Predicates', while continuous in a way with this last group, is important enough to be taken as introducing a new stage in the author's thought, and as indicative of his current interests. (It is the most recently published paper in the collection.) While there is not a paper in the book (save perhaps the faintly dispirited one disputing with Chomsky) which does not merit, and has not received, more detailed attention than is in place here, I shall attend to 'Meaning and Truth' alone.

The simplest way to join the C-I party, we are told, is: 'present and elucidate a primitive concept of *communication* (or communication-intention) in terms which do not presuppose the concept of *linguistic meaning;* then show that the latter concept can be, and is to be, explained in terms of the former' (172). The articles of war of the rival party, viz. the FS, are: 'the syntactic and semantic rules together determine the meaning of all the sentences of a language . . . by means, precisely, of determining their truth-conditions' (177). Strawson's contention is that the notion of truth-conditions itself cannot be explained or understood without reference to the function of communication: 'Reference . . . to belief-expression is inseparable from the analysis of something true (or false)' and 'it is unrealistic to the point of unintelligibility—or at least, of extreme perversity—to try to free the notion of the linguistic expression of belief from all essential connection with the concept of communication-intention'.

Some remarks. This resounding victory claimed for the C-I may be a little too quickly claimed; and it may even be that the struggle itself, between the FS and the C-I, is not what Strawson claims it to be. The move from 'belief-expression' to 'communication-intention' is sound, but it is dubious whether 'Reference . . . to belief-expression is inseparable from the analysis of something true (or false)'. Linguistic expressions taken *qua* T/F statements can well be distinguished from the same tokens taken *qua* belief-expressions or credal affirmations, as this reviewer shows elsewhere. It is precisely where belief-expression is first insinuated into the account of the FS that some Laocoon of the latter camp should resist the importation: *Equo ne credite, Teucri.* The struggle could then shift to its true ground, with the difference seen to be not, *pace* p. 176, that the C-I insist, while the FS refuse to allow, that the meaning-determining rules of a language can be understood only with reference to communication-intention; but that the "meaning" which truth-conditions are capable of determining is *not* the meaning, without scare-quotes, which a comprehensive account of 'meaning' as used both by the vulgar and by philosophers in some of their more important utterances, would have to explain. Thus the justifiable complaint of the C-I is not that the FS account fails in what it is calculated to do (and at least Davidson, in his recent work, would seem willing to make the more modest claim involving only "meaning" and not meaning) but that what the FS type of account is calculated to do, is not good enough for important purposes.

Professor Strawson is not easy reading. While almost always clear as to what he is saying, he is too often convoluted in the saying of it. And he sometimes says things of prime importance to the reader in insignificant-looking footnotes. Yet this book is a fine example of a leading philosophical technician at work on questions whose significance is often far from being merely technical: theologians, for instance, might do something more valid with "communication-intention" than with some of the things they have bought in recent years from other markets.

'These manticists' (190) is just a pleasing misprint for 'the semanticists': descriptive metaphysics, unlike the cultic fringes of devotion to Wittgenstein or Heidegger, perhaps, has not yet fallen among the soothsayers.

LAWRENCE MOONAN

ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE, by Joel J. Kupperman. ***Allen and Unwin,*** **London, 1970. 156 pp. £2.75.**

The title of this book should be sufficient to ensure that it will not be overlooked. Implicit in it are both a challenge and a promise which, in the present climate of Philosophical Ethics, command attention. Happily, the author does not disappoint the expectations raised.

What is being challenged, of course, is the imperialism of Science which has claimed (or its court philosophers have claimed) the world of Knowledge for itself—'the sciences'. Ethics, we have been told, is not a science, and so it has been banished from the realm of knowledge. Cognitivists have always disputed this sentence, and they will obviously expect to find an ally in Professor Kupperman. It is the special merit of his book that he proves to be a critical and an original ally.

The main burden of the argument is that

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there has been over-simplification and misrepresentation on both sides, and that the argument for and against 'cognitivism' in Ethics has been particularly misleading. Much of the blame for this he lays at the door of Moore, who started philosophers off on a wild goose chase for a non-natural quality called Goodness, and for 'Intuition', the faculty by which it could be detected. When it began to be suspected that there was no such animal, and the chase was called off, Stevenson and Ayer were on hand to draw the moral: a science without an object is no science. Better to salvage what we may for Psychology, Sociology and the like, and declare ethical statements as non-negotiable except when changed into the currency of these sciences.

Interestingly enough, however, the backbone of the author's argument is an appeal to Ordinary Language, which would surely have interested and appealed to Moore. Indeed one would expect Moore to have approved of the conclusions reached. These are, briefly, that the commonest patterns of everyday ethical discourse reveal a consistent concern with knowledge, with knowing that this ethical decision or judgment was right or wrong—and that it would still be so even if one's mood, circumstances or society's conventions should change. Ordinary Language, therefore, provides *prima facie* evidence for there being such an animal as Ethical Knowledge.

Two possible objections to this appeal to ordinary usage, one ethical and the other philosophical, receive careful consideration. The argument in each case is that the assumptions implicit in ordinary ethical usage are dangerous (ethically) or confused (philosophically), and that ordinary language should accordingly be reformed, by analysis, or ignored. Consideration of the first involves the author in a useful discussion of Relativism, its merits and philosophical flaws. But it is with the second, the philosophical objection, that he is preoccupied throughout the book.

Stevenson and Ayer have, he argues, made too much of the differences and not enough of the similarities between ethical and what they are pleased to call cognitive or scientific discourse. His critique of Ayer is particularly good, in that he refuses the dilemma which Ayer's over-simplifications enable him to urge. Instead of debating the possibilities of verifying ethical judgments empirically, he explores the role actually accorded experience in the formulation, acceptance or rejections of ethical judgments in a variety of everyday situations; and concludes that experience can and does support the claim to know the rights and wrongs of decisions taken, etc. Likewise, instead of recommending Ethics to Ayer as a different kind of logic (as in their different ways Toulmin and Baier have done) he explores the scope of reason in a suitably varied range of examples; and concludes that in some cases it has a major role, in other cases hardly any part at all.

This is a painstaking and modest book which will be welcomed by all philosophers interested in its subject matter. It is, however, intended for a wider public inasmuch as it deals with a problem which, as he observes in the Preface, 'is perhaps the one most relevant to the life of the average unphilosophical man'. Such a reader will find the discussion heavy going in places, but the movement of the argument is always clear; and his interest, once caught, is likely to be held.

J. J. MCCLUSKEY

CULTURE AND ANARCHY: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRITICISM, by Matthew Arnold, edited by Ian Gregor. *Bobbs-Merrill,* Indianapolis and New York, 1971. 281+xliv pp. $2.95.

Why does the benign Victorian hawk on this paperback's cover avert his eyes? The real man is elusive. Yet he exudes from his work (when we read him, E. M. Forster said, 'he seems to be in the room'), and sometimes he exudes from what he wrote and later cancelled. 'I remember my father', Matthew Arnold declared approvingly in the first edition of *Culture and Anarchy*, in 1869 '. . . thus: "As for rioting . . . flog the rank and file, and fling the ring leaders from the Tarpeian Rock!" '

That sits oddly with Sweetness and Light. ('The most odiously irrational, advice . . . ,' fumed J. M. Robertson, forgetting, perhaps, that when Dr Arnold of Rugby flogged or flung bad boys, he always made amends to them.) Even if Matthew intended a rather paternal and hyperbolic effect, however, the Tarpeian Rock says something about him.

And it seems to me that Professor Ian Gregor's best point, in his generally illuminating introduction to the great social 'essay', is that a 'personal' quality of Arnold's keeps *Culture and Anarchy* alive. What is important in *Culture and Anarchy* is Matthew Arnold. One re-reads it thinking it will be a bore. It isn't. Not that its circular arguments, vague generalizations, or self-advertising catch phrases in themselves

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