

Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved because of the nonpayment of debts due their citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the custom-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking possession of a certain amount of territory.

It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine. It can not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the Government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part of which will be distributed *pro rata* among the creditors of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors, and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps.

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the custom-houses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these Republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, *unless there is interference on the part of the United States.*

#### ADMIRAL TOGO — "THE PEACEFUL MAN OF THE EAST"

The progress that the peace movement has made in the past hundred years since the signing of the Treaty of Ghent is evidenced by the existence of numerous peace societies, which, beginning in the United States, encircle the earth, and the position which these societies hold. Their importance in the life of the community and the influence which they exercise upon international affairs is shown by the fact that re-

sponsible statesmen and public men use them increasingly, not merely for the pronouncement of advanced and enlightened views on matters of great national and international importance, but as channels of communication and means of dissemination of their views.

Thus on March 20, 1910, President Taft expressed himself before the New York Peace and Arbitration League in favor of enlarging the scope of arbitration treaties by including questions of honor. At the first annual meeting of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes recently organized by Theodore Marburg and James Brown Scott, and under the presidency of the latter, President Taft declared himself in favor of judicial settlement as the only safe and sure way to the reduction of armaments, urged the establishment of the International Court of Arbitral Justice, and stated his willingness to conclude a treaty of arbitration with some one nation which should omit the customary reserves of honor.

President Taft's statement before the New York Peace and Arbitration League is said to have influenced Mr. Carnegie to endow the peace movement and it is well known that his address before the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes marks the beginning of the modern movement in favor of arbitration treaties without the customary reserves.

Admiral Togo has followed the good example, and made his one public utterance on the subject of peace at a luncheon tendered him by the Japan Society of New York and the New York Peace Society. At a dinner at the White House, President Taft had broached the subject of arbitration and sought an expression of approval from Admiral Togo. The latter avoided the subject for the moment, but a few days later in New York, as guest of honor of the two societies, and before six hundred guests, the Admiral spoke in no uncertain terms in favor of the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States.

The address was carefully thought out, was written and read in Japanese by the Admiral and translated into English for the benefit of the English-speaking audience.

The Admiral, who indulged in a pleasing personal allusion and etymological exercise, said:

I thank you very sincerely for this magnificent entertainment. The truth is that I am at a loss for words with which to express my appreciation for the warm and hearty reception which has been accorded me ever since my arrival in this hospitable country.

My name, Heihachiro Togo, possesses particular significance at this time. Heihachiro signifies "peaceful son" and Togo means "Eastern country," the peaceful man of the East. I consider, therefore, that the name by which I was christened entitles me to address you on terms of intimacy.

It gives me much pleasure to learn that this function has been given by the Japan Society in conjunction with the Peace Society. I can not conceive of a happier combination, since the relationship between Japan and the United States must ever be one of peace and neighborly good will.

In this belief I take advantage of the occasion to declare myself among the foremost advocates in favor of maintenance of that relationship, in order that our two countries, which have so long lived in harmony and cordial friendship, may continue to do so forever. My only regret to-day is that I can not shake the hand of all of you. I raise my glass to wish prosperity to the two societies, success to their benevolent work; welfare to you all; and to the sentiments originally expressed by one of the great Western sages, which should be revised thus; I would say: "Peace hath its victories, more renowned than those of war." I thank you.

Mr. Carnegie, who appreciated as keenly as the Admiral the international elements in the occasion and its importance, sent the following singularly happy cable from Scotland:

Cordial greetings to Togo, great warrior and great peace-maker! May success crown his noble efforts to bind Japan's First Friend, our own beloved country, and his in the bonds of everlasting peace.

Mr. James Brown Scott, Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was asked not inappropriately to read the telegram of the generous donor, and on behalf of the Endowment addressed a few words to the Admiral. "I shall not weaken," he said, "Mr. Carnegie's eloquent words, which voice the hopes and aspirations of the American people, by adding to or commenting upon them. I merely allow myself to say that we want peace, not peace at any price, not the peace of fear, but peace based upon justice which alone can be permanent. May your visit, Sir, to the United States hasten the coming of the day when in the fine words of Mirabeau, justice shall rule the world."

From this luncheon, at least, the doughty Admiral or the peaceful man of the East, to use his own words, will carry a souvenir which will outlast the enthusiasm of the moment. The Japan Society of New York was happily inspired to present the Admiral with a specially bound copy of the rare original report of Commodore Perry's mission to Japan, which mission has had such important consequences not only to the two countries but to the world at large. The presentation was made on behalf

of the Society by General Stewart L. Woodford in a gracious and well-phrased address, and the Admiral, evidently much touched and pleased, accepted the volume in a few brief sentences.

Mr. Lindsay Russell, President of the Japan Society, introduced Mayor Gaynor as toastmaster. In addition to the gentlemen already named, Rear Admiral Leutze spoke for the American Navy and General Grant for the American Army.

#### THE REVISED ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE<sup>1</sup>

About the middle of July Great Britain and Japan made important alterations in their alliance and extended it ten years from date. There were other reasons for the change, but the chief one was the negotiations then in progress for the general arbitration treaty between England and the United States. Under the agreement of 1905, itself a revision and strengthening of that of 1902, if Japan and the United States should have been engaged in a war which involved any of the vital interests mentioned in the preamble of the treaty, and if it should have appeared that the United States was in any way the aggressor, then England would have been bound to support Japan against the United States. If without changing this, England should have agreed with the United States to submit to arbitration every cause for disagreement, then England's obligations to Japan and to the United States would have been conflicting. However small the likelihood was of this potential conflict becoming an actual one, England could not afford to take the risk. To obviate this a new provision was introduced, Article four, as follows:

Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

If the arbitration treaty then in contemplation and since concluded, but not yet agreed to by the Senate, should go into effect, war between the United States and Japan, so much talked of for so many months, would be practically impossible. The fact that Japan so readily consented to the change shows how little basis there had been for the war talk. These two agreements taken together promise more for the peace of the world than any similar contracts ever made.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the new agreement, see SUPPLEMENT to this issue, p. 276; for that of 1905, see SUPPLEMENT, 1:15; and for that of 1902, see SUPPLEMENT, 1:14.