

French labor first organized, moderate leaders tended to prevail. On the other hand French employers were implacable in their opposition to the unions and refused any accommodation with them. It was in desperation that workers turned to hitherto isolated militants who then led them out in futile strikes. The employers and/or the government would then ruthlessly put down the strikes, would jail or fire hundreds of workers, break the union, and discredit the leaders. Slowly, painfully more moderate leaders would reorganize only to see the cycle repeat itself. (pp. 225, 228).

By the turn of the century, however, a more conciliatory government policy helped the unions to grow; ironically the unions ended up becoming, in the workers' eyes, superfluous. After 1914 the unions, particularly the C.G.T., became almost government institutions (pp. 275ff). As the unions turned to the state to assist them in defeating employers, they participated increasingly in government bodies, accepted subsidies for their unemployment funds, cooperated with government insurance programs, and looked to the government to settle collective bargaining disputes. This development reached its climax with the Matignon agreements of 1936; moreover in 1944-5 it was the state and not the unions which emerged as the principle challenge to employers. Even as they joined the unions, workers looked increasingly to the state, not the union, to protect them from employers. Zeldin notes that this may have been due, in large part, to the very high proportion of union workers who were civil servants. French unions had very little success in attracting workers from private industry.

What Zeldin's analysis illustrates is that in modern Europe, the state has become increasingly powerful and, rather than the instrument of any single interest group, has acted largely as an arbitrator among all social groups, responding to the relative strengths, seeking stabilizing settlements and also weighing such interests as full employment, economic growth, national security and internal stability. Labor has been quick to recognize this and has become increasingly politicized but not revolutionary.

William Jannen, Jr., Brooklyn College

### Errata

In the report on "Reggio Emilia" in No. 4 (December 1973) p. 16/17, l. 40/1, should read "Basso stressed the importance of the concept of *totality which was the central concept* of Marx's dialectics."

"Recent Japanese Studies in European Labor History," in the same issue should read as follows:

- p. 25, l. 2 – *Not* a few titles had to be excluded.
- p. 25, l. 19/20 – in a *narrower* scope
- p. 26, l. 8 – *Narihito* Ito
- p. 26, l. 6 – insert following footnote:  
Tetsuya Hirase, "The Popular Front in France. Some Problems", Keiichi Yamamoto (ed.), *Studies in the French Third Republic* (1966); Yoshinari Hirata, "The Popular Front Movement in France", *Social Science Report* (Univ. of Kagoshima), Nos. 8-11 (1961-1964); Shun Umihara, *The Popular Front in France* (1966); idem, *A History of the Communist Party of France* (1967).
- p. 27, l. 23 – sympathetic to the *loyalists*
- p. 28, l. 9/10 – Yukio *Tominaga*
- p. 29, note 20 – *Masaharu* Tanaka