

THE BONDAGE OF OLD HABITS  
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY  
ARGENTINA \*

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Liberty was in their hearts, but the old bondage was  
nevertheless perpetuated in their habits and, moreover,  
they were not united among themselves.  
Juan Bautista Alberdi<sup>1</sup>

A number of recent publications have added to our knowledge of the century in which Argentina seems to have been transformed from a traditional colonial society into a modern and prosperous nation. Most of these new studies lean toward socioeconomic and sociopolitical analysis, testimony to the influence of Tulio Halperin Donghi's work on the Independence period and James Scobie's work on Buenos Aires.<sup>2</sup> Because these two studies of the mid-1970s are so well known, this article will review only the literature that has appeared since. All modern scholars agree that the economy since 1820 expanded at least in the littoral region and that the century ended in an upsurge of technological innovation and export-led growth that extended even into the interior. Most also concur that the benefits of economic progress were not shared equally. The critical questions seem to be who got what and why?

Despite the divergence of perspective, the scholars reviewed here point collectively to a coherent set of hypotheses. The collective view seems to indicate that capitalist growth—despite its intensive urbanization—failed to change the basic organizational principles of Argentine society or transform political practices. A judicious reading of the recent literature reveals the preservation of a hierarchical social system in which origin and color determined one's prospects in society.<sup>3</sup> As a method of preserving their exclusivity, the social elites perpetuated these social and ethnic antagonisms among the non-elites. Liberalism notwithstanding, basic patterns of political practice and participation

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continued from the colonial period through the Generation of 1880. The persistence of racial distinctions permitted the state to maintain a paternal tie to the native working class as a balance to the aspirations of the immigrants, and the expanding public treasury permitted the government to gain an additional measure of autonomy from the socioeconomic structure.

What emerges from the new research is a view of nineteenth-century Argentina as a multiracial society that responded to capitalist expansion in ways that preserved much of the old order.<sup>4</sup> Racial discrimination remained an operative social habit, the social elite preserved itself, and political authoritarianism endured. These trends were not products of economic change. Rather, they resisted it.

#### CONSERVATIVE LIBERALISM

The doctrine of liberalism was the ideology of capitalist expansion and of those elites that wanted to “Europeanize” Argentina. An implicit assumption of many of the new social histories is therefore that the process of economic modernization—driven by its intellectual apologetics, liberalism—either dispossessed the non-elites or caused their oppression. Recent studies of Argentine liberalism seem to undermine this analysis of both the power and the outcome of this ideology. According to David Bushnell, liberal reforms were intended to remove laws that restricted individual initiative and to create the conditions under which private citizens would build a better society “rather than creating such a society directly by governmental action.”<sup>5</sup> The first wave of reforms (which occurred roughly before 1830) effectively separated church and state and abolished trade monopolies, but they failed to remove all legal restrictions on the labor force. While the slave trade was abolished, for example, slavery itself did not end until 1853. Moreover, as Bushnell observes, the antivagrancy laws that restricted the working class actually “were reinforcing colonial practice rather than breaking new ground.”<sup>6</sup> Consequently, many liberal reforms remained to be accomplished by 1850.

The second wave of reform was the task of the Generation of 1837, a group of Argentine exiles who returned at the end of the Rosas dictatorship in order to take part in the process of national regeneration. (It is this process that Halperin Donghi has studied.) The strength of this group consisted in their economic vision. They all preached the gospel of European immigration and foreign investment.<sup>7</sup> Although they may have been economic liberals, as Halperin Donghi notes, they were at the same time socially conservative. For example, part of Sarmiento’s rationale for encouraging immigration to the countryside was that it would remedy the elite’s lack of control over rural workers, and

he hoped that immigration would eradicate the primitivism and abuse of authority in the countryside. Halperin Donghi views this social conservatism as one of the weaknesses of Argentine liberalism because it did not envision "a radically new peasant society on the pampas that would offer a solid foundation to an equally renovated nation."<sup>8</sup>

In addition, an element of blatant racism crept into the positivist edition of liberalism toward the end of the century. Reid Andrews states that Argentine liberals, who combined indigenous racism with imported European varieties, were well satisfied with certain aspects of European immigration because they were able to identify themselves as "citizens of the only 'truly white' nation in South America."<sup>9</sup> Mark Szuchman calls Argentine immigration "the successful failure," meaning that Argentines successfully encouraged foreign settlement without letting it challenge the dominant values of society.<sup>10</sup> Elements of racism were incorporated into twentieth-century ideology, according to Jesús Méndez, despite the resurrection of the gaucho as the symbol of authentic Argentine character. For example, in 1913 Leopoldo Lugones lectured Argentine audiences that the gaucho's "disappearance was good for the country because he possessed in his part-Indian blood an inferior component."<sup>11</sup> While Argentine urban society denigrated natives of color, it also forced social conformity on the sons of immigrants. The dress, language, and culture of European immigrants became objects of derision at all levels of Porteño society. According to Scobie, sons of immigrants at the turn of the century rejected their parents' heritage.<sup>12</sup> The leading proponent of a return to Hispanic values in Argentina was Emilio Becher, grandson of a Dutch immigrant. One scholar has suggested even a *deanglicización* of British residents, who accepted political subordination as well as the dominant Argentine culture.<sup>13</sup> Because conformity preserved the social hierarchy, it became a powerful mechanism within Argentine society.

Educated Argentine elites took from liberalism only those reforms that freed the economy, remaining chary of changes in the traditional social structure. According to Theodore Reutz, this matter was one of choice.<sup>14</sup> Argentine elites chose to limit the social impact of economic growth because they never entertained any conception that material improvement was supposed to alter the social and political values with which they were comfortable.

#### LANDHOLDING REVISITED

The extent to which elites chose to share the benefits of economic growth with non-elites can be analyzed by modern historians by utilizing documentation that affords some measure of the opportunity for social mobility. The studies reviewed here are based on manuscript cen-

suses, ranch and business account books, police and judicial records, travelers' accounts, cadastral maps, militia records, photographs, legal registries, records of lay organizations, notarial records, reports of foreign diplomats, and marriage and death records of both civil and ecclesiastical origin. Utilizing such a vast array of otherwise pedestrian documents enables scholars to reach new conclusions about old issues such as the concentration of landholding in this expanding agrarian economy. After all, the possession of land determines who profits from rural production and who enjoys opportunities for social advancement.

In the pampa of Buenos Aires province, settlement as opposed to hunting began as early as the mid-eighteenth century, when the florescence of trade at the port attracted migration from Córdoba, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán. The importance of the farmer (*labrador*) in this early settlement is striking. The research team led by César García Belsunce discovered that the number of cultivators in 1815 equaled that of cattlemen, even though the latter employed more peons and occupied more land.<sup>15</sup> García Belsunce's team traced the real boom in cattle raising to the post-1820 period, an interpretation that corroborates John Lynch's research on Rosas. An *estanciero* and *saladerista* himself, Juan Manuel de Rosas ascended in the 1820s with the support of those involved in pastoral exports.<sup>16</sup> Lynch and García Belsunce's team seem to differentiate Buenos Aires from other Latin American economies, which D. C. M. Platt believes became more autarchic following the wars of independence, even to the point of falling "over the outer edge of the periphery."<sup>17</sup> The growth of exports stimulated the establishment of *estancias*, attracted migrant workers, and made possible the rise of cattlemen politicians. Does this conclusion imply that yeoman farmers had lost their place in the *bonaerense* countryside after 1820?

One interpretation posits that the expansion of cattle raising concentrated landownership, coerced free gauchos (as opposed to *labradores*) into working on the *estancias*, and prevented the spread of farming on the pampa. Richard Slatta suggests that cattlemen used political leverage to extend their domination over the land and utilized the criminal justice system and militia recruitment to transform gauchos into pliant *peones de campo*. Slatta concludes, "The political power of the large landowners and their reluctance to alter traditional land tenure patterns, land usage, and social relations killed any possibility of large-scale farming in [Buenos Aires] province."<sup>18</sup>

Other recent scholarship has uncovered more variety in landownership and rural production, especially with reference to the Argentine pampa. My own research on the first half of the nineteenth century proposes that a process of subdivision worked to reduce the size of the first great cattle estates. Regarding the situation at the end of the century, three scholars assert that the enlargement of holdings

by the leading families reflected the extent to which new lands were opened on the frontier.<sup>19</sup> After the conquest of the desert, railways, sheep breeding, and cereal production began to push the cattle herds farther out into the pampa. This agrarian transformation set in motion a commercial dialectic in which new forms of production caused the older cattle estancias to be subdivided. From cadastral maps, Roberto Cortés Conde makes a convincing case for the district of Baradero. Properties smaller than a thousand hectares covered only 14 percent of Baradero in 1895, but within fifteen years, these “modest” units multiplied to cover nearly 85 percent of the total land.<sup>20</sup> These indications suggest that export growth fostered the subdivision of older landholdings as well as the settlement of new land.

Furthermore, Platt claims that most of Argentina’s economic expansion before the railway was financed by national, not foreign, sources of capital, indicating an element of rational economic choice operating among the national elite.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the landed elite chose export-led development, a choice that may have enlarged economic opportunities for the non-elites. Hilda Sabato reports that the growth of wool exports between the 1840s and the 1880s resulted in a diffusion of occupations. The fluctuations in the export trade prevented a monopoly of marketing and preserved middlemen like small growers, warehousemen, buyers and sellers, rural shopkeepers, and consignment houses.<sup>22</sup> If the evidence indicates that the land was being subdivided and social opportunities were being diffused, then who benefited?

For Buenos Aires, it is unclear as yet who profited from the diffusion of landownership. Little is known of the twenty-three thousand *hacendados* in Buenos Aires at the end of the century except that the *clase terrateniente* was divided into truly wealthy cattlemen and modest proprietors. Certainly, few immigrant farmers benefited. According to Noemi Girbal de Blacha, the cattlemen who previously had settled the pampa relegated the immigrants to public lands far from markets and rail traffic. Foreigners had little chance of purchasing pampa land, the most expensive in the country, and they consequently gravitated toward farm tenancy. Roberto Etchepareborda suggests that many of the new landowners may have acquired land as an extension of wealth gained in urban and professional occupations.<sup>23</sup> Evidently, immigrants and others who did not make money first in the city had little access to land in Buenos Aires province.

Land purchase may have been more possible in the interior, where the arrival of railways commercialized several regional economies toward the end of the century. Paul Goodwin notes that railway building encouraged rural settlement along roadbeds that paralleled the old cart trails through the interior.<sup>24</sup> Mark Szuchman finds in Córdoba a

significant incidence of landownership among urban immigrants. Yet their wills and testaments reveal that they failed to form a true rural middle class, preferring to rent their suburban plots to migrants and propertyless natives.<sup>25</sup> Donna Guy's information on Tucumán, where immigration was less significant, is less conclusive. At the same time that sugar cultivation was expanding—and national capitalists were consolidating production and refining—the number of smallholdings also increased.<sup>26</sup> In Mendoza Italians gained access to subdivided land through contracts to plant grapevines. William Fleming found that the immigrant role in establishing bodegas and wine pressing plants and in developing vineyards enabled the wealthiest foreigners to join the local oligarchy. Among the workers, immigrants moved in as *contratistas*, who took charge of employing and supervising the unskilled in the various tasks of making wine. Ricardo Salvatore suggests that the local oligarchy utilized these immigrant middlemen to discipline “indolent” creole day workers.<sup>27</sup> Land was being subdivided in those interior areas that were undergoing capitalist expansion, and foreigners appear to have been the beneficiaries.

Nowhere is the evidence more conclusive than in Santa Fe, where the railway stimulated intensive agricultural growth. In the north of that province, foreigners began to acquire land in 1872 to carry out family-based production of corn, flax, and peanuts.<sup>28</sup> Ezequiel Gallo found indications of social mobility among small- and middle-sized producers in the central wheat-growing colonies. The incidence of landownership by producers themselves was greater in the oldest colonies, the newer colonies being dominated by renters and sharecroppers. Thus, expanding wheat exports after 1869 had set in motion a dialectical process by which renters over time were able to buy the land they worked. In 1895 some 48 percent of the farm families owned their own land, the national average being approximately 30 percent.<sup>29</sup> But this rural middle class was composed of immigrant Swiss, Germans, and Italians. The creole working class remained as peons on the cattle ranches, lacking the educational and occupational opportunities of the *gringos*.

#### UNWRITTEN CODES OF DISCRIMINATION

A closer examination of the dominant social values reveals active discrimination against persons of color in the distribution of economic and social benefits—the sort of discrimination that seldom shows up in Argentine wage indexes. But some literature points to limited improvement in the material well-being of the Argentine working class. Halperin Donghi found that the revolutionary and civil wars of the early nineteenth century tended to redistribute the wealth among those bear-

ing arms, who were mostly creoles and men of color. Moreover, he establishes that some 42 percent of British imports into Buenos Aires in this early period consisted of items of popular consumption whose prices generally were falling faster than the prices of Argentine exports.<sup>30</sup>

Richard Slatta collected data from ranch account books that depict upward trends in nominal wages throughout the century. Yet he doubts that these wages offset a corresponding rise in the cost of living, especially at the end of the century. He supports the view of Bradford Burns that export agriculture raised the prices of foodstuffs and that rural workers were worse off by the end of the century than at the beginning.<sup>31</sup> Cortés Conde has constructed the most complete wage series to date. His figures for 1882–1914 show that wages actually rose faster than the cost of foodstuffs. According to the case that Cortés Conde makes for the “pull” factor in immigration, it is little wonder that foreigners were attracted to Argentina. Except for the depression years of 1891 and 1895, when immigration showed a net outflow, Argentine wages consistently exceeded Italian and Spanish wages. Cortés Conde’s figures also indicate that Argentine urban wages rose faster than rural wages.<sup>32</sup> This trend would seem to have favored industrial workers, who usually were immigrants. Richard Walter discovered that 84 percent of the manual workers and 82 percent of the skilled workers in Buenos Aires in 1895 were foreign-born. In fact, workers emigrated from Europe to Argentina in order to improve their lives, or *hacer la América*, and the first immigrant-dominated unions failed to act as radically as their anarchist ideology implies. The workers’ “interest in overthrowing the existing social structure could never be wholehearted,” concludes Ruth Thompson, “as long as they nurtured dreams . . . of becoming part of the upper echelons of that structure.”<sup>33</sup> Even though general standards of living may have improved for all workers, European immigrants participated in the economic improvement to a greater extent than did creole laborers. Elite prejudice against the creole working class was a constant theme throughout the nineteenth century. Restrictive laws aimed at the *vago y mal entretenido* existed in Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Córdoba, Tucumán, and Mendoza, where they may have been directed against seasonal migrants from outside those locales. Although the elites were extolling economic liberalism, as David Bushnell observes, they did not contradict the heritage of social hierarchy by extending liberal principles to the labor force.<sup>34</sup>

What has this observation to do with race? The point is that the average creole had more Negro and Indian blood than most historians have realized until recently. The age-old scarcity of labor in the Río de la Plata area dictated a brisk colonial trade in African slaves. Recent studies on colonial stock raising show that increased exports to Upper Peru

and Europe stimulated trade in slaves destined for work on the estancias. Nicholas Cushner finds that the Jesuits increased their slave holdings from thirteen hundred to thirty-one hundred persons in the last forty years prior to their expulsion from estates throughout the Río de la Plata region. Because slaves were needed to supplement the labor of Indians, the missionaries entertained few moral reservations about human bondage. The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 further “darkened” the complexion of rural workers in the provinces, according to Juan Carlos Garavaglia, because Guaraní Indians then began to emigrate from the Paraguayan missions toward the littoral.<sup>35</sup> Marta Goldberg studied closely the early censuses of Buenos Aires and concluded that blacks and mulattoes were underenumerated.<sup>36</sup> Colored persons constituted more than one-third of the city’s population at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the cessation of Spanish immigration after Independence may have enlarged temporarily the nonwhite portions of Argentina’s population. Municipal censuses have convinced both Reid Andrews and Susan Socolow that a surge in the black population occurred at the very moment that the civil wars were supposedly killing black soldiers in large numbers. Karl Graeber claims that the enumerated nonwhites still comprised 15 percent of the population of Buenos Aires in the 1854 census, even though many persons of color undoubtedly passed as white.<sup>37</sup>

As yet, I know of no estimate of the black and mulatto population in the interior provinces, but it must have constituted a significant proportion. A major part of the colonial slave trade pushed through Buenos Aires toward the interior. Halperin Donghi notes that some 44 percent of the Tucumán population in the late colonial period was black.<sup>38</sup> Szuchman found in the 1869 census references to *morenos* and *pardos* among the native-born population of Córdoba. Immigrants and elites alike looked down upon these darker-skinned creoles.<sup>39</sup> According to Andrews, many persons of color were underenumerated in national censuses because they used the escape hatch of calling themselves *trigueños*. That is to say, those with wheat-colored skin declared themselves to be whites because of the general prejudice toward persons of color.<sup>40</sup> Censuses consequently do not reflect racial heterogeneity accurately. In the 1815 *padrón* of Buenos Aires, many creoles called themselves *blancos*. This finding led the García Belsunce team to conclude that the “whitening” of the rural population commenced with the arrival on the pampa of the first supposedly white migrants from the interior.<sup>41</sup> In fact, these criollos may have been dark-skinned.

It would be difficult to prove the existence of racism in a society in which the elite and the working class are of the same race. But this situation is not the case in Argentina. Although the elite was also creole (native-born), it had little racially in common with the native working



class. Who were the elites of nineteenth-century Argentina? They were principally Caucasian creoles who neither intermarried with nonwhites nor permitted the advancement of nonwhites to elite status. Susan Socolow describes the social elite of the viceregal period as wealthy Spaniards engaged in commerce in Buenos Aires. They married creole women from established families, but their wives' fathers and maternal grandfathers were most likely also Spaniards. Among those native-born merchants who followed their Spanish fathers' profession, one can imagine very few mestizos or mulattoes.<sup>42</sup> Independence altered the composition of the elites somewhat but did not disrupt the racial continuity. Militias permitted the rise of creole leaders, while native-born bureaucrats supplanted the Spanish-born in the highest government posts.<sup>43</sup> Meanwhile, sons of the viceregal merchants shifted their assets into internal trade and especially into cattle. Research by Karla Robinson has established that even many Spanish-born merchants survived the revolutionary wars at Buenos Aires. They too placed their resources in domestic trade and urban real estate as well as in land and cattle.<sup>44</sup>

In other words, the merchant elite of the viceregal era was not supplanted by the landowning elite of the early national period. Both elites were made up of the same families. Many of the wealthiest estancieros of the post-1920s were native-born sons of Spanish merchants. They then married the creole daughters of other Spanish merchant families.<sup>45</sup> Into this elite group entered only a few who achieved property through political and military careers. But even this point of entry had its limitations. Andrews observes that although many men of color served as officers, seldom did they rise to the rank of colonel, and never to that of general.<sup>46</sup> In a study based on probated wills, Diana Balmori and Robert Oppenheimer describe the means by which elite families preserved their socioeconomic status through three generations. By the 1880s, the grandsons of colonial merchants were diversifying their estancia-based portfolios with investments in urban property, railway and bank stocks, and joint stock companies. These first families had consistently intermarried with one another.<sup>47</sup>

The Argentine elite also was open to infusions of non-Spanish Europeans. Thus the economic expansion of the nineteenth century allowed the blue bloods to admit a limited number of very successful immigrants and sons of immigrants into their inner circles. Research by Vera Blinn Reber on British merchant houses and by Ronald Newton on Germans in Buenos Aires is replete with data on wealthy Europeans who married into creole elite families throughout the century.<sup>48</sup> Names like Bunge, Santamarina, Cambaceres, Gowland, Tornquist, and Armstrong connoted considerable status. As in colonial times, close business relationships facilitated the absorption of foreign-born businessmen into the local elite. Early in the century, an important group of

Porteño merchants acted as partners to British mercantile houses.<sup>49</sup> Later many Argentines held positions on the boards of foreign companies, a situation that led David Rock to conclude that the well-being of the elite depended upon continued British investments. As Winthrop Wright and Colin Lewis discovered, the Argentine elite refused to invest in the initial railway construction themselves. Nonetheless, recent research by Donna Guy has uncovered a number of Argentine industrial entrepreneurs who invested in the domestic economy but chose to incorporate their native companies in London rather than in Buenos Aires because of unenlightened credit laws.<sup>50</sup>

In nineteenth-century Argentina, racial purity was as much a prerequisite for elite status as wealth. Magnus Mörner says of these colonial antecedents: "there existed restraints, both formal and informal, on upward individual social mobility. Anyone who was not white or of acceptable social origin was excluded from membership in the sociopolitical elites."<sup>51</sup> This principle continued to operate late into the nineteenth century. Argentine officials preferred Northern European immigration but had to settle for Italians and Spaniards. Even so, Carl Solberg reports, Northern Italians and Basques were favored over Sicilians and Andalusians.<sup>52</sup> These principles of ethnic exclusivity even extended to the rising middle class. Both Szuchman and Samuel Baily have found that members of immigrant families of the nineteenth century married within their French, Spanish, or Italian social circles and seldom into creole working-class families.<sup>53</sup> Respectable families, whether elite or bourgeois, guarded their racial purity closely over several generations.

The assertion that the elites captured large increments of the wealth created by economic progress is not disputed. In the first half of the century, the better families lived in the center of town in close proximity to the working classes. Great wealth permitted those in Buenos Aires to construct a new Parisian-style neighborhood called Barrio Norte, while newly arrived immigrants inherited the *conventillos* downtown. On the estancias, the landowners erected sumptuous chateaus and abandoned the traditional huts with thatched roofs that the previous generation had shared with peons during their visits.<sup>54</sup> As a contemporary British writer observed, "Increasing wealth no doubt has set a bar betwixt the classes, making the poor man feel his poverty, and the rich know that isolation is the best weapon in the fight that he must wage."<sup>55</sup> But the story does not end with the mere differential sharing of wealth. Social distinctions and ethnic discrimination engendered resentments and rivalries that Argentine elites were able to utilize in order to maintain a semblance of the old order in the face of economic change.

## A SOCIETY OF UNEQUAL WORKING CLASSES

Even before Esteban Echeverría wrote *El matadero* in the 1830s, Argentines had been aware of the distinction between native creoles and immigrant Europeans. Dividing the two groups were not only culture and sometimes language, but often racial differences. Creoles were swarthy with Indian and Negro blood, while immigrants were Caucasian. Despite liberal reforms, creoles and immigrants continued to be separate and unequal—and mutually hostile. Politicians exploited this animosity to maintain social control, alternately balancing the interests of immigrants and natives so that both groups remained dependent and nonthreatening. Mark Szuchman is correct in concluding that Argentina was not a melting pot.<sup>56</sup>

The Argentine working class traditionally was divided by birth and color. Lyman Johnson's work on the viceregal artisans implies that working-class divisions had colonial antecedents. In the late eighteenth century, Spanish immigrants were able to enter the highest artisan ranks because of prevailing racial attitudes and because they attracted the business of Spanish-born elites. Johnson's research also indicates that the colonial administration understood how to control the working classes by means of their racial division. Officials frustrated the guild movement among Spanish artisans as a concession to nonwhite and socially marginal artisans.<sup>57</sup> Karl Graeber maintains that during the nineteenth century, creoles and immigrants lived in separate, although sometimes adjacent, *conventillos*. Although the artisan work force in Buenos Aires expanded in proportion to the economy, creoles were systematically excluded from advancement. Graeber shows that skilled immigrant artisans hired only other Europeans as journeymen and apprentices, thus relegating creoles to the less skilled positions in the building trades.<sup>58</sup> Part of the reason for immigrant hegemony in the artisan trades was the continued appetite among the elites for European-style goods, whether homemade or imported. "At the same time that economic activity was expanding," Luis Alberto Romero concludes, "new and varied opportunities of social advancement opened for those foreigners possessing technical knowledge and an enterprising spirit."<sup>59</sup> Toward the end of the century, immigrants still retained their control of Argentine manufacturing (indeed, they may have strengthened it). In 1910, 79 percent of all domestic manufacturing establishments had foreign-born owners. While the expansion of manufacturing opened up jobs for women, immigrant domination of the shops meant that "initially immigrant women had more work opportunities than the native-born," according to Donna Guy.<sup>60</sup>

Rosas and other politicians had learned well the lesson of divide and rule. The natives resented the immigrants for their haughtiness, for

their opportunities, and as Graeber found, for their exemption from military service. Thus creole workers responded favorably to Rosas's anti-gringo policies even while they remained powerless to temper the military adventurism that kept the press-gangs active among the native-born. Nonetheless, Porteño officials understood, like their colonial forebears, that concessions were necessary. This necessity was the rationale behind fixed prices for the beef consumed by the urban working class.<sup>61</sup> Thus the creoles received concessions and manipulation but no power.

Family life among the creole working class scarcely measured up to traditional Hispanic values. Using colonial court records, Susan Socolow discovered that for the lower classes in particular, life was violent. In the viceregal period, widespread adultery, illegitimacy, and abuse of women already existed in the male-dominated society. (Socolow's finding seems to indicate that the abuse of women was something of an original sin, a conclusion that calls into question Nancy Caro Hollander's view that the post-1870 factory system tended to erode the status of women in Argentina.)<sup>62</sup> These poor social conditions continued into the nineteenth century. Mark Szuchman found that a large number of abandoned children lived in many working-class barrios of the capital.<sup>63</sup> In the countryside of Buenos Aires province, only one-third of the native-born residents were married, although the research team of García Belsunce discovered in the censuses a large number of single women with children. On the pampa, traditional values discriminated against widows, with the result being that second marriages were common among widowers but seldom considered proper for women whose first husbands had died.<sup>64</sup>

Family life was difficult because men and women of the creole working class lived such extraordinarily separate lives. Slatta posits that the harsh conditions of economic modernization prevented stable family lives among the native-born workers. Graeber found that nine thousand fewer creole men than native women lived in Buenos Aires at mid-century. Szuchman's figures for 1895 indicate that in urban Córdoba the number of native-born females exceeded that of native males by six thousand.<sup>65</sup> But in the countryside, creole males (as expert horse-men) vastly outnumbered females. All evidence points to the conclusion that creoles in the working class simply lacked a cohesive family structure that could provide security and advancement in society.

Recent research illuminates other advantages that immigrants may have had over natives. Hobart Spalding has shown that immigrants were more literate than the native-born Argentines, a fact that raised the nation's overall literacy rate to 62 percent before World War I.<sup>66</sup> Once in the Argentine countryside, immigrants distanced themselves from creoles. Kristin Ruggiero studied a group of Protestant Ital-

ian farmers who became the rural middle-sector employers of creole peons, despite the fact that the Italians soon resented the uncouth behavior and sometimes violent temperaments of the creoles. "Although no colonist admitted any racial prejudice, perhaps a slight color prejudice entered in, too," Ruggiero concludes, "since natives tended to be darker-skinned and often were called Negros." No intermarriage occurred between the two rural groups. At the same time that immigrants were arriving, *enterriano* creoles began to emigrate to Buenos Aires, and incoming creoles from Corrientes were seeking work on the Italian-owned farms.<sup>67</sup>

Creole workers on the Buenos Aires pampa resented the immigrants as well. As Solberg demonstrates, foreigners found work as petty merchants, tradesmen, and sharecroppers, competing effectively with creoles for these positions in the countryside. Consequently, the Tata Dios nativist rebellion of 1872 directed its violence at immigrants in Tandil.<sup>68</sup> The activities of mutual-aid societies among immigrant groups, especially in the urban environments of Buenos Aires and Córdoba, may also account for the success of immigrants over creoles. Baily and Szuchman have shown how these associations helped recent arrivals find jobs, living accommodations, and social contacts.<sup>69</sup> In addition, says Ruggiero, the immigrants came to Argentina with work-oriented and future-oriented goals, and they were more apt to seize opportunities to buy land and to enter the professions. In contrast, the creoles "organized for short-term goals [and] failed to see the sense in the constant struggle to get ahead that was waged by the immigrants." Finally, immigrants benefited from their relative numerical strength. In a path-breaking comparative study, Samuel Baily suggests that Italians assimilated into Buenos Aires society more rapidly and at higher levels than their compatriots did in New York City. European immigrants simply encountered less competition among Argentine workers for skilled jobs, whereas turn-of-the-century New York already had a large, entrenched work force and an entrepreneurial class.<sup>70</sup>

Although vagrancy laws nominally applied equally to Spaniards and to persons of color, most scholars agree that they were enforced more heavily against the latter, especially against gaucho horsemen. The detailed research of García Belsunce's team on crime and justice implies that control of the gauchos had limitations prior to 1830. While it was true that local officials looked down upon the humble local folk (perhaps because they were of mixed blood), many hacendados at the same time protected petty thieves because of the shortage of workers. Moreover, the judicial system was complicated, and rural constables lacked enough men and arms to police the countryside thoroughly.<sup>71</sup> Slatta speculates that the subsequent economic expansion of the province of Buenos Aires resulted in the number of gauchos increasing from

eight thousand in 1822 to seventy-nine thousand in 1869. Many had obviously migrated from the interior provinces. Yet Slatta and Solberg agree that economic growth ultimately cost the gauchos their independence, converting them into pliant, although alienated, *peones de campo*.<sup>72</sup>

Persecution of creole workers was undoubtedly more severe during wartime. "Vagrants" were a source of troops for Rosas's gaucho armies in Uruguay and of Mitre's army in Paraguay. Yet conscription was contrary to the economic interests of cattlemen because rural workers were already in short supply. Halperin Donghi notes that the Uruguayan wars in the 1820s first motivated recruitment that extended beyond vagrants to workers, to married men, and even to boys twelve years of age.<sup>73</sup> During the Paraguayan war, say F. J. McLynn and José Alfredo Fornos Peñalba, men had to be delivered to the front in chains, so unpopular were the *levas* throughout the provinces and so frequent the mutinies in militia units. An estimated eighteen thousand Argentine troops were killed in the Paraguayan war, and another five thousand died in domestic rebellions such as the Montonero risings during the war.<sup>74</sup> While political instability and war had their particular economic costs, they seldom challenged the elite's social position.

Nor did crime threaten the status quo. Thus far, studies of Argentine criminology tend to interpret police records in terms of society's efforts to control the working class, and creoles appear to have committed most of the crimes. Both Szuchman's work on the city of Buenos Aires and García Belsunce's study recognize the limits of the criminal justice system. Following the traditions of clientelism and localism in Iberian culture, police and local justices often were arbitrarily severe or lenient, depending on the individual circumstances. Szuchman found that arrests peaked at moments of political, rather than economic, stress and that arbitrariness occasionally affected bona fide employees as well as vagrants. Both Szuchman and Graeber agree that the goal of punishment was to limit the public misbehavior of non-elite groups. In the city of Buenos Aires, robbery, fighting, drunkenness, and insulting occurred more often than homicide, and those arrested were mostly single men of color.<sup>75</sup> Research on urban crime later in the century corroborates the identity of the criminal element. Julia Kirk Blackwelder and Lyman Johnson debunk the contemporaneous Porteño notion that Italian immigrants committed the city's crimes, noting that arrests were higher for Spaniards and native Argentines and also for teenage males (most immigrants were older).<sup>76</sup>

While many crime studies often claim that the social order was deteriorating due to expanding capitalism, the literature as a whole indicates that political disturbances added to a long-standing endemic criminality. Socolow observes that the countryside in late colonial Bue-

nos Aires was already lawless, the perpetrators of many crimes easily escaping the short reach of the law.<sup>77</sup> Certainly, the Indian and civil wars fought by creole militias did nothing to mitigate the savagery of frontier life. Prisoners in battle were fortunate to die quickly of a slash across the throat by a *facón*, the gaucho knife, for many slower methods were also employed.<sup>78</sup> Richard Slatta's work on rural criminality emphasizes class conflict, the premise being that rural workers resisted capitalist modernization through the medium of crime.<sup>79</sup> No doubt, social resentments were factors, as in Entre Ríos, where immigrant farmers became victims of crimes perpetrated by native creoles.<sup>80</sup> One might say that violence and crime may be linked to ethnic discrimination.

In this multiracial environment, the absolute victims of social discrimination were the least white. In the colonial period, black slaves were victimized; in the nineteenth century, the Indians suffered this distinction. Returning to the question of who profited from economic growth, however, it is assumed that the Indians of the southern plains were both excluded from economic expansion and resisted it from the very beginning.<sup>81</sup> Lynch describes Rosas's Indian policy as an attempt to break Indian resistance to the expanding cattle estancias through both military force and tribute. Rosas wanted the missionaries to pacify the Indians so that they could become peons on the expanding estancias. Hugo Edgardo Biagini reports that intellectuals and even members of the Sociedad Rural (the estanciero organization) cautioned against exterminating the Indians because they were needed as rural workers and farmers.<sup>82</sup> The arrival en masse of Caucasian immigrants, however, may have muted such counsel because the Indian war of 1879 was not intended to capture laborers but to exterminate Indians. Novelist David Viñas visualizes this conflict as a deterministic process of racial assassination perpetrated by expansionist European capitalism.<sup>83</sup> The point being made here is that the Indian traditionally is described as passive and resistant to economic change.

The forthcoming work of Kristine Jones may transform this viewpoint. Her research indicates that the Pampa Indians had enlarged their autonomous trade in cattle and horses between the Argentine pampa and the Chilean marketplace. Their participation in commerce at frontier posts and *pulperías* produced a labor shortage in the Indian economy as severe as that on the estancias. The need for labor prompted the Indians to raid for *cautivos*, captive women and children who were to perform the menial work. Jones concludes, "The Indians of the pampas, by virtue of dependence on annuities, or dependence on the trade in livestock, were by this time [circa 1850] integrated, if imperfectly, into the market economy. By virtue of their political consolidation, however, they managed to retain cultural and political autonomy."<sup>84</sup>

Was the extermination of the Indians an inevitable result of economic growth? Their resistance to becoming rural proletarians and the racism in Argentine society certainly made extermination inevitable. Evidence exists that the increased presence of whites spread the diseases that greatly wasted the Indian population, notably in remote Patagonia. But some Argentines desired the quick disappearance of the "dirty" and "stupid" Indians, and some frontier authorities had been mistreating the native peoples all along.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, the governing elites looked askance on nonwhites who were undisciplined, and the Indians were both uncontrolled and uncontrollable. Glyn Williams characterizes the war against the Patagonian Indians, who had maintained a peaceful exchange with the local Welsh settlers in Chubut, as a cruel and unjustified campaign to exterminate the native Americans.<sup>86</sup> To Argentine officials, Indian resistance represented more than mere crime, which they tolerated; it represented a nonwhite group having political and economic autonomy, which was unconscionable.

#### THE EVOLUTION OF LIBERAL AUTHORITARIANISM

If social values retained much of their conservatism throughout the nineteenth century, was the political culture likewise impervious to liberalism and modernization? Fortunately, the books discussed here permit a comparison of Rosas's politics with that of the Generation of '80. One is struck by the similarities in the political practices of the so-called Restaurador de las Leyes on the one hand and those of the liberal state on the other. John Lynch describes Rosas's political organization as perfectly suited to the social hierarchy. Peons were beholden and loyal to patrons who, through kinship ties, were beholden and loyal to the superpatron Rosas.<sup>87</sup> He reinforced this loyalty by extending patronage as far as possible. Although nominally governor of Buenos Aires province only, Rosas felt justified in intervening in provincial political affairs. He sent gaucho armies to Uruguay, maintained client governors in several provinces, and attempted to dominate trade on the Río Paraná in order to control provincial rivals.

Most of all, Rosas based his authoritarianism on preserving the social order, even though he was Argentina's first populist leader. Lynch shows that Rosas's brand of populism sought to gain control of the working class in order to prevent social revolution. The creole working class was responsive to antforeign hysteria, yet Rosas was not against foreign capitalists, as he demonstrated by guaranteeing British merchants and estancieros the maximum security of property and freedom of religion.<sup>88</sup> It is important to note, however, that Rosas did not develop the direct tie between the state and the creole working class. The revolutionary wars had already accomplished that. For example,



slaves first received arms to repulse the British invasions in 1806–7; and as Halperin Donghi reports, they were taken from their owners by the state to fill the ranks of the revolutionary armies thereafter. Moreover, the *clases plebeyas* came to support the revolutionary cause principally because the maintenance of armies of five thousand troops represented a substantial redistribution of income in this hierarchical society—and woe to those rulers (like Dorrego in 1828) who failed to pay the troops!<sup>89</sup> Did the lower classes bargain with the elites, trading political support for redistribution of wealth? If so, the elite acceded only as long as no restructuring of society was involved.

The Rosista program to preserve the social structure came at the expense of those elite members who dared oppose their leader. Rosas demanded absolute power, using terror and intimidation against the recalcitrant. He confiscated five hundred estancias and many thousands of head of cattle. Rosas's Mazorca, an organization made up of working-class toughs who resorted to throat cutting on orders from above, was just another instrument of salvation. "It will be said that I abused power," Rosas himself wrote. "When I was given this hateful extraordinary power, I was given it not on condition that I always had to be right but that I act with complete freedom, according to my judgment, and act without restrictions, for the sole object of saving the dying country."<sup>90</sup> The fact that the abuse of human rights continued after Rosas fell may be explained by the acceptance by Rosas's enemies of political bloodletting. Lynch counts Lavalle and even Sarmiento among this group.

Did Rosas represent the estanciero class, and was he a political tool of this class? Lynch and Halperin Donghi would answer, "Yes and no." Himself a cattleman, Rosas fashioned his economic policies to favor estanciero interests. But once having gained power, he sent the estancia militias home and used the burgeoning customs receipts to build a subservient bureaucracy and a provincial army.<sup>91</sup> Rosas refused to share power or to delegate authority, tirelessly handling routine administrative matters. Using political power to assure loyalty, Rosas allowed his supporters to obtain the lucrative contracts that supplied the armies and the government. Halperin Donghi suggests that growth of Rosas's autocratic decision making and of this factional criterion in public administration eventually paralyzed the government. Decisions became centralized to such a degree that the state separated itself from its social bases of support, relying more on administrative fiat and repression.<sup>92</sup> Rosas's press-gangs recruited gaucho armies for continuous wars in the provinces, aggravating the already severe labor shortage on the pampa. The power of the state made Rosas increasingly autonomous of other cattlemen. This style of personal authoritarianism and autonomy of the state ultimately becomes self-defeating, however, be-

cause the more despotic the despot becomes, the more he narrows his support and increases his vulnerability. After two decades of exactions by Rosas, the Porteño estancieros finally stood by in 1852 and watched another cattleman caudillo, Justo José Urquiza, defeat their superpatron.

One nevertheless should be wary of concluding that Rosas introduced these patterns of arbitrary rule into Argentine politics. Factionalism as a political criterion pervaded all political movements. Pueyrredón's forced loans of 1817, for instance, fell on his political enemies. The Unitarian Rivadavia taxed landowners and saladeristas, and the Federalist Dorrego taxed the import merchants.<sup>93</sup> A half-century of economic change and the experience of Rosismo failed to alter radically these political practices. Bartolomé Mitre, the quintessential liberal modernizer, conscripted large numbers of rural workers over the protests of the estancieros, and because he was unwilling to delegate authority, Mitre personally commanded the armies in Paraguay. Mitre supported constitutional restrictions on cruel punishments and torture, but John Robinson, Halperin Donghi, and F. J. McLynn have all pointed out that Mitre was not above raising the banner of factionalism and rebellion against rivals when out of power. Nor was Mitre averse to using the national army against opponents when in power.<sup>94</sup>

The Generation of '80, while basing its political hegemony upon the most technologically innovative economy in Latin America, also honored political traditions. Did meritocracy replace patronage in national politics? Donna Guy observes that the ruling elites "distributed political favors in a way that nurtured resentment and maintained regional conflicts as a feature in Argentine political life." Karen Remmer states that Julio Roca's Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN) functioned not as a party with a definitive political program but rather as an organization of public officials wanting to perpetuate their own power.<sup>95</sup> Did electoral legitimacy and rule of law replace patronage and informal political alliances? Guy states, "Through friends and relatives Roca developed a network of political alliances comprised of provincial oligarchs and supported by electoral manipulation of a limited and mostly uneducated electorate."<sup>96</sup> Did political compromise replace factionalism? Guy shows that rebellions continued among the competitors for power, as factions in the provinces sought outside intervention from federal authorities in order to destroy their local enemies. Although federalized and professionalized, the military never retreated far from politics, as Gilbert Ramírez has demonstrated. Civilians continued to influence promotions and to manipulate the officer corps for their own political gain. Politicians in the Unión Cívica used obstructionism and rebellion as did those in the dominant PAN. Walter and Remmer demonstrate that the political opposition in 1890 and 1905 plotted revolts by

suborning the loyalty of army officers and bore the brunt of government repression as well.<sup>97</sup> *La política criolla* survived because the opposition accepted it too.

Actually, political competition was a superficial phenomenon in a profoundly stable society. "Marriage was the principal form of association, one that subsumed social, economic, and political alliances," conclude Balmori and Oppenheimer. "A cursory glance . . . shows the same family clusters in all the political parties . . . so that no matter which party prevailed, the same group allied through marriage, was in power."<sup>98</sup> Broadened elite participation may have been one of the most significant political changes, perhaps preventing an autonomous despotism like that of Rosas. But the larger number of participants behaved politically much like the fewer of a half-century earlier.

True to form, Argentine politicians continued to obtain support from the creole working class. In 1893 immigrant grain producers rebelled against a new production tax intended to support the provincial government controlled by the PAN, the dominant party of the Generation of '80. To crush this resistance, the politicians marshalled creole cattle workers, who were only too willing to attack foreigners. As Ezequiel Gallo has shown, throat cutting reappeared as an expression of political preferences.<sup>99</sup> The politicians counterbalanced the two working classes elsewhere too. Richard Walter notes that the elite cavalry units of the Buenos Aires police force used to suppress immigrant labor demonstrations were composed of "Indians and mestizos from the northern provinces."<sup>100</sup> David Rock has established that even the Sáenz Peña Law of 1912 was intended to restructure elite political control by permitting the secret ballot and by extending voter participation to native-born Argentines but not to the foreign-born.<sup>101</sup> The electoral system enfranchised the native-born working and middle classes because they were controllable and the aspiring foreigners were not.

Actually, the conservative order of the late nineteenth century was a blend of Buenos Aires liberal centralism and provincial hierarchical traditionalism. Roca never centralized national administration as Rosas earlier did in Buenos Aires. According to Lee Kress, Roca was instead the consummate compromiser and shrewd bargainer who combined these skills with his prestige to unite provincial political organizations. Technological advances such as the railway and telegraph also contributed to Roca's extending federal power.<sup>102</sup> Natalio Botana has recognized the continued dominance of provincial politics by locally based elite families, who nevertheless competed with each other for state control. Federal intervention, the centralizing political instrument of the government at Buenos Aires, was used merely to introduce adjustments and readjustments between conflicting local rivalries—not to effect fundamental change in the principles of political participation. As

Jorge Balán and Nancy López have said of the provinces of Tucumán and Mendoza, “provincial societies and economies suffered an accelerated transformation [but] without profound alterations in the dominant political organization.”<sup>103</sup> Nineteenth-century liberalism may have encouraged some mobility for immigrants, but it did not open the political system to them. Botana refers to this situation as “political liberty for the few and civil liberty for the many.”<sup>104</sup> While provincial governments were dominated by local elites, the national government, centered in the expanding city of Buenos Aires, may have had a more complex base. Roberto Etchepareborda found that many participants in national politics represented recently acquired wealth, near-wealth, or a mixture of provincial status and new connections.<sup>105</sup> Not all the politicians represented the “best families.”

Modern scholarship has also criticized the Argentine state at the turn of the century for not having taken enough action in social and economic affairs. Donna Guy suggests that politicians refused to reform commercial laws and controlled credit according to the interests of political factionalism. This bias had the effect of giving foreign capital advantages over domestic capital.<sup>106</sup> Mark Szuchman and Leandro Gutiérrez point out that the state was slow in remedying the problems of rapid urban growth—poor housing, inefficient sanitation, and unpaved streets. More is expected of a modern state.<sup>107</sup> Once again, the element of choice appears. Having little conception of state responsibility toward public welfare, the Argentine governing elites chose to limit political modernization, even to the point of failing to respond to economic and social responsibilities. Debate about the autonomy of the state leads to divergent views about the strength of the government vis-à-vis domestic and foreign interests. Douglas Friedman contends that the state relied upon external sources of income such as foreign loans and customs revenues in order to gain a measure of control over domestic groups, resulting in the dependent integration of Argentina into the world economy. But the Argentine state may have been more autonomous when dealing with foreign interests than when attempting to mediate antagonisms within the body politic. In a new interpretation of the government’s sale of public railways to foreign interests in 1891, Colin Lewis claims that the resultant reduction of Argentina’s foreign indebtedness actually strengthened the state. Privatization permitted the Argentine government to extend its regulatory power over the foreign-owned assets to a greater degree than it could have controlled domestically owned interests.<sup>108</sup>

It is obvious by now that the political system of the Generation of ‘80 was not the blueprint model of Argentine Liberalism. The surviving Liberals of the Generation of ‘37 did not approve entirely. The state had become too powerful and too autonomous—even of the oligarchy that

it was supposed to serve. As Halperin Donghi concluded, "In sum, while Argentina finally seems to have found the road that Alberdi had pointed out, . . . there is one aspect of Alberdi's vision that was poorly carried out: the State had not become the passive instrument of an economic elite whose long-range goals [the State] undoubtedly shared but with whom no exact coincidence of interests and aspirations could be reached."<sup>109</sup> Obviously, the so-called liberal state was neither liberal nor totally dependent on the social elite.

#### WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The preceding hypotheses, heretical though some of them may be, merit further testing. By now it is obvious that the interior provinces remain the largest enigma of nineteenth-century Argentina. Native and foreign scholars alike should direct their research energies west and north of the capital city. A particular question concerns the continuity of the provincial elites and their economic and political activities from Independence through the Generation of 1880. Even more of a mystery is the nature of the creole working class in the interior. What in their circumstances in provinces like Catamarca and La Rioja, Corrientes, Jujuy, and San Juan caused creoles to migrate willingly to places where they suffered social discrimination because of their color? What were their relationships to the land and to the provincial elite?<sup>110</sup> Another neglected subject of inquiry is the landowners in Buenos Aires province—we know little about those who were not from the great families but were modest proprietors. The causes and effects between the workers and the process of urbanization must also be explored with regard to Buenos Aires and particularly the provincial cities. We know much about their self-proclaimed leaders like the socialists, anarchists, and syndicalists but little about how the workers themselves lived or about their aspirations.<sup>111</sup> Closely associated is the need to investigate the roles and conditions of women, particularly those in the working classes. Civil wars, immigration, and migration in the nineteenth century skewed sex ratios of population clusters throughout Argentina to such a degree that traditional Hispanic family life was impossible for many of them. What impact did these developments hold for Argentine women and for Argentine society?

Thus far, the development of new sources for the study of Argentine social history has been impressive. Nonetheless, the remaining resource to be tapped systematically is the cache of notary records, known in Argentina as *protocolos* and *registros*. Municipal and provincial archives throughout the country undoubtedly contain a lode of notarial gems just waiting for the historical prospector. No better source exists for constructing a detailed cross-section of provincial societies or for

portraying the dynamics of social relationships. Historians have used the manuscript censuses to a greater extent, especially for urban studies, but the manuscripts belonging to the 1869 and 1895 censuses have yet to be exploited properly for studies of rural areas and the provinces.

The second large gap in our knowledge of the nineteenth century still concerns the nature of the state. Countless studies exist in Spanish and English on politics and politicians, but few deal with the bureaucracy, which absorbed 25 percent of the Porteño middle class. Were the bureaucrats a relatively stable element in provincial and national governments in spite of the succession of governors and presidents? Or were government officials replaced with each change in political leadership?<sup>112</sup> Who were these bureaucrats? What were their connections to the best families and to the workers? What were their perspectives and their powers? Scholars who peruse government and administrative records should be able to determine how the interests of the state coincided with or diverged from those of the dominant social elites and foreign interests.

For modern historians, queries about the role of ethnicity in Argentine society require both contemporary observation and extrapolation from the historical records. The finding that nineteenth-century Argentines ceased using the terminology of a multiracial society does not prove that color distinctions between Argentines no longer mattered. Ample evidence indicates an improvement in living standards among the workers, but what of the abundant social conflict within the working classes? Was it a matter of class or racial distinction? Future studies of the workers must investigate education, dress, speech, values, and family life—the cultural complex in which individuals occasionally might rise above their origins despite having dark skin.

Are scholars drawing historical distinctions that no longer obtain in Argentine society? One only need observe the present process of the “darkening” of Argentina, in which migration from the interior to the littoral continues, immigration from Paraguay and Bolivia replaces that from Europe, and educated professionals leave the country. On the prairies and in the fertile valleys, the whites, be they grandchildren of immigrants or scions of old Spanish families, still control the land. Persons of color provide the rural labor, particularly in the interior.<sup>113</sup> In the cities, migrant women work as housekeepers for the middle class, and migrant men labor in unskilled construction jobs or even as policemen. On the streets, they are called *morochos* and *cabecitas negras*. How much of the violence of the recent “dirty war” relates to age-old social resentments—*la venganza criolla*—has yet to be determined. No longer can Argentines or Argentinistas rely solely upon economic theories to explain the paradoxes of this bountiful, but haunted, land. Social elitism, racism, and political authoritarianism—often impermeable to de-

mographic and economic changes—are burdens of history with which every Argentine must live.

## NOTES

1. Juan Bautista Alberdi, *The Life and Industrial Labors of William Wheelwright in South America*, translated from the Spanish (Boston, 1877), 46–47. Although this statement was made to characterize the attitude of Chilean and Peruvian officials toward the entrepreneurial efforts of Wheelwright, the description nonetheless applies to other nineteenth-century Latin American elites, including those in Argentina.
2. Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period*, translated by Richard Southern (Cambridge, 1975); and James R. Scobie, *Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb, 1870–1910* (London, 1974). Regarding the debate of the previous generation of scholars, see Joseph Barager, “Historiography of the Río de la Plata Area,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 39, no. 4 (1959):588–642. See also two recent reviews: Susan M. Socolow, “Recent Historiography of the Río de la Plata: Colonial and Early National Periods,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 64, no. 1 (1984):105–20; and Roberto Etchepareborda, “Interpretaciones recientes del pasado argentino,” *Cuadernos del Sur* 16 (1983):99–116.
3. See especially George Reid Andrews, “Race versus Class Association: The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1850–1900,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11, no. 1 (1979):19–39.
4. The foregoing suggests that we scholars ought to heed Jorge Balán’s admonition: “I believe theoretical coherence in very exploratory areas where research data are scarce is a poor strategy to advance knowledge.” See Balán, “Regional Urbanization under Primary Sector Expansion in ‘Neo-Colonial’ Societies,” mimeo, University of Texas Institute of Latin American Studies, 1974, 1.
5. David Bushnell, *Reform and Reaction in the Platine Provinces, 1810–1852* (Gainesville, 1983), 3. As John Lynch writes in his review of Bushnell’s study, “Before modern critics launch their attacks on the so-called liberal heritage, they ought to know for what liberalism actually stood.” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 64, no. 3 (1984): 88.
6. Bushnell, *Reform and Reaction*, 23–24, 101.
7. Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Proyecto y construcción de una nación: Argentina, 1846–1880* (Caracas, 1980), lxxix, lxxxix.
8. *Ibid.*, xciv. Also see Natalio Botana, *La tradición republicana: Alberdi, Sarmiento y las ideas políticas de su tiempo* (Buenos Aires, 1984).
9. George Reid Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1800–1900* (Madison, 1980), 102–3, 106.
10. Mark D. Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration in Urban Argentina: Córdoba in the Liberal Era* (Austin, 1980), 173.
11. Leopoldo Lugones, *El payador* (Buenos Aires, 1972), 188, as quoted by Jesús Méndez, “Argentine Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century, 1900–1943,” Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 85.
12. Scobie, *Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb*, 232.
13. Méndez, “Argentine Intellectuals,” 56; and John P. Bailey, “Inmigración y relaciones étnicas: los ingleses en la Argentina,” *Desarrollo Económico* 72 (1979):544, 553.
14. This concept of choice, the idea that Argentine elites have choices and choose either willingly or under duress, comes from Theodore A. Reutz, “Politics of Inflation and the Failure of Justice: The Case of Argentina,” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, xii–xiii, 451–57.
15. Between 1778 and 1810, the rural population of the countryside south and west of Buenos Aires grew by 8.2 percent per annum. See *Buenos Aires, 1800–1830*, vol. 1, *Su gente*, directed by César A. García Belsunce (Buenos Aires, 1976), 174ff.
16. John Lynch, *Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas* (Oxford, 1981), 45.
17. D. C. M. Platt, “Dependency in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: An Historian Objects,” *LARR* 15, no. 1 (1980):115–16.

18. Richard W. Slatta, *Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier* (Lincoln, 1983), 92, 104, 154, 157.
19. Jonathan C. Brown, *A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776–1860* (London and New York, 1979), 157–63; F. J. Flynn, "The Frontier Problem in Nineteenth-Century Argentina," *History Today* 30 (Jan. 1980):32; and Diana Balmori and Robert Oppenheimer, "Family Clusters: Generational Nucleation in Nineteenth-Century Argentina and Chile," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (1979):244–45.
20. Roberto Cortés Conde, *El progreso argentino, 1880–1914* (Buenos Aires, 1979), 115.
21. D. C. M. Platt, "Foreign Finance in Argentina for the First Half of the Century of Independence," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 15, no.1 (1983):23–47.
22. Hilda Sabato, "Wool Trade and Commercial Networks in Buenos Aires, 1840s to 1880s," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 15, no. 1 (May 1983):49–81.
23. See Noemi M. Girbal de Blacha, *Los centros agrícolas en la provincia de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1980), 93, 156–59; and Roberto Etchepareborda, "La estructura sociopolítica argentina y la generación del ochenta," *LARR* 13, no. 1 (1978):133. The widespread use of farm tenants is the subject of some controversy in the literature. Australian John Hirt suggests that tenancy was antieconomic and inflexible, while Ezequiel Gallo retorts that it was highly flexible at a time of rapid market changes. See *Argentina y Australia*, edited by John Fogarty, Ezequiel Gallo, and Héctor Diéguez (Buenos Aires, 1979), 100; and also D. C. M. Platt and Guido Di Tella, *Argentina, Australia, and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870–1965* (London, 1985), which appeared too late to be included in this discussion.
24. Paul B. Goodwin, "The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 1854–1881," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57, no. 4 (1977):626–27.
25. Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, 67, 69, 124–26.
26. Donna J. Guy, *Argentine Sugar Politics: Tucumán and the Generation of Eighty* (Tempe, 1980), 132.
27. William Fleming, "Regional Development and Transportation in Argentina: Mendoza and the Gran Oeste Argentino Railroad, 1885–1914," Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 121, 192–98, 214–18; and Ricardo Salvatore, "Labor Control and Discrimination: The Contratista System in Mendoza Argentina, 1880–1920," *Agricultural History* (forthcoming).
28. Eduardo P. Archetti, "El proceso de capitalización de campesinos argentinos," *Cahiers du Monde Hispanique et Luso-Brésilien* 28 (1977):127.
29. Ezequiel Gallo, *Farmers in Revolt: The Revolutions of 1893 in the Province of Santa Fe, Argentina* (London, 1976), 5–6. The national figure is obtained from Republic of Argentina, Ministry of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics, 1910–1911* (Buenos Aires, 1912), 31. Also see Carl E. Solberg, "Peopling the Prairies and the Pampas: The Impact of Immigration on Argentine and Canadian Agrarian Development, 1870–1930," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 24, no. 2 (May 1982):137. Therein he states that by 1935, 30 percent of the immigrant farmers had acquired land. See also Gallo, "The Cereal Boom and Change in the Social and Political Structure of Santa Fe, Argentina, 1870–95," in *Land and Labour in Latin America*, edited by Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (Cambridge, 1977), 328.
30. Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del estado argentino (1791–1850)* (Buenos Aires, 1982), 88, 93, 227, 247.
31. Slatta, *Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier*, 50; and E. Bradford Burns, *The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), chap. 7.
32. Cortés Conde, *El progreso argentino*, 232, 265.
33. Richard J. Walter, *The Socialist Party of Argentina, 1890–1930* (Austin, 1977), 11–12; and Ruth Thompson, "The Limitations of Ideology in the Early Argentine Labour Movement: Anarchism in the Trade Unions, 1890–1920," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 16, no. 1 (May 1984):98–99. Undoubtedly, new work by members of the Argentine historical group PEHESA-CISEA will shed light on the urban working class. See "PEHESA: An Argentine Social History Group," *LARR* 18, no. 2 (1983):118–24.
34. Bushnell, *Reform and Reaction*, 76.
35. Tulio Halperin Donghi, "Una estancia en la campaña de Buenos Aires: Fontezuela, 1753–1807," in *Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones en América Latina*, edited by Enrique



- Florescano (Mexico, 1975), 456–57; Nicolas P. Cushner, *Jesuit Ranches and the Agrarian Development of Colonial Argentina, 1650–1767* (Albany, 1983), 88, 94, 102, 112; and Juan Carlos Garavaglia, “Las actividades agropecuarias en el marco de la vida económica del Pueblo de Indios de Nuestra Señora de Los Santos Reyes Magos de Yapeyú, 1768–1806,” in Florescano, *Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones*, 475.
36. Marta B. Goldberg, “La población negra y mulata de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1810–1840,” *Desarrollo Económico* 61 (1976):81; and Lyman L. Johnson, “Estimaciones de población de Buenos Aires en 1744, 1778, 1840,” *Desarrollo Económico* 73 (1979): 118–19.
  37. Andrews, *Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires*, 4, 39; Susan M. Socolow, “Buenos Aires at the Time of Independence,” in *Buenos Aires: 400 Years*, edited by Stanley R. Ross and Thomas F. McGann (Austin, 1982), 22; and Karl Frederick Graeber, “Buenos Aires: A Social and Economic History of a Traditional Spanish American City on the Verge of Change, 1810–1855,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 180, 231–33.
  38. Halperin Donghi, *Politics, Economics, and Society*, 63. On slave imports, see Lyman L. Johnson, “Manumission in Colonial Buenos Aires, 1776–1810,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 59, no. 2 (1979):259; and Jonathan C. Brown, “Outpost to Entrepôt: Trade and Commerce at Colonial Buenos Aires,” in Ross and McGann, *Buenos Aires: 400 Years*, 6–8.
  39. Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, 49, 169.
  40. Andrews, *Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires*, 87–89.
  41. García Belsunce, *Buenos Aires, 1800–1830*, 1:187, 220, 248.
  42. Susan Migden Socolow, *The Merchants of Buenos Aires, 1778–1810: Family and Commerce* (Cambridge, 1978), chap. 1.
  43. José M. Mariluz Urquijo, *Orígenes de la burocracia rioplatense: la Secretaría de Virreinato* (Buenos Aires, 1974), 104–8; and Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Militarización revolucionaria en Buenos Aires, 1806–1815,” in *El ocaso del orden colonial en Hispanoamérica*, compiled by Halperin Donghi (Buenos Aires, 1978), 131.
  44. Karla Robinson, “The Merchants of Post-Independence Buenos Aires,” in *Hispanic-American Essays in Honor of Max Leon Moorhead*, edited by William S. Coler (Pensacola, 1979), 111–32.
  45. Jonathan C. Brown, “A Nineteenth-Century Cattle Empire in Argentina,” *Agricultural History* 52, no. 1 (1978):160–78; and Luis Alberto Romero, “Buenos Aires: la sociedad criolla, 1810–1850,” *Revista de Indias* 41, nos. 163–64 (1981):146.
  46. Andrews, *Afro-Argentines in Buenos Aires*, 132–37.
  47. Balmori and Oppenheimer, “Family Clusters,” 234, 242; and especially Diana Balmori, Stuart F. Voss, and Miles Wortman, *Notable Family Networks in Latin America* (Chicago, 1984), chap. 4.
  48. Vera Blinn Reber, *British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires, 1810–1880* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 113–14; and Ronald C. Newton, *German Buenos Aires, 1900–1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis* (Austin, 1977), 7.
  49. See Hugo Raúl Galmarini, *Negocios y política en la época de Rivadavia: Braulio Costa y la burguesía comercial porteña (1820–1830)* (Buenos Aires, 1974), 19–30.
  50. David Rock, *Politics in Argentina, 1890–1930: The Rise and Fall of Radicalism* (London and New York, 1974), 6–7; Colin Lewis, “British Railway Companies and the Argentine Government,” in *British Imperialism, 1840–1930*, edited by D. C. M. Platt (Oxford, 1977), 403–4, 422–23; and Winthrop Wright, *British-Owned Railways in Argentina* (Austin, 1974), 22, 38, 61; and Donna J. Guy, “Dependency, the Credit Market, and Argentine Industrialization, 1860–1940,” *Business History Review* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1984):554–56, 559.
  51. Magnus Mörner, “Economic Factors and Stratification in Colonial Spanish America with Special Regard to Elites,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 2 (1983): 356.
  52. Solberg, “Peopling the Prairies and the Pampas,” 136.
  53. Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, chap. 7; Szuchman, “The Limits of the Melting Pot in Córdoba, 1869–1909,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57, no. 1 (1977):24–50; and Samuel L. Baily, “Marriage Patterns and Immigrant Assimilation in Buenos Aires, 1882–1923,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 60, no. 1 (1980):32–48. Could

- the ethnic selectivity in marriage have been at work earlier on the pampa of Buenos Aires? The team of García Belsunce notes the penchant of native-born women for foreign-born men as early as the 1820s. See García Belsunce, *Buenos Aires, 1800–1830*, 1:220, 248.
54. See the descriptions of elite lifestyles in Scobie, *Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb*; and in Thomas F. McGann, *Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), chaps. 1–5.
  55. *The South American Sketches of R. B. Cunningham Graham*, selected and edited by John Walker (Norman, 1978), 150.
  56. Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, 149, 169. In essence, I am arguing here against the notion that the relationship between the classes was strictly economic, as suggested by Leopoldo Allub. He writes, “Pampean landowners considered their workers only in terms of economic rentability, and like any capitalists, they were only interested in the rate of profit.” See Allub, *Orígenes del autoritarismo en América Latina* (Mexico, 1983), 63.
  57. Lyman Lucius Johnson, “The Artisans of Buenos Aires during the Viceroyalty, 1776–1810,” Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 17, 306; and Johnson, “The Impact of Racial Discrimination on Black Artisans in Colonial Buenos Aires,” *Social History* 6, no. 3 (Oct. 1980):301–16; and Johnson, “The Silversmiths of Buenos Aires: A Case Study in the Failure of Corporate Social Organization,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 8, no. 2 (1976):181–213.
  58. Graeber, “Buenos Aires: A Social and Economic History,” 100–104, 110–11, 138, 158.
  59. Romero, “Buenos Aires: la sociedad criolla,” 149, 153.
  60. Donna J. Guy, “Women, Peonage, and Industrialization: Argentina, 1810–1914,” *LARR* 16, no. 3 (1981):77, 80. Also see Walter, *The Socialist Party of Argentina*, 11–12; and República Argentina, Dirección General de Comercio e Industria, *Censo industrial y comercio*, *Boletín* no. 13 (Buenos Aires, 1910), 4.
  61. Graeber, “Buenos Aires: A Social and Economic History,” 18–22, 164.
  62. Susan Migden Socolow, “Women and Crime: Buenos Aires, 1757–94,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12, no. 1 (1980):40, 51, 53; and Nancy Caro Hollander, “Women in the Political Economy of Argentina,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 37.
  63. Mark D. Szuchman, “Continuity and Conflict in Buenos Aires: Comments on the Historical City,” in Ross and McGann, *Buenos Aires: 400 Years*, 58.
  64. García Belsunce, *Buenos Aires, 1800–1830*, 1:25, 238.
  65. Slatta, *Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier*, 5, 59–65; Graeber, “Buenos Aires: A Social and Economic History,” 131; and Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, 195.
  66. Hobart A. Spalding, Jr., “Education in Argentina, 1890–1914: The Limits of Oligarchical Reform,” *Journal of Inter-Disciplinary History* 3 (1972):45. He contends that the elite actually hedged on instituting Sarmiento’s educational proposals because the export economy needed few literate workers.
  67. Kristin Ruggiero, “Italians in Argentina: The Waldenses at Colonia San Gustavo, 1850–1910,” Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 266. Herbert S. Klein also indicates that many immigrants came to Argentina with money to invest in land and artisan shops. See “La integración de italianos en la Argentina y los Estados Unidos: un análisis comparativo,” *Desarrollo Económico* 81 (1981):20.
  68. Carl Solberg, “Farm Workers and the Myth of Export-Led Development in Argentina,” *The Americas* 31, no. 2 (1974):121–38. Some of this nativist resentment may have been reflected in the Peronist movement of the next century. See Peter Winn, “From Martín Fierro to Peronism: A Century of Argentine Social Protest,” *The Americas* 35, no. 1 (1978):89–94.
  69. Samuel Baily, “Las sociedades de ayuda mutua y el desarrollo de una comunidad italiana en Buenos Aires, 1858–1918,” *Desarrollo Económico* 84 (1981):485–512; and Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, chaps. 4–5.
  70. Kristin Ruggiero, “Gringo and Creole: Foreign and Native Values in a Rural Argentine Community,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 24, no. 2 (1982): 165; and Samuel L. Baily, “The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires

- and New York, 1870–1914," *American Historical Review* 88, no. 2 (April 1983): 304–5.
71. *Buenos Aires, 1800–1830*, vol. 2, *Salud y delito*, directed by César A. García Belsunce (Buenos Aires, 1977), 193, 276–80.
  72. Slatta, *Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier*, 2, 69, 198; and Solberg, "The Myth of Export-Led Development."
  73. Halperin Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 158–59.
  74. Although they agree on the impact of the war on working-class creoles, the two scholars disagree on the role of Great Britain in the Paraguayan conflict. See José Alfredo Fornos Peñalba, "Draft Dodgers, War Resisters, and Turbulent Gauchos: The War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay," *The Americas* 48, no. 4 (April 1982):463–80; Fornos Peñalba, "The Fourth Ally: Great Britain and the War of the Triple Alliance," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles; and F. J. McLynn, "The Montonero Risings in Argentina during the Eighteen-Sixties," *Canadian Journal of History* 15, no. 1 (April 1980):49–60.
  75. Mark D. Szuchman, "Disorder and Social Control in Buenos Aires, 1810–1860," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1984):83–110; *Buenos Aires, 1800–1830*, 2:276–80; and Graeber, "Buenos Aires: A Social and Economic History," 231–33.
  76. Julia Kirk Blackwelder and Lyman L. Johnson, "Changing Criminal Patterns in Buenos Aires, 1890 to 1914," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 14, no. 2 (1982):359–80; and Blackwelder and Johnson, "Estadística criminal y acción política en Buenos Aires, 1887–1914," *Desarrollo Económico* 24 (1984):109–22.
  77. Socolow, "Women and Crime," 40.
  78. Walker, *South American Sketches*, 105.
  79. Richard W. Slatta, "Rural Criminality and Social Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Buenos Aires Province," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 60, no. 3 (1980):450–72.
  80. Ruggiero, "Italians in Argentina," 253–54.
  81. I have observed that the nomadic Indians of the pampa were victims of economic growth even before Roca's desert campaign. See Brown, *A Socioeconomic History*, 170–73.
  82. Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 25; and Hugo Edgardo Biagini, *Cómo fue la Generación del 80* (Buenos Aires, 1980), 60–67.
  83. David Viñas, *Indios, ejército y frontera* (Buenos Aires, 1982), 87.
  84. Kristine L. Jones, "Conflict and Adaptation in the Argentine Pampas, 1750–1880," Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 131; Jones, "La Cautiva: An Argentine Solution to Labor Shortage in the Pampas," in *Brazil and the Río de la Plata: Challenge and Response, An Anthology of Papers Presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of ICLLAS*, edited by Luis Clay Méndez and Lawrence Bates (Charleston, Ill., 1983); and Jones, "From Autonomy to Subjugation: Contraband Economies and Extermination in the Argentine Pampas," paper presented at the meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, Mexico City, Oct. 1983.
  85. Arnoldo Canclini, *Cómo fue civilizado el sur patagónico* (Buenos Aires, 1977), 189, 192–93, 220; Viñas, *Indios, ejército y frontera*, 147, 155, 211; and Biagini, *Cómo fue la Generación de 80*, 66–67, 86.
  86. Glyn Williams, "Welsh Settlers and Native Americans in Patagonia," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11, no. 1 (1979):41–66.
  87. Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, 108.
  88. *Ibid.*, 123, 260, 276.
  89. Halperin Donghi, "Militarización revolucionaria," 142–44, 157–58; Halperin Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 15, 88, 117; and Juan Carlos Nicolau, *Dorrego gobernador: economía y finanzas (1826–1827)* (Buenos Aires, 1977).
  90. Lynch, *Argentine Dictator*, pp. 213–14, 222.
  91. Halperin Donghi, *Guerra y finanzas*, 11, 91, 178.
  92. *Ibid.*, 172, 232, 235.
  93. *Ibid.*, 110; and Nicolau, *Dorrego gobernador*, 91, 99.
  94. Halperin Donghi, *Proyecto y construcción de una nación*, lxxv, lxxxvi; John L. Robinson,

- Bartólome Mitre: *Historian of the Americas* (Washington, D.C., 1982), 21, 32; and F. J. McLynn, "Political Instability in Córdoba Province during the Eighteen Sixties," *Ibero-Amerikanische Archive* 6, no. 3 (1980):251–69; and F. J. McLynn, "Urquiza and the Montoneros: An Ambiguous Chapter in Argentine History," *Ibero-Amerikanische Archive* 8, no. 3 (1982):283–95.
95. Guy, *Argentine Sugar Politics*, 3; and Karen L. Remmer, *Party Competition in Argentina and Chile: Political Recruitment and Public Policy, 1890–1930* (Lincoln, 1984), 28, 31.
  96. Guy, *Argentine Sugar Politics*, 32.
  97. *Ibid.*, 71; Walter, *The Socialist Party of Argentina*, 19; Remmer, *Party Competition in Argentina*, 32–33, 87–88; and Gilberto Ramírez, Jr., "Reform of the Argentine Army, 1890–1910," Ph.D. diss., University of Texas.
  98. Balmori and Oppenheimer, "Family Clusters," 243.
  99. Gallo, *Farmers in Revolt*, 64–65.
  100. Walters, *The Socialist Party of Argentina*, 46. During La Semana Trágica of 1919, police and "armed mobs" intimidated immigrant workers. Of the 193 workers killed in the strike repression, 179 of them were Jews. See Eugene F. Sofer, *From Pale to Pampa: A Social History of Jews in Buenos Aires* (New York, 1982), 43–44.
  101. Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 34–40.
  102. Lee Bruce Kress, "Julio A. Roca and Argentina, 1880–1886: A Political and Economic Study," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2, 461; and John E. Hodge, "The Role of the Telegraph in the Consolidation and Expansion of the Argentine Republic," *The Americas* 41, no. 1 (July 1984):59–80.
  103. Natalio A. Botana, *El orden conservador: la política argentina entre 1880 y 1916* (Buenos Aires, 1977):51–52, 155–60; and Jorge Balán and Nancy G. López, "Burguesías y gobiernos provinciales en la Argentina: la política impositiva de Tucumán y Mendoza entre 1875 y 1914," *Desarrollo Económico* 67 (1977):427. Also see Fleming, "Regional Development and Transportation," 61.
  104. Botana, *El orden conservador*, 157.
  105. Etchepareborda, "Estructura sociopolítica argentina," 133.
  106. Donna J. Guy, "La industria argentina, 1870–1940: legislación comercial, mercado de acciones y capitalización extranjera," *Desarrollo Económico* 87 (1982):374.
  107. Szuchman, *Mobility and Integration*, 78; and Leandro Gutiérrez, "Condiciones de la vida material de los sectores populares en Buenos Aires, 1880–1914," *Revista de Indias* 41, nos. 163–64 (1981):167–202. Actually, the state's neglect of social responsibility in housing, for example, persisted into the 1940s. See Reutz, "Politics of Inflation," chap. 5.
  108. Douglas S. Friedman, *The State and Underdevelopment in Spanish America: The Political Roots of Dependency in Peru and Argentina* (Boulder, 1984), 168; and Colin M. Lewis, *British Railways in Argentina, 1857–1914: A Case Study of Foreign Investment* (London, 1983), 144–45.
  109. Halperin Donghi, *Proyecto y construcción de una nación*, page c. For contemporary views of the state and its relation to society, see xcvi, xcvi; and Biagini, *Cómo fue la Generación de 80*, 33.
  110. For a list of possible sources for such a study, see Donna J. Guy, "The Rural Working Class in Nineteenth-Century Argentina: Forced Plantation Labor in Tucumán," *LARR* 13, no. 1 (1978):135–45. Argentine scholars are undertaking studies of the provinces. See especially Academia Nacional de la Historia, *Tercer congreso de historia argentina y regional*, 4 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1977), and *Cuarto congreso nacional y regional de historia argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1979).
  111. A scheme for occupational studies may be found in Mark D. Szuchman and Eugene F. Sofer, "The State of Occupational Classification Studies in Argentina: A Classification Scheme," *LARR* 11, no. 2 (1976):159–72. See also Hilda Sabato, "La formación del mercado de trabajo en Buenos Aires, 1850–1880," *Desarrollo Económico* 24 (1985): 561–92, which appeared too late to be discussed in this article.
  112. Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 22–23. Gilberto Ramírez, Jr., suggests that in the military of 1890, at least, civilian employees lost their positions when new commanders assumed control. In other words, patronage in the late nineteenth century still dic-

- tated a turnover as well as an enlargement of governmental employment. See Ramírez, "Reform of the Argentine Army."
113. Eduardo P. Archetti and Kristi Ann Stölen, *Explotación familiar y acumulación de capital en el campo argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1975), 23; Scott Whiteford, *Workers from the North: Plantations, Bolivian Labor, and the City in Northwest Argentina* (Austin, 1981); Ian Rutledge, "Plantations and Peasants in Northern Argentina: The Sugar Cane Industry of Salta and Jujuy, 1930–1943," in *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, edited by David Rock (Pittsburgh, 1975), 103–4; and Adriana Marshall and Dora Orlansky, "Inmigración de países limítrofes y demanda de mano de obra en la Argentina, 1940–1980," *Desarrollo Económico* 23 (1983):35–58.