

In detail, B.'s argument is coherent and persuasive. The function of restraint values was to make the aristocratic honour-and-office distribution system operate smoothly. The people most important for this were those who held the awesome power of the magistracies at any one time; they were the ones who could potentially put the Republic at risk and so it mattered greatly *how* they exercised this power. Restraint norms, transmitted by *exempla*, taught them how to do so. But these values were at best a rough guide to conduct, and disputes inevitably occurred. In the middle Republic which Livy describes for us, the Senate served as the authoritative judge in such disputes, not because of its constitutional position, but because it was the magistrates' peer group. Usually, wilful individuals could be overborne by a united front of their peers in the form of a delegation from the Senate. 'Men who refused to be curbed were shunned and shamed; men who displayed self-control were praised and received notable honors' (190); this is a straightforward incentive structure for status. What B. does well is to render concepts like *auctoritas*, *verecundia* and *existimatio* concrete: they cease to be abstract words and become easily imaginable conversations and feelings.

B. also understands that, while restraint values allowed the Republic to function, this was because of a happy (and temporary) conjunction of circumstances. The Senate-as-judging-peer-group explicitly serves as Simmel's *dritte Instanz*, the accepted and authoritative arbiter (which renews our thanks to Hölkeskamp for bringing Simmel into the scholarly conversation). One problem emerged with the Gracchi: the People became an alternative source of honour and judge of right conduct (although this ignores Polybius 6.14, which suggests they always had been). The division was shown most dramatically with Octavius' deposition in 133: Tiberius Gracchus sided with the People, Octavius with the Senate (as the judge whose collective opinion should be deferred to) and the result was a very unhealthy *exemplum*. After Tiberius, *popularis* rhetoric was extremely damaging to restraint values. It gave cover to any Roman who did not want to accept his senatorial peers' verdict on his *existimatio*: senators could be represented as luxurious and corrupt, and their opinion ignored. More basically (and this is a point B. does not make), the simple fact that there were two judges of behaviour provided the option of playing one against the other and diminished the authority of each. Fewer disputes could be resolved: the result was escalation and violence.

Yet, according to B., restraint values never lost their normative hold on the Romans. The problem was these values could *only* have a stabilising effect as part of a coherent system, and by the post-Sullan generation that coherence was long gone. The result was disordered politics, which B. interprets well. A good example is Caesar's ostentatious moderation over his agrarian law in 59 (Cass. Dio 38.1–3), which caused only confusion and suspicion among his senatorial peers. The best description is of Cato, whom B. calls 'the most lost of all his generation' (159), forcing all around him into a moral schema which no longer made sense. Such a situation invited zealotry, and Cato obliged.

The book began life as a PhD thesis, and its main fault derives from that origin: a tendency to over-interpret events through the lens of restraint values, despite explicitly warning against this tendency (11). But the argument is well thought out and persuasive. B. presents to us Roman senators who were enmeshed in a social system of peers and values, who were social actors before they were political ones, and who sought status and the good opinion of their fellow citizens more than they sought power. That both helps us see Rome simply as a community and makes these men more understandable as human beings.

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ANNE-MARIE LEWIS, *CELESTIAL INCLINATIONS: A LIFE OF AUGUSTUS*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. 538, illus. ISBN 0197599648 (hbk). £81.00; 9780197599662 (ePub); 9780197599679 (eBook).

The thesis of this book is not new: Augustus exploited the stars in constructing his image. But Lewis' methodology is fundamentally flawed. Historiographical scholarship is routinely overlooked in

favour of a naïve historiography which takes sources such as Suetonius as accurately representing 'real' events. For instance, when L. discusses the story of Nigidius Figulus' prophecy at Octavian's birth (Suet., *Aug.* 5), she assumes the words of Nigidius are quoted *verbatim* by Suetonius. She asserts, 'Ancient sources ... clearly viewed the prediction that Nigidius Figulus delivered at the time of the birth of the son of Gaius Octavius as historical' (24). This tendency to interpret ancient texts as unmediated fact is coupled with wilful, sometimes erroneous, readings of sources. Consider her interpretation of the famous opening of Cicero's *De consulatu suo*:

Principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni
vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum
menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit...

L. claims that this passage gives 'a literary and accurate record presented by the Muse Urania, in chronological order, of Cicero's observation of the celestial sphere during the year 63 BC' (46–7). She interprets Cicero's Jupiter as the *actual planet* moving through the sky: 'The planet Jupiter glowed with light, turned around, and confined itself in a celestial orbit' (46). She associates her interpretation with Theogenes' birth-prophecy: 'The view that a planet was the celestial manifestation of an Olympian deity appears to have been behind the pronouncement made by Nigidius Figulus on the day of Octavius' birth, and it had become common by the time the *De Divinatione* was published in 45 BC'. No evidence is presented as to whether identification between god and physical planet was common at this time. Furthermore, L. ignores the Stoic background to these lines, not least their connection with Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*. Jupiter allegorises the Stoic Zeus, the spirit permeating the universe. This passage is *not* simply a record of celestial observation.

L.'s interpretations are driven by a desire to see all evidence as referring directly to actual sky-maps. However, the sky maps given are *modern* reconstructions which use anachronistic nomenclature and numeration. For example, L. claims that 'a diagram that replicates the appearance of the *genitura* of Octavius that Theogenes may have displayed on his astrological board can be created' (fig. 5.2, 149). There is little about this diagram that 'replicates' any ancient *genitura*: it is a *modern* diagram, with degrees and minutes in Hindu-Arabic numerals, very *unlike* the horoscope (*POxy.* 235, illustrated on 136) which L. gives as its parallel. L.'s tendency towards 'cartographical' interpretation is not limited to textual evidence. A similar operation is performed on the *Gemma Augustea* (409–11).

The book gives itself an air of consistency by repetitively citing its own formulations as though they were fact. L.'s argument works on a scheme of symmetry between the supposed routes to celestial afterlife taken by Julius Caesar, and Augustus. This is exemplified by L.'s re-interpretation of the *sidus crinitum* (comet) that appeared at Caesar's funeral games in 44 B.C.E. as the star she anachronistically names 'Altair in Aquila'. The argument is illustrated by the sky map (177), combined with a reading of Servius *ad Ecl.* 9.47, which L. again treats as straightforwardly historical. A table (174) is confidently headed 'Ancient Sources Supporting the Identification of the *sidus crinitum* as the Star Altair in Aquila'. The use of such headings for this and other tables is not merely sloppy; it puts a cast of certainty on a speculative argument.

L. argues that, while Altair conveyed Caesar's soul to heaven, 'Zubeneschamali in Libra' (again anachronistically named) is his final resting place (219, 272, 296, 403, etc.). This argument is based on readings of a series of texts, the lynchpin of which is the proem to *Georgics* 1. Sweeping away preceding scholarship, L. re-interprets this passage as an invocation, *not* of Octavian, but of *Julius Caesar*. The justification is that Virgil 'would have been [emphasis added] unwise to speculate at this time about the early death and journey to the heavens of the soul of the young Octavianus' (210). L. goes on to adduce *Met.* 15.746–50, where, apparently, 'Ovid is describing how Caesar's soul has moved from the Milky Way, to which it had originally been conveyed by Altair in Aquila into the *sidus novum*: that is, into the newly named constellation Libra and, more precisely, into one of the stars in Chelae (Libra), its *stella comans*.' To achieve the connection with Zubeneschamali, L. argues that *comans* at *Met.* 15.759 means not 'hairy', but 'bright', and Zubeneschamali is the brightest star in Libra. None of this is what Ovid actually says.

Not only is Caesar made to effect a double translation, but the same pattern is mapped onto Augustus: 'The soul of Augustus, like that of Caesar, journeyed first to the heavens — that is, to the Milky Way ..., and like the soul of Caesar it did not stay permanently in the Milky Way' (405). L. argues, counter to scholarship, that Augustus' resting place was not Capricorn (cf. German., *Arat.* 558–60) but rather Virgo, adducing Manilius 4.763–8:

Virgine sub casta felix terraque marique
 est Rhodos, hospitium recturi principis orbem,
 tumque domus vere Solis, cui tota sacrata est,
 cum caperet lumen magni sub Caesare mundi.

She glosses: '[Virgo] received into its care the light of the great world (*lumen magni ... mundi*) under the rule of a Caesar (*sub Caesare*)' (407), meaning that Virgo received the soul of Augustus. But her translation is wrong. The passage is actually about the rule of zodiacal constellations over specific places on earth (Housman 1950, vol. 4 pp. xii–xvii), and the complement of *hospitium* is not Virgo, but Rhodos: Rhodos is sacred to Virgo and was the home of the 'sun' in the person of Tiberius when he lived there. The passage does *not* mean that Virgo received the soul of Augustus.

These and many other examples act as a cautionary tale about giving credence to poor scholarship apparently legitimised by a smattering of 'science'.

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OLIVIER HEKSTER, *CAESAR RULES: THE EMPEROR IN THE CHANGING ROMAN WORLD* (c. 50 BC–AD 565). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxiii + 400, illus., maps. ISBN 9781009226790 (hbk) £30.00.

The shadow of Fergus Millar falls obliquely across Olivier Hekster's latest imperial venture. *Caesar Rules* is dedicated to Millar's memory. Its subtitle knowingly riffs on Millar's influential *The Emperor in the Roman World* (31 BC–AD 337) (1977; 2nd edn 1992), reviewed brilliantly and with careless cruelty in this journal by Keith Hopkins ('Rules of Evidence', *JRS* 68 (1978)). Aside from an excoriating critique of Millar's methodology, Hopkins objected to the limits of the project and its emphasis on the emperor as administrator and judge. Millar's credo that 'the emperor was what the emperor did' took no account of 'what people thought about the emperor, what they believed him to be doing or to have done' (186).

Hopkins' review is not cited by H. But it is worth a skim read by those interested in H.'s construction of his own intellectual genealogy. It also underscores his diplomatic delicacy: *Caesar Rules* boasts a genuine reverence for Millar's work (17, 160), while offering *sotto voce* a productive response to Hopkins: 'The emperor may well have spent most of his time on administrative affairs (and in that sense the emperor was what he did), but most of his subjects expected him to be doing something different' (163).

For H., these expectations are key. Ch. 1 ('Portraying the Roman emperor') looks in detail at imperial titlature and at how emperors were represented. It offers a fine discussion of imperial regalia, especially the crown and sceptre (81–101). Ch. 2 ('Playing imperial roles') examines the expectations of emperors in religious, civic and military contexts, the last a welcome corrective to Millar's desk-bound monarch. H.'s use of numismatic 'big data', in part based on the soon to be published work of Corey Ellithorpe, to capture some sense of mass image production is particularly interesting (170–7). Ch. 3 ('Being around the emperor') explores the relationship between emperors and courtiers, senators, bishops and the imperial family, especially wives and heirs. Ch. 4 ('The emperor in the capital and provinces') offers a set of rewarding observations on the expectations of the emperor in Rome, Constantinople and the provinces as a civic, military and religious ruler.

While emphasising the constraints imposed by the ever-accumulating weight of tradition, H. also insists on the 'kaleidoscopic image of emperorship' (330) that resulted from varied — often conflicting and incompatible — expectations of imperial rule. Emperors were 'men for all seasons' (331), yet 'there was no endless flexibility' (331–2); 'emperors could not simply present themselves as they saw fit' (182 and 332). Rather, 'context created emperorship' (326). 'Playing the right roles for the relevant people was the best way to become the perfect emperor' (182). Expectation,