

to introduce a strategy for producing belief, to meet the objection that one could hardly wager without believing. Pascal's strategy works because, as Penelhum says, "Belief is notoriously catching (So is unbelief). How else can we explain intellectual fashion or party loyalty?"¹

With that, Penelhum suggests a second thought, related to Wernham's project of working out what the doctrine is "really about" (7). Of course, everyone takes it to be about faith, but when that has been granted our interpretations still vary, depending on our time and place, our education, and even the "intellectual fashion or party loyalty" in which we participate. Thus, the will-to-believe doctrine could have been interpreted as "really" a non-cognitivist religious strategy in the Anglo-American philosophical world of 1955, but in that same world now, with pluralism and pragmatism resurgent, might strike us as "really" a post-modern theory of faith. James's doctrine can speak to each of us about faith in a different way, according to what we bring to it. Wernham's study, throwing one important interpretation into high relief, helps us to realize how rich in meanings and associations the famous essay "really" is.

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1 Terence Penelhum, *Religion and Rationality* (Toronto: Random House, 1971), 214.

Announcement/Chronique

Wittgenstein Symposium

The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society will host the Fourteenth International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg/Wechsel, Lower Austria from August 13-20, 1989. The theme is "Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-Evaluation". For further information in Canada and the USA, please contact Professor Philip Hugly, Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA, Tel. (402) 472-2425. Others should contact Dr. A. Hübner, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, A-2880 Kirchberg/Wechsel, Markt 2, Austria, tel. 02641/2280.