

yet seen. There are valuable chapters on the practical side of this relationship ('Psychotherapy and Ethics', 'The Analyst and the Confessor', and above all 'The Frontiers of Theology and Psychology'), in which Father White firmly rejects the theory, dear to many Catholic Freudians, that the two sciences can be kept rigorously separate. He sees in them rather two sciences each of which is concerned with the same subject-matter (the human psyche) from a different point of view, and each of which needs the assistance of the other. But it is on the theoretical side that the most important studies are to be found. The two chapters on 'Aristotle, Aquinas and Man', and on 'Revelation and the Unconscious', in which he shows the bearing of Aristotle's psychology (in the *De Anima*), and of St Thomas' conception of Revelation on modern psychological theory, are masterpieces of exposition. It must be admitted that to read Aristotle and St Thomas through Father White's eyes is to find a very different person from what a superficial reading of them suggests. But it is precisely his genius to have brought out this aspect of Thomist thought which brings it into relation with the irrational and the unconscious. Perhaps his finding on St Thomas' thought cannot be better summarised than in the sentence, 'It is through the sub-rational that the super-rational is brought to human consciousness'. Thus what often appears like a superficial rationalism in St Thomas is seen to rest on a plane of thought between the height of the superconscious and the depths of the subconscious. In this way the whole field of the subconscious, and all the symbols and archetypes of the collective unconscious, are brought into relation with Christian revelation. In a fascinating last chapter on 'The Dying God' (the subject originally of a broadcast) he shows how the astonishing resemblances between ancient pagan rites and the Christian mystery, especially in the rites of Holy Week, can only be understood as the fulfilment by the Church of the most profound instincts and aspirations of the human soul. Thus the whole argument of Frazer and Freud is reversed, and religion is seen not as the perversion of a natural instinct but as its fulfilment, psychologically in every soul, and historically in Christianity. There is an introduction by Dr Jung himself, and an appendix consisting of a translation of an article by Father Gebhard Frei, which throws some interesting light on Jung's own attitude to religion.

BEDE GRIFFITHS, O.S.B.

JUSTICE: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY. By Giorgio Del Vecchio. Edited with additional Notes by A. H. Campbell. (Edinburgh University Press; 30s.)

This is a very distinguished work, deserving close attention from all those whose interest or concern lies in ethical philosophy. The author, a former Rector of the University of Rome, enjoys an international standing as a philosophical jurist. For moral philosophers, and indirectly also for theo-

logians, his work has a special interest since it represents a notable effort to relate the study of legal systems to an absolute moral standard. This standard Del Vecchio sees displayed in the idea of justice as a 'fundamental mode of human consciousness'. The philosophical presentation of this idea, and a sketch of its historical development in the West, is the special theme of the volume under review.

What first strikes one reader of this book is what may perhaps be called its humanity; I mean a certain nobility of moral outlook which combines with and issues into an exploration in depth of the concept of justice and an immense range of literary and historical reference. The book displays indeed a blend of simplicity and learning, of lightness and gravity, rare enough to be surprising as well as delightful; one is tempted to call it wise, which is after all the highest epithet available. It gives one the impression, to adapt words used by Professor Campbell in his excellent Introduction, of a 'distillation of a lifetime's study and reflection'. Fourteen short chapters give the distilled essence of Del Vecchio's thought; and each is followed by several pages of bibliographical notes which, to one who admittedly has no particular competence on the legal side, seem extraordinarily rich. These notes alone, with their ample citations and international range and variety, will make the book a treasure for students. One small example of their range: Tolstoy as a moralist stands somewhat apart from the European tradition which Del Vecchio represents and is chiefly concerned with; yet a passing mention of Tolstoy's views on punishment occasions half a closely printed page of references. *Humani nihil alienum*; Del Vecchio's curiosity is as wide, as human, as his great theme. Let me add that his acquaintance with the Scholastic tradition, and notably with St Thomas, is remarkably thorough and respectful.

The heart of the book is in the seventh chapter, where Del Vecchio finds the ground of the 'idea' and 'sentiment' of justice in the act of consciousness whereby a subject contrapositions to itself an object which it recognises as another *subject*. This recognition gives rise to a relation 'no longer reducible to the antithetic general formula of self and not-self, but [which] must be conceived as inter-subjective', i.e. as 'a relation between the self and *another self*'. Thus every human being, simply in virtue of consciousness, cannot but 'recognise himself as an element in a net of inter-relations between selves', as involved by his very nature as human in relations *ad alterum*, in the claims and duties of justice. And the historical development of the notion of justice is traced as the emergence and clearer defining of the notion of *alteritas*, already given basically in human consciousness, in so far as the *alter* appended therein is a *person*.

Working out the consequences of this principle, Del Vecchio lays particular stress on the problem of harmonising justice and law, and on the question, so much to the fore now, of penalties. Of more direct, if more

theoretical interest, to thomists is his assessment and very suggestive, though brief, critique of the great aristotelian contribution to the theory of justice. Aristotle was the first, it seems, to bring out clearly the specific character of justice as a particular virtue governing the relations between man and man in society; but, throwing his stress on the objective element, the *thing* to be equalised, as between two persons, by commutative justice, he tended to understress the subjective element (represented in contracts by the consent) which is really the prior element, in the sense that it is on a recognition of the *alter* as a *subject*, a person (not a mere object or 'thing') that all the mutual claims and obligations of justice between men fundamentally rest. In line with this critique (which I do no more than indicate here) is Del Vecchio's insistence that commutative justice 'presupposes distributive justice, which (understood in the widest sense as recognition of the value of persons) is therefore the primary and basic form of justice'. But this 'personalist' emphasis does not, in Del Vecchio, appear to weaken in the least his sense of the *objectivity* of the just 'thing', the *justum*, in any given case. Nor indeed need it. One might, however, with regard to his general treatment of the subject, object that the obligatory character of justice is not so clearly brought out as its psychological basis.

The translation is good lucid English, and the printer has done his work beautifully. The book is a joy to both eye and mind.

KENELM FOSTER, O.P.

A PEOPLE'S CONSCIENCE. Six Typical Enquiries (1729-1837) by Select Committees of the House of Commons. By Strathearn Gordon and T. G. B. Cocks. (Constable; 21s.)

This book gives us six glimpses into the murkier corners of English life in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Each inquiry constitutes a separate little sketch or story on its own, and is presented mainly in verbatim extracts from the proceedings of the committees. The dispassionate, even pedantic, phraseology of these reports seems to throw into relief the lurid or sordid nature of the information they contain. For lurid, or sordid, or both, it certainly is. An introductory chapter tells us how these committees worked, and how we owe the reports of their proceedings to the industry of Thomas Gurney, who might be called the father of English shorthand reporting. Of special interest perhaps to Catholics is the chapter on the transportation of convicts to Australia, with its citations from the evidence given the committee by Dr Ullathorne.

But it is not very clear, at the end of it all, quite why the book was written. What purpose did the authors have in mind? The title would suggest that they intended it as an essay in social history, while the subtitle indicates a study in the remoter workings of Parliament. In fact it can