

Appendix

TABLE A.1 *Additional descriptive statistics*

| | Variable | N | Mean | Range | Source |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|--------|---------------|---|
| Controls: Electoral | Vote Gap, 2002 | 13,754 | 0.358 | 0–1 | Author Coded; <i>Direction Generale des Elections</i> |
| | Vote Gap, 2009 | 13,595 | 0.378 | 0–1 | Author Coded; <i>Direction Generale des Elections</i> |
| | Winning % Votes, 2002 | 13,756 | 0.657 | 0.047–1 | Author Coded; <i>Direction Generale des Elections</i> |
| | Winning % Votes, 2009 | 13,593 | 0.659 | 0–1 | Author Coded; <i>Direction Generale des Elections</i> |
| | Nat'l Alignment, 2002 | 14,461 | 0.6 | 0–1 | Author Coded; <i>Direction Generale des Elections</i> |
| | Nat'l Alignment, 2009 | 14,461 | 0.67 | 0–1 | Author Coded; <i>Direction Generale des Elections</i> |
| Controls: CG Favoritism | Teacher/Student Ratio, 2002 | 14,461 | 0.266 | 0–1 | Author Coded from Ministry of Education data |
| | Teacher/Student Ratio, 2009 | 14,461 | 0.292 | 0–1 | Author Coded from Ministry of Education data |
| | Avg. CG Transfers | 14,457 | 23,495 | 13,201–86,186 | <i>Direction des Collectivites Locales</i> |
| Controls: Ethnicity | Wolof, 2002 | 14,461 | 0.499 | 0–1 | Author Coded |
| | Wolof, 2009 | 14,461 | 0.494 | 0–1 | Author Coded |
| | Ethnic Fractionalization, 2002 | 14,457 | 63.84 | 16.66–98 | Author Coded |
| | Ethnic Fractionalization, 2009 | 14,457 | 63.79 | 16.66–98 | Author Coded |

| | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|--------|---------|------------|---|
| Controls: Social Capital Location-Allocation Models | # Civic Associations, 2002 | 14,489 | 1.839 | 0-5 | ANSD <i>Enquête Villages</i> 2002, 2009 |
| | # Civic Associations, 2009 | 14,490 | 2.474 | 0-5 | ANSD <i>Enquête Villages</i> 2002, 2009 |
| | Max. Attendance, Schools 2002-2009 | 285 | 305.63 | 0-2,680.3 | Author Coded |
| | Max. Attendance, Schools 2009-2012 | 318 | 579.9 | 0-4,169.4 | Author Coded |
| | Max. Attendance, Clinics 2009-2012 | 183 | 2,805.6 | 0-22,759.6 | Author Coded |
| | Max. Coverage, Schools 2002-2009 | 285 | 766.31 | 0-5,945 | Author Coded |
| | Max. Coverage, Schools 2009-2012 | 318 | 413.3 | 0-4,678 | Author Coded |
| | Max. Coverage, Schools 2009-2012 | 183 | 639.9 | 0-8,580 | Author Coded |
| Placebo Test Outcomes | New High Schools | 14,509 | 0.002 | 0-1 | ANSD <i>Enquête Villages</i> 2002, 2009 |
| | Electrification | 12,266 | 0.028 | 0-1 | ANSD <i>Enquête Villages</i> 2002, 2009 |
| | New Roads | 12,266 | 0.109 | 0-1 | ANSD <i>Enquête Villages</i> 2002, 2009 |

TABLE A.2 *Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new social services (Figure 5.2)*

| | New primary school access, odds ratios | | | | | | | | New clinic access, odds ratios | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | 2002–2009 | | | | 2009–2012 | | | | 2009–2012 | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 2.762 ^{***} (0.404) | 2.775 ^{***} (0.404) | 2.341 ^{***} (0.355) | 2.452 ^{***} (0.379) | 2.035 ^{***} (0.314) | 2.022 ^{***} (0.309) | 1.597 ^{***} (0.255) | 1.573 ^{**} (0.261) | 1.662 ^{**} (0.273) | 1.655 ^{**} (0.271) | 1.919 ^{***} (0.329) | 1.850 ^{***} (0.325) |
| Ln Population | 1.417 ^{***} (0.037) | 1.387 ^{***} (0.037) | 1.341 ^{***} (0.036) | 1.354 ^{***} (0.038) | 1.586 ^{***} (0.046) | 1.551 ^{***} (0.046) | 1.457 ^{***} (0.044) | 1.473 ^{***} (0.046) | 1.223 ^{***} (0.040) | 1.229 ^{***} (0.041) | 1.234 ^{***} (0.042) | 1.231 ^{***} (0.043) |
| Dist. School Baseline (sqrt) | 1.038 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.038 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.041 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.043 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.037 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.036 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.039 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.041 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.025 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.025 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.026 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.026 ^{***} (0.001) |
| Population Density | 1.000 ^{**} (0.000) | 1.000 ^{**} (0.000) | 1.000 ^{**} (0.000) | 1.000 ^{**} (0.000) | 1.000 ^{**} (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) |
| % Villages Schools | 1.007 ^{**} (0.003) | 1.009 ^{**} (0.003) | 1.009 ^{***} (0.003) | | 1.013 ^{***} (0.003) | 1.008 ^{**} (0.003) | 1.009 ^{***} (0.003) | | | | | |
| % Villages Clinics | | | | | | | | | 0.174 ^{**} (0.132) | 0.977 (0.595) | 0.832 (0.521) | |
| Local Economic Activity | | 1.045 ^{**} (0.023) | 1.023 (0.023) | 1.025 (0.028) | | 1.031 (0.020) | 1.019 (0.020) | 1.066 ^{**} (0.028) | | 0.969 (0.026) | 0.984 (0.027) | 0.959 (0.030) |
| Department Wealth Measure | | 1.054 (0.074) | 1.127 (0.074) | | | 1.064 (0.072) | 1.117 (0.076) | | | 1.158 (0.133) | 1.213 (0.142) | |
| % Mouride | | 0.689 (0.482) | 1.110 (0.715) | | | 1.294 (0.866) | 1.420 (0.944) | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| # Built Schools | | 1.144 ^{***} (0.012) | 1.164 ^{***} (0.012) | | | 1.162 ^{***} (0.017) | 1.184 ^{***} (0.017) | | | | | |
| # Built Clinics | | | | | | | | | | | 2.010 ^{***} (0.103) | |
| Village Elevation | | | 0.996 (0.001) | 0.998 (0.002) | | | 1.000 (0.002) | 0.998 (0.002) | | | 0.996 (0.002) | 0.996 ^{**} (0.002) |
| Ln Dist. Waterway | | | 0.958 (0.022) | 0.949 (0.026) | | | 0.966 (0.024) | 0.994 (0.031) | | | 1.005 (0.031) | 1.064 (0.039) |
| Soil Fertility | | | 0.989 (0.009) | 0.986 (0.011) | | | 0.876 ^{**} (0.010) | 0.967 ^{**} (0.011) | | | 0.998 (0.013) | 0.984 (0.014) |
| Ln Dist. Road | | | 0.987 (0.023) | 0.975 (0.023) | | | 0.935 ^{**} (0.024) | 0.938 ^{**} (0.024) | | | 1.000 (0.029) | 0.997 (0.029) |
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | | | 0.737 ^{***} (0.029) | 0.869 ^{***} (0.032) | | | 0.762 ^{***} (0.033) | 0.789 ^{***} (0.035) | | | 1.165 ^{**} (0.062) | 1.211 ^{***} (0.066) |
| Local Government Capital | | | 4.583 ^{***} (0.722) | 4.636 ^{***} (0.752) | | | 4.854 ^{***} (0.696) | 4.469 ^{***} (0.646) | | | 0.729 (0.195) | 0.732 (0.196) |
| N | 14,267 | 14,267 | 14,167 | 13,553 | 14,224 | 14,224 | 14,124 | 13,611 | 11,269 | 11,269 | 11,190 | 8,274 |
| Level-2 | 318 | 318 | 318 | | 368 | 368 | 368 | | 286 | 286 | 286 | |
| Pseudo-R ² | | | | 0.146 | | | | 0.132 | | | | 0.074 |
| FE | | | | Y | | | | Y | | | | Y |

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.

TABLE A.3 *Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new social services, increased buffer size*

| | New primary school access, odds ratios | | | | New clinic access, odds ratios | |
|-------------------------------------|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|
| | 2002–2009 | | 2009–2012 | | 2009–2012 | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Institutional Congruence 25 km | 1.651** (0.266) | | 1.438** (0.235) | | 1.734** (0.349) | |
| Institutional Congruence 30 km | | 2.813*** (0.431) | | 1.884*** (0.309) | | 0.950 (0.165) |
| Ln Population | 1.340*** (0.036) | 1.342*** (0.036) | 1.456*** (0.044) | 1.457*** (0.044) | 1.223*** (0.042) | 1.229*** (0.042) |
| Dist. School Baseline (sqrt) | 1.040*** (0.001) | 1.041*** (0.001) | 1.039*** (0.001) | 1.039*** (0.001) | 1.025*** (0.001) | 1.025*** (0.001) |
| Population Density (3 km radius) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) |
| % Villages Schools | 1.008** (0.003) | 1.001** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | 1.009*** (0.003) | | |
| % Villages Clinics | | | | | 0.790 (0.496) | 0.749 (0.469) |
| Local Economic Activity | 1.020 (0.023) | 1.021 (0.023) | 1.019 (0.020) | 1.016 (0.02) | 0.985 (0.027) | 0.984 (0.027) |
| Department Wealth Measure | 1.104 (0.073) | 1.118 (0.075) | 1.105 (0.076) | 1.109 (0.076) | 1.218 (0.143) | 1.226 (0.144) |
| % Mouride | 1.020 (0.659) | 1.028 (0.672) | 1.286 (0.854) | 1.270 (0.843) | | |
| # Built Schools | 1.164*** (0.012) | 1.166*** (0.012) | 1.184*** (0.018) | 1.185*** (0.018) | | |

| | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| # Built Clinics | | | | | 2.008 ^{***} (0.105) | 2.004 ^{***} (0.104) |
| Village Elevation | 0.998 (0.001) | 0.999 (0.001) | 1.001 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.002) | 0.997 (0.002) | 0.996 (0.002) |
| Ln Dist. Waterway | 0.954 ^{**} (0.022) | 0.955 ^{**} (0.022) | 0.963 (0.024) | 0.964 (0.024) | 1.006 (0.031) | 0.999 (0.031) |
| Soil fertility | 0.989 (0.009) | 0.992 (0.009) | 0.975 ^{**} (0.010) | 0.976 ^{**} (0.010) | 1.006 (0.014) | 1.006 (0.014) |
| Ln Dist. Road | 0.986 (0.023) | 0.987 (0.023) | 0.934 ^{**} (0.023) | 0.934 ^{**} (0.0254) | 0.990 (0.029) | 0.989 (0.029) |
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | 0.722 ^{***} (0.029) | 0.739 ^{***} (0.029) | 0.754 ^{***} (0.032) | 0.764 ^{***} (0.033) | 1.157 ^{**} (0.062) | 1.124 ^{**} (0.059) |
| Local Government Capital | 4.660 ^{***} (0.734) | 4.588 ^{***} (0.724) | 4.889 ^{***} (0.701) | 4.839 ^{***} (0.694) | 0.741 (0.198) | 0.747 (0.199) |
| N | 14,167 | 14,167 | 14,124 | 14,124 | 10,930 | 10,930 |
| Level-2 | 318 | 318 | 368 | 368 | 282 | 282 |

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.

TABLE A.4 *Effect of institutional congruence on village access to new social services, reduced measure of access*

| | New primary school access in 2 km, odds ratios | | New primary school access in 1 km, odds ratios | | New clinic access in 3 km, odds ratios | New clinic access in 1 km, odds ratios |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|---|
| | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2009–2012 | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 2.363 ^{***} (0.372) | 1.549 ^{**} (0.252) | 2.157 ^{***} (0.378) | 1.171 (0.204) | 1.991 ^{***} (0.365) | 2.053 ^{**} (0.511) |
| Ln Population | 1.409 ^{***} (0.039) | 1.481 ^{***} (0.046) | 1.744 ^{***} (0.057) | 1.766 ^{***} (0.062) | 1.278 ^{***} (0.047) | 1.705 ^{***} (0.086) |
| Dist. School Baseline (sqrt) | 1.037 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.035 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.033 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.031 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.023 ^{***} (0.001) | 1.019 ^{***} (0.002) |
| Population Density (3 km radius) | 1.000 ^{**} (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 0.999 (0.000) |
| % Villages Schools | 1.009 ^{***} (0.003) | 1.009 ^{***} (0.003) | 1.012 ^{***} (0.003) | 1.011 ^{***} (0.003) | | |
| % Villages Clinics | | | | | 0.781 (0.446) | 1.110 (0.593) |
| Local Economic Activity | 1.002 (0.022) | 1.021 (0.020) | 1.014 (0.023) | 1.001 (0.020) | 0.985 (0.027) | 1.008 (0.030) |
| Department Wealth Measure | 1.101 (0.070) | 1.105 (0.073) | 1.103 (0.067) | 1.116 (0.069) | 1.116 (0.114) | 1.106 (0.101) |
| % Mouride | 0.525 (0.347) | 1.177 (0.763) | 0.553 (0.357) | 1.807 (1.107) | | |
| # Built Schools | 1.154 ^{***} (0.011) | 1.175 ^{***} (0.017) | 1.142 ^{***} (0.010) | 1.165 ^{***} (0.015) | | |
| # Built Clinics | | | | | 1.738 ^{***} (0.076) | 1.545 ^{***} (0.058) |

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Village Elevation | 0.999 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.002) | 1.000 (0.002) | 1.001 (0.002) | 0.997 (0.002) | 1.000 (0.002) |
| Ln Dist. Waterway | 0.949** (0.022) | 0.964 (0.023) | 0.958 (0.022) | 0.973 (0.023) | 0.995 (0.031) | 0.955 (0.032) |
| Soil Fertility | 0.983 (0.009) | 0.981 (0.010) | 0.982 (0.011) | 0.989 (0.011) | 0.985 (0.014) | 0.983 (0.017) |
| Ln Dist. Road | 0.969 (0.023) | 0.937** (0.024) | 0.967 (0.025) | 0.947** (0.026) | 0.969 (0.030) | 0.954 (0.038) |
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | 0.734*** (0.031) | 0.759*** (0.033) | 0.763*** (0.034) | 0.774*** (0.036) | 1.078 (0.059) | 1.046 (0.072) |
| Local Government Capital | 4.024*** (0.637) | 4.363*** (0.627) | 3.134*** (0.507) | 3.905*** (0.567) | 0.833 (0.221) | 1.032 (0.279) |
| N | 14,167 | 14,124 | 14,167 | 14,124 | 10,655 | 10,655 |
| Level-2 | 318 | 368 | 318 | 368 | 273 | 273 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.

TABLE A.5A *Effect of alternative explanations on village access to new primary schools, odds ratios (Figure 5.3a and b)*

| | Panel A: Electoral variables | | | | | | Panel B: Civic associations | | Panel C: Ethnicity | | | | Panel D: Central gov. relations | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|------|------------------|------|---------------------------------|-----------|------|
| | 2002–2009 | | | 2009–2012 | | | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | 2002–2009 | | 2009–2012 | | 2002–2009 | 2009–2012 | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) |
| Vote Gap | 0.652 (0.315) | | | 0.939 (0.445) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Vote Gap × Ln Population | 1.015 (0.088) | | | 1.000 (0.083) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Logged Population | 1.369*** (0.055) | 1.477*** (0.145) | | 1.570*** (0.069) | 1.579*** (0.153) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Winning % Votes | | 1.119 (0.917) | | | 0.803 (0.649) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Winning % Votes × Ln Population | | 0.896 (0.131) | | | 0.989 (0.140) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nationally Aligned | | | 1.013 (0.105) | | | 1.036 (0.111) | | | | | | | | | |
| # Civic Associations | | | | | | | 0.992 (0.022) | 1.036 (0.024) | | | | | | | |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | | | | | | | | | 0.999 (0.003) | | 0.988 (0.003) | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Wolof Dominant | | | | | | | | | 0.976 (0.123) | | 1.136 (0.142) | | | | |
| % Change Teachers per Student/ Region | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.317*** (0.098) | | 1.409 (0.257) |
| Average CG Transfer (\$) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0.9999** (0.000) | |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 2.833*** (0.421) | 2.837*** (0.422) | 2.552*** (0.362) | 2.148*** (0.337) | 2.146*** (0.337) | 2.021*** (0.309) | 2.774*** (0.404) | 2.019*** (0.309) | 2.774*** (0.404) | 2.776*** (0.405) | 2.023*** (0.309) | 2.019*** (0.308) | 2.794*** (0.408) | 2.019*** (0.309) | 2.018*** (0.308) |
| N | 13,568 | 13,568 | 14,267 | 13,364 | 13,362 | 14,224 | 14,267 | 14,224 | 14,267 | 14,267 | 14,224 | 14,224 | 14,267 | 14,224 | 14,224 |
| Level-2 | 313 | 313 | 318 | 358 | 358 | 368 | 318 | 368 | 318 | 318 | 368 | 368 | 318 | 368 | 368 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.

TABLE A.5B *Effect of alternative explanations on village access to new clinics, odds ratios (Figure 5.3c)*

| | Panel A: Electoral variables | | | Panel B: Civic associations | Panel C: Ethnicity | | Panel D: Central gov. relations |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Vote Gap | 1.599 (0.903) | | | | | | |
| Vote Gap × Ln Population | 0.924 (0.093) | | | | | | |
| Logged Population | 1.239*** (0.063) | 1.456** (0.178) | | | | | |
| Winning % Votes | | 8.422** (8.275) | | | | | |
| Winning % Votes × Ln Population | | 0.742 (0.132) | | | | | |
| Nationally Aligned | | | 1.029 (0.186) | | | | |
| # Civic Associations | | | | 1.005 (0.028) | | | |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | | | | | 0.999 (0.004) | | |
| Wolof Dominant | | | | | | 0.882 (0.169) | |
| Average CG Transfer (\$) | | | | | | | 0.999 (0.000) |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 1.592** (0.263) | 1.599** (0.264) | 1.665** (0.271) | 1.654** (0.271) | 1.656** (0.271) | 1.665** (0.271) | 1.655** (0.271) |
| N | 10,596 | 10,594 | 11,269 | 11,269 | 11,268 | 11,268 | 11,268 |
| Level-2 | 278 | 278 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 | 286 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$. Models report odds ratios and standard errors, in parentheses, from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. All hierarchical models include a centered mean of precolonial centralization at the local government level (level 2) as well as an interaction term between village latitude and longitude.

TABLE A.6 *Trust estimates (Figure 5.4)*

| | Panel B. Nunn and Wantchenkon replication | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| | Relatives | Acquaintances | Local government | Neighbors | Other Senegalese |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Slave Exports per Area | 0.011 (0.017) | 0.053 (0.050) | 0.038 (0.077) | -0.047 (0.052) | 0.013 (0.081) |
| Age | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.003) | -0.004 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.004) |
| Age ² | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.071 (0.066) | 0.115 (0.077) | -0.043 (0.073) | -0.029 (0.113) |
| % Co-ethnic | 0.027 (0.036) | -0.005 (0.129) | -0.146 (0.167) | 0.193 (0.103) | 0.206 (0.165) |
| Went w/o Cooking Oil | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.045 (0.027) | 0.018 (0.035) | 0.024 (0.026) | -0.072 (0.042) |
| Went w/o Cash Income | 0.009 (0.009) | 0.031 (0.036) | 0.059 (0.042) | 0.003 (0.029) | -0.037 (0.052) |
| Went w/o Medical | 0.006 (0.012) | 0.042 (0.033) | -0.037 (0.045) | 0.023 (0.021) | -0.052 (0.043) |
| Went w/o Water | -0.002 (0.009) | 0.030 (0.025) | -0.051 (0.031) | -0.024 (0.021) | 0.036 (0.034) |
| Went w/o Enough Food | -0.001 (0.006) | -0.006 (0.028) | -0.00 (0.032) | 0.001 (0.022) | 0.009 (0.046) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.000 (0.001) | -0.002 (0.004) | -0.001 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.000 (0.003) |
| Education FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Religion FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Employment FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Department FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Round FE | Y | Y | Y | Rd 5 Only | Rd 5 Only |
| N | 1,232 | 1,217 | 1,085 | 585 | 610 |
| R2 | 0.129 | 0.251 | 0.121 | 0.170 | 0.128 |

(continued)

| Panel C. Afrobarometer data | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Relatives | Acquaintances | Local government | Neighbors | Other Senegalese |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Inst. Congruence 20 km | 0.004 (0.024) | -0.185 (0.118) | -0.265 (0.262) | -0.211** (0.079) | -0.239 (0.231) |
| Age | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.002 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.004) |
| Age ² | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.021 (0.024) | 0.075 (0.065) | 0.119 (0.077) | -0.034 (0.071) | -0.021 (0.0117) |
| % Co-ethnic | 0.033 (0.035) | 0.002 (0.124) | -0.141 (0.168) | 0.163 (0.103) | 0.215 (0.166) |
| Went w/o Cooking Oil | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.045 (0.027) | 0.017 (0.036) | 0.026 (0.026) | -0.070 (0.043) |
| Went w/o Cash Income | 0.009 (0.009) | 0.029 (0.036) | 0.056 (0.042) | 0.002 (0.029) | -0.041 (0.053) |
| Went w/o Medical | 0.005 (0.012) | 0.041 (0.033) | -0.039 (0.046) | 0.025 (0.022) | -0.053 (0.043) |
| Went w/o Water | -0.003 (0.009) | 0.030 (0.025) | -0.048 (0.031) | -0.025 (0.021) | 0.038 (0.033) |
| Went w/o Enough Food | -0.001 (0.006) | -0.006 (0.028) | -0.004 (0.031) | 0.001 (0.021) | 0.008 (0.046) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.000 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.004) | -0.000 (0.005) | 0.002 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Education FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Religion FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Employment FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Department FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Round FE | Y | Y | Y | Rd 5 Only | Rd 5 Only |
| N | 1,238 | 1,223 | 1,090 | 587 | 614 |
| R ² | 0.127 | 0.251 | 0.126 | 0.173 | 0.133 |

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report results and standard errors clustered by Department, in parentheses, from OLS models.

TABLE A.7 *Effect of institutional congruence on location-allocation choices (Figure 5.6)*

| | Maximize attendance | | | Maximize coverage | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Schools, 2002–2009 | Schools, 2009–2012 | Clinics, 2009–2012 | Schools, 2002–2009 | Schools, 2009–2012 | Clinics, 2009–2012 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | -75.53 (52.86) | -27.54 (86.57) | 714.01 (599.32) | -567.45*** (110.69) | -167.27** (74.55) | -685.89** (292.06) |
| Ln Population (LG) | 267.63** (57.82) | 221.65** (84.42) | 1,957.9*** (466.29) | 630.08** (188.13) | 306.73** (118.35) | 556.71** (208.05) |
| Population Density (LG) | -29.66 (20.01) | 165.18** (56.58) | 356.05 (287.78) | -228.69** (93.11) | -134.14** (48.64) | -135.52** (40.39) |
| # Built Schools | 5.49 (8.17) | 96.29*** (20.61) | | -5.63 (17.36) | 24.02 (11.82) | |
| % Villages Schools | -392.57** (110.48) | 369.13 (247.9) | | -1,203.04** (291.29) | -776.42*** (146.32) | |
| % Mouride | 502.39** (223.01) | -26.18 (235.90) | | 1,872.2 (885.75) | 674.31 (329.39) | |
| # Built Clinics | | | 506.98** (139.86) | | | -3.21 (53.49) |
| % Villages Clinics | | | 980.44 (2,757.59) | | | -2,214.51** (771.46) |
| N | 283 | 318 | 183 | 283 | 318 | 183 |
| R ² | 0.22 | 0.44 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.15 | 0.22 |

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05. Models report results and standard errors, in parentheses, from OLS models. Unit of observation is the local government.

TABLE A.8 *Placebo models – effect of institutional congruence on central state allocated goods, odds ratios (Figure 5.7)*

| | New high schools | | Electrification | | New roads | |
|--|------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Base | Full | Base | Full | Base | Full |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Institutional Congruence 20 km | 0.998 (0.574) | 1.284 (0.884) | 1.070 (0.282) | 0.644 (0.191) | 0.775** (0.099) | 0.742 (0.115) |
| Ln Population | 12.484*** (4.74) | 11.534*** (6.379) | 2.133*** (0.239) | 1.804*** (0.169) | 1.639*** (0.085) | 1.556*** (0.074) |
| Population Density 5 km | 0.999** (0.000) | 0.999** (0.000) | 1.000*** (0.000) | 1.000** (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) | 1.000 (0.000) |
| Department Wealth Measure | | 0.864 (0.334) | | 2.324*** (0.544) | | 1.135 (0.093) |
| Village Elevation | | 1.005 (0.022) | | 1.010** (0.004) | | 0.999 (0.003) |
| Ln Dist. Waterway | | 1.002 (0.118) | | 1.061 (0.093) | | 0.876*** (0.031) |
| Soil fertility | | 0.933 (0.073) | | 1.052 (0.049) | | 0.969 (0.016) |
| Ln Dist. Road | | 1.001 (0.306) | | 0.738*** (0.049) | | 0.705*** (0.030) |
| Ln Dist. Administrative Center/Market | | 1.211 (0.615) | | 0.583*** (0.072) | | 0.849*** (0.052) |
| Local Government Capital | | 21.13*** (16.516) | | 16.021*** (4.052) | | 3.644*** (0.922) |
| Electric Grid within 5 km | | | 1.984** (0.505) | 1.361 (0.344) | | |
| N | 1,504 | 1,503 | 11,441 | 11,421 | 11,863 | 11,763 |
| R ² | 0.324 | 0.441 | 0.084 | 0.213 | 0.042 | 0.086 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.05$. Models report results and standard errors clustered at the local government level, in parentheses, from OLS models. Models of new high school access are limited to villages with a population of 1,000 residents or higher. Models for electrification and new road access do not include villages with baseline access. Full models include a village's latitude, longitude, and their interaction term.