

SOME REMARKS ON PUBLIC LIFE

This paper sketches an analysis of the public realm in Western democracies. It has often been said that there is a decline of public life in advanced industrial societies, and that this decline threatens the nature and function of political democracy. I doubt this. The most that I would claim at this stage is that large masses of the citizenry are excluded from the contemporary political scene, and that the most urgent political problems are discussed by social organizations representing the interest of individuals and groups. This is of philosophical interest; for these organizations, and not individual citizens, are constituting now the public life. It would take me too far afield to show how the new radicalism of the 1960s and many other social and political movements of today reacted against the threatened liquidation of the public realm. My main object is to draw attention to the lack of participation, least of all of political participation, of the citizens, and to answer the question why this happened.

First, however, I will start with the problem of public life in a historical perspective, and with the fact that many citizens have begun escaping from the public realm and restricting themselves

to their role as private men; secondly, I shall argue that this present situation is essentially conditioned by the social structure of communal life; and thirdly, I shall conclude by showing that the public life of political democracy can exist as long as there are conflicts about social and political affairs in the world that all have in common.

I

If we set out to find an answer to the question: "What does public life mean?", it soon becomes apparent that we must deal with the problem in a historical perspective. "Public life" is a historical term. It was totally unknown during the Middle Ages, and became an important concept only after the emergence of the modern idea of the state. The traditional belief in the feudal powers of church, monarchy, and guilds began to lose significance more and more. A society of citizens grew up in contrast to the state. They began to feel that they were no longer ruled by feudal authorities and institutions. They thought about the state and its activities; they discussed these things with others; and consequently a public opinion began to evolve. The citizens stood, so far, between society and state and exercised a political function.

This is not to say that the concept of public life did not exist before that time. We find it in Greece and in the classical political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. "The distinction between a private and a public sphere of life corresponds to the household and the political realms, which have existed as distinct, separate entities at least since the rise of the ancient city-state; but the emergence of the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-state."¹ That is, the Greeks knew the relation between private and public life. But they did not know about the contrast between state and society. They viewed

¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 28.

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public life as a social as well as a political phenomenon; privacy became simply a familiar one. This has something to do with the fact that the Greeks discovered the self, but that the “discovery of the self was more an awareness of separateness and differentiation”² from the other members of the *polis*. There was, therefore, no chance to realize that citizens could begin critical reflection on public affairs and form a public opinion against the state. “The identity of the individual and the *polis* was an integral part of Greek culture.”³ Such sort of identity was impossible since the authority of the citizens was emphasized and since there were constitutional guarantees for the right to criticize the existing system within a political public.

My purpose here is not to describe the way in which public rights have been gained, but rather to examine the liberal concept of the public.

Perhaps looking at the terms “public” or “public opinion” can provide us the best way to begin such an examination. These terms have been in use since the seventeenth century in England and since the eighteenth century in France; that is, they have existed since the time when state and society were separated. Since that period, citizens have been granted constitutional rights of privacy—rights limited only by the civil rights of others and by the need to preserve the norms of the constitution. What the citizens demanded is that the state protect their privacy as much as possible, guarding it from powers which could rule, govern, and, at the very end, politicize that privacy.⁴ They realized the importance of withdrawing now and then to be alone, living within the small-group intimacy of a family, or pursuing their

² John G. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time*, Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press, 1968, p. 95.

³ Gunnell, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁴ Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom*, New York, Atheneum, 1967, p. 24: “These areas of individual pursuit prevent the total politicizing of life and permit other models of success and happiness to serve as alternatives to the political career and the citizenship role. Personal retreats for securing perspective and critical judgment are also significant for democratic life. A liberal democratic system maintains a strong commitment to the family as a basic and autonomous unit responsible for important educational, religious, and moral roles, and therefore the family is allowed to assert claims to physical and legal privacy against both society and the state.”

own subjective interests in work and business.⁵ Only when such private life exists within a non-political social organization will the citizenry become free to form a sort of political public in contrast and opposition to the power of the state. A life which is separated from the state can be the only basis for rationalizing the power used by a government and for justifying its activities. The people with such a political interest need special means to express their opinions publicly. For this reason, moral and critical journals, newspapers, etc. have been formed: as a means of establishing and moulding opinions within the political public.

What is interesting is that this liberal democratic understanding of the public has undergone a basic change since the eighteenth century. In today's advanced industrial societies we no longer see the private man standing in bold silhouette against the state and forming with other citizens a political public. There are now parties, associations, trade unions and lobbies who represent group as well as personal interests, and who are continually striving to share in the power of the state or to influence its distribution and administration. But what is the reason that both private and public life have lost their earlier functions?

The liberals emphasized that private men possess rights, which no government could call in question. Their freedom and privacy was guaranteed with regard to their house, their religion, their property and education and to all their economic and political activities. But this sort of liberty did not mean the negation of power as some thought in the beginning. "The eighteenth—and nineteenth—century struggle against feudal practices not only defined liberty as the antithesis of power"; it developed "a pattern of ways in which force was to be used."⁶ This concept of power has something to do with a reaction against the Greek idea of the people's participation within the Athenian *polis* and against Rousseau's idea of the "*volonté générale*" and his understanding of direct public participation in government. It was a reaction to this direct democracy that in America, Hamilton,

⁵ See C. B. Macpherson, *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962.

⁶ Oscar and Mary Handlin, *The Dimensions of Liberty*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, chap. I "Liberty and Power," pp. 9-22, see 20, 21.

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Madison, and Jay in *The Federalist Papers* thought that the term “indirect democracy” was a contradiction in terms and that they called themselves “republicans”. According to their understanding, the citizens must be represented in government through elected representatives, that is, in an indirect way. Also liberals, like Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill called special attention to the civil liberties of the people and their common interests,⁷ but they were at the same time afraid of the general will of big populations and thought that under these circumstances the shift to indirect democracy was necessary for the development of constitutional government. It was this principle of representative government which created a gap between society and state and led to the consequence that private and public life were steadily losing their functions as prerequisites for a democratic state.

About the same time that de Tocqueville and Mill were proclaiming their idea of representative government, Marx and Engels, in their *Communist Manifesto* (1848), were emphasizing the fact that the public must be enlarged according to the changing social situation of the time. The public, they thought, can no longer consist merely of private men who base their life and their role within the public on private property and education. Rather, the public must be enlarged to include those who have neither private property nor education—the lower classes. It is true that this argument dissolves the contrast between society and state. According to that line of reasoning the traditional minority control of government must be eliminated, and government must become the business of the enlarged public, the business of all.

It is important for us to look closely at the role of private and public life in a totalitarian dictatorship.—The party of a communist state has as its declared goal the freedom of man and a classless society in the future, and the individual citizen must dedicate himself entirely to this goal and the “general public welfare.” Any refusal to participate in the “necessary revolutionary actions of the proletariat” faces strong condemnation. Private life and individualism are considered an unworthy aspi-

⁷ See Brian Barry, “The Public Interest,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Suppl., vol. 38 (1964), pp. 1-18.

ration which simply must not be pursued. And if this is true, there is no free and independent expression vis-a-vis the state and in opposition to the state and therefore no political public where, as we have seen, the state is criticized and controlled. F. G. Wilson speaks, for that reason, of "the Marxian revolutionary attitude toward representative government,"⁸ and he shows that this attitude does not admit any sort of liberal democratic public: "the Marxist concept of the state as the agent of class repression limits or destroys both the liberal and conservative idea of public opinion. Proletarian democracy rejects the principle of government by discussion, if that principle includes discussion with or within the bourgeoisie."⁹ It is interesting, however, that sometimes exceptions are made in the case of artists, students, and other groups of intellectuals. Their need for privacy is recognized by the bureaucracy, which justifies its position by explaining that these groups are working for the good of society. These groups might be allowed to withdraw from participation in public affairs in order that they might benefit the public welfare in a broader sense. And yet the same groups are kept under close surveillance, and any of their actions which are too much out of line—for instance, the protests in Moscow in the fall and winter of 1967-68¹⁰—are promptly condemned. Also, of course, in the name of the public interest. In short, the guarantees existing in Western democracies which provide not only for man's right to participate in the political public but also for his existence do not exist in totalitarian dictatorships. It may be possible in such situations for a person to separate himself from the environment, but only in secrecy, for such a separation represents a break with the political establishment.

It is certainly true that privacy and freedom are protected in Western democracies, and it is also true that every citizen is encouraged to participate. But the point still remains that these democracies are being threatened by certain political developments and first of all by the fact that many citizens have begun

⁸ Francis G. Wilson, *A Theory of Public Opinion*, Chicago, Henry Regnery Comp., 1962, p. 229.

⁹ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

¹⁰ See Paul A. Smith, Jr., "Protest in Moscow," in *Foreign Affairs*, 47 (Oct. 1968), pp. 151-163.

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escaping from political reality and restricting themselves to their roles as private men.¹¹

It may be helpful at this point to turn to Professor Lipset, who, during the last few years, has made major contributions to comparative and historical sociology. In a personal postscript in his book *Political Man*, Lipset expresses the idea that many of the public policy issues of the eighteenth century have been realized or are about to be realized in Western democratic systems.¹² This, however, has produced another problem for those who are interested in politics. Says Lipset, "This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action." It is easy to see why this "triumph" ends a political discussion. A democratic society gives the same rights to all citizens, and it can exist as such only if these citizens are socially integrated and if the citizens come together occasionally to make compromises. If the citizens are not willing or able to socialize with others, a democracy cannot exist. But the question then arises whether the socialization can become political as well as social. One may join social organizations or participate in group affairs, or one may be satisfied with the privatization of one's life and show little or no political engagement. The latter is often the case when one is no longer interested in ideologies and utopias. Professor Lipset uses the following words in emphasizing their importance. "Ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent democracies, but they are clearly needed in the international effort to develop free political and economic institutions in the rest of the world. It is only the ideological class struggle within the West which is ending. Ideological conflicts linked to levels and problems of economic development and appropriate political institutions among different nations will last far beyond our lifetime, and men committed to democracy can abstain from them only at their peril". The final point here is that we can gain and maintain freedom and privacy in our lives by directly confronting these ideologies and utopias. Only

¹¹ Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideology*, New York, Free Press, 1962.

¹² Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Garden City, N. Y., Anchor Books, 1963, pp. 437-456, see 443 and 456.

through such confrontation can an atmosphere of freedom be created.¹³ Perhaps those citizens who do not experience this kind of confrontation belong to a democratic society, but in reality they may not be free at all.

I have deliberately neglected some problems which I wish to discuss later. My interest here has simply been to show the changes since the citizen's emancipation from the feudal powers. As we have seen, there are many advanced industrial civilizations which are not interested in ideologies and utopias. People may vote, but in other respects they stand outside the state and peep ignorantly at its activities. This does not mean that such people have lost their political function. It rather means that there are groups, associations, unions, etc. which form the political public and control the state. These organizations had to take over the political functions of individual citizens and to pursue their different interests. But once the citizenry had begun to give up their function they did not realize that this can only be done from time to time and with regard to a special project—that just this form of representation needs the most extensive and matured participation by the people.

II

This new political orientation has its foundations in the twentieth-century development of our Western democracies. Yet we must take into account the fact that this political situation is essentially based in the social relations of the citizens.

This assertion may become clearer if we examine the terms "private" and "public." The liberals indicated two different, but related, things by the term "private"—the realm of the profession and the more personal area of the family. No matter what the profession may be, since the end of the nineteenth century it has become more and more of a public affair. I do not go so far as to claim that professions have become purely a matter of state. But for the most part it became the state's business to plan and to regulate the whole economic process. The state also had to take care of things like income—distri-

¹³ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 183.

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bution, social security, and labor market—in short, those actions which private men in an industrial society were not able to manage themselves. In some cases, however, these public issues are currently dealt with, not by the state, but rather by large-scale concerns, administrations, and small businesses. In any case, it is easy to see that the profession is no longer simply a private matter—it has become a public one.

Thus, there is only one remaining area of privacy—the area of the family and of other close personal relationships. But it becomes increasingly evident that even this area is rapidly becoming more and more public. There are many evidences of this: for instance, a man who lives in a suburban area is a man who comes into close contact with his neighbors.¹⁴ He sends his children to the local school, he belongs to social organizations or local committees, he goes to church, and he, in all probability, spends a great deal of his leisure time watching television or using another of the popular consumer goods at his disposal. In other words, this man finds himself in confrontation with a wide range of social organizations, both great and small, and the usual consumer goods. No citizen could live without being involved in these attitudes, desires, and values of his environment's organization. Or, as Professor Moore has put it in his essay "The Individual in an Organizational Society": "In terms of concrete aggregations of individuals with common goals and regular procedures, of collective forms of working and playing, of disciplined procedures for pursuing the production of goods or the exchange of information or the governing of men, human concerns do get organized. Not to join the group is to be a social isolate, and that is social death."¹⁵ There is, of course, a considerable difference between an individual's existence within his family group and the social conditions present in the other environment; but basically, it seems to me that these areas are not truly private ones, but public ones. It is important to be aware of that, and to see the ways in which these two areas are related. If that is the case, we should

¹⁴ See Maurice Stein, *The Eclipse of Community*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1960.

¹⁵ Wilbert E. Moore, *Order and Change: Essays in Comparative Sociology*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1967, pp. 220-233, see 222.

remember that the citizen who is trying to get privacy and freedom and to satisfy his human need for autonomy has quite a high price to pay. He runs the risk of becoming the prisoner of his society.¹⁶

From what I have already said about the life within a community, it is evident that one could come under the pressure of what we may call "socialization." But it may be worth stating that in all cases there is not always a necessity to fulfill the social role obligations. It seems to me that from the point of view of gaining privacy and freedom, one can resist the pressure of "socialization" by a counter-pressure.

This has been pointed out by Professor Goode in his article on "Norm Commitment and Conformity to Role-Status Obligations."¹⁷ He agrees with those who hold that there is a set of given norms which, after all, are socializing elements upon the citizens' behavior; but, he believes that one can determine the rank of dependence and independence by one's own decisions, perhaps, by a "rational calculation," by calculating the "balance of advantages and disadvantages." Goode belongs to those Anglo-American social scientists like Alvin W. Gouldner, Peter M. Blau, and George C. Homans who are using the model of "exchange" and "bargaining" to explain the social interrelationships among individuals. What they try to show is that the degree of dependence and independence under different parts of a social system is based on one's rational and conscious kind of behavior. I do not go so far as to claim that this model has a far-reaching importance for the whole discussion of social and political issues. I see its limitations. But it helps us to some degree. Thomas C. Schelling, an expert in political science and international strategy and one of the originators of the new relationship between Washington and Moscow since the end of the 1950's, emphasizes, therefore, in his book *The Strategy of Conflict* the importance of "rational behavior—not just of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a

¹⁶ William A. Faunce, *Problems of an Industrial Society*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968, chap. IV: "Freedom, Control, and the Future of Industrial Society," pp. 134-175.

¹⁷ *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 66 (Nov. 1960), pp. 346-358.

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calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system.”¹⁸ Schelling views these conflict situations as a bargaining process. “They are situations in which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make.”¹⁹ But why should we stress this point within our context? On the one hand, there is a community with its commitments to appropriate role behavior and its pressure of “socialization” which can profoundly influence a citizen’s behavior, and which can powerfully affect his image of the state and his activities. On the other hand, there is a need of a citizen for privacy and freedom, for “a privately owned place to hide in.”²⁰ It is certainly true that he needs this place in the privacy of a household and as a protection of his activities in the private realm. But it is also true that such need is not always a common interest, that it gives occasion for conflict situations among the other members of the community. He soon gets into difficulties if he is aware of the difference and contradiction between the private and public realms. And yet he could bring the personal and the common interests, the private and the public life under control. When I say that this control requires a rational and conscious calculation and a strategy of life, indeed, I do not think that this is without danger. For it may be that as one is looking for a sort of privacy and freedom, he is running into even greater difficulties because privacy and freedom, as he understands and practices them, have no political function at all. They allow him the satisfaction of some basic human needs. I believe this to be a misunderstanding of both the public and the private life, and I want to explain my line of thought.

It would not be too much to say that the necessities of private life have been changed in modern industrial societies by the great expansion of leisure and consumption. Otto Kirchheimer has described this in his article on “Private Man

¹⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 4.

¹⁹ Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁰ Hannah Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

and Society.”²¹ He uses the situation of workers and their conception of labor and leisure as an example to demonstrate why citizens sometimes play no active role in society and state, and are not concerned about human affairs in general. These workers restrict themselves to their private life and separate it from their job. “Thus the main tendency is separationist. Job life and private life have no common denominator.”²² This is based on the contrast of private and public sphere which we already know. The workers live under democratic conditions, and yet they make little or no use of trade unions or other organizations which could represent their interests in the public realm (if we look away from the fact that they are members of the organizations). We may say, by all means, let us enjoy the new kinds of leisure activity; let us see them as an alternative to the laboring-life process. But it is without doubt clear that this tendency toward leisure, consumption behavior, and all the other values of a community life is merely a step in the direction of greater political freedom. It could involve a “restriction of freedom exclusively to consumer goods orientation,”²³ that is, to a behavior which is socially determined by “the context of mass-consumer institutions. ... But for the individual these decisions draw their importance only from the fact that they create the illusion of a margin of initiative. For a fleeting moment he may enjoy this initiative and then become a victim of subliminal guidance by the purveyors of these articles.”²⁴ It would seem indeed to be an impossible undertaking to regard this initiative as a function within a democracy. In other words, I suspect that this leisure and consumer-oriented initiative permits the most extensive political participation by the citizens, and is extremely good for the democratic conditions of privacy and freedom within a political public.

If I am right in saying that an invasion of privacy and intimacy by the social conditions of mass consumption has taken place,

²¹ Otto Kirchheimer, “Private Man and Society,” in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 81 (March 1966), pp. 1-24

²² Kirchheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²³ Kirchheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁴ Kirchheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

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it follows that the rights which we ourselves own, as members of a political community, are threatened. Some social and political scientists have, in fact, held that such a situation creates a world of alienation and anomie; and some others have gone even further to the point of holding that this may be the most fruitful base of totalitarianism.

Surely, it may well be that a lot of people are estranged from themselves, from others, and from the world in which they live; and it may also be possible that these people could forget their anxiety and despair and their whole feeling of loneliness in communication, in union with others. But I do not see that this helps us to understand the decline of concern about the entire field of politics in a modern political democracy. Steven Lukes' essay on "Alienation and Anomie" makes this, indirectly, quite clear.²⁵ Mr. Lukes shows that the classical term "alienation" relies on a philosophical understanding of man's nature.²⁶ What this term provides, at best, is a comparison. It implies the vision of the essential nature of man and the necessary conditions of its development in the private and public realms, and it emphasizes that this ideal has not been reached at the present. I would deny that and hold that the industrial civilizations of our Western world are confronting us with social and political problems which could not be solved by a romantic and idealistic concept of man's nature, by a pessimistic critique, or by comparing the present and the past world. These generalizations, however, take no notice of the special social conditions of privacy within a political public today.

With regard to the second argument, what reason have we for believing that the socially determined consumer orientation protects always the rights of citizens against an invasion of authoritarian and totalitarian powers?

In his book on *The Politics of Mass Society*, Professor Kornhauser points out that the fewer the social ties are, the easier it becomes for individuals and groups to participate in

²⁵ Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie," in *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, third series, ed. Laslett and Runciman, New York, Barnes & Noble, 1967, pp. 134-156.

²⁶ See W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory*, Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press, 1963, chap. III.

extreme political movements. In the tenth chapter of the book he uses the example of the "Unattached Intellectuals," claiming "that free-lance intellectuals are more receptive to political extremism than are other types of intellectuals."²⁷ According to this, free-lance intellectuals and other groups of individuals who are entirely unrelated to each other and do not belong to organizations and other forms of "establishment" within a given public realm, show a corresponding political behavior. They "tend to have fewer institutional responsibilities than intellectuals in professional organizations, and therefore are less likely to be committed to central institutions."²⁸ The example of the new radicalism of the 1960's and the rebellion of intellectuals, artists, and students shows more clearly, perhaps, than others, that the social isolation of citizens is an ideal condition for political mass movements. Of course, it is quite obvious that many citizens in Western market societies are living under similar conditions. They live their own private life, isolated from the other citizens of their community, and no longer related to the common world, the public realm. It is, I hope, clear that this loss is important. It may be true that the need in political participation is more difficult to satisfy the more the problem of practical politics and of the distribution of power are discussed by parties, pressure groups, and other forms of organizations; but that does not affect my point. Privacy and freedom can survive only in the realm of a modern democracy if the citizens do not stand apart from the political scene, observing it as pure spectators,²⁹ but if and when, and only if and when, there is a recognition of the state's activities and of one's main political task. If Professor Kornhauser is right, therefore, and I believe he is, it would follow that also the place in the privacy of a household, as a kind of counter-world against the world of our modern societies, could be the source of political extremism. It is the isolation of the privacy which furthers this consequence.

²⁷ William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1959, pp. 183-193, see 186.

²⁸ Kornhauser, *op. cit.*

²⁹ Nelson Polsky, *Community Power and Political Theory*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1963.

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III

One thing that may be said about the political public is that as long as citizens live under the conditions of a common world, there are conflicts. Or in other words—there is a profound connection between the public realm of constitutional democracies and conflicts about social and political affairs.

Amitai Etzioni discusses this in his book *The Active Society* (1968). He mentions in a chapter on “Power as Societal Force” that both power and conflict “are intimately connected and frequently appear together.”³⁰ Without them a social association could no longer exist. “While the *intensity* of power—the extent to which societal relations are regulated by it—might well decline as the scope of shared values and authentic consensus broadens, so long as there is a scarcity of assets and societal actors have a degree of autonomy, some actors will meet with some resistance from some other actors and will use part of their assets to reduce it in order to further their own goals.”³¹ It is true that a democracy needs conflicts, and that the end of a democracy has come when conflicts have lost their significance within the political public. This could be possible if the relationships between the members of a community have, because of a value-consensus, a consumer orientation, or a dominating interest in an entirely private life, an unpolitical and even antipolitical character. I do not say that this is so in present-day societies but only that I can imagine citizens who are no longer concerned about the whole community decision-making process, who enjoy the conditions necessary for the fulfilment of their private sphere. They do not worry about public affairs, they do not recognize it when bureaucratic élites, authoritarian and totalitarian leaders with charisma, or other groups and individuals begin to dominate the political scene. And they would not know how to react against them.

This will help us to understand more clearly what is happening in modern democracies between government, parliament, parties,

³⁰ Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society. A Theory of Societal and Political Processes*, New York, Free Press, 1968, p. 319.

³¹ *Ibid.*

pressure groups, and public opinion. In whatever other political activities they may differ, they have, in my opinion, at least this in common that they deal with the relation between governing and governed. From the bare fact that the governed have to give up a part of their freedom and that they could regard, whatever the governing are doing, as a pressure, a stress for themselves, it follows that there are conflicts, and that these conflicts exist as long as there are some citizens having power over some other citizens. These conflicts are, in my opinion, the great force of a political democracy in regard to authoritarian, totalitarian, and other government systems.³² Or, as a liberal like John Plamenatz has put it at the end of an essay on "The Use of Political Theory": "The more men differ, and the longer they have been accustomed to differing, the more likely they are to accept principles which make it possible for those who differ to live peacefully together."³³ This, as we have seen, is based on the contrast between the private and public realms and on the fact that citizens can stand against the state and form with other citizens a political public. It remains their confidence that a political democracy can work just because of that.

³² Gerhard E. Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966.

³³ In *Political Studies*, vol. 8 (1960), pp. 37-47.