

freedom. When, however, he notes that we can have limitations put on what we can do, to the extreme of ruling out action altogether, but it is within these limitations that we are more or less free, depending on the coherence of our motivations, memories of the rather scornful assertions of Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, "when I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less", steal forward.

Wetzel's book is not an easy book. It may give a not very rounded picture of Augustine. It is, however, a spur to the continuing contemporary debate concerning human autonomy.

ALVYN PETERSEN

AQUINAS ON HUMAN ACTION: A THEORY OF PRACTICE, by Ralph McInerny, *The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1992, Pp. ix + 244. \$19.95 [Paperback Edition].*

This reviewer has often considered "Action Theory" to be one of the more difficult philosophical issues to elucidate and analyze with care. Beyond this general concern, the action theory articulated by Thomas Aquinas in the first section of the *Prima Secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae* is one of the more difficult bits of philosophical analysis in Aquinas to lay out clearly and perspicuously. Ralph McInerny, the Michael P. Grace Professor of Medieval Studies and Director of the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame, has attempted such a project with this well crafted and thoughtful book. Convinced that Aquinas's action theory is an important connecting link between the structure of natural law and the discussion of the ultimate end, Professor McInerny takes special care to provide a painstaking analysis of how Aquinas indeed elucidates a consistent and coherent theory of human action. The closest competitor to McInerny's analysis of these difficult texts in Aquinas is that given by the late Alan Donagan in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* [Cambridge, 1982].

The book is divided into two principal sections. The first part—nearly two-thirds of the book—consists of McInerny's elucidation of the *Prima Secundae* texts dealing with action theory. This first section contains large sections of Aquinas's text—both the Latin text and an English translation side by side—together with McInerny's thoughtful commentary. The second part contains six essays in which McInerny discusses contemporary issues directly related to action theory and to natural law.

Schematically, the issues of natural law theory determine the structure and scope of this book. Aquinas argues that "moral acts and human acts are the same" [I-II, Q 1, a. 3]. Historically, the canon for natural law in western moral and legal theory is Aquinas's account found in Questions 90-97 of the *Prima Secundae*. McInerny argues that this set of questions is in some ways a unique treatment of philosophical issues in Aquinas. He also argues that this discussion of natural law makes sense only if one understands Aquinas on action theory on the one hand

and Aquinas's reformulation of Aristotelian "ultimate end" talk on the other. Given this goal, McInerney provides clearly articulated accounts of Aquinas on the difference between speculative reason and practical reason, the self-evident first principles, the practical syllogism, the naturalistic fallacy, the will, willing, and the role of intention, as these important concepts fit into Aquinas's account of human action, especially as related to moral action. This reviewer has often been troubled by how Aquinas plays out the distinction between will and practical reason; McInerney's analysis resolved these worries with dispatch.

There may be two audiences for this book. Philosophers interested in how Aquinas unpacks conceptually these thorny issues in action theory will find the first section illuminating and sophisticated philosophically. Those philosophers—and moral theologians—interested in natural law reconstructions articulated by contemporary philosophers will find the second section more attractive.

In this latter section, McInerney considers in some detail what he takes to be problems with certain contemporary elucidations of Aquinas on action theory and natural law moral theory. He provides a thoughtful analysis of the revisionist natural law account offered by John Finnis in *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, suggesting that Finnis's position on practical reason does not square with Aquinas and Aristotle. McInerney is quite critical of the interpretation of Aquinas's Aristotelianism put forward by Père Gauthier, the editor of the Leonine edition of Aquinas's *Sententiae super libros Ethicorum*. According to McInerney, Gauthier "insists that St. Thomas must be put in the forefront of those who did violence to Aristotle's thought by forcing it into the Procrustean bed of Christian theology" [p. 161]. McInerney suggests a more consistent reading of the role of "ultimate end"—acting "*sub ratione boni*"—in Aristotle and Aquinas which, he claims, resolves this difficulty.

Moral theologians concerned with the "proportionalism" debates will find McInerney's analysis of the work of Theo Belmans informative. Parts of this essay contain short summaries of several twentieth century commentators on Aquinas. McInerney suggests that Donagan's account of action theory in Aquinas is not completely foursquare with the texts, especially regarding "*usus*." This reviewer found McInerney's discussion of the historical and contemporary similarities and differences between natural law and natural right to be well worth the price of the book. Rights theory is tremendously important in contemporary jurisprudence, especially given the work of Rawls, Dworkin and Nozick. Some political philosophers have attempted to make sense of "natural right" in light of natural law. McInerney sorts out this complicated set of issues with care, suggesting that what Aquinas means by "*ius naturale*" is distinct conceptually from contemporary accounts of the foundation for rights theory. Moreover, he offers enlightening suggestions regarding Maritain's theory of rights and its connection with natural law.

This is a thoughtfully crafted yet dualistic book. The account of action theory in Aquinas is elucidated clearly and with care. Philosophers

interested in making sense of Aquinas's texts will do well to read McInerney's commentary. The essays on contemporary moral and legal theory in the second section of the book offer McInerney's reflections on what he takes to be strengths and weaknesses in recent work in Aquinian studies. While one might disagree with McInerney at times, nonetheless a thoughtful reader always learns something useful and important in considering his analyses of issues in the philosophy of Aquinas.

ANTHONY J. LISSKA

THE EUCHARIST MAKES THE CHURCH, Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas in Dialogue, by Paul McPartian. Foreword by Edward Yarnold, S.J. T & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1993. pp.xxii-342, £24.95.

The thesis studied in this comparison of the theology of de Lubac and Zizioulas is that the latter's concept of the Church as the corporate personality of Christ has synthesised the two parts of the former's apothegm: "The Church makes the Eucharist and the Eucharist makes the Church" and that Zizioulas, initially influenced by the patristic work of de Lubac, has carried forward the implications of that synthesis in his own mystical ecclesiology. The book accordingly constructs what it calls a dialogue between these two theologians who in fact rarely allude to each other. Parts I and II present in turn the theology of each, structured in parallel with chapters 1-3 and 6-8 setting their eucharistic doctrine in a context of ecumenical considerations, patristic studies and an existential theology of human personhood. The main eucharistic thesis of each is approached in chapters 4-5 and 9-10, while in Part III the author claims to carry forward the dialogue thus set up.

A cluster of related themes from the principal programmatic works of each theologian is analysed, starting with the premise common to both that Christian life is essentially ecclesial and not individualistic. Christian personhood, distinct from individual biological existence, finds its hypostasis not merely in human relationships but in relationships developed in and through the body of the risen and glorified Christ—his Church. This provides the platform for development of the main theme—the relationship between Church and Eucharist, and opens up the contrasts between the two authors. It is contended that de Lubac sees Christian personhood as achieved by the grace of the Holy Spirit through the indwelling of the incarnate Christ in all individuals, who are united in one body, the Church, by the fact of this identical indwelling in each. The celebration of the Eucharist renders this salvific indwelling currently available, and so gathers the Church. Thus the mystical effect of the Eucharist shines from the past events of Calvary and resurrection on to the present celebrating Church, and moves her members forward towards the final glorious consummation of the last day. Zizioulas on the other hand sees the human Christ as a corporate personality, inseparable from the body of those redeemed through the execution of