

through the early years of Mao Zedong's dominance of the CCP as it developed foreign policy in the years 1935 through 1951. The conclusions drawn from this exegesis will not surprise any student of CCP foreign policy either before or after the party seized power in 1949. Hunt determines that Marxism-Leninism did not and has not imposed an ideological strait-jacket on China's policymakers, nor were communist leaders, including Mao Zedong, driven by a primitive "middle kingdom" complex. Rather, they faced and responded to complex domestic and international influences so interwoven that only by understanding the interaction of the two with ideology and personality can we understand their combined effect on the CCP's policy choices. Casting its shadow over these elements was China's nineteenth-century crisis, which formed the crucible for the CCP's founding fathers.

Hunt contends that in recent years China's foreign relations have been neglected by historians and left to political scientists, who have their own scholarly agenda. At the hands of political scientists, China's foreign relations history has been subjected to theoretical abstractions of little value in understanding Chinese foreign policy and the use of analytic tools designed to overcome the paucity of evidence but which ultimately provide misleading interpretations of the CCP's decision-making processes and the policies it produced. Hunt concludes, however, that the new information now available on both the Republican era and the early years of the CCP, including the role of Mao Zedong, provide sufficient data for political science theories to usefully frame the issues used to order the new data. Further, he asserts that political scientists' concern with contemporary issues can complement the work of historians in that the latter's historical findings can be used to illuminate current problems. In essence, Hunt suggests that these new sources provide sufficient data that the study of Chinese foreign policy can now be more fully integrated into the frameworks provided by comparative foreign relations history.

Hunt performs yet an additional service to the study of Chinese foreign policy by providing a guide to the literature focused on the evolution of CCP foreign relations (pp. 251–72), including sources that have appeared in China over the past decade. Similarly, his discussion of the strengths and weaknesses in the foreign policy scholarship underway within China since the late 1970s will be invaluable to those using the results of this scholarship or who seek to conduct collaborative projects with Chinese researchers already at work on the process of revitalizing the study of China's foreign relations. In short, Hunt uses this superb book to invite discussion and debate over the history and future of China's foreign relations, and of the methods used to explore the many dimensions of this complex topic as new data illuminate the past. I cannot imagine any serious student of Chinese foreign policy not placing this book in a personal library and recommending it to students.

PAUL H. B. GODWIN
The National War College

Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China. By ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. xii, 317 pp. \$39.50.

After generations of scholarship stressing the pacific and humanistic nature of China's Confucian culture, several important recent studies have shifted the focus to violence in China: most notably Mark Lewis's *Sanctioned Violence in Early China*

(Albany: SUNY Press, 1990) and *Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counter-Culture*, edited by Jonathan Lipman and Stevan Harrell (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990).

A second notable trend has seen bright young political scientists from the University of Michigan apply rigorous analytical methods and models to topics from China's historical past. Here Elizabeth Perry's *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845–1943* (Stanford: 1980) and James W. Tong's *Disorder Under Heaven: Collective Violence in the Ming-Dynasty* (Stanford: 1991) stand out—both admirable studies, though historians have generally found Perry's methodology and conclusions more suitable to their taste.

The present book combines these two trends. Another keen Michigan-trained mind has turned its attention to China's past, this time to assess the theory and practice of China's "strategic culture" in the light of the most recent political science literature. This ambitious and closely reasoned book has two purposes. First, it attempts to test the propositions that countries have coherent strategic cultures (strategic preferences in the appropriate uses of warfare and violence) and that those strategic cultures actually influence foreign policy behavior. Second, it attempts to identify a Chinese strategic culture in the *Seven Military Classic (Wu Jing Qi Shi)* and then determine how this strategic culture affected Ming military policy toward its Mongol neighbors.

Although the volume contains a rigorous and informative critique of the literature on strategic culture and a detailed explication of the author's methodology (cognitive mapping and symbolic analysis), readers of this journal are most likely to be interested in Johnston's analysis of Chinese strategic culture. And well they should, for his painstaking dissection of the logical structure and symbolic discourse in both Chinese military classics and memorials on Ming strategic policy produces a direct challenge to the conventional wisdom that Chinese tradition was averse to violence and accepted war only as a last resort.

Though the argumentation is exceedingly complex, its basic structure is simple enough. In the political science debate between neorealists who hold that strategic decisions are based purely on realpolitik considerations, and the advocates of "strategic culture" who argue that strategic choices are also influenced by historical and cultural considerations, China provides an important test case. Many have argued that Confucian teachings condemning offensive warfare and exalting civil over military virtues have made Chinese foreign policy distinctively defensive—a defensiveness symbolized by the preference for wall-building and the discouragement of overseas expansion.

Johnston notes that the *Seven Military Classics*, which included such famous texts as Sun Zi's "Art of War," were widely read and formed the basis for the military examinations from the time of their compilation in 1083. He tests them for internal consistency and then examines a series of Ming dynasty memorials dealing with Ming-Mongol relations to see whether their strategic choices are consistent with the military classics. He finds sufficient consistency in strategic preferences to demonstrate the existence and influence of a distinct Chinese strategic culture.

But the nature of this strategic culture is quite unexpected. The conventional wisdom understands Sun Zi's "not fighting and subduing the enemy"—a theme which infuses many other texts—as part of a general Confucian preference for nonmilitary solutions to interstate conflicts. Johnston, by contrast, finds only a symbolic legitimating role for Confucian ideas, and discovers in the military texts a "*parabellum*" (prepare for war) paradigm, which includes "a preference for offensive, preemptive uses of force against the enemy" (p. 109). And the Ming, despite its reputation as the

preeminent wall-building dynasty, “tended to favor more coercive, offensively oriented strategies” (p. 243). The implications of this analysis are carried right to the present. His conclusion cites studies showing the PRC resorting to violence in 72 percent of its foreign policy crises (versus 18 percent for the U.S. and 27 percent for the Soviet Union).

How does he reach such novel conclusions? The fundamental technique involves a sophisticated process of dissecting and decoding the arguments in his texts. The analysis is too complex to unravel in a short review, but there is a troubling tendency to judge any counsel of restraint to be purely “contingent”—the result of an unfavorable military balance increasing the danger of defeat. But Johnston never confronts the possibility that Chinese *political* preferences kept military forces weak, thus creating the “contingency” on which strategic restraint was based.

Equally troubling are the definitions behind his conclusion that “Ming decision makers preferred . . . more offensive uses of force. . . .” First, he includes within “offensive” “both external extermination campaigns and active defense measures.” Then a footnote explains that “Active defense refers to the offensive use of force against Mongols raiding within Ming territory” (p. 216). So advocating an attack on Mongol forces raiding within Ming territory gets coded as a strategic preference for the offensive use of force!

The beauty of this book is the clarity and precision of the argument—the very clarity which permits a reviewer to make the sort of criticisms advanced here. The methodological rigor is admirable. Few Sinologists are likely to be persuaded by this book, but they should read it and take its arguments seriously. Our scholarship needs to confront the violent face of the Chinese state, and we need the intellectual challenge of such social science research on ancient and imperial China.

JOSEPH W. ESHERICK
University of California, San Diego

Demon Hordes and Burning Boats: The Cult of Marshal Wen in Late Imperial Chekiang. By PAUL R. KATZ. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. xviii, 261 pp. \$59.50 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

The epidemics of deadly diseases which used to be inflicted from time to time on many areas of the world must have been terrifying. In the southern Chinese province of Chekiang, great festivals were held annually to a deity known as Marshal Wen, among other names, who was thought able to protect against the demon hordes which brought epidemics. A grand procession lasting over a week included martial figures with swords and halberds, beggars hired to dress as demons, large numbers of tearful people portraying penitent sinners, and finally a palanquin carrying the statue of the Marshal, who at one point would hold a session for people with grievances to file complaints with the underworld bureaucracy. All through the last night young men with torches raced screaming through the city to scare away evil forces. If nonetheless plague came, a long exorcistic expulsion ritual would be held to capture the spirits responsible in a great paper and bamboo boat and send it ablaze drifting out to sea.

The cult of Marshal Wen appears to have originated in the Southern Song period, a time of commercial and urban development and of new religious movements. The earliest temples were in the region of Wenchow in southeastern coastal Chekiang, whence the cult spread quickly, apparently along trade routes, to cities and towns in