

Mass Media and its Effects on Just War Criteria in the Gulf War

Vimal Tirimanna CSSR

It is often claimed that high technology won the Gulf War for the allies. However, a careful analysis of the ways in which the mass media was controlled after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would clearly indicate that it was not just technology which gave the allies their victory, but also the skillful media manipulation. At the very outset of this article I would like to make it clear that not only the allies but the Iraqis themselves were guilty of media manipulation. Saddam Hussein used the media first of all to convince the predominantly Islamic Iraqi people that they were waging a Holy War' against the western infidel. He attempted to portray the war as a religious affair, a cause of Allah', hoping both to tap the resources of religious feeling throughout the Islamic world and to draw on the political capital of Muslims in the Middle East. Throughout the crisis he did not hesitate to match the tone of his rhetoric with that of President Bush.

When the allies began their air attacks on Iraq on January 17, Saddam informed the nation that the enemy had declared war, by using the phrase: 'the mother of all battles has begun !' He assured his people, in graphic terms, that the enemy would be burned alive and buried in the desert sands. Throughout the war the Iraqi people were never given an accurate picture of events at the front. This, of course is normal war-time practice, but it cannot be denied that the Iraqi High Command consistently manipulated the media in its own favour. This was clearly illustrated by the announcement of the defeat of the Iraqi army in Kuwait by Radio Baghdad. The proclamation was couched in diplomatic terms, suggesting that since Iraqi objectives had been achieved in Kuwait, it was now time for the army to withdraw. However, it is doubtful whether the Iraqis themselves were gullible enough to swallow all of Saddam's propaganda, especially in view of his previous habits of 'economy with the truth'.

Saddam's manipulation of the mass media was matched in allied circles as the rest of the world came under the powerful, effective grip of western media-manipulation before, during and after the war. By controlling news with first-class communication skills, the allied powers, and in particular the United States, waged a virulent propaganda war. A war that had, in effect, credited them with victory even before the first bombs were dropped. The press censorship enforced on journalists was

unprecedented. Almost all the TV networks all over the world had to depend on the American controlled CNN for news coverage of the War. Who could state with any certainty that CNN was impartial? The CNN reporter, Peter Amett, faced fierce criticism for saying that there was 'no sign' that the Amiriya shelter, which had formerly been used by the Iraqis as a military bunker, was currently being used for military purposes. During the air strike on this installation hundreds of unarmed Iraqi civilians were killed. The main charge levelled against Amett by his critics was that his sort of news-reporting served Iraqi purposes.¹ A bias in favour of the allied cause, so it appeared, was more important than factual news reporting. Surely modern war is more than war fought with modern weapons, it is also war that is 'advertised, marketed, . . . supported by shaped public opinion, public relations, propaganda and disinformation'.²

Immediately after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait the western mass media inaugurated a powerful campaign against him. Undoubtedly, the invasion of Kuwait was a grave violation of international law and could not be justified. It is quite understandable that Saddam's actions were presented in the West as naked aggression. However, similar western hostility was not so obvious during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Throughout this conflict Saddam engendered considerable western support as the enemy of Islamic fundamentalism, symbolised by the Ayatollah and his followers.³ It might also be asked where were the western correspondents when Saddam was waging chemical warfare against the Kurdish people? It is estimated that 5000 Kurds died in the course of this attack in 1988.⁴ Yet, it was not this but the invasion of Kuwait which prompted the Western media to depict Saddam as 'evil incarnate'. A spate of documentaries and newspaper articles pointed to his past misdeeds and to his potential for effecting worse if left unchecked, but very few asked how he had become 'the devil' he was alleged to be, or who assisted him on the road. Many of those who later opposed Iraq in Kuwait had previously armed Saddam. Neither the mass media nor the western powers seemed interested in considering any of these matters in any great depth. All that they appeared concerned with was the rectification of the 'great injustice' committed by this 'big bully' of the middle east.⁵

The editor of *Harper's* magazine, Lewis H. Lapham, made a savage attack on the performance of the press during the Gulf War. He adopted a conspiratorial view of President Bush's performance from the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, suggesting that Bush had decided almost at once to go to war in order to control oil prices, revive the US Military budget and divert attention from economic recession at home. Lapham went on to say:

But none of these happy events could be brought to pass, unless a credulous and jingoistic press could convince the American people

that [Saddam Hussein] was a villain as monstrous as Adolf Hitler, that his army was all but invincible, that the fate of nations (not to mention the destiny of mankind) trembled in balance."⁶

The identification of Saddam as 'absolute evil' had great repercussions on the entire conduct of the Gulf War, and on the application of the Just War criteria. When someone or something is identified as the unique, absolute evil, any 'means' becomes justified in order to get rid of that so-called unique 'absolute evil'. It could be argued, in this case, that the 'end', namely the removal of this 'absolute evil', becomes so important that any 'means' used to achieve that 'end' becomes automatically justified. I would suggest that this is exactly what happened during the Gulf Crisis.

Legitimate Authority

Since the Second World War the United Nations has played an important role in preventing or attempting to resolve any major international conflict. Indeed, it is generally believed that the UN has a rôle to play in maintaining the traditional just war criteria in the modern world. However, during the Gulf crisis, and even before the UN could decide on action to get Iraq out of Kuwait, the United States had already assumed the role of the 'International Policeman', rallying an army of some 300,000 soldiers designed to serve against Iraq in the Gulf. Thereafter, the UN was used to legitimise war and further involved, as the war moved on towards a conclusion, to reject the possibility either of a ceasefire or negotiations.⁷ Decisions relating to the conduct of the war, including that to call a halt to the massacre of Iraqi troops fleeing along the Basra road, were not considered to be the province either of the Secretary General of the United Nations or any of that organisation's agencies.

The authority for the conduct of the war rested on the United Nations' so-called mandate, which was widely publicised by the mass media. In the process the very authority of the United Nations as a truly international body was undermined. Questions as to why the President of the United States, rather than the Secretary General of the UN, was acting as the leader of international efforts were generally unasked in the Western press. Any doubts as to the propriety of this attitude were suppressed in the interests of ridding the world of the 'unique absolute evil', Saddam Hussein. Against this background it is worth recording that since 1947 there have been more than 160 UN Security Council resolutions, along with 400 more by the UN General Assembly, in relation to UN efforts to end the Palestinian problem. But, neither the US nor any of the Allies seem to be eager to implement them with the same vigour and urgency they

demonstrated during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. There is evident a clear double standard in the conduct of international affairs. However, this lapses into obscurity with the portrayal of Saddam and his invasion as the evil of all evils.

Just Cause

From the moment the Americans began to warm up for the battle against Iraq 'the Liberation of Kuwait' from the 'monstrous' clutches of Saddam Hussein was apparently the prime emphasis of the allies and the mass media. The urgent requirement for the liberation of Kuwait was never explained.⁸ Throughout, the mass media and the allied powers continued to insist that they were about to wage a 'just war' in accordance with a 'just cause'.⁹ In accepting this line the media, and the allied leaders, decided conveniently to forget other such illegal acts committed in recent history in the Middle East including: Israel's occupation of Arab lands since 1967, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the appropriation of Lebanese territory as a so-called Israeli security zone, Syria's invasion of Lebanon, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. All of these were passed over in silence so that Saddam's Iraq might be portrayed as the unique culprit of this sort.

In his flamboyant rhetoric, Saddam Hussein did not fail to link the various related problems of the Middle East by insisting that Iraq would immediately withdraw from Kuwait if Israel and Syria retired from their respective occupied areas. All of the allied leaders, save the French, stressed that there could be absolutely no linkage between these issues. As the eminent moral theologian, Kevin T. Kelly wrote: this denial of any linkage between these issues had to be challenged.¹⁰ Obviously, the only way to explain this denial of linkage was the urgency and absolute necessity of driving Saddam and his forces from Kuwait. When this end became absolute, the other issues became merely secondary; whether the invasion of Kuwait had any other linkage became totally unimportant in the face of this absolute end.

When Kuwait was 'liberated' the so-called 'just cause' of the Allies suddenly expanded to encompass the removal of Saddam Hussein himself; President Bush openly called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. The subsequent Kurdish revolt, together with its brutal suppression by the monstrous dictator' was given wide publicity by the media. When the Kurds began a mass exodus to evade Saddam's forces, their miseries were rightly highlighted in the press. However, the same media hardly mentioned the miseries and agonies of millions of ordinary Iraqi civilians as a result of the destruction of the infrastructure of Iraq by the

unprecedented allied bombing. According to a special UN report, the situation in Iraq was 'near apocalyptic'. It was estimated that the Iraqi people would soon be facing catastrophe, including epidemic and famine. The British Prime Minister's suggestion that safe havens be established for the Kurds was not matched by any obvious concern on the part of western leaders, or representatives of the mass media, for similar treatment for the Palestinians, large numbers of whom had become virtually refugees in their own land.

Last Resort

According to the traditional Just War criteria, war should follow only when all the other available means of resolving conflict have failed. When Kuwait was invaded on 2 August 1990 the UN Security Council, very correctly, imposed various sanctions on Iraq in order to force a military withdrawal. These included an embargo on Iraq's oil industry, which is the life blood of the nation. Instead of waiting for a few months to allow these sanctions to work and to gauge their effects, the US-led western nations supported by the mass media were impatient for action and, despite the contrary views held by some of the key official planners, pressed for a resort to force. They managed to persuade some of the members of the Security Council to support their initiative. The offer of added incentives, such as economic aid, secured the passage of an unprecedented UN resolution setting a deadline for Iraq to make an unconditional withdrawal. On the expiry of this deadline military force could be used to expel them from Kuwait.

In order to court the vital vote of China, a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States even went to the extent of hinting at the possibility of lifting the sanctions imposed on the Chinese after the events in Tiananmen Square. Moreover, after the war, instead of helping to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq, the allies secured UN resolutions tightening the grip on the already devastated Iraqi economy. Even after the 'liberation' of Kuwait trading embargoes remained in force. Meanwhile, other western leaders openly declared that as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power all embargoes would continue. Further resolutions were then passed demanding that Iraq pay the costs of war damage to Kuwait. The expenses incurred in the projected destruction of the Iraqi nuclear capability, mainly purchased from the west in the first place, were to be met by the Iraqis. The United States insisted that 50% of Iraqi oil revenues be devoted to the payment of war reparations. The Americans finally managed to secure the approval of a resolution which called for the deduction of 30% of all oil revenues of Iraq. The mass media openly

justified this, but once again no mention was made of the ailing post-war Iraqi economy. Nobody remarked that, without massive aid to restore its economy Iraq would find it virtually impossible to abide by the terms imposed on it.

At the same time, the west determined that as long as Saddam was in power Iraq was not to be allowed to sell its oil. It is difficult to imagine similar punishment being visited on any other nation for its failure to rid itself of its leader. The already ailing economy of Iraq and the ensuing misery of the ordinary Iraqi civilians were easily forgotten in an attempt to chastise Saddam and, if possible, to get him out of power. Once again it appeared that any measure can be justified when its end is made to appear so absolute. It is highly doubtful whether the western nations, or any other nation for that matter, has the moral or legal right to decide who should be the leader of an independent state.

There are some who hold the passing of the notorious UN resolution 678 on 30 November 1990 to be a gross abuse of the UN Charter. According to them, it did not receive the consenting vote of China, a permanent member, as required by Article 27.3 of the UN Charter, of the Security Council.¹¹ Even if considered legitimate, such a resolution could not be thought to authorise military action because Article 42 of the same Charter makes it clear that before moving on to military action, the Security Council has to consider that non-military actions under Article 41 'would be inadequate or have proved inadequate'. The Security Council never met to give consideration to the effects of sanctions and its sanctions committee was ignored.¹² Even before the effects of the economic embargo could be evaluated the US, the Allies and, of course, the Mass Media became impatient since in the face of such an 'evil monster' it was 'dangerous' to wait and see!

Non-Combatant Immunity

Both before and during the war the mass media gave wide coverage to the so-called 'guided bombs'. These bombs were declared to be so sophisticated that they could be accurately directed to the exact intended target; unintended damage, especially damage to innocent human life, could be entirely ruled out. During the first few days of combat there was unprecedented all-day media coverage of the war showing scenes of 'precision-guided bombs' going down the chimneys or through the doors of Iraqi targets. However, after the war, it was disclosed that only 7% of the US bombs dropped on Iraq were in this 'smart bomb' category.¹³ Here is an excellent example illustrating how mass media can be used not only to distort what happens at the front, but also deliberately to deceive the

general public. The creation of favourable public opinion took precedence over the truth. In this regard it has also been established 70% of the 88,500 tons of bombs dropped on Iraq and Kuwait missed their target.¹⁴ No-one seemed to trouble to ask where they in fact fell? Again, the predominant emphasis was that this the 'most intense aerial bombardment in history' should achieve its end. Once more the eradication of Saddam Hussein appeared to be of paramount importance.

As yet no accurate figures of the number of Iraqis killed during the war are available. This has been attributed mainly to US reluctance to give a correct body count; a practice in Vietnam that drew criticism and questions as to reliability of estimates. General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Desert Storm commander, in a briefing just after the hundred-hour allied ground attack ended, refused to offer an estimate of Iraqi dead; he only said that it was a 'very, very large number'. However, on the 4 June, the US State Department issued the following details: 100,000 dead; 300,000 wounded and 150,000 deserters.¹⁵ By any standards these are massive figures, and certainly contrary to the principle of noncombatant immunity of the Just War criteria. However, the allied powers and the mass media appeared to justify it by highlighting the 'necessity' of their actions. Some newspapers and radio and TV interviews soft-pedalled these figures of Iraqi casualties by saying that such 'collateral damage is inevitable'. There were other efforts to highlight 'the very low loss of life' for the allied forces by totally ignoring the Iraqi casualties which amounted to thousands.¹⁶ Here, we see a sort of discrimination with regard to human lives: 'Our lives are more important than the lives of the enemies'. It is also very hard to understand why it was militarily necessary during the final stages of the war, to massacre thousands of fleeing Iraqis on the road to Basra. Some try to justify this as an 'unintended effect'.¹⁷ Some others try to explain it as 'necessary' to achieve the final victory. But, the very champions of Human Rights, including sectors of the mass media, were very quiet about this brutal violation of the most important of all rights: the right to life.

The allied bombing of the Amiriya shelter in Baghdad was a classic illustration of how the mass media was used to camouflage real Allied intentions. The first BBC news bulletins to report the event clearly stated that the bunker had been used as a civilian shelter. However, the Allied military sources insisted that the bunker was used for military purposes and instead of apologising for what had happened went on to blame 'the sinister plans' of Saddam in keeping civilians inside the bunker. However, on the ground in Baghdad, Peter Amett of CNN and a few other reporters closely examined the bunker and in uncensored reports found 'no sign' that it was a command and control centre, as the US claimed.¹⁸ Amett later

faced fierce criticism charging him with supporting Saddam in his manner of news reporting. There were even reports in the media which claimed that the whole Amariya affair was a ploy used by Saddam to court public opinion. However, *Newsweek*, in an article which appeared a week after this incident, reported that the Allies were well-aware that the bunker was a civilian shelter and that they had aimed the raid at Saddam's inner circle, presuming them to be taking shelter there. It quoted an allied government source as having said:

There is space in (the city's) air raid bunkers for just 1% of the population of Baghdad. We know that because we have mapped the bunkers. Now, which 1% do you think is allowed in those bunkers.¹⁹

According to intelligence sources, Saddam himself was spotted at the Amiriya bunker in the later stages of the Iran-Iraq war and again at the beginning of February. Did this targeting of Saddam and his inner circle legitimise or justify the killing of the innocent civilians? Of course, the answer is in the affirmative if and only if we presume that Saddam is 'so absolutely evil' that we can do anything, even contemplating the 'collateral damage' of killing innocent civilians, in order to get rid of him.

Proportionality

One of the means of setting limits to warfare by the Just War theory is through the principle of proportionality. That is to say the means used and the harm caused must be proportionate to the ends of the war. But as had been pointed out throughout this article, we encounter a big problem when the ends of a particular war appear to be absolute; then any means become just. There is no doubt that the price Iraq had to pay for her violation of the sovereignty of Kuwait was unprecedented. As mentioned above: the enormous loss of human lives, the destruction of the entire infrastructure of the country, pushing back that country to 'pre-industrial ages', the political instability that ensued within Iraq due to minority uprisings at the instigation of the west which threatened Iraq's own territorial integrity, the destruction of some Iraqi oil targets, the effects of the sanctions which it still faces, and the rising cost of living due to the effect of trading embargoes, the eradication of what was once an excellent health care system, the threat of epidemics and other diseases, and most of all the daily struggles of ordinary innocent Iraqi civilians even some time after the actual war, all these raise the question of proportionality with regard to the sufferings inflicted on the ordinary civilian population of Iraq. They are certainly not proportionate to the so-called 'liberation' of Kuwait. To

illustrate this point it suffices to point out that the Allied forces used one and a half times as many precision bombs in 43 days in the Gulf as the US did in Vietnam during eight years of war.²⁰ What we need to ask here is: 'Did the allies have to engage in this destruction and taking of human life in- such massive proportions in order to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait?' In answer to this the planners of the war have been quoted as saying that their intent was to destroy or damage valuable facilities that Baghdad could not repair without foreign assistance.²¹

According to US Colonel John A. Warden, deputy director of strategy, doctrine and plans for the air force, a purpose in destroying Iraq's electrical grid was to pose a long-term problem to the leadership; a problem with which it would have to deal at some time. Colonel Warden went on to say:

Saddam Hussein cannot restore his own electricity. He needs help. If there are political objectives that the UN coalition has, it can say, 'Saddam, when you agree to do these things, we will allow people to come in and fix your electricity'.²²

Another air force planner was quoted as saying:

We wanted to let people know, 'Get rid of this guy and we'll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding. We're not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that, and we'll fix your electricity'.²³

Such remarks, coming out some four months after the war, shed some light on the real intentions of the allies in inflicting such massive, inhuman damages on Iraq's infrastructure. Evidently, the main target is 'the evil personified', Saddam Hussein; getting rid of whom has turned out to be an absolute end'. It is only in this light that one can justify the present neglect of the sufferings of ordinary Iraqis, even by such an august body as the UN, which seems to have become the handmaid of the United States. Furthermore, the above-mentioned remarks of the US war-planners are in total harmony with the views of the American Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney, according to whom every Iraqi target was perfectly 'legitimate'. He added: 'If I had to do it all over again, I would do exactly the same thing'.²⁴ This implies that the damages inflicted on Iraq were well-planned and deliberate. At the same time, it is very hard to reconcile these statements of the US officials with those of the mass media, which had tried to soft-peddle the loss of lives and mass-destruction of Iraqi infrastructure as something either unintended or merely inevitable. Obviously, the planners and executors of the Gulf War strategy seem to have totally ignored the principle of proportionality. But, in another sense, with the help of the mass media, they used the very principle of

proportionality to justify and legitimise whatever they did by making the end appear so 'absolutely evil.' In a notorious statement before the war began President Bush said 'no price is too heavy to pay' to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. This is a clear denial of the traditional Just War criterion which demands that the harm caused by going to war should not be disproportionate to the evil that the use of force seeks to remedy. It also implies the dangerous principle that no means is disproportionate to the end envisaged, because the end is so 'absolute'. This is confirmed by Bush himself, who was quoted as saying in early January:

If force is used, the generals' hands will not be tied behind them. This concept of 'well, you can only do so much, but not more,' is unacceptable to me'.²⁵

This is in sharp contrast to International Law which Bush claimed to be defending throughout the war! How could the President of the most powerful nation which claims to defend human rights and democratic values all over the world, get away with such statements? The answer is simple: the mass media had already prepared the way for him and the same mass media would have said: 'He is just trying to get rid of the greatest threat to International Order'.

In an article in *Concilium*, Thomas M. Garrett, discusses some of the ways that may be 'deliberately used' by the mass media to set the stage for manipulation.²⁶ Among the available techniques are selectivity and salience; selecting only those news items that favour a given cause, and highlighting them, whilst at the same time totally ignoring the rest of the news items, or just mentioning them in passing. The extensive coverage given to the Kurdish refugee problem, while ignoring the miserable life conditions within Iraq itself due to the havoc caused by the unprecedented allied bombing, is a good illustration of this. The censorship imposed on journalists during the war in the Gulf was severe, and much of the information released by the allies had propaganda value. But, it appeared that the American people especially appeared to like it that way. As Jonathan Alter wrote for *Newsweek*:

Having justified their actions for years by invoking the public's right to know', the media now confront viewers bent on exercising their war-time right not to know".²⁷

Why did the American public display this attitude ? The media had already influenced them so much as to the absolute necessity of getting rid of this 'evil-personified', Saddam Hussein, that the general public were willing even to forego their right to know if it would serve the purpose of achieving that all-important end. As a consequence sections of the general

244

public willingly allowed the authorities to shape their own views on the war through the manipulation of the mass media. Thus, victory parades could be held in both the USA and Britain, without the public's knowing how that victory was achieved.

The Just War Theory was originally formulated in order to check the violence and evil of war; Aquinas and later sixteenth-century theologians reformulated it. Until today, this theory has appeared to be an acceptable means to check the violence of warfare. However, there are some who hold that this theory no longer holds good because the times have changed, but these critics have not proposed an alternative. In the absence of such a theory, whether we like it or not, the Just War Theory continues to recommend itself. This is by no means to say that wars are good or that they are justified. On the contrary, this theory sets limits on warfare. In the early 1960s, the eminent American theologian John Courtney Murray expressed this succinctly, when he wrote:

The Church does not look immediately to the abolition of war. Her doctrine still seeks to fulfil its triple function: to condemn war as evil, to limit the evil it entails, and to humanise its conduct as far as possible".²⁸

This is exactly what the Just War Criteria are supposed to do. However, it is true that many new factors of modern times are affecting these criteria. The mass media is one of those factors. The communications industry not only affects, but even undermines the basis of the Just War. As Robert Dodaro has observed:

Modern applications of just-war theory generally fail to recognise the 'hidden' cultural forces which, because they are amplified by mass media easily distort public perception of political reality. Applying 'Augustinian' (or other) just-war criteria to any modern political situation without taking such distortion into account amounts to reading Augustine in a hall of mirrors, where much of the symmetry between pirates and super powers is skewed beyond recognition. Failure to apply a hermeneutic of this order to just-war theory risks allowing it to be subverted by right-wing apologists in order to justify what are essentially crusades'.²⁹

- 1 Jonathan Alter and others, 'The Propaganda War', *Newsweek*, 25 February, 1991, pp. 30-31
- 2 cited in Robert Dodaro OSA, 'Pirates or Superpowers: Reading Augustine in a Hall of Mirrors', *New Blackfriars*, January, 1991 p. 10 cf. also Hodgkin, 'Miscalculations that brought war: what now?', *The Tablet*, 26 January, 1991 p. 103.
- 3 Hodgkin, 'Miscalculations that brought war: what now?' *The Tablet*, 26 January, 1991 p. 103

- 4 *ibid.*
- 5 of Mark Whitaker and others, 'Avoiding the Next Crisis', *Newsweek*, 11 March, 1991 p. 43.
- 6 quoted in Anthony Lewis, 'Docile Media Hawked the Official View of the War', *International Herald Tribune*, 7 May 1991.
- 7 Khor Kok Peng, 'Brutal End to Gulf War Leaves Unanswered Questions', *Christian Worker* May 1991, p. 22
- 8 In a television interview a retired but influential Italian cardinal asked "Why there had been such a strong reaction when Iraq invaded Kuwait, but none when Syria ate Lebanon" *The Tablet* 26 January 1991 p. 111.
- 9 Kenneth L. Woodward, 'Ancient Theory and Modern War', *Newsweek* 11 February 1991 p. 31. In this article President Bush was quoted as saying: 'The war in the gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war or a Muslim war. It is a just war.'
- 10 Kevin T. Kelly, 'Christians and Linkage'. *The Month* February 1991 p. 67.
- 11 Bruce Kent, 'The UN and the War'. *The Tablet* 9 March, 1991.
- 12 *ibid.*, cf. a letter by the same author in *The Tablet*, 23 February, 1991 p. 238.
- 13 The US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill A. McPeak was quoted in an article in *The International Herald Tribune* 24 March, 1991 p. 1, entitled 'Desert Mirages: In The War, Things Weren't Always What They Seemed'.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 *The International Herald Tribune*, 24 March, 1991 p. 1
- 16 Russell Watson and others 'After the Storm' *Newsweek* p. 16 gives a table of US fatalities and quotes General Schwarzkopf as saying that, by any measure, the low rate of American casualties was 'almost miraculous'.
- 17 John Keegan, 'Judging the United States', *The Tablet*, 11 May, 1991., p. 573
- 18 Jonathan Alter and others, 'The Propaganda War' *Newsweek*, February 25, 1991 p. 12.
- 19 John Barry and Douglas Waller, 'What Really Happened', *Newsweek*, 25, 1991, p. 12 February.
- 20 Barton Gellman, 'Desert Mirages: In the War, Things Weren't Always What They Seemed', *International Herald Tribune*, 18 March, 1991 p. 4.
- 21 Barton Gellman, 'Gulf Air War's Larger Target'. *International Herald Tribune*, 24 June, 1991, p. 3.
- 22 *ibid.*
- 23 *ibid.*
- 24 *ibid.*
- 25 cf. Gilbert Márkus, 'Comment' *New Blackfriars*, February, 1991 p. 55.
- 26 Thomas M. Garrett, 'Manipulation and Mass Media', *Concilium*, no 7, May 1971, p. 57-62.
- 27 Jonathan Alter and others, *Op cit.*, p. 30.
- 28 J.C. Murray, *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections On The American Proposition*, (New York, 1960), p. 270.
- 29 Robert Dodaro O.S.A., 'Pirates or Superpowers. Reading Augustine in a Hall of Mirrors', *New Blackfriars*, January, 1991, p. 17.