

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY

KLAUS-FRIEDRICH KOCH
University of Virginia

JOHN A. SODERGREN
*University of California,
Berkeley*

with the collaboration of
SUSAN CAMPBELL

INTRODUCTION

Conflict between individuals and between groups is a normal part of social life. The necessity of coping with disputes and enmity is universal, but societies differ in the ways they deal with conflict. Six basic modes of procedure of conflict management that fall into two major classes can be distinguished: *triadic procedures*; i.e., those in which the settlement of a dispute depends on the intervention of a third party (adjudication, arbitration, mediation) and *dyadic procedures* (negotiation, coercion, avoidance).¹ In the dyadic modes one or both principal parties must necessarily rely on self-help in processing a dispute, though possibly with the help of partisan supporters or representatives. Avoidance occurs when one principal withdraws from the conflict situation ["exit" in Hirschman's (1970) terminology]. By coercion, the threat or use of force, one principal imposes the outcome of a dispute and alone determines his concession, if any, to the opponent. Negotiation, once initiated by one of the principals, requires the cooperation of both parties and, if successful, leads to the settlement of a dispute by bilateral agreement.

These six basic modes of conflict management are of course ideal types and the ultimate settlement of a particular dispute

-
1. For descriptive definitions of these concepts see Koch (1974: 27-31). Note that "coercion" as used in this typology excludes the special case in which a third party applies force or pressure on two opposing parties to cease their hostility.

For alternative typologies that refer primarily to Western legal systems, see Eckhoff (1966), Fuller (1971), Galtung (1965), and Thibaut and Walker (1975). Excellent discussions of arbitration and mediation can be found in Fuller (1963, 1971). Recent research has greatly improved our understanding of the forms, organization, and function of dispute processing; see, especially, the work of Abel (1974), Felstiner (1974), Galanter (1974), and Gulliver (1973). In an interesting series of studies Thibaut and Walker (1975) and their collaborators have used experimental contexts that model real-world conflict situations to investigate the relationship of procedures and outcomes in the settlement of particular types of disputes.

may actually involve several procedures. However, although in all societies a number of procedures coexist, their use may be preferred in or restricted to particular social, political, and economic contexts. For example, in the United States we find adolescent street gangs deciding conflicting territorial claims through coercion, marriage counselors mediating in matrimonial quarrels, arbitrators deciding labor-management disputes under collective bargaining agreements, and government agencies processing complaints by administrative routine alongside courts of varying jurisdiction.² In spite of the proliferation of legal and para-legal institutions, many disputes remain unresolved and "access to justice" has become a serious problem in American society, a problem rarely if ever encountered in the pre-industrial societies traditionally studied by anthropologists (cf. Nader and Singer, 1975).

For these societies it is possible to identify a *dominant* mode of conflict management, at least for specific societal segments or organizational levels. Some societies rely on dyadic procedures in managing most conflicts that arise among their members. People in other societies regularly resort to triadic procedures. This paper examines, in a cross-cultural perspective, the variables associated with the dominance of one class of procedure over the other on the *community level* in pre-industrial societies. We have chosen the community as our unit of comparison for the following reasons. First, due to traditional anthropological research practice, ethnographic studies tend to contain the most detailed description of a society's social and legal organization for this level of its political system. Second, using the community as the basic unit of analysis allows the comparison of societies of different sizes, levels of economic development and political and social complexity (Murdock and Wilson, 1972:255).

By dominant mode we mean that procedure of conflict management upon which, according to ethnographers' reports, the members of a community typically rely in processing disputes that receive public recognition (cf. Abel, 1974:227). We have taken care to ascertain whether an ethnographer reported an ideal mode of conduct or actual practice. Wherever possible we have coded actual behavior and identified the most frequently used procedure (either as stated by the ethnographers or as inferred from their reports) as the dominant mode of conflict management.

2. Until the middle of the last century adjudication in local, state and federal courts has been the general mode of formal conflict management in this country (see, e.g., Friedman, 1973: 14).

We are aware of the methodological problem in assigning to a community a dominant mode of conflict management. The multitude of legal and para-legal procedures in present-day U.S. society, for example, would present insurmountable problems for the type of comparative analysis we have made. Moreover, the inclusion of a polyethnic, multicultural, industrialized nation in a cross-cultural sample of ethnographic community studies would necessarily lead to "false comparisons" (van Velsen, 1969). We think, however, that the universe of cultures from which we obtained the sample and our unit of comparison minimize the risk of making false comparisons. The possibility that a degree of intuition entered an ethnographer's report on procedures of conflict management can neither be discounted nor remedied.

Another problem that we recognize, but are unable to solve satisfactorily given the overall quality of our sources, concerns the interdependence of mode of procedure, the nature of the grievance, and the relationship of the parties involved in a conflict. It may certainly be the case that the members of a particular community tend to solve a disagreement over inheritance within a kin group by negotiation, but depend on formal third-party intervention for the settlement of boundary disputes with unrelated neighbors. Having searched the literature needed for our study we are convinced that the complex interrelationships of these variables cannot be handled with a sample as large as ours, given the vastly different quality of the sources. Instead, an investigation of this complexity can best be accomplished by comparative analysis of the few well-documented ethnographic studies on law available.

Our theoretical orientation derives in part from an analysis of patterns of conflict management among the Jalé people (Koch, 1974). In this population of agriculturalists in the highlands of New Guinea, village communities are divided into several distinct residential compounds each consisting of a common men's house and the family huts of its married members. The residents of a men's house usually belong to several agnatic lineages, each of which holds its land as a corporate estate. No political office exists for the compound, nor any government for the village as a whole. This lack of political integration of Jalé communities is reflected in the absence of any third-party authorities that could successfully intervene in a dispute, leaving the parties to resort to self-help in the pursuit of their interests. A comparison of the Jalé case with the findings of several other studies (especially Brögger, 1968; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Gluck-

man, 1959; Hoebel, 1954; Nader, 1965; and Shapera, 1956) suggests that there exists indeed a very strong association of interdependence between a community's dominant mode of conflict management and its level of political integration. If level of political integration is defined as the degree to which a community coordinates and controls its public affairs by centralized decision-making, the observed association appears obvious and its assertion tautologous. However, the variables that indicate a community's level of political integration and thus correlate with a community's dominant mode of conflict management still need to be ascertained.

Conflicts in Jalé society frequently escalate into violence because negotiations are often impossible or, if attempted at all, fail to settle the dispute. Minor quarrels even among neighbors may lead to armed combat, and warfare involving several villages may be the outcome of such disputes. Recent studies suggest that socialization practices in societies whose social structure entails a segregation of the sexes in adult life engender, among males, an adolescent and adult personality predisposed to violent and aggressive conduct, a behavioral syndrome of "protest masculinity" according to its investigators (Burton and Whiting, 1961; B. Whiting, 1965; J.W.M. Whiting, 1969; Whiting and Whiting, 1975). Since the Jalé have a social structure and socialization practices typical of societies that engender such "protest masculinity" (Koch, 1974: 170-172), we suspected that societies where coercive procedures of conflict management are dominant might have socialization practices which produce the "protest masculinity" syndrome. Therefore, in addition to exploring the interdependence of political integration and procedures of conflict management this paper also endeavors to ascertain whether and under which conditions such socialization practices represent a general cultural adaptation to the necessity of managing conflict by coercive self-help. As we shall explain in the discussion of our findings, our conceptualization of this question proved to be simplistic.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Political Integration and Conflict Management

Following clues from the studies cited above we could assume that the level of a community's political integration is indicated by the degree of a community's political autonomy within the wider organization of the society, the relative strength of community government, and the mode of succession to political offices where they exist.

These variables are of course not independent of one another. The absence of superordinate political control and the concomitant retention of local autonomy frequently entails the absence of a centralized community government. Fixed modes of succession to political office are likely to evolve as a response to the centralization of political authority (Wirsing, 1973), and thus are likely to be associated with a strong community government and restricted local autonomy.

In order to explore the interdependence between political integration and mode of conflict management (MCM) on the community level we analyzed an ethnographic sample of fifty societies using the methodological procedures described in the following section. For reasons explained below we had to abandon our original plan to control for all of the six MCM we had initially distinguished. Instead we restricted our analysis to the crucial dichotomous categories of dyadic and triadic procedures. With this restriction in mind we formulated the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Dyadic MCM are dominant in communities with a low level of political integration, while triadic MCM are dominant in communities with a high level of political integration.

The hypothesis implies that dyadic MCM are dominant in communities with relatively unrestricted local autonomy, weak or decentralized government, and flexible mode of succession to political office, while triadic MCM are dominant in communities with relatively restricted local autonomy, strong or centralized government, and fixed mode of succession to political office. This statement, however, needs qualification in view of the results of a cross-cultural study by Thoden van Velzen and van Wetering (1960). Their findings showed that in non-stratified societies in which patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence favor the formation of "fraternal power groups" with exclusive political and economic interests, conflicts tend to be managed by dyadic, often violent, confrontations. Matrilineal societies, owing to built-in cross-cutting interests between kin and residence groups, tend to resolve conflicts peacefully even in the absence of superordinate political control and a formal community government.³ Consequently, we expected the association between MCM and level of political integration to be most pronounced in patrilocal communities. In matrilineal communities, on the other hand, we expected to find triadic procedures of conflict management regardless of their level of political integration.

3. Such a system has been documented for the Tonga of Zambia (Colson, 1953) and the Mundurucú in Brazil (Murphy, 1957).

If our hypothesis concerning the relationship between MCM and political integration were correct, an important question remains: What are the determinants of political integration? Following Marx's view (1904:11) ("the mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social (and) political . . . process of life"),⁴ we formulated the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis II: A community's level of political integration depends on the relative intensity of its mode of production in that the degree of intensity determines the level of integration.

Intensity refers to the relative efficiency of food production which previous research has linked to population density, mode of subsistence, and relative fixity of residence (see, e.g., Carneiro, 1967; Harner, 1970; Tatje and Naroll, 1970). A pattern of high population density, sedentary settlement and food production results in a mode of production of high intensity; a pattern of low population density, migratory settlement, and foraging for food results in a mode of production of low intensity.⁵

Several studies have found an association between the relative efficiency of food production and the extent of social cooperation involved in the exploitation, control, and defense of resources. In fact, an increased efficiency of production and its concomitant specialization of labor and redistribution activities appear to be a prerequisite of political development (see, e.g., Ember, 1963 and Polanyi, 1944). Thus, irrigation agriculture, for example, which supports large settled communities requires a much higher level of political integration than the foraging economy of small migratory communities of hunters and gatherers. However, we expected the communities of nomadic herders in our sample to deviate from this general pattern, because their economy necessitates extensive and efficient cooperation in spite of their relatively low population density and migratory settlement.

To summarize, our hypotheses derive from the following considerations: The institutionalization of formal, relatively de-

-
4. Our considerations derive more directly from the theoretical framework of Steward (1955) and Whiting (1964), which in turn derive from Marx. A growing number of studies in the field of cultural anthropology consider environment and subsistence as explanatory variables. See Harris (1968: Chs. 22 and 23) for an illuminating discussion.
 5. One could, of course, reverse the argument: food-production technologies make high density population possible. We think that such questions of temporal priority are of little significance for our study; both variables are elements of an irreducible evolutionary system (cf. Dumond, 1965).

pendable, triadic procedures of conflict management requires the coordination and administration of at least some public affairs by authorities who exercise control over the community, and it is thus associated with a relatively high level of political integration. The level of political integration, however, depends on the intensity of the community's mode of production.

Socialization and Conflict Management

Our speculation relating coercive self-help to socialization practices that engender "protest masculinity" appeared plausible because one could assume that assertive and aggressive behavior would be advantageous in conflict situations where each party must rely on self-help and non-violent procedures such as negotiation and avoidance cannot be used. Several studies have linked this syndrome to the development of a sex-identity conflict of the male children in societies that combine a marked segregation of men and women with an exclusive control of political and economic affairs by men (D'Andrade, 1973; Burton and Whiting, 1961; Carlsmith, 1973; Harrington, 1970; Munroe and Munroe, 1974; Munroe, Munroe and Whiting, 1973; B. Whiting, 1965; Whiting and Whiting, 1975). The dominance of a coercive MCM and the presence of conditions leading to "protest masculinity" in Jalé society, as noted above, suggested the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis III: A coercive MCM is dominant in societies whose social structure and socialization practices engender the "protest masculinity" syndrome.

The underlying theory, developed by Whiting and his collaborators, predicates a sex-identity conflict for boys in societies in which an exclusive association with their mothers during infancy (or its correlate "father absence") produces a primary identification with a female role and in which subsequent recognition during childhood that adult males actually control the distribution of resources leads to a secondary identification with an adult male role. These societies exhibit a great deal of violence in their patterns of conflict management, with revenge as a typical form of punishment (B. Whiting, 1965) and/or place a high value on military exploits (J.W.M. Whiting, 1969).

On the basis of this theory we expected a coercive MCM in societies where the composition of household membership and a prolonged, exclusive mother-infant association indicate the presence of conditions engendering "protest masculinity". Although there is no reason to assume that these conditions are directly related to either political integration or the mode of production,

a society's system of political control may curtail the use of violence in conflicts within a community but not in conflicts between communities.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

To test our hypotheses we relied to a great extent on existing codes for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock and White, 1969), from which, however, we had to eliminate a number of societies for reasons explained below. The SCCS has been used in numerous studies investigating a variety of patterned correlations between cultural traits. The special value of this ethnographic source material derives from the meticulous research that led to the selection of the 186 societies included in the sample. These societies were chosen to represent the known range of "cultural provinces," to maximize the historical independence of the cases, and to control for the quality of their ethnographies.⁶ A further advantage of working with the SCCS is the judicious choice of its authors of a "typical" or "focal" community from these societies.⁷ As far as practicable, the measurements of each of the variables employed in this study for a given society were made for the same point in time and for the same local community, since meaningful tests of our hypotheses depend on this procedure.

Since indigenous MCM are immediately altered when societies lose their "cultural autonomy," we initially selected the 105 societies from the SCCS which Tuden and Marshall (1972:437) have classified as either "fully autonomous" or enjoying "de facto autonomy." We removed five more societies from the roster, for which the Murdock and Wilson (1972) code of "settlement patterns and community organization" did not include sufficient in-

6. Several suggestions to improve the quality of cross-cultural samples have been made. We do not think that the purpose of this paper warrants a discussion of these general methodological problems. For the reasons stated we have chosen to work with the Murdock-White SCCS. No matter how sophisticated the sampling techniques proposed by other authors are, they would do little to remedy our basic dilemma, *i.e.*, the inadequacy of most sources included in larger samples for coding MCM. Readers interested in the problem of sampling, data-quality control, and the epistemology of cross-cultural research are referred to Driver (1973), Naroll (1973), Strauss and Orans (1975), Vermeulen and Ruijter (1975), and Whiting (1968) for recent reviews.

7. Following Murdock, we assumed that there necessarily exists a unit of significant social interaction beyond the family and that it is possible to identify this unit as the community in each society. For the purpose of this study we have adopted his criteria (Murdock and Wilson, 1972: 255) for determining the community, which are: "(1) it is the maximal number of people who normally reside together in face-to-face association . . . ; (2) the members interact with some regularity; (3) it is a significant focus of social identity for the members."

formation for our analysis.⁸ Since the psychological part of our study required the construction of a scale of “protest masculinity” we had to eliminate another 27 societies for which no reliable information was available on more than one of the variables that Whiting and his collaborators have linked to the development of this syndrome. A total of 50 of the remaining 73 societies had sufficient ethnographic information for coding their MCM; they constitute our final sample and are listed in Table 3.

In constructing our codes of political integration and mode of production and in scaling our “protest masculinity” variables we simplified several codes devised by Murdock and his collaborators. The sources and definitions of these codes are listed in the Appendix.

Political Integration Code:

- (1) Political autonomy: autonomous/non-autonomous
- (2) Community government: weak/strong
- (3) Succession to political office: flexible/fixed
- (4) Marital residence: matrilocal/patrilocal/translocal

Mode of Production Code:

- (1) Population density: low/high
- (2) Mode of subsistence: foraging/producing
- (3) Fixity of residence: migratory/sedentary

Protest Masculinity Scale: For our “protest masculinity” scale we selected four variables that the studies cited above have identified as entailing the conditions engendering this syndrome of sex-identity conflict, namely (1) form of the family, (2) parent-infant sleeping proximity, (3) infant carrying technique, and (4) age of weaning. As explained in the Appendix, each variable was dichotomized in such a way that all scale categories representing aspects of social structure or socialization likely to produce a sex-identity conflict were mapped onto a single value, 1, and all other scale categories were mapped onto a single value, 0. Every society in our sample was scored on these four dichotomous variables, receiving a value of 0 or 1 on each. These scores were then summed into a protest masculinity score to give every society a score between 0 and 4, a high score indicating the presence and a low score indicating the absence of conditions engendering sex-identity conflict.

Conflict Management Code: A perusal of the pertinent ethnographic literature suggested that a revision of our original

8. For these five societies either the codes had no information on one of the following variables: marital residence, descent, intercommunity marriage, community leadership, and local political succession (Murdock and Wilson, 1972: cols. 9-11, 15 and 16) or the information on more than one of these variables was based “on a weak and possibly erroneous inference.”

typology of the six basic modes of procedure identified in the Introduction would yield more suitable categories for coding the dominant MCM of the communities in our sample. It appeared, for example, that avoidance or arbitration does not occur as the dominant MCM in any society in this sample. On the other hand, a MCM peculiar to societies with a band organization led us to add a type intermediate between negotiation and mediation proper, a dyadic MCM in which public opinion in the community at large, rather than direct intervention of a third party as such, regularly promotes the settlement of a dispute.

The five types of our MCM code range from hostile dyadic confrontation to elaborate institutions of third-party intervention:

- (1) The dominant MCM in the community is *coercive self-help* using force and retaliation.
- (2) The dominant MCM in the community is *self-help through dyadic negotiation* for restitution and compensation.
- (3) The dominant MCM in the community is *self-help with the community at large exerting pressure toward a settlement*.
- (4) The dominant MCM in the community is *mediation by third parties without juridical offices*.
- (5) The dominant MCM in the community is *mediation or adjudication by juridical authorities*.

Two persons used these categories to code independently the relevant ethnographic material. This material consisted of a set of abstracts from the ethnographic sources listed for the final sample by Murdock and Wilson (1972: 278-295) and by Barry and Paxson (1971: 490-508). The abstracts were prepared by a third person and described in detail the procedures of conflict management used by members of a community but did not identify the society for the coders and included no information about its political and economic systems. The ratings of the two coders agreed in more than 90 percent of the cases. In the few remaining cases the coders resolved their disagreement after discussing the abstracts in question.

Because of the low frequency of cases for some categories, especially for (2) and (3), we later combined the first three categories into "dyadic MCM", and the last two categories into "tri-

adic MCM" in all tables except Table 3, which retains the original code.⁹

RESULTS¹⁰

Political Integration and MCM

Table 1 presents the relationship between political autonomy of the local community and the other political integration variables.¹¹ A lack of political autonomy tends to be associated with strong or centralized community government, and hence with fixed modes of succession to political office. Conversely the absence of control over a local community by a superordinate political authority tends to be associated with a weak community government and flexible modes of succession to political office. Not surprisingly we found no significant relationship between patterns of marital residence and community political autonomy or government per se.

Table 1. Relationships between Variables of Political Integration

Local Community Politically Community with	Autonomous	Non-Autonomous	Level of Significance	Distribution (N = 50)	
Weak Government	+		Fisher's exact < .001	19	6
Strong Government		+		6	19
Flexible Succession to Political Office	+		Fisher's exact ≤ .010	14	5
Fixed Succession to Political Office		+		11	20
Matrilocal Residence	-	-	n.s.	7	6
Patrilocal Residence				11	13
Translocal Residence				7	6

9. This new code has a reliability of nearly 100 percent and entails no great loss of information from our theoretical point of view.
 10. Tabulations and statistical analyses of our data were carried out on the Harvard/MIT IBM 370 system, using *Datatest*, a statistical package design for the social sciences, developed by Armor and Couch (1972).
 11. In the paradigms included in Tables 1, 2, 6 and 7, a [+] indicates the hypothesized relationship, and the corresponding cells to the right the actual distribution.

The results shown in Table 2 validate our hypothesis that a community's dominant MCM and its level of political integration are interdependent. A political authority above the level of the local community, a strong or centralized government, and a relatively fixed mode of succession to political office tend to coexist with the management of conflict among members of the community by triadic procedures. Conversely, in autonomous communities having a weak, decentralized government and flexible mode of succession to political office, parties to a conflict tend to rely on dyadic procedures.¹² We shall not discuss higher order interactions in the tables, but the "error" cells in Table 2 deserve some comment. Seven of the eight societies with weak community governments but triadic procedures also have fixed modes of succession; six of the seven societies which have flexible modes of succession but triadic procedures also have strong community governments; and six of the nine cases which have fixed modes of succession but dyadic procedures have weak community governments.

Table 2. Relationships between MCM and Political Integration

Variables of Political Integration		Mode of Conflict Management		Level of Significance	Distribution (N = 50)	
		dyadic	triadic			
Local Community Politically	autonomous	+		Fisher's exact $\leq .002$	16	9
	non-autonomous		+		5	20
Community Government	weak	+		Fisher's exact $< .001$	17	8
	strong		+		4	21
Succession to Political Office	flexible	+		Fisher's exact $\leq .019$	12	7
	fixed		+		9	22

Although we found no significant relationship between patterns of marital residence and MCM, significant distributions emerged after we combined marital residence with the other variables of political integration. Tables 3 and 4 clearly show the trend of the predicted interaction effect. Matrilocality appears associated with triadic MCM in both autonomous and non-autonomous communities, as we expected on the basis of Thoden van Velzen and van Wetering's study (1960). However, since these

12. The relationship of political succession to MCM may not be reliable. Since we are testing a large number of relationships, levels of significance should be corrected for the number of tests. Results that do not reach significance levels of better than .005 should be regarded with some suspicion.

authors also postulated an intrinsic correlation between patrilocality and the occurrence of feuding and violence, the observed use of triadic MCM in non-autonomous communities requires a revision of their theory.

Table 3. Distribution of 50 Societies along the Dimensions of MCM, Marital Residence, and Political Autonomy

Mode of Conflict Management	Marital Residence							
	Matrilocal		Patrilocal		Translocal			
	autonomous communities	non-autonomous communities	autonomous communities	non-autonomous communities	autonomous communities	non-autonomous communities	autonomous communities	non-autonomous communities
Dyadic	1		(142) Pawnee	(90) Tiwi (91) Aranda (92) Orokaiva (121) Chukchee (163) Yanomamo (169) Jivaro (186) Yaghan	(100) Tikopia	(137) Paiute (164) Carib	(105) Marquesans	
	2	(173) Siriono		(138) Klamath (150) Havasupa	(140) Gros-Ventre		(130) Eyak	
	3	(129) Kaska		(13) Mbuti		(2) Xung (124) Copper Eskimo		
Triadic	4	(148) Chiricahua (159) Goajiro (176) Timbira (179) Shavante	(87) Toradja (158) Cuna	(167) Cubeo	(34) Masai (106) Samoans	(131) Haida (135) Pomo	(41) Tuareg	
	5	(149) Zuni	(7) Bemba (29) Fur (144) Huron		(1) Nama (3) Thonga (16) Tiv (18) Fon (48) Gheg (51) Irish (94) Kapauku (153) Aztec (171) Inca	(152) Huichol	(12) Ganda (19) Ashanti (143) Omaha	

The SCCS identifying number (Murdoch & White, 1969) precedes the name of each society

This theory implies that most non-stratified patrilocal societies would rely on dyadic MCM. But our data show that this is true for the local community only if it is politically autonomous. However, since Thoden van Velzen and van Wetering (1960) did not distinguish between patterns of inter-community and intra-community conflict management and themselves recognized that communities which frequently feud with each other may successfully maintain internal peace, our results do not challenge the validity of their theory for inter-community MCM.

Table 4. Relationships between MCM, Political Autonomy, and Marital Residence

Mode of Conflict Management	Matrilocal Communities: Politically		Patrilocal Communities: Politically		Translocal Communities: Politically	
	autonomous	non-autonomous	autonomous	non-autonomous	autonomous	non-autonomous
Dyadic	2	1	10	2	4	2
Triadic	5	5	1	11	3	4

Chi-Square 17.525, significant at .004

While autonomy (or lack of autonomy) predicts the dominant MCM only for patrilocal communities, the configuration of another variable of political integration, type of community government, and patterns of marital residence shows a similar association with MCM for patrilocal as well as matrilineal communities (Table 5). The type of government alone almost completely pre-

Table 5. Relationships between MCM, Community Government, and Marital Residence

Mode of Conflict Management	Government in Matrilocal Communities		Government in Patrilocal Communities		Government in Translocal Communities	
	weak	strong	weak	strong	weak	strong
Dyadic	2	1	11	1	4	2
Triadic	2	8	2	10	4	3

Chi-Square 18.431, significant at .003

dicts the dominant MCM in both cases. A strong local government tends to facilitate triadic procedures of conflict management in patrilocal communities and strengthens their association with matrilineality.

The evidence presented in this section has confirmed the hypothesized interdependence of a community's dominant MCM

and its level of political integration, identified the pertinent variables of political integration and discussed their interrelationships.

Political Integration, Mode of Production and MCM

Our second hypothesis concerns the dependence of a community's political integration on the relative intensity of its mode of production. Table 6 shows the interrelationships of the three ecological variables which determine the mode of production (population density, mode of subsistence, and relative fixity of

Table 6. Relationship between Political Integration and Ecological Variables, and among Ecological Variables

Ecological Variables		Variables of Political Integration						Ecological Variables					
		Local Community Politically		Community Government		Succession to Political Office							
		auto-nomous	non-auto-nomous	weak	strong	flex-ible	fixed						
Mode of Subsistence	foraging	+		+		+							
	producing		+		+		+						
	Level of Significance	Fisher's exact <.001		Fisher's exact <.003		Fisher's exact <.017						Mode of Subsistence	
	Distribution (N=50)	14 11	2 23	13 12	3 22	10 9	6 25					foraging	produc- ing
Fixity of Settlement	migratory	+		+		+		+					
	sedentary		+		+		+		+				
	Level of Significance	Fisher's exact <.002		Fisher's exact <.010		Fisher's exact <.025		Fisher's exact <.001		Fixity of Settlement			
	Distribution (N=50)	15 10	4 21	14 11	5 20	11 8	8 23	13 3	6 28	migratory	sedentary		
Population Density	low	+		+		+		+		+			
	high		+		+		+		+		+		
	Level of Significance	Fisher's exact <.001		Fisher's exact <.001		Fisher's exact <.010		Fisher's exact <.001		Fisher's exact <.001			
	Distribution (N=50)	20 5	5 20	19 6	6 19	14 5	11 20	15 1	10 24	18 1	7 24		

settlement) and their relationships to the three variables of political integration. The data essentially confirm our expectations in yielding two general patterns: Communities which produce food tend to have a high population density and fixed settlements, and communities which subsist on foraging tend to have a low population density and migratory settlements. However, the distribution of the sample communities over some variables indicates the existence of a third pattern. Note that while most sedentary communities depend on food production, several migratory communities ($N = 6$) also produce food. Five of these six belong to the nomadic herding societies included in the sample. Four of these five herding societies reappear among the ten food-producing societies that have a low population density. The sedentary communities with low population density either fish or practice rudimentary shifting agriculture. Thus, the third pattern comprises the communities of migratory herders and sedentary shifting agriculturalists which produce food but have a low population density.

Table 6 further reveals that each of the ecological variables is significantly related to each of the three variables of political integration. The weakest relationships appear for the mode of political succession to political office. Nevertheless, the results indicate that a fixed mode of succession might be advantageous to communities that require efficient cooperation and coordination in the production and storage of food and for the protection of their resources.

Table 7. Relationships between MCM and Ecological Variables

Ecological Variables		Mode of Conflict Management		Level of Significance	Distribution (N = 50)	
		dyadic	triadic			
Mode of Subsistence	foraging	+		Fisher's exact $\leq .002$	12	4
	producing		+		9	25
Fixity of Settlement	migratory	+		Fisher's exact $\leq .004$	13	6
	sedentary		+		8	23
Population Density	low	+		Fisher's exact $< .001$	18	7
	high		+		3	22

Given the interdependence of the dominant MCM and community integration, we next tested the relationship between mode of production and MCM. The results appear in Table 7, and they are highly significant. The weakest of the three sets of relationships involves fixity of settlement. Again, however,

four of the six communities with migratory settlement that have triadic MCM belong to herding societies, and three of these are among the seven cases combining a low population density and triadic MCM. Since a community's dependence on its herds requires much more coordination in economic and political affairs (especially in the protection of its resources against other groups)

Table 8. Relationships between MCM, Mode of Production, and Political Integration

Mode of Subsistence	Foraging				Producing			
	Low		High		Low		High	
	migratory	sedentary	migratory	sedentary	migratory	sedentary	migratory	sedentary
Population Density	(2)-1-1-2 (13)-1-1-1 (90)-1-1-1 (91)-1-1-2 (124)-1-1-1 (129)-1-1-1 (137)-1-1-1 (138)-1-1-1 (140)-2-1-1 (173)-1-1-2 (186)-1-1-1	(130)-2-2-2	(121)-1-1-2 (150)-1-2-1	(142)-2-2-2 (163)-1-1-1 (164)-1-1-1 (169)-1-1-1	(1)-2-2-2 (41)-2-1-2 (159)-1-1-2	(167)-1-1-2	(3)-2-2-2 (7)-2-2-2 (12)-2-1-2 (16)-2-2-2 (18)-2-2-2 (19)-2-2-2 (29)-2-2-2 (48)-2-2-2 (51)-2-2-1 (87)-2-2-1 (94)-2-1-1 (106)-2-2-2 (143)-2-2-1 (144)-2-2-2 (149)-1-2-2 (152)-1-2-1 (153)-2-2-2 (158)-2-2-2 (171)-2-2-2 (176)-1-2-2	
Fixity of Settlement								
Mode of Conflict Management								
	Pyadic							
	Triadic							

A community's level of political integration is indicated by a three-number sequence following the SCCS identification number set in parentheses. The first of the three number indicates the political autonomy of the local community (1 means "autonomous and 2 means "non-autonomous"). The second number indicates the type of government (1 denotes "weak or decentralized" and 2 denotes "strong or centralized"). The third number indicates the mode of succession to political office (1 means "flexible" and 2 means "fixed").

than is required in hunting and gathering communities, one can assume a greater need for triadic MCM within communities of the former type. Thus, in spite of the relative low population density and migratory settlement of herders, these figures confirm rather than weaken our hypotheses.

Table 8 shows the relationships between mode of production, political integration, and MCM for each community in our sample. This table summarizes the evidence for our hypotheses that (1) the intensity of the mode of production in a community determines the level of its political integration and (2) the level of a community's political integration and its dominant mode of conflict management are interdependent. This evidence is compatible with earlier studies that have used different variables to reach essentially similar conclusions (e.g., Ember, 1963; Harner, 1970; Sawyer and LeVine, 1966).¹³

Protest Masculinity and MCM

On the other hand, we found no support in our data for our third hypothesis. As Table 9 shows, no statistically significant association between sex-identity conflict and a coercive MCM exists in our sample. This result can mean two things. Either the incidence of violence as reflected in the codes used in the studies that suggested our hypothesis has no relationship with the dominant MCM, or the political and economic organization of the society may prevent violent conflict within the community but encourage it toward other communities. Since it was our aim to discover the conditions associated with the dominant MCM *within* communities, the evidence of studies that have taken whole societies as their units of comparison cannot be compared with our findings. The need to settle conflicts peacefully within

13. The data summarized in Table 8 suggest that triadic MCM are related, more generally, to cultural complexity. To test this assumption, we used Murdock and Provost's (1973) five-point scale of cultural complexity. This scale summarizes ten five-point scales ranging from 0 to 4, where 4 represents the highest complexity of each one of the ten variables: writing and records, fixity of settlement, agriculture, urbanization, technological specialization, land transport, money, density of population, political integration, and social stratification.

The computed mean value for societies whose communities have dominant dyadic MCM is 6.95 ($N = 21$), that for societies whose communities have dominant triadic MCM is 18.72 ($N = 29$). The significant difference between these two means is $p < .001$. These results accord with the findings concerning evolutionary sequences by Carneiro (1970) and Carneiro and Tobia (1963) as well as with the findings concerning the evolution of specialized roles in the legal organization of societies by Schwartz and Miller (1964). For subsequent discussions of the Schwartz and Miller study see Udy (1965), Schwartz (1965), Wimberly (1973), Baxi (1974) and Schwartz (1974).

the community may indeed relate to the necessity of fighting for the protection of the community's resources, be they in land or in herds, against outside groups. In this case the conditions engendering an aggressive personality may well occur frequently in societies where disputes within the community are not settled by coercive self-help.

Table 9. Relationship between MCM and Sex-Identity Conflict

Mode of Conflict Management		Value on Protest Masculinity Scale				
		0	1	2	3	4
Dyadic	(1)	1	3	2	3	3
	(2), (3)	1	1	2	3	2
Triadic	(4), (5)	3	7	8	7	4

No significance

CONCLUSION

In this cross-cultural study we have attempted to analyze the conditions that explain the use of dyadic and triadic methods as dominant modes of conflict management on the community level in a sample of fifty pre-industrial societies. We encountered some difficulties with our research design that we could not solve satisfactorily given the quality of available data. One difficulty, as we pointed out in the Introduction, concerns the concept of a "dominant" MCM.¹⁴ However, while it would indeed be very difficult to ascertain a dominant MCM, in the sense we have used this concept, for complex industrial societies without controlling, at least, for types of conflict, the ethnography of the societies included in our sample reduced this problem to acceptable proportions. Although our MCM code may not perfectly categorize what is, after all, a most complex field of social and political interaction,¹⁵ our results have vindicated its use in the preparation of the available ethnographic records for analysis.

14. These intriguing connections between MCM on different levels of society, political organization, and subsistence will be explored in a separate study by Sodergren.

15. We do not share the belief expressed by Schwartz and Miller (1964: 160) that legal organization "tends toward a unified, easily identifiable structure in a given society [and that] its form and procedures are likely to be explicitly stated."

Another possible problem concerns the choice of our ecological variables. We do not know whether other variables might better predict a community's level of political integration. However, the fact that several previous studies on the relationship between cultural ecology and political organization have yielded very similar patterns of association strongly supports the results of our analysis, especially since some of these studies involved much larger samples and could, therefore, employ more refined statistical tests than those we could usefully apply to our sample.

Our analysis has shown (1) that the level of a community's political integration as indicated by the relative elaboration of local government is determined by the intensity of its mode of production, and (2) that the level of political integration and the community's dominant mode of conflict management are interdependent.

Our hypothesis concerning the relationship between a coercive MCM and socialization practices found no support in the analysis of our data. This negative evidence may result from the limitation of our research design inasmuch as we did not control for differences between intra-community and inter-community modes of conflict management. It appears that further research on the relationship between modes of conflict management within and between local communities and their political context within the wider society is required in order to re-examine our proposition.

Although we did not intend to demonstrate the existence of any developmental sequence in the evolution of legal institutions, our results do have evolutionary implications, if only because evolutionary processes hinge upon the degree of "functional fit" between interdependent elements of a cultural system. Thus viewed in the context of previous research demonstrating the concomitance of increased political integration, intensity of production, and societal complexity, the shown interdependence of MCM and level of political integration means that triadic procedures evolve with an overall increase in societal complexity.¹⁶

16. The general pattern does not extend to industrial societies whose complex political and economic systems apparently demand a far greater variety of both dyadic and triadic MCM than that encountered in the societies of our sample.

APPENDIX

OUR CODE FOR *POLITICAL INTEGRATION* CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR VARIABLES (LETTERS OR NUMBERS IN BRACKETS REFER TO THE CODES IN THE ORIGINAL SOURCES):

- (1) *Political autonomy*: Dividing Murdock and White's code of "level of political integration" (1969:353), we considered a community to be autonomous [I] if it is independent of control from a higher level of the society, and to be non-autonomous [J,K,L] if it is integrated into the wider political organization of the society (paramount chieftaincies, hierarchial states, and the like).
- (2) *Community government*: We collapsed Murdock and Wilson's "community leadership" code (1972:264, col. 15) into the categories of weak government [O,H,D] which is indicated by the absence of centralized leadership with political authority being dispersed among the community's households or other segments, or by single or multiple headmanship without additional, subordinate political positions; and strong government [S,F,E,C,U] which is indicated by the presence of political offices in addition to that of a headman and/or the presence of councils, assemblies, committees, and similar bodies responsible for the administration of public affairs.
- (3) *Succession to political office*: Combining several types of Murdock and Wilson's code of "local political succession" (1972:264, col. 16), we assumed the presence of flexible succession [O,D,I] for communities if succession derives from divination, dreams, and similar circumstances, or if recognition of leadership depends on the acquisition of personal influence, wealth, or prestige, or if no office of local leadership exists; we assumed fixed succession [A,R,P,M,L,S] for communities if it derives from seniority, election, heredity, or from an appointment by a superordinate political authority.
- (4) *Marital residence*: Modifying Murdock and Wilson's code of "marital residence" (1972:261, col. 9), we classified a community's residence pattern as either matrilineal [M], patrilineal [P], or trans-local [A,B,D] (for want of a better cover term where the couple resides neither in or near the household of one of the husband's male patrilineal kinsmen nor in or near the household of one of the wife's female matrilineal kinsmen).

OUR CODE FOR *MODE OF PRODUCTION* CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING THREE VARIABLES:

- (1) *Population density*: Dichotomizing Murdock and Provost's five-point scale of this variable (1973:382, scale 8), we obtained the categories of low density [0] representing an average of no more than one person per square mile, and of high density [1,2,3,4] representing any greater average number of persons per square mile. Since we have little faith in either the ratio or interval properties of this scale, we used the median sample value to obtain this dichotomy.
- (2) *Mode of subsistence*: Dichotomizing Murdock and White's eight-category code of "primary subsistence economy" (1969:353), we called a mode of subsistence foraging [F,G,H] where gathering, hunting, or fishing provide a major source of food supply, and producing [A,B,C,D,E] where most of the food supply derives from either the cultivation of land, from the domestication of animals or from trade.¹⁷
- (3) *Fixity of residence*: Dichotomizing Murdock and Provost's scale (1973:380, scale 2), we divided our sample into migratory [0,1] and sedentary [2,3,4] communities.

OUR SCALE OF *PROTEST MASCULINITY* DERIVED FROM THE FOLLOWING FOUR VARIABLES:

- (1) *Form of family* (Murdock and Wilson, 1972:260-61, col. 8)
0 - if the form of the family is independent or extended monogamous [M,Em,Fm,Sm], independent nuclear or extended with the inci-

17. No society in our sample derived its subsistence from trade.

- dence of polygyny less than 20 percent [N,En,Fn,Sn], or polyandrous [Q,Eq,Fq];
 1 - if the form of family is independent or extended polygynous [P,Ep,Fp,Sp] since polygyny results in low father salience, i.e., the father remaining 'absent' or 'aloof' (Whiting and Whiting, 1975).
- (2) *Parent-infant sleeping proximity* (Barry and Paxson, 1972:467, col. 1)
 0 - if mother and father share the same bed and the infant sleeps in a different bed [1,2,3,4], or mother and father sleep in the same bed which may or may not also be the infant's [5,9].
 1 - if mother and infant sleep in same bed and father sleeps in a different bed [6,7,8] since this arrangement involves a high degree of exclusive mother-infant intimacy and low father salience.
- (3) *Carrying device* (Barry and Paxson, 1972:468, col. 4a)
 0 - if the carrying device is a basket or cradleboard [4,5];
 1 - if there are no carrying devices (skin to skin contact [1] or use of clothing or blankets [2] or the infant being carried in a sling or flexible pouch [3]), since each of these situations necessitates a high degree of mother-infant contact.
- (4) *Age of weaning* (Barry and Paxson, 1972:471, col. 11)¹⁸
 0 - if the age of weaning is thirty months or less;
 1 - if the age of weaning is more than thirty months, indicating a long period of intimate mother-infant contact.

REFERENCES

- ABEL, Richard L. (1974) "A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society," 8 *Law & Society Review* 217.
- ARMOR, David and Arthur COUCH (1972) *Datatext Primer*. New York: The Free Press.
- BARRY, Herbert and Leonara M. PAXSON (1971) "Infancy and Early Childhood: Cross-Cultural Codes 2," 10 *Ethnology* 466.
- BAXI, Upendra (1974) "Comment—Durkheim and Legal Evolution: Some Problems of Disproof," 8 *Law & Society Review* 645.
- BRÖGGER, Jan (1968) "Conflict Resolution and the Role of the Bandit in Peasant Society," 41 *Anthropological Quarterly* 228.
- BURTON, Robert V. and John W.M. WHITING (1961) "The Absent Father and Cross-Sex Identity," 7 *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development* 85.
- CARLSMITH, Lyn (1973) "Some Personality Characteristics of Boys Separated from Their Fathers during World War II," 1 *Ethos* 466.
- CARNEIRO, Robert L. (1967) "On the Relationship between Size of Population and Complexity of Social Organization," 23 *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 234.
- _____ (1970) "Scale Analysis, Evolutionary Sequences, and the Rating of Cultures," in R. Naroll and R. Cohen, eds., *A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology*. Garden City: The Natural History Press.
- CARNEIRO, Robert L. and Stephen F. TOBIA (1963) "The Application of Scale Analysis to the Study of Cultural Evolution," 26 *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series II* 196.
- COLSON, E. (1953) "Social Control and Vengeance in Plateau Tonga Society," 23 *Africa* 199.
- D'ANDRADE, Roy G. (1973) "Father Absence, Identification and Identity," 1 *Ethos* 440.
- DRIVER, Harold E. (1973) "Cross-Cultural Studies," in J.J. Honigmann, ed., *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- DUMOND, D.E. (1965) "Population Growth and Cultural Change," 21 *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 302.

18. When a range of ages was specified, we used the mean of the two extremes.

- ECKHOFF, Torstein (1966) "The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict-Resolution," 10 *Acta Sociologica* 148.
- EMBER, Melvin (1963) "The Relationship between Economic and Political Development in Nonindustrialized Societies," 2 *Ethnology* 228.
- FELSTINER, William L.F. (1974) "Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing," 9 *Law & Society Review* 63.
- FORTES, M., and E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, eds. (1940) *African Political Systems*. London: Oxford University Press.
- FRIEDMAN, Lawrence M. (1973) *Some Historical Aspects of Law and Social Changes in the United States*. Working Papers from the Program in Law and Society No. 2. University of California, Berkeley.
- FULLER, Lon L. (1963) "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator," 1963 *Wisconsin Law Review* 3.
- (1971) "Mediation—Its Forms and Functions," 44 *Southern California Law Review* 305.
- GALANTER, Marc (1974) "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change," 9 *Law & Society Review* 95.
- GALTUNG, Johan (1965) "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm," 2 *Journal of Peace Research* 348.
- GLUCKMAN, Max (1959) *Custom and Conflict in Africa*. Glencoe: The Free Press.
- GULLIVER, P.H. (1973) "Negotiation as a Mode of Dispute Settlement: Toward a General Model," 7 *Law & Society Review* 667.
- HARNER, Michael J. (1970) "Population Pressure and the Social Evolution of Agriculturalists," 26 *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 67.
- HARRINGTON, Charles (1970) *Errors in the Sex-Role Behavior of Teen-Age Boys*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- HARRIS, Marvin (1968) *The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture*. New York: Crowell.
- HIRSCHMAN, Albert O. (1970) *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- HOEBEL, E. Adamson (1954) *The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- KOCH, Klaus-Friedrich (1974). *War and Peace in Jalémó: The Management of Conflict in Highland New Guinea*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- MARX, Karl (1904 ed.) *The Critique of Political Economy*. Chicago: International Library.
- MUNROE, Robert L. and Ruth H. MUNROE (1973) "Psychological Interpretation of Male Initiation Rites: The Case of Male Pregnancy Symptoms," 1 *Ethos* 490.
- MUNROE, Robert L., Ruth H. MUNROE, and John W.M. WHITING (1973) "The Couvade: A Psychological Analysis," 1 *Ethos* 31.
- MURDOCK, George P. and Catherine PROVOST (1973) "Measurement of Cultural Complexity," 12 *Ethnology* 379.
- MURDOCK, George P. and Douglas R. WHITE (1969) "Standard Cross-Cultural Sample," 8 *Ethnology* 329.
- MURDOCK, George P. and Suzanne F. WILSON (1972) "Settlement Patterns and Community Organization: Cross-Cultural Codes 3," 11 *Ethnology* 254.
- MURPHY, Robert F. (1957) "Intergroup Hostility and Social Cohesion," 59 *American Anthropologist* 1018.
- NADER, Laura (1965) "Choices of Legal Procedure: Shia Moslem and Mexican Zapotec," 67 *American Anthropologist* 394.
- NADER, Laura and Linda R. SINGER (1975) *Dispute Resolution in the Future: What are the Choices?* Unpublished paper prepared for a conference sponsored by the State Bar of California. San Diego, September 1975.
- NAROLL, Raoul (1973) "Holocultural Theory Tests," in R. Naroll and F. Naroll, eds., *Main Currents in Cultural Anthropology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

- POLANYI, Karl (1944) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. New York: Rinehart.
- SAWYER, Jack and Robert A. LEVINE (1966) "Cultural Dimensions: A Factor Analysis of the World Ethnographic Sample," 68 *American Anthropologist* 708.
- SCHAPERA, I. (1956) *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*. London: C.A. Watts.
- SCHWARTZ, Richard D. (1965) "Reply," 70 *American Journal of Sociology* 627.
- (1974) "Legal Evolution and the Durkheim Hypothesis: A Reply to Professor Baxi," 8 *Law & Society Review* 653.
- SCHWARTZ, Richard D. and James C. MILLER (1964) "Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity," 70 *American Journal of Sociology* 159.
- STEWART, Julian H. (1955) *Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- STRAUSS, David J. and Marin ORANS (1975) "Mighty Sifts: A Critical Appraisal of Solutions to Galton's Problem and a Partial Solution," 16 *Current Anthropology* 573.
- TATJE, Terrence A. and Raoul NAROLL (1970) "Two Measures of Societal Complexity: An Empirical Cross-Cultural Comparison," in R. Naroll and R. Cohen, eds., *A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology*. Garden City: The Natural History Press.
- THIBAUT, John and Laurens WALKER (1975) *Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- THODEN VAN VELZEN, H.U.E. and W. VAN WETERING (1960) "Residence, Power Groups and Intra-Societal Aggression: An Enquiry into the Conditions Leading to Peacefulness within Non-Stratified Societies," 49 *International Archives of Ethnography* [Part 2] 169.
- TUDEN, Arthur and Catherine MARSHALL (1972) "Political Organization: Cross Cultural Codes 4," 11 *Ethnology* 436.
- UDY, Stanley H., Jr. (1965) "Dynamic Inferences from Static Data," 70 *American Journal of Sociology* 625.
- VAN VELSEN, J. (1969) "Procedural Informality, Reconciliation, and False Comparisons," in Max Gluckman, ed., *Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law*. London: Oxford University Press.
- VERMEULEN, C.J.J. and A. DE RUIJTER (1975) "Dominant Epistemological Presuppositions in the Use of the Cross-Cultural Survey Method," 16 *Current Anthropology* 29.
- WHITING, Beatrice B. (1965) "Sex Identity Conflict and Physical Violence: A Comparative Study," 67 *American Anthropologist* [Part 2] 123.
- WHITING, John W.M. (1964) "Effects of Climate on Certain Cultural Practices," in W.H. Goodenough, ed., *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- (1968) "Methods and Problems in Cross-Cultural Research," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., 2 *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (2d ed.) Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- (1969) "The Place of Aggression in Social Interaction," in J.F. Short, Jr., and M.E. Wolfgang, eds., *Collective Violence*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
- WHITING, John W.M. and Beatrice B. WHITING (1975) "Aloofness and Intimacy of Husbands and Wives: A Cross Cultural Study," 3 *Ethos* 183.
- WIMBERLY, Howard (1973) "Legal Evolution: One Further Step," 79 *American Journal of Sociology* 78.
- WIRSING, Rolf (1973) "Political Power and Information: A Cross-Cultural Study," 75 *American Anthropologist* 153.