

or not. To demand retribution in this sense is to make the suffering of the criminal an end in itself. And to seek the harm of another as an end in itself is an evil thing; which, I take it, is what Socrates meant.

Lord Longford writes: 'In terms of strict justice it seems to me that the man who has broken the law has placed himself in the debt of society. Society, therefore, has a right to insist on some form of restitution or compensation' (p. 60). But one can pay a debt to someone only by benefiting him in some way; and how does society benefit by the useless suffering of any of its members? I can think of only one way in which it might be thought to do so. Suburban housewives, if we may believe the *New Statesman*, feel an intense desire to have young hooligans thrashed. It might well be thought, therefore, that a juvenile delinquent who is chastised in this manner is performing, perhaps for the first time in his life, a public service: he is keeping the suburban housewives happy. I have heard this argument put forward seriously by a philosopher: but I hardly think it would appeal to Lord Longford any more than it does to me.

But isn't it true that criminals *deserve* to be punished? Yes, if they have broken a law which carries a punishment as its sanction: this is what in this context 'deserving punishment' means. But don't the wicked deserve to suffer, quite apart from any context of law and sanction? No: not in any sense of 'deserve' in which an injustice is done if a man does not get his deserts. If a bad man deserved, in this sense, to suffer, then every time an offence was forgiven, an injustice would be done. A good man deserves to be happy, and a bad man does not deserve to be happy; that is all. But doesn't the good man deserve to be *happier than* the bad man, so that *he* is cheated of *his* deserts if the bad man is happy after all? No: we cannot say that a good man deserves to be *happier than* a bad man; unless, that is, we accept the philosophy of the Prodigal's elder brother.

Perhaps I have misunderstood Lord Longford's theory of retribution; I trust that I have. But it seems to me sad that a book so obviously full of goodwill and earnest thought should even appear to lend the authority of his name to a theory so mistaken.

Since the book will certainly be reprinted, it may be worth while to point out some misprints: 'McDoughall' (p. 29), 'Teilhard du Chardin' (p. 74), 'Hobbs' (p. 80), 'Bloomesbury' (p. 81), 'Fr Kevin S.J.' (for 'Fr Kelly S.J.', p. 92), 'Routledge' (p. 103), and, quaintest of all, 'Irish Murdoch' (p. 84).

ANTHONY KENNY

PAUL AND HIS PREDECESSORS, by A. M. Hunter; S.C.M. Press, 15s.

The first 115 pages of this book are a reprint of a study which appeared in 1940, reacting against the widespread exaggeration among Protestant biblical scholars of St Paul's role as a doctrinal innovator. It was then argued more frequently than it is now that Paul was the source from which other New Testament writers

derived much of their doctrine; while his own dependence on the traditions of the primitive Church, stemming ultimately from our Lord himself, tended to be overlooked. The 1940 study examines the dependence of Paul on his predecessors, and some detailed attention is given to many apparently pre-Pauline allusions, traditions, hymns and doctrines contained in his letters. A 35-page appendix, 'After twenty years', surveys the original work and brings it up to date in conformity, for the most part, with the views of Jeremias, Cullmann and Dodd. It is interesting to see just how far it has been necessary to amend the author's earlier exegesis, for here is a reflexion of the progress made in biblical studies in the last twenty years. It is unfortunate that each subject for study is divided between the main part of the book and the appendix; however the whole is still valuable as a concise and readable account of some leading biblical criticism. One would like to have seen more appreciation of Paul's immense personal contribution as a creative theologian, especially in regard to the *body*, and the antithesis *flesh-spirit*. By the nature of its thesis, the book leaves a one-sided impression.

It may seem to some that Paul's debt to the traditions he received is too obvious to need thrashing out. Catholics especially are hardly likely to suspect Paul of creating his own doctrine in cases, for example, where it is plainly affirmed in the synoptic Gospels. True as this is, an examination of the elements of tradition, cult and doctrine which Paul inherited illuminates the 'twilight period' of primitive Christianity. 'We can, to some extent, know what the pre-Pauline Christians believed; what *kerygma* they proclaimed; what ethical teaching they gave to converts; what sacraments they celebrated, and the kind of hymns they sang; how they conceived of Jesus their Master, and how they interpreted and used the Old Testament scriptures; how they thought about the Holy Spirit, and what convictions they held about the last things'. (p. 110f).

ROBERT SHARP, O.P.

CHRIST AND US, by Jean Daniélou; Mowbray, 30s.

'The aim of the present work', says the author in his introduction, "is to provide a kind of Summa", a comprehensive survey, from the standpoint of every intellectual discipline, of Christian speculation concerning the Incarnate Word of God'.

That is the first paragraph of the publisher's 'blurb', and constitutes a fairly accurate picture of the kind of book Père Daniélou has set out to write. It is a work of popularization plus a dash of polemic, a mixture that makes it a very easy book to read. What I am less certain about is whether or not this is a good thing. In a simple, sometimes an over simple, way it introduces many of the themes of modern theology, but it introduces so many of them that they often receive just the sketchiest treatment. On the other hand it may be argued that this is not very important when the author is simply concerned to produce a short