

of scholarship will be appreciated. It proposes to provide the different English meanings of every word used in the *Summa Theologica* and of selected key-words from the remaining works. St Thomas's own definitions are given first.

The preface does not match the contents. The careful scholarship of the editors appears even from a cursory reading of this first section from *a, ab* to *Cyrus*. You may look for some of the classical traps and find them sprung. Such a work of course can only be tested by the regular consultation which its appearance merits. As a first ABC for the editors' second thoughts, it may be suggested that Alexander of Aphrodisias, who is missing, is more important than popes of that name, that the application of the term *bonum commune* to God should be referred to, and that it is not a happy start to describe *causa* as a wide synonym of *principium*.

T.G.

CERTAINTY, PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL. By Dom Illyd Trethowan. (Dacre Press; 15s.)

Many of the Thomist circles which have sprung up in recent years must have felt the need for a guide-book which would show them how St Thomas's thought is relevant to contemporary thought, whilst at the same time providing a lead through the forest of the *Opera Omnia*. Such circles will find Dom Illyd's book extremely useful. Some of Dom Illyd's gay 'tilting at long-established views' will appear misdirected when they have recourse to St Thomas's own works, and the Benedictine is quite obviously in for a rough-handling from the strict Thomists; but that is a minor matter if everyone derives as much enjoyment from discussing the book as the author must have done from writing it.

So many problems come into range and vanish again with breathless speed (pp. 46-48 'The Theory of Analogy') that even a list of its contents would occupy pages. In response, then, to Dom Illyd's invitation to suggest improvements, we limit ourselves to asking whether the method of discussion is the correct one. Repeatedly we are told that certain views are 'gaining currency', or that M. Maritain's views are 'promising' that someone else's are 'encouraging'; the torrent of names makes one imagine that a Thomist Third-Programme is being broadcast. The author might have found it easier to communicate his thought if he had 'aimed at things' rather than at other people.

D. NICHOLL.

LE CONCEPT DE DROIT SELON ARISTOTE ET ST THOMAS. T.R.P. Louis Lachance, O.P., S.T.M. (Les Editions du Lévrier, Ottawa, Montreal, 1948; n.p.)

This is the second edition, revised and corrected, of a work which first appeared in 1933. The notion of right is an involved one and

it is a welcome volume which succeeds in putting clearly before us the thought of St Thomas on the matter in its Aristotelian background. The author reaches the core of the problem when he writes 'the concept of right in its widest sense is not a generic but an analogical one. The unity of the concept is that unity engendered by analogy. Hence the doctrine of analogy is the pivot, as it were, around which the whole question of right revolves' (p. 32). Consistently with this statement Fr Lachance tackles his problem in a systematic way beginning with the notions of the Aristotelico-Thomist method of induction and analysis, and the idea of analogy, then going on to treat of right according to its causes, extrinsic and intrinsic, finally dealing with it in its relations to the social sciences. Modern jurists, not entirely free from Nominalist tendencies, are likely to balk at such a purely philosophical approach to a problem with which they are so much concerned, for the notion of analogy is one with which they are not very familiar, but they would do well to make a profound study of the thesis. Without its metaphysical foundations 'right' loses much of its meaning.

The chapter on the divisions of right in which he descends from the analogical concept to its particular determinations, giving schemata embracing all forms of both subjective and objective right, is especially useful. It is an extremely valuable volume although one regrets the lack of adequate indices.

G.B.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENCE. By Gabriel Marcel. Translated by Manya Harari. (Harvill Press. Changing World Series; 5s.)

'Hardly a day goes by without my being asked what is existentialism. (Usually it is a society lady who asks for this information, but tomorrow it may be my charwoman or the ticket-collector on the underground).' This experience of Marcel's is by no means unique but his capacity for giving an answer may very well be so; for although any existentialist has the right to reply, with Berdyaev, 'L'existentialisme c'est moi', nevertheless Marcel had put himself on the market at such an early date that he fully deserves to enjoy a corner on his own. Nor will this present work weaken his claims. It consists of four chapters, 'On the Ontological Mystery', 'Existence and Human Freedom' (a criticism of Sartre), 'Testimony and Existentialism' and 'An Essay in Autobiography', which taken together give a very clear account of his position, and of how this position differs from others which bear the same label.

Only a review as long as the book itself could give an adequate impression of the stimulus to thought which it affords, with its phenomenological treatment of technics and the vilification of man, with its illustrations of how reliance upon material imagery leads to error, its description of testimony and its inherent transcendence. Such lengthy treatment being out of the question it may be helpful