

THE INTERNATIONAL PROSPECT FOR 1953

JOHN EPPSTEIN

IT is necessary from time to time to withdraw oneself from the tangle of events and to contemplate the main trends of contemporary history. What are the most significant international happenings of recent months, and what conclusions may be drawn from them?

It is a tribute to the immense power and responsibility of the United States in the world today that Governments outside the Communist orbit almost all marked time as they awaited the outcome of the recent American presidential election. The semi-paralysis of diplomacy has continued during the interregnum between General Eisenhower's election and his official replacement of President Truman in the White House. The reason is not far to seek. The whole scale of the rearmament effort, which has been getting under way in Western Europe during the last year, depends more than anything else upon the policy of the new President and the appropriations of the 83rd Congress. The prospects of orderly control of the Middle East and Moslem North Africa—which constitute the Achilles heel of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—depend upon the extent to which the new American Government can subordinate the sentimental anti-imperialism which is part of the stock-in-trade of American politics to the solidarity of the alliance and long-range strategic requirements. In the Far East, no solution (if solution there be) can be found for the deadlock in Korea except through the leadership of the United States, which has shouldered the main responsibility for the war against the Communists and has suffered nine-tenths of the United Nations' casualties.

Such impressions as Europeans have been able to form from General Eisenhower's post-election speeches and his choice of ministers, notably of Mr Foster Dulles as the future Secretary of State, incline them to believe that there will be continuity in the main lines of American foreign policy. But there is unlikely to be much respite before the familiar conflict between Executive and Legislative re-

appears, in the form of a tug-of-war between the constructive international policies of the new President and his technical advisers, on the one hand, and Senator Taft and the tough Republican bosses, who will be chairmen of the Congressional committees, on the other. Europe is likely to get less, not more, dollars for its military effort next year.

While the North Atlantic Allies of the United States are not unnaturally postponing decisions, so far as they can, until the new American administration is in the saddle, no such self-denying ordinance has been observed by their enemies or by those for whom partisan ambitions are paramount.

The Soviets have found further advance in Europe blocked, because the N.A.T.O. defences, though still greatly inferior to the Red army and air force, would be a hard nut to crack and because an attack upon them would immediately involve a major war, for which the Kremlin is not ready. For some months, therefore, the Russians' policy has been designed to 'seal off' the European front, while wasting and dividing their enemies in the Far East and weakening them by the stimulation of those 'national liberation movements' in colonial and backward countries, to which Lenin attached so much importance.

It has been a very rewarding tactic. The danger of war in Europe was vividly present to the popular imagination at the time of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin. But no sooner does that threat seem to have receded, than the demagogues of the west seek cheap applause from their electorates, claiming credit for this development, and giving to the slowing down of the rearmament effort (which is not without economic justification) a significance which is only too welcome to their peace-loving and ill-informed peoples. There are riots and mutinies against the two-year period of military service in Belgium. In Britain the hostility of Mr Aneurin Bevan and Mr Crossman to the Americans and the Atlantic Alliance makes new recruits. In France the sense of urgency, which alone can carry through the uncongenial consent of the French to the German rearmament involved in the European Defence Community, has been lost, giving way to the usual party manoeuvres of the Budget period. Meanwhile, the

Communist-inspired 'Peace Campaign' continues with plodding insistence, and, though the well-informed know it for what it is, the collection of 'innocents' who were enticed to its congress in Vienna in December shows that it can deceive some, even, of the elect.

But perhaps the most profitable by-product of the 'new line' in Soviet foreign policy has been the way in which the pacific sentiments and hopes, so easily aroused among Europeans, have reacted upon the morale of the Western Allies in the three Peninsular Wars maintained by the Communists in Eastern Asia. The British effort in Malaya has been least affected, if only because it requires far less men than the wars in Indo-China and Korea, and the Communists, in circumstances where their reinforcement is particularly difficult, have already suffered substantial defeat. But the mood, both of the American people in regard to the Korean War, and of the French in regard to the war in Indo-China, is one of weariness and frustration. Thus the maximum dividends, psychological as well as material, can be obtained by the Kremlin through keeping these campaigns going indefinitely: they tie down large number of their opponents' troops (including a quarter of all the officers and two-fifths of the n.c.o.s of the French army) and involve them in great expenditure, without the loss of a single Russian soldier.

When we come to the main foci of discontent or partisan sentiment beyond the boundaries of the Asiatic-European land-mass controlled by the Communists, we find, in Europe, Africa and the Middle East explosions occurring or crises coming to a head precisely during this uncertain period of the American interregnum to which I have referred. And, whatever their local history and characteristics, they have all been of a nature to injure the Western Powers and further the Communist strategy.

I draw attention particularly to three of these developments—first, the defeat of Chancellor Adenauer's attempt to secure ratification in 1952 of the Bonn Treaties, framed to integrate the German Republic in the western world and to make a German contribution to North Atlantic defences; secondly, the exacerbation of Moslem nationalism in the

Middle East and Mediterranean areas—riots in Baghdad; increase of terrorism in Tunisia; riots and massacres in French Morocco; and thirdly, the Mau-Mau insurrection in Kenya. Of these the most serious, in its immediate consequences to the plans of the Allies for the collective defence of the western world, is undoubtedly the temporary success of the German Socialists and the other opponents of the German Federal Government in delaying, with a view to defeating, the ratification of the 'German Contract' and the E.D.C. Treaty. Time is the all-important factor. The Allies were already two years too late with their plan for the integrating of Western Germany in the European family. So divided and disillusioned is the German people, so strong, for those who lack political sense and experience, is the emotional appeal of German unity against the prevailing Partition, that the Social Democrats, in their partisan hatred of the Christian Democrats, have fallen straight into the Communists' trap. They have found the 'unity' slogan, so diligently plugged by the Russians, a useful weapon with which to belabour their political opponents, whom they accuse of perpetuating the Partition by agreeing to join in the rearmament of the West: yet they themselves, knowing a Soviet-Western agreement on Germany to be impossible, and the Soviet Zone to be already rearmed, have never produced any alternative, constructive policy to the treaties which they denounce. It is a classical case of party politics run mad.

In the case of the Moslem countries of northern Africa and the Middle East, it is obvious that, in the duel between Soviet Communism and the Western Powers which divides the world, they would be valuable assets to either side. To the British and the French they are areas either of traditional influence or of present administrative responsibility, and, to them and the Americans, they are territories of major economic and strategic importance. It may be said that the British humiliation at Abadan was the natural and inevitable consequence of the British withdrawal from India; and that the fiery torch of anti-European nationalism was no less inevitably handed on, by a process of contagion, to Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Morocco. That is true, as far as it goes.

The support, which the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists received in the United Nations from India and the other Asiatic members for their complaint against France, no doubt reinforced their belief, that they had on their side a general movement in favour of national independence from the effete 'colonial Powers' and that the Americans could be successfully played off against their European partners.

But it is equally true that the mob does not emerge and take part in bloody riots in great cities without careful organisation and leadership. If we examine the reports of the riots in Baghdad last November, with the shouting of slogans against the Anglo-Iraq Treaty and in favour of the nationalisation of oil, we find it established that the ring-leaders were members of the Persian Tudeh (Communist) Party, just as we find the Communists heavily involved with the hotheads of the Moslem Brotherhood in the burning and bloodshed of the Cairo riots earlier in the year. In Tunisia the co-operation of the Communist Trade Union agitators with those of the Neo-Destour is equally known; and in the terrible outbreaks in Casablanca at the beginning of December the Communists, whose leaders, with those of the Istiqlal Party, have now been arrested, were found, not only to have instigated the strikers to violent attacks upon Europeans, but to have distributed cutlasses, razors and knives to the mob.

The same exploitation of particular local discontent and racial feeling is to be found in the intensification of Mau-Mau terrorism in recent months in Kenya, with the belated programme of Government repression which it has provided. It is indeed an indigenous tribal movement, the beginnings of which were known to experienced missionaries years ago. But the literate leaders of the movement, those in particular who have long used the independent African schools as the seed-bed for it, and those who have given the Mau-Mau its virulently anti-Christian character, owe much to the training of key men in the 'hospital' attached to the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa, who have slipped over the long, unprotected frontier. It is this diplomatic post which is the centre from which much of this skilful mischief is organised in East Africa, just as (with more difficulty nowadays) the

Consulates in Pretoria and Dakar fulfil the same function for the South African Union and West Africa respectively.

Here then are a few not unimportant happenings, all pregnant with trouble for the future, which have occurred since the autumn. We are faced, much as we like to forget it, with the unremitting hostility of a great Power with the machinery of a fanatical international organisation at its disposal. We are involved in open but inconclusive war with it, in three peninsulas of the Far East. But, just because it has been deterred from conventional war in the European area through the improvised defensive coalition which now stretches from Iceland to the Caucasus, it does not mean that it has discarded every other form of warfare. On the contrary, it is the frustration of the clumsy 'frontal' attacks of the Molotov period which has turned the Communist directorate to a much more intensive development of other and more subtle forms of attack, especially the scientific use of the varied forms of nationalism, be they German, Arab, Moroccan or African, in order to confuse and weaken the Western Powers. And, as yet, these Powers, united for the most part for conventional military action in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, have discovered no common means of defence or counter-attack against this new technique of aggression by penetration, sedition and the propaganda of hate.

The moral of recent events is surely this. That no sooner is there any evidence of the slackening of resolution, or of disunity among the principal Powers of the Western Alliance, than the forces constantly at work to prepare revolution in its various forms push their dupes into violent action or precipitate any local crises which will serve their purpose. The long delays of the Allies in producing their plans for Germany and following them up have played into the hands of the opponents of their treaties. The temporary paralysis of the higher direction of the Allies during the disedifying American election campaign and the diplomatic interregnum that has followed it have evidently been an invitation to these mischief-makers. There seems to be an overwhelming case for the permanent co-ordination of foreign policy—and colonial policy—and for the adoption

of a common plan to counteract damaging attacks upon members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation other than open war.

But only too few people seem as yet to have grasped the fact that to sign treaties, establish a central headquarters in Paris and joint Commands is only part, and not the most difficult part, of the creation of an effective defensive coalition of fourteen States, destined formally to last for twenty years and very probably needed for much longer. The hundreds of thousands of young men called upon to serve in the forces of these allied countries year by year—not to speak of their parents, wives and sweethearts—must be satisfied that what they are called upon to do is right and necessary. We have in the N.A.T.O. a reply—inadequate, no doubt, but real and practical—to an unprecedented danger; and it is a reply which a very important part, at least, of the free world has made its own.

Is there any *other* means of achieving the successful defence of one's own country? Is there any hope of advancing the much-desired unification of Western Europe *without* the protective shield of the American alliance? And for those—and they are many amongst us—who speak and write nobly about preserving European culture and our Christian heritage but shrink from the realities of politics and strategy, there is this other very blunt question to answer. What hope is there (humanly speaking) of preserving and developing European civilisation from the slow death that has already fallen upon it in Prague or Warsaw or Budapest, *unless the old heart and core of Christendom is successfully defended?* Yet that is precisely the military and geographical purpose of the existing North Atlantic alliance. Idealists may discern its imperfections and toy with visions of the political and economic community into which it might one day be transformed. Others—and would they were more numerous—would prefer to think of the liberation of that half of Europe which is enslaved by a Godless tyranny, rather than dwell upon the defence of the half that is not. But here and now the great problem is one of intelligent popular perseverance in the Treaty obligations which our country and its allies have assumed. That is why I suggest that it is every

man's duty to face and answer the simple questions which I have set down above and to order his course of action accordingly.

EMIGRATION

A CANADIAN DECLARATION

IN a *communiqué* issued after their annual meeting last autumn, the archbishops and bishops of Canada have drawn the attention of Christians to the problem of immigration. In publishing this document, their thought was first of all for Canada where the policy of racial restriction in immigration recently put into force is much criticised by Catholics, but, in its general and doctrinal character, their *communiqué* is applicable in a much wider field:

'Immigration is a social fact with many aspects.

The Church does not pronounce upon technical questions concerning immigration, but she reminds all that immigration is subject to laws of morality on which legislators should base their decrees:

1. The separation of families is a deplorable and disastrous condition of affairs; it is the duty of public and private organisations to make an immediate and constant effort to reunite families, when one member has already obtained permission to enter a particular country—and this especially if it is the head of the family who has done so;
2. Since God has put the earth at the disposal of mankind, those countries which have unoccupied land have the duty of favouring the immigration of the inhabitants of over-populated countries;
3. The policy which directs immigration services must be truly democratic and any procedure which would arbitrarily exclude citizens of a nation with a surplus population from entering the country, or refugees from a country undergoing political or religious persecution, would be contrary to the principle of true peace.'

This firm stand is echoed by a declaration of Mgr Antoniutti, Apostolic Delegate in Canada. This important statement, from which we quote, stresses the fact that the problem of migrations is perhaps the most important social problem of our time:

'It is not the problem of the poor of which I am going to speak to you, that problem which haunted the warm-hearted St Vincent de Paul, to quote one name alone. Neither is it simply the problem of class barriers,