

part has to be handled differently. Feelings have to be identified and expressed; acts may have to be limited and redirected. 'The restrictions are applied without violence or excessive anger. The child's resentment of the restrictions is anticipated and understood; he is not punished additionally for not liking the prohibitions.' It all makes good sense, but, as the author concludes, a wise application of any new approach will not ignore the basic grain of a child's temperament and personality.

Rosemary Simon of *The Times'* Women's Page has compiled a factual handbook for parents giving details of publications and addresses of organizations covering such topics as: group activities for under-fives, the gifted child, the handicapped child, children's holidays, the working mother, youth service in the community, etc. A really useful addition to the family bookshelf.

ANN HALES-TOOKE

JUIFS ET ARABES 3000 ANS D'HISTOIRE, by Jean-Pierre Alem. Grasset, Paris, 1968.

Courage, sense of the past and—let us admit—lack of *mesure*, characterize the story in Jean-Pierre Alem's book. Whether in terms of history or the current political situation, I would regard it as a manifest impossibility for anyone to write a book about the Arab-Israel problem without being partisan. M. Alem's book is the closest I have seen anyone come to success. His title should not deceive: he has wanted to set the present conflict in perspective but of his 380-odd pages all but the first fifty deal with the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the parallel rise of Jewish and Arab nationalism. His rehearsal of the historical evidence is full and fair—exceptionally so for a French writer—and he does not get hot under the collar when Syria or the Lebanon are mentioned. But these facts, however manipulated or interpreted, are available already; more interesting perhaps is his view of future developments.

His conclusions run roughly like this. At the beginning of 1967, an Israeli-Arab peace was inconceivable. The 1967 war changed the data of the problem. Before then, the Israelis wanted peace, the Arabs rejected it. Now Israel is no longer threatened with destruction, and war can only break out if the Israelis so wish. There is no serious likelihood of either extreme solutions being adopted: Israel returning all the conquered territories, or abandoning them all. The revisionists, under the banner of the Herut, want to retain everything, including Sinai, and a half-canal at Suez. But that would mean accepting 1,400,000 Arabs facing 2,400,000 Jews in a Greater Israel, and the Arabs' more rapid demographic growth would give them a majority in several decades. Some Israelis, including Dayan, have suggested the formation of an Arab state in 'Cisjordania', demilitarized, linked economically to Israel and willing to accept the presence of the Israeli army on its eastern frontier. But this would be

a vassal state, and in the twentieth century such a solution would hardly be viable. It would go against the decolonizing current of history and be morally unacceptable. A prolonged occupation of purely Arab territories would develop terrorism, whose first manifestations have already appeared. But brutal oppression has never, in modern times, strangled national resistance. The result would be a tragic escalation; and the majority of the Jewish people would never countenance the creation of a Gestapo.

But it is no less improbable that Israel should renounce all her conquests. Jerusalem is too dear to the heart of the Jewish people, 'indispensable to her soul'; and it seems unlikely that Israel would relinquish the Gaza Strip or the Golan Heights, from which the Galilee *kibbutzim* have so often been shelled. Between total abandonment and total rejection there is a vast field for negotiation. Time is not on the Arabs' side, and they should not put off negotiating. Israel must not make it difficult for them to do so. The Arabs always find it difficult to pass from the plane of dreams to that of reality, so honourable clauses must be proposed and their humiliation avoided. It is indispensable that Israel abandon her demand for direct bilateral negotiations, and give back those territories which are not vital to her survival. And the refugee problem must be solved.

In May 1967, the refugees already numbered 1,000,000. Today there are 1,300,000. The absorption of these by the Arab states is not easy. The solution is closer now, paradoxically, since Israel controls the majority of the refugees. In the framework of peace negotiations, one could envisage the Jewish Agency, with its remarkable experience, helping in the definitive settling of this population. The operation would cost over three thousand million dollars—Alem's figure being based on the Jewish Agency's evaluation of the cost of integrating

à family of new immigrants into the Israeli economy as 10,000 dollars and the number of refugee families as (now) 310,000.

Even if one envisages peace, its character would depend on the answer to certain questions: would the emigrations of Jews from the U.S.S.R. be permitted, to bring hundreds of thousands of energetic and enterprising settlers to revive the pioneer spirit in Israel? Or will the greater demographic fertility of the Sephardis give Israel an Oriental character? Will Israel maintain her links with the West, or will her Russian minority take her into the Soviet orbit? Will Israel be the common fatherland of the Jews of the whole world, or a country like any other, the country merely of the Israelis themselves? Depending on the answers to these questions (but M. Alem is careful not to say which answers!) the Near East will either be divided into two worlds, foreign to each other, or peace will be prolonged by a federation between Israel and the Arab states. Many in Israel, including Ben Gurion, would welcome the latter solution, but it would demand great realism on the part of the Arabs and discretion on the part of the Israelis. There would be initial disappointments, particularly since the economies of the two sectors are only partially complementary. Israel could not compete on the Arab markets with European, American or Japanese goods of superior quality and lower prices than hers. The industrialization of Egypt could bring about competition between her and Israel. But in the long term an Arab-Jewish symbiosis could give greater prosperity to the Near East.

Most conflicts end by war in which one side is the victor and imposes its will on the other. In the present case, the new factor, U.N.O.,

imposes a difference: it can stop the fighting, but not establish peace. The relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. complicate the equation. And our impatience to see a solution falsifies the time scale appropriate to this problem. The conflict between Jews and Arabs has its roots in antiquity and is linked to the destiny of Israel. The birth of a Jewish state in Palestine is an event in world history which must be inscribed in the perspective not of a generation or of a century, but one, two, even three thousand years. Jews and Arabs are two irritating and fascinating peoples, who have so far shown each other their first characteristic. What harmony would follow chaos, what freedom would follow bondage, if they undertook to fascinate each other. . . .

M. Alem ends thus, with a rhetorical flourish . . . and, given the facts, it is difficult to do otherwise. Perhaps there is one chink of light which M. Alem could not have seen: Arabs and Israelis have in fact talked together. There is no reason for Israel to abandon her demand for direct bilateral negotiations, since without them no peace would last long. And, in a sense, they have begun to take place, since Arab notables of considerable standing (Palestinians and Jordanians, not Syrians or Egyptians) have met under the aegis of the magazine *Israel Today* and spoken with considerable—indeed alarming—freedom. If people like the former Jordanian Ambassador to London, Anwar Nusseiba, and the newspaper editor Ibrahim Khaldi, are prepared to sit down with Israelis and exchange views, then some solution other than renewed hostilities is possible, however remote it may seem now.

LOUIS ALLEN

EN CHINE AVEC TEILHARD, 1938-1944, by Claude Rivière. Editions du Seuil Paris, 1968.

This book has a three-fold interest: Claude Rivière ran the French broadcasting station in Shanghai under the daunting difficulties of the Japanese occupation, and the book is therefore, unintentionally perhaps, an interesting sideline on life in the Far East during World War II. But she was also very friendly with Teilhard, and her account of his conversations with her make up the *raison d'être* of her narrative, together with his letters, written during the period when he was composing *Le phénomène humain*. This is why her book is crucial to an understanding of Teilhard, though it may seem a lightweight beside the many tomes of philosophical analysis that have been lavished

on him. Shanghai had a curious war-time existence. Life was hard for the Chinese, but there had always been large foreign populations in the city, and those whose mother-country was not at war with Japan were not too badly treated. Because of the agreements negotiated with France over Indo-China, the French were to some extent favoured, and Mlle Rivière took advantage of this to circulate news from Saigon and Chungking clandestinely. (A footnote, presumably by the editor Jean de Beer, on page 71, states quite inaccurately that the Japanese took over control of the French concession, including the radio, when the French in Indo-China 'fomented a revolt