

Dr. Allers' invocations of elementary textbook scholastic philosophy are unlikely to redound to its credit, and the assumptions underlying some of his arguments leave the impression that in his denunciations of Freudian materialism the pot is indeed calling the kettle black. His main contention, as against that of Dalbiez which has been echoed by Maritain and Mortimer Adler, is that 'theory and practice are so closely bound together in psychoanalysis as to be truly inseparable.' He has little difficulty in proving this point; the pity is that he proves too much. It is a pity too that, as his few references to Jung show clearly, his knowledge of the theory and practice of the Analytical Psychology (Jungian) school is of the most superficial character. But for all his objections to Dalbiez, he shares the view that religion and psychology can be kept in mutually exclusive compartments. A Jungian must conclude that he has, after all, swallowed the essential *venenum freudianum*.

Not very much light, it is to be feared, will be shed on the elusive frontiers of religion and psychology by Dr. Hughes' book, which takes us from the acrimonious arena of Dr. Allers to the urbanities of the parsonage parlour. It is full of ornamental bric-a-brac, and is pervaded by good intentions (of the kind which lead inevitably to the final conclusion that there is No Hell), but presents little evidence of strenuous thought. The 'psychology' is a vague eclecticism, and the 'religious truth' a mush of 'experience' combining unmistakably Modalist, Nestorian and Pelagian elements. There are occasional 'bright ideas,' but they scarcely repay the energy required for the task of reading the whole book.

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY. A Study of the Psychological Prerequisites of Law and Order. By Raynard West, M.D., D.Phil. (Methuen; 15s.)

RELIGION IN PLANNED SOCIETY. By E. C. Urwin. (Epworth Press; 4s.)

Dr. Raynard West sets out to show that we fail to tackle successfully the task of building a world community because 'there are certain simple facts of human nature' which can be learnt from philosopher, psychologist and lawyer but which we have failed to interpret, and that in particular we have misunderstood the place and significance of aggressiveness in our social lives. Noting the extent to which men's theorising is the result of emotional and other non-rational factors, he exemplifies his general statement by a detailed study of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Freud; and proceeds to collect the facts of human nature in 'a way which will avoid the partial and prejudicial selections which we have had to record.' His examination, which uses case-material of normal as well as abnormal or neurotic subjects, leads him to conclude (1) that for the purposes

of sociology we may best divide man's primary instincts into social and aggressive or self-assertive; (2) that both in the happy normal and in the unhappy neurotic personality the social instinct nearly always wins; (3) that we can understand and therefore master collective aggressiveness by analogy with individual aggressiveness, recognising the presence of aggressiveness in ourselves, and the mechanisms of 'distortion' and identification of opponents with primitive fantasy figures and 'projection' on to them of our own aggressiveness; hence (4) that loyalty to world society is not enough without the 'extended self-control' provided by enforced law; (5) that this means that communities of nations as of individuals can be started only by abnegation of absolute sovereignty; (6) that mere 'condensations' of power into bigger groupings of powers (each group implying loyalty *against* other groups) will do nothing to remove the problem of war, but that on the contrary, (7) the problem is 'to find a means of associating with those who are different from and potentially hostile to us. The method is law superior to all groups; the means the force that can create it'; and that finally (8) this abnegation of sovereignty and world-law can either be established voluntarily, or imposed through military victory, or achieved by a revolution of peoples against states as such.

The survey of historical theories from the psychological standpoint which this argument involves is extremely interesting, particularly the alignment of Hobbes with Freud and the comparison of the latter with an aggressive-obsessional patient of the author's; the survey of the facts of human behaviour and the inferences drawn are of great value, especially at the present time when objective thinking about the aggressive instinct is so difficult; and it would be difficult to over-stress the importance of the main conclusion, that we must recognise the presence of aggressiveness in ourselves, and guarantee its control by renouncing national sovereignty sufficiently to allow of effective control by world law—the League failed because of lack of machinery for 'utilising the loyalty of its members by *taking the execution of their promises out of their own hands.*'

And yet the argument seems to stop short of completeness. Law is not the restraint of self-assertiveness; it is the restraint of this or that *expression* of self-assertiveness. And how are we to decide which expressions ought to be restrained and which not? 'It is the obsessionals who lead us into aggressiveness'; 'we cannot judge our own cause': true, but perhaps not the whole truth? An objective standard of justice will surely say that some acts of self-assertion are justified and necessary, and others not. It is just here, at the point at which objective principles—the *content* of law—become necessary that the argument halts. Perhaps the very scant space given in the historical survey to the Middle Ages in general and to St. Thomas in particular is significant. (Vitoria is not even mentioned.) These men did not 'fail completely' to find a law con-

trolling war; they were working to define the content of law within a framework (of faith and theology) which itself supplied a sanction. True, it was a sanction that could be defied; but it is surely inaccurate to read our modern scorn of religious principles and consequent complete lack of common ground into a more theologically-minded age. And it is significant also that Dr. West scarcely mentions Jung; and sees no difference between the psychologist who sees sex or fear or aggressiveness in everything, and the psychologist who sees religion in everything: all are 'equally fetishists'; yet religion is unlike the rest in that, whether fact or fiction, it is at any rate admittedly all-inclusive. It can supply a content to the notion of Equity, which otherwise is apt to be nebulous and endlessly disputed in application; it can also supply a motive force for self-abnegation where the cold light of reason is likely to fail.

It is here that Mr. Urwin's book provides a needed complement to Dr. West's. Even in national life we are far from having successfully defined the content of controlling law. According to Dr. West, we have solved the problem of individual aggressiveness by the rule of law: but is it not true to say that aggressiveness, robbed of its political outlet, has found an economic outlet—and has reduced us to a state of injustice which makes men clamour precisely for a planned society? But is a planned society compatible with freedom? Once again, it depends surely on two things: the extent (or content) of the planning, and what Mr. Urwin notes as the 'most desperate need of planned society, the need for a faith to give the body [politic] a soul.' It is above all the sense of thwarted justice which produces the demand for planning; but if we are to have justice must it be at the expense of freedom? Dr. West says yes, though not of happiness; Mr. Urwin, with what seems greater penetration, says no. The Christian religion is widely distrusted in the modern world because of the subservience to vested interests which men see in many professed Christians; yet in the main it has fought hard both for justice and for freedom; and because it is clear in principle as to the extent of public planning and of private initiative alike, it can safeguard both. (It is a pity that Mr. Urwin, treating of all this, did not enumerate the areas of individual freedom more explicitly.) Again, because Christianity can 'give the body a soul' it can save freedom not only by limiting the *extent* of planning, but by determining the *mode* of planning: for a community spirit which accepts and *wills* the control of law makes obedience itself a form of freedom. Dr. West has done a great service in making the 'psychological prerequisites' of order clear; Mr. Urwin helps us to see a stage further, to the need of establishing the content of laws (governing the economic as well as the political domain), and of a common faith which will make even obedience to those laws themselves an act of freedom.

GERALD VANN, O.P.