furthermore, after the 1848 Revolutions, nationalists and internationalists of all stripes would support or resist through fraternal images the nation-based order to which the world was gradually shifting. As late as during the 1960s decolonisation, fraternal images served anti-colonial movements in imagining national, pan-African, pan-Islamic, and pan-Arab communities. Accounting for these images traces how the nation-based order in which we live has been diversely imagined, limited, hierarchised, legitimised – and challenged.

¹⁴¹Fruci, 'Un sentiment en action', pp. 99–100.

¹⁴²On the institutionalisation of emotions, see Neta C. Crawford, 'Institutionalizing passion in world politics: Fear and empathy', *International Theory*, 6:3 (2014), pp. 535–57.

¹⁴³Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, *Il Gattopardo* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1958), pp. 41–2.

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