

into the complexities of Pannenberg's thought. The style is snappy, with short sentences (especially in the opening chapters), and the book may well have originally been a series of lectures for undergraduates. Yet Pannenberg does undoubtedly lose something in this process of simplification, and this introduction is in no sense a substitute for reading the original.

The appearance of two introductions to Pannenberg's theology within a few months of each other means that any review of them must be like a record review, deciding which is the finer interpretation and the better value for money. The second book, by Frank Tupper, wins in every respect apart from the attractiveness of the dust cover. It is half again as expensive as Professor Galloway's book, but the text is at least three times longer and it is a much more thorough and complete piece of work. Tupper has, in fact, not just written a general introduction to Pannenberg's theology. He has offered a systematic, though provisional, presentation of that theology in the absence of any complete account by Pannenberg himself. This work started as a doctoral thesis, and the author spent a year in Munich working with Pannenberg and subsequently corresponding with him. Snatches of this correspondence appear in footnotes. There is also an extensive bibliography of Pannenberg's published works in German and English up to 1972, a very detailed index, and at the end a postscript by Pannenberg himself in which he comments on some of Tupper's criticisms and on projects still to be completed.

The book is in three parts. The first part places Pannenberg's theology in a historical and biographical context, and then describes his theological methodology. The second part gives a general but detailed account of 'Pan-

nenberg's Theological Program' (sic) under the main headings of Revelation, Christology and the God-problem. Within these headings Tupper covers every aspect of Pannenberg's theology: faith, knowledge, reason: apocalyptic, eschatology, resurrection: hermeneutic, non-Christian religions, personality, futurity . . . to mention only the outstanding fields surveyed. The last part assesses Pannenberg's controversies with a variety of German and American theologians and locates Pannenberg on the contemporary theological map, so to speak. And, finally, Tupper delineates a number of inadequacies and hiatuses in Pannenberg's theology which will have to be dealt with in the near future, though I am not sure that all his criticisms are as pointed as they appear at first sight. The text abounds with footnotes, and has the master's own imprimatur—which is recommendation enough.

I noticed recently in a review of a book on Pannenberg in another Catholic periodical that he was referred to as an 'interesting' theologian in the 'lamentably weak' field of Protestant theology. Anyone who reads Frank Tupper's book (and it may be advisable at first to read it in bits rather than straight through) cannot fail to be struck by the immensity and originality of Pannenberg's achievement, and one can hardly say that Protestant theology is 'lamentably weak' when there is a theologian writing who is at once so traditional and so original, and whose contribution is so relevant to contemporary problems. A lot of hard work has evidently gone into Tupper's book, and until Pannenberg himself writes a *Systematic Theology*—if he ever does—this must stand as a splendid substitute.

GEOFFREY TURNER

LOGICO-LINGUISTIC PAPERS, by P. F. Strawson. *Methuen & Co.*, London, 1973. 249 pp. £1.60.

It is indeed welcome news that Methuen has reissued this collection of Professor Strawson's essays in paperback. The fact that this has occurred within two years of the hardback publication only further attests to the importance of this collection in recent philosophical literature.

The twelve essays in the collection, all previously published, span twenty years of Strawson's philosophical activity. Included are the much-anthologised 'On Referring', from 1950, in which Russell's theory of descriptions was weakened beyond the point of repair; the equally well-known reply to Austin's essay on truth, also from 1950; plus other essays on predication, reference, grammar, convention, meaning and truth. The spectrum of topics treated reflects both the recurring and the de-

veloping interests of post-war British philosophy. For this reason it is a pity that the essays are not grouped chronologically, since they mirror so well the development of ordinary, or Oxford, philosophy. Instead, Strawson has chosen to group them in a loose thematic fashion. While the three essays on truth all deal with Austin's treatment of the topic, it is more difficult to see why a thematic arrangement was considered preferable to a chronological one when one reads the other essays. But the acknowledgements of the original places of publication allow the reader to reconstruct the chronological order. And I think that treating them in this fashion brings out the real value of this collection. For in so doing, we get a good overview of Oxford

philosophy at its best, and are in a privileged position for watching how it developed over a period of twenty years.

The first essays, from 1950 ('On Referring', 'Truth'), already illustrate the shift in the method and intent of British philosophy that had taken place after the war. There was a clear move away from the more formalist approach to language that had dominated the '20s and '30s. In Strawson's own words, 'Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic' (p. 27). A close attention to the wealth of ordinary usage, and an inductive (though fairly unsystematic) move from examples drawn from ordinary usage toward some sort of rules, characterised the style of philosophising of those years. There was a dual effort to unmask those perennial problems of philosophy that were really based on uncaredful use of words, and, at the same time, to point out the inadequacies of pre-war attempts to reform philosophical language.

Although much of this early approach continues to inform Oxford philosophy, important changes have taken place. Significant among these are a growing interest in linguistics and a gradual coming to terms with pre-war ideal language philosophy. These trends are best exemplified in 'Grammar and Philosophy' and 'Meaning and Truth', both from 1969. In the former essay, Strawson confronts the transformational grammar of Chomsky and his followers, and clearly sees its importance for ordinary language philosophy. Transformational grammarians have respected ordinary language philosophers' concern for empirical usage and its underlying rules, but have deplored their lack of any systematic procedure. Strawson acknowledges this problem but points out at the same time that the transformational grammarians' continuing problem with the semantic component of language (despite its success with the syntactic and phonological aspects) calls for the philosopher. For trans-

formational theory at that time (the situation has changed somewhat since) could provide no unified theory of language that brought together the three aspects of sense, syntax and sound. And it is at this point—in closing the gap between sense and syntax—that ordinary language philosophers have been disagreeing for years. The dilemmas of structure without structure and meaning without muddle becomes most evident here. In 'Meaning and Truth', Strawson considers both philosophical approaches on the battleground of what is without a doubt the central question in contemporary British philosophy: the question of meaning. And in this confrontation we can see how ordinary language philosophy has grown from a reaction to ideal language philosophy into an opponent of equal status. The older approach is now seen more as an emphasis on the need for rules and logical structure, while the younger protects philosophy from the illusion of being able to fully account for all of linguistic usage by means of a formalized system. Although Strawson sees ordinary language philosophy's contribution as the more weighty, he does not fail to give ideal language philosophy its due credit.

But Strawson presents more than a method. For method without significant subject matter results either in ungrounded flights into abstraction or an equally disastrous sinking away into a mire of banality. Strawson, however, has wider philosophical interests. If there is one topic that does bind all these essays together and so prevents their argumentation from slipping into triviality, it is the issue of *reference*. It is along this line, where mind meets world, where concept meets phenomenon, that the discussions of meaning, truth, predication, universals and method, coupled with a concern for central philosophical issues, make this book not only a quarry of exciting philosophical ideas, but also a brilliant portrait of ordinary language philosophy in its finest form.

ROBERT SCHREITER

POPERY AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND 1660–1688, by John Miller. *Cambridge University Press*, 1973. 288 pp. £4.90.

Herbert Butterfield once remarked about English historiography, 'It might be argued that our general version of the historical story still bears the impress that was given to it by the great patriarchs of history-writing, so many of whom seem to have been whigs and gentlemen when they have not been Americans'. Dr Miller does not proffer the damaging confession that he is a whig or an American, but his analysis of Restoration political life shows him to possess those qualities of fairness, candour and generosity of judgment that mark the seventeenth century ideal of the

gentlemen, the man of virtù. It was, of course, Lord Macaulay (no gentleman he) Butterfield had in mind, that perilously brilliant stylist, scanning the historical process through a mist of dubious historical parallels and literary reminiscences, whom Sidney Smith advised to take two tablespoonfuls of the waters of Lethe every morning before breakfast. If we see the reign of James II through Macaulayan spectacles now, it will not be for want of Dr Miller's trying.

It is a superbly researched and organised piece of work, moving from demography to