

should 'express in our lives and make manifest to others'—but he seeks to help us in an entirely different, and ultimately much more compelling way. By examining the historical origins of living Christianity in action and how social and liturgical life were framed together and interacted, he trusts that he may lead us to deepen our insight into the very meaning of Christianity.

Taking four main lines of enquiry, the author deals in minute detail, and with lavish source references, with the eucharistic meal and its situation at the confluence of two themes. The first is the poor and their place in Christ's mission and the new paschal meal. The second is the function of the deacon, originally combining liturgical and social functions. This second theme illustrates forcibly the interaction of worship and action, part of the 'explosive vitality' of early Christianity which seems so dear to him as a very worthwhile study leading to a point of renewal in the Church today. As he wryly points out, St James (I, 27) when admonishing his hearers not merely to worship God but also to act, was not suspected of being a progressive. The *agapé*, 'one of the most obscure problems', nevertheless emerges as an early form of 'manifesting to others' Christian love and charity. Lastly the sense of community and personal involvement in Christ's mission amongst early Christians is brought out in the study of communal sharing of worldly goods.

Although Père Hamman is a scholarly writer, the book makes fascinating reading. Its length and detail may destine it for the library but it is through such a work as this that modern liturgical development can be based on real appreciation of how the early Christian Church tackled the job of living directly in the 'work

of our redemption'. As Père Danielou says: 'La liturgie chrétienne est chrétienne avant d'être liturgique.' One minor point, however. Père Hamman presumes his readers have a working knowledge of Greek. This makes the chapter on the diaconate confusing. A transliteration of Greek words would have helped.

Taking it as a whole, the English book of personal experiences lacks punch. One sympathizes with each writer in his search and in his joy, but it is a difficult form for a book which wants to make a real impact. Certainly, Dr Pratt in his introduction puts forward the real problem, liturgy is too important to be left to the liturgists, it must bridge the gap between ritual worship and the life of men and women. But in giving the writers this very personal brief 'to what extent the liturgy had helped them to understand and live Christianity more deeply', the designers of this book let themselves in for a great deal of superfluous detail. In retrospect it may become useful historical material for those who have not lived before Vatican II, but as it stands it does little to move the situation forward. One point alone seems to stand out from each essay and this justifies the book as a whole. What people need in a renewed liturgy is the sense of being personally responsible and involved in an active way. Liturgy must be connected directly with their lives in the world as it is. Only when they sensed this briefly did the writers really come at some point to deeper understanding of Christianity. These essays stress an implied need for social reorganization within the structure of the Church; the parish as it is today must alter in order to allow for personal liturgical involvement.

BARRY AND CHRISTINE BUTLER

**MYSELF AND OTHERS: A STUDY IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MINDS**, by Don Locke. Oxford University Press. 162 pp. 27s. 6d.

The contents of this book can be described as follows: some seventy pages (they are small pages and the print is large) present the *status quaestionis*, a general survey of how we come to be able to say things about what people feel and think, leading up to an exposition of the sceptical difficulties that have classically been found in claiming to know such facts about people other than ourselves. Another seventy or so pages follow devoted to expounding and criticizing the attempted solutions which Wittgenstein, Malcolm and Strawson, respectively, have offered of this problem. A further

brief thirteen pages in conclusion set out Mr Locke's own solution, which has, of course, already been emerging from his criticism of his rivals.

Mr Locke strikes me as a rather old-fashioned young philosopher. Perception is not infrequently talked of as a 'process'. He never strays far from the stock and shop-soiled examples that tend quickly to numb the mind of anyone who has read more than one or two books on the subject. The wide-ranging scrutiny of an Austin and the freshness and penetration of a Wittgenstein have not,

apparently, provoked him to emulation.

The most interesting parts of the book are those devoted to the discussion of the views of Wittgenstein and Strawson. What Mr Locke has to say here is clearly expressed, but I think that at certain locatable points it can be shown that he has misunderstood the authors he is criticizing. For instance, on p. 72 he lists four possible senses of 'private language', No. 4 being the one which is relevant to the argument of Wittgenstein which he claims to refute. No. 4 reads, 'A language in which terms refer to "private objects", items of which only one person is and can be aware, e.g. bodily sensations'. This would be an accurate interpretation of what Wittgenstein meant by a 'private language' only if the phrase 'refer to' were replaced by 'are defined ostensively by referring to'. It is at most a secondary object of Wittgenstein's argument to dispute the possibility of referring to private objects: his primary aim is to show the absurdities into which philosophers are led when they maintain that sensation-words get their whole meaning from being made the names of private objects. Again, Mr Locke misunderstands Strawson in a way in which I had occasion to complain that he was understood by Professor Coval whose book I reviewed recently in these pages. He attributes to Strawson the view that we have 'two sets of logically adequate criteria' for the ascription of predicates involving consciousness. It is implied that one of these sets is what we use when we apply these predicates to other people, one when we apply them to ourselves. It is, however, an important

feature of Strawson's doctrine that when we apply a predicate like 'feeling sick' to ourselves, we do so without the aid (or hindrance) of any criteria whatsoever.

Mr Locke's own view of the role of behavioural criteria in the ascription of the predicate 'is in pain', for instance, seems to be that these provide the *differentia specifica* for a definition whose *genus* is the notion of *feeling* or *sensation*. Thus 'pain' would be defined by Locke as 'the feeling a person is having when he groans, writhes, and in general exhibits what we should call pain-behaviour'. What this seems to me disastrously to ignore is that the *genus* of this definition is itself a word for which the need of public criteria arises in exactly the same way as it does for 'pain'. Locke has, in fact, missed a warning which Wittgenstein himself issued on this matter. 'Sensation', he remarks, 'is a word of our common language' (*Philosophical Investigations* I, 261).

This is a book which contains too many mistakes, but at least the detection of these mistakes is made easy by an admirable clarity and directness of style. Once in a way this directness can lapse into brashness: 'So Strawson's argument is a complete muddle', he writes on p. 144. But despite such obstacles to one's sympathy with the author, it is proper to acknowledge that compared for instance to the book by Coval mentioned above, the clean-limbed, straightforward and lucid manner of Mr Locke's writing encourage us to hope for better things from the books that he has yet to present to us.

G. F. J. WILLIAMS

**THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT**, by Sir Walter Moberly. *Faber and Faber*, London, 1968. 386 pp. 84s.

The first two parts of this book consist of a very thorough account of the evolution of the concepts of deterrence, retribution and reform in the history of penal theory. These are subjected in turn to careful critical scrutiny. On the basis of what he regards as their psychological and indeed theological shortcomings, Sir Walter Moberly then attempts to construct his own theory of the moral justification for punishment. He seeks to refine the idea of retribution by excluding its grosser elements derived from the basic human instinct for revenge. He tries to isolate the rational moral element in the universal feeling of even the most civilized and sane men that deliberate delinquency is rightly met by society with retribution in some form. He has no difficulty in showing that earlier attempts to rationalize

retribution with concepts of 'annulment' or 'just desert' are inadequate.

He regards the administration of punishment as the symbolic expression of the moral beliefs and needs of a society concerned not only with its own protection but with the moral welfare of all its members including the offender. The author summarizes his ideas in these words: 'A punishment is thus a dramatic form of expression. In some appropriate ritual action, it represents and embodies two spiritual processes, the wrongdoing and the counter-action. It is a peremptory inroad on the wrongdoer's freedom and comfort, which signifies rebuke, thwarting and ultimate transmutation of evil will. It foreshadows the pain of conscience which must be his, if and when he comes to appreciate the meaning of his deed.