

# THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS IN SPANISH AMERICA: A CASE FOR THE HISTORY OF IDEAS\*

*Charles A. Hale, University of Iowa*

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL PROCESS IN LATIN America is in trouble. With the burgeoning of Latin American history as a professional activity, historians are increasingly "moving beyond" past politics to study social and economic themes. The traditional treatments of the nineteenth century, dedicated to glorifying or debunking heroic leaders, to perpetuating old partisan and ideological struggles, or even to presenting in a more detached way a minutely-detailed political narrative, have lost their allure. It is true, to the obvious consternation of the editors of the *Handbook of Latin American Studies*, that items in the traditional mold still abound. In Mexico, for example, the celebration of the centennial and sesquicentennial of the two heroic ages of liberalism, the Revolution for Independence and the *Reforma*, gave great impetus to political writing. Analogous historiographical stimulants can be found in other countries, sometimes where the heroism of the anniversaries is less clear. Yet the value of even the best of such work is increasingly called into question by professional historians.

One can identify, for example, in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile, historiographical traditions built fundamentally on the arguments and policies of nineteenth-century partisans. Significant thematic differences exist from country to country but in each appears the idea of national progress toward individual liberty, representative democracy, and the secular state. Whereas the storm center of Mexican political historiography has been the church, in Argentina it has been the dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas. José Luis Romero (1963), in depicting Rosas as the representative of "inorganic democracy" in Argentina, may have incorporated some of the sympathy for the dictator shown by Ernesto V. Quesada (1950) and other revisionists, but basically he perpetuates the categories of Domingo F. Sarmiento and Esteban Echeverría when he asserts that Argentine history is a conflict between authoritarianism and liberalism.

In fact, Argentine political historiography is more complex than Mexican because of a problem which appeared in Sarmiento's *Facundo* and which has continued to plague interpreters. Was the principal obstacle to liberal progress the clericalism and colonial mentality epitomized by the interior city of Córdoba, or was it the barbarism of the interior generally, which found its champion in the Buenos Aires regime

\* This article is a substantially revised version of a paper first given at the 1970 meeting of the Southern Historical Association, in Louisville. I am grateful to several colleagues for their helpful criticisms, especially Charles Gibson, Peter H. Smith, and Alan B. Spitzer.

of Rosas? In other words, did “civilization versus barbarism” mean modern liberal ideals versus colonial obscurantism without reference to region as it might in Mexico, or did it mean the city versus the countryside?<sup>1</sup>

In Chile, where the regionalism of Argentina and the ideological polarity of Mexico have been muted, traditional historiographical controversy has centered on the issue of authoritarianism, identified variously as the regime of Diego Portales, the Santiago aristocracy, or the church. Ricardo Donoso and Luis Galdames, for example, in their much-read syntheses, essentially restate the liberal themes of the nineteenth century histories of Amunátegui, Vicuña Mackenna, and Barros Arana, and the essays of Lastarria. The political development of Chile, writes Donoso (1946: 113–114), has entailed the effort to establish congressional independence by limiting the powers which made the president a monarch in republican dress, and also to establish democracy by dismantling obstacles imposed by the “juridical and spiritual legacy of Spain.” The dissenters, such as Alberto Edwards, Jaime Eyzaguirre, and Francisco Encina, have praised the Hispanic and Catholic heritage which the Portales and Montt regimes upheld, thus providing Chile with its unique nineteenth-century stability. Edwards (1966: 62) refers to this era as the “republic ‘in form’,” a time when elements of authority (president), hierarchy (aristocracy), and “hereditary sentiments” (race and religion) were blended together as a vital organic whole under the Constitution of 1833.<sup>2</sup>

When an avowed liberal interpreter such as Domingo Amunátegui Solar (1946: 57) could admit inadvertently that Chile needed strong oligarchical government in the 1830s to counter anarchy, it is clear that “liberal” and “conservative” positions cannot be sharply differentiated.<sup>3</sup> Traditional Chilean political historiography is more vulnerable than would be Mexican or Argentinian to the strictures of such a critic as the Marxist Julio César Jobet, who condemned it (1955: 1–28) as the erudite and irrelevant expression of a narrow oligarchy unconcerned with the social and economic realities of the country. In Chile there was lacking the kind of sympathy some Mexican historians had for the social upheavals of Hidalgo and Morelos or Argentine historians had for the populism of Rosas.

The disinterest in and even the reaction against traditional political history by present-day professionals is unquestionably a healthy development, but it is not without its difficulties. The problem is that there is no *new* political history to replace the old. In fact, the nineteenth century is in danger of becoming the stepchild of historical interpretation as it loses its integrity in comparison with the monumental Spanish period or the more relevant twentieth century. Even the significant new departures in the socioeconomic bases of politics may prove insufficient by themselves to rescue the nineteenth century from the threat of oblivion.

## I.

We can grasp the problem more readily by examining some recent significant efforts to reinterpret the Latin American historical tradition. In these interpretations

the nineteenth-century political process has become the victim of two determinisms, the first cultural and the second economic.

The cultural interpretation has been presented most forcefully by Richard M. Morse (1964) who argues that Spanish America's unique set of institutional and social arrangements stems from the establishment of the Spanish imperial or "patrimonial" state in the sixteenth century. This state was still largely medieval in structure and had not yet become, as it was to evolve in the eighteenth century, "a unitary and rationalized whole." Its medievalism was characterized by "pluralistic, compartmented privilege" and "administrative paternalism," not by parliamentary representation. In the absence of a strong feudal tradition of limitations on royal authority, the monarch and his officials in America dispensed justice and created socioeconomic privilege freely. Morse speaks of a "cultural and institutional fix" taken by Spanish America, buttressed by the neo-Thomism of Francisco Suárez, the latter a philosophy of law which subordinated individual conscience to infallible Natural Law and put ultimate limitations on the sovereign in the name of this law. Moreover, the system of Suárez embodied organicism, patriarchalism, and a pervasive sense of social hierarchy. Suárez reformulated medieval principles in post-Reformation terms, and they became the basis of Catholic culture in the New World. By using the terms "mind-set" and "fix," Morse implies the permanence of these characteristics of the "formative" or Hapsburg period.

Brief but suggestive essays by Ronald N. Newton (1970) and Claudio Véliz (1967; 1968) come to conclusions analogous to those of Morse, though their concern is more specifically to explain the peculiarities of contemporary Spanish American social structure and politics. Véliz (1967), aided by the substantive studies of his collaborators, notes the failure of autonomous pressure groups, middle sectors, the military, peasants, industrialists, and students, to influence policy. He concludes that these groups ultimately pursue the "politics of conformity" and find their sustenance in the centralist state. Newton points to the anomalous persistence of both the Roman Law tradition and the medieval *fuero* or *interés creado* as explaining the lack of "cross-cutting loyalties" or North-American-type pluralism among functional groups in Spanish America. While continuing to create privilege, the state remains supreme in the face of political challenge from "intermediary" bodies.

For these interpreters the twentieth century becomes an era of gradual recovery of traditional patterns, or as Véliz puts it, a return to Latin America's "own cultural mainstream." Véliz differs from Morse in that he locates this cultural mainstream in the eighteenth century, whereas Morse locates it in the previous two centuries. Morse sees the Hapsburg patrimonial state revealed in the Mexican Institutional Revolution, while Véliz (1968) finds Bourbon centralism operating in the new nationalism of the right and in state-directed economic development without social change. Kalman Silvert (1963:360–361, 371–372) has depicted traditional corporatism in Perón's Argentina and has argued the existence of a "Romance" or "Mediterranean" politics in Iberoamerica.

What is the place of the nineteenth century in these cultural interpretations? For

## *Latin American Research Review*

Morse it represents an aberration from more permanent patterns. Morse (1964: 165) terms 1760 to 1920 the "Colonial" period "when the creole, Catholic culture and institutions of Spanish America lay open to influences and pressures of the Western World which were on the whole ineffectually mediated to the ethos of the formative Spanish Period." Thus the "National" period does not begin till 1920. The Western "influences and pressures" that Morse is referring to constitute principally the heritage of the Enlightenment: Anglo-French constitutionalism, bourgeois liberalism, and even the unitary, rationalized, and technocratic state of the Bourbons. Both Morse and Newton, and by suggestion Lyle N. McAlister (1963: 370), argue that the collapse at independence of imperial bureaucracy and the legal basis of the corporate society led to the reemergence of autonomous extended family systems, tribes, haciendas, municipalities, and armed bands ("telluric creole social structures" [Morse, 1964: 162] or "primary components" [Newton, 1970: 27]) that competed in a naked contest of power to capture the remains of the state. The now decapitated patrimonial state had developed neither an underpinning of feudal contractual relationships nor a rationalized legal order which could serve to legitimize post-independence governments.

Let us turn to the economic interpretation, presented primarily in the remarkable short book by Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein (1970), but also in the work of other historians such as Tulio Halperín Donghi (1969) and Arnold J. Bauer (1971). The Steins see the central fact of Latin American history as its colonial relation to, or dependence on, the more economically advanced nations of Western Europe. Spain and Portugal served as mere intermediaries in the relationship. Economic dependence produced a rigid class society; it inhibited modernization; it prevented the development of liberal political institutions; and it perpetuated a pattern of economic and racial exploitation not effectively challenged by the masses until the twentieth century, and then only sporadically. The silver flow from America freed the Spanish monarchy from limitation by representative bodies and allowed it to preside over a commercial system controlled by privileged merchants who had little interest in economic modernization on either side of the Atlantic.

When the Bourbon monarchs attempted "defensive modernization" in the eighteenth century to counter the threat from increased British trade, policy adjustments served only to divide creoles and Spanish merchants and to prepare the way for the disruption of the empire during the international crisis of 1793 to 1815. The creoles saw in disruption a chance to trade directly with northern Europe. At the same time, the smoldering discontent of the masses had led in the eighteenth century to conflicts over occupation of and access to property. By 1810, the creole elite "provided the leadership that the castas and the lower, even more oppressed strata of colonial society had long awaited, and the result was revolution" (Stein and Stein, 1970: 114).

In the economic interpretation of Latin American history the nineteenth century is designated "neo-colonial," a term which is certain to enjoy increasingly wide use by historians. Halperín's impressive synthesis focuses on the modern era; thus he treats

## THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

the nineteenth century in greater detail than do the Steins, who emphasize the pre-independence centuries. Halperin like Bauer (1971: 78–80, 98), dates the “rise of the neo-colonial order” from the 1860s, whereas the Steins see it as beginning with independence; but the three agree on the general characteristics of the entire era. The creoles, primarily a resurgent landed upper class, struggled to reimpose the structure of political elitism and social stratification that had been challenged momentarily by popular upheaval during the Revolution for Independence. By mid-century an agricultural and mining oligarchy became tied in a new relationship of direct dependence to European, particularly British, commerce and capital. Despite political instability, factional contention, and experimentation with republican forms, Latin American governments, argue the Steins, continued under the sway of a small elite which at first coopted upcoming mulattos and mestizos, and later in the century returned to unmitigated racism. Economic and social exploitation was not challenged until 1910 in Mexico and perhaps not until 1930 elsewhere.

These interpretations serve as fresh and welcome antidotes to the liberal or developmental view which has seen progress toward middle class democracy or toward economic modernization along North American or Western European lines as an inevitable process in Latin America. The region can now be studied on its own terms, culturally or economically, and its peculiarities recognized for what they are. Yet from the vantage point of nineteenth-century politics these interpretations are inadequate. Newton openly admits that the post-independence processes are a “conundrum.” Morse appears to regard the search for liberal patterns of political organization as aberrant, while the rubrics “neo-colonial” and “colonial” hardly do justice to the fact of political independence.

In effect, our understanding of the nineteenth century has suffered from this widespread though varied use of the derogatory label “colonial.” One use of the word is derived from traditional liberal discourse and stresses the “colonial survivals” or “colonial mentality” which persisted despite reform efforts after independence.<sup>4</sup> In this sense the term really means “Hispanic” or “traditional” rather than “colonial” in the strict legal or political sense. Another use appears in Morse’s novel “Colonial Period,” the era from 1760 to 1920 when Latin America was under the cultural sway of the Anglo-French Enlightenment. Finally, the economic interpretation construes “colonial” to mean economically dependent, whether in its traditional form before independence or in its new and revised form after independence.

A discussion of the term “colonial” would be incomplete without recalling what Latin Americanists know to be a commonplace, namely that Latin America, as a historical, cultural, and perhaps even as an economic entity, is unique. As a “developing” area Latin America is distinct from other regions with which it is often compared. The fact that it is Western, that it is a culture “fragmented” from Europe, to use Louis Hartz’ term, sets it apart from the older autonomous civilizations of Japan, China, and perhaps India, which felt the impact of European ideas, institutions, and technology as alien elements.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, because of its early attainment of political independence, Latin America cannot be directly compared with the new

nations of Africa and Asia, which until recently were European colonies. Moreover, the obvious comparison between Latin America and the United States, as two former colonial areas of Europe, is no longer satisfactory. With the failure of the Alliance for Progress, we have perhaps finally given up the effort to posit a common history of the two Americas and to draw deceptive parallels between a developed (or over-developed) Anglo-Saxon culture and one that is Iberian and underdeveloped. Perhaps one key to this peculiarity of Latin America among developing regions is its liberal experience; that is, the ideas and institutions that became established in this outpost of Atlantic civilization during what R. R. Palmer calls the "Age of the Democratic Revolution."

Imbedded in the cultural and economic interpretations of Latin American history is the assumption that the nineteenth was the century of imitation. The adjectives "mimetic," "imitative," or "exotic" pervade the references by observers of diverse interests and orientations to liberal political organizations or economic policy.<sup>6</sup> A few scholars like Silvert and Véliz carry their strictures even beyond the nineteenth century. Véliz (1968: 68) asserts that "for the last century and a half Latin America has been a faithful echoing chamber for every political noise uttered in the more civilized regions of the northern hemisphere." Silvert (1966: 331) speaks in general of "the role of the Latin American leader as the importer and adapter of ideas from abroad."

The critical view of liberal forms and organization as alien imports has deep roots in the conservative political tradition, whether in its Burkean form as espoused by the Mexican Lucas Alamán and the Chilean Mariano Egaña, or in its later positivist or organicist form by Emilio Rabasa in Mexico or Alberto Edwards Vives in Chile. More recently, the theme of imitation has been an integral part of the philosophical and literary "quest for identity." Are not historians and social scientists influenced more than they realize by the Mexican search for *lo mexicano*, as in the classic assertion made as early as 1934 by Samuel Ramos, that imitation of Europe and a resulting inferiority complex were fundamental features of Mexican culture in the nineteenth century? It is significant that Morse and Hirschman (1961) cite the *Labyrinth of Solitude* by Octavio Paz at crucial points in their argument and that Morse draws his new periodization from a suggestion by Paz.

The philosophical search for identity also contains an anomalous quasi-Marxist strain which may even have made it congenial to the recent economic interpretations of nineteenth century politics. Leopoldo Zea views liberalism and positivism as expressions of the bourgeoisie in two stages of its evolution, that of combat and that of order. While rejecting Spanish colonialism, the Latin American bourgeoisie ultimately became the prisoner of the great Western bourgeoisie.<sup>7</sup> Is not Zea's argument analogous to the Steins' emphasis on neo-colonialism, that is—the dependence of an agricultural and mining oligarchy upon European capital as the central fact of life in the nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup> It should be noted, however, that behind the Steins' severe and scholarly analysis of the roots of economic dependence may lurk an activist zeal, not unlike that which Bourricaud (1972: 130–132) identi-



## THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

ties in the thought of the new engaged *técnicos* (such as Orlando Fals Borda) who call for revolutionary change in the face of a pervasive neo-colonialism.<sup>9</sup> This radical stance makes the position of Zea in the Forties and Fifties and even that of Véliz today seem conservative by contrast.

### II

In order to escape the determinism inherent in these nonetheless refreshing and persuasive interpretations, we must turn directly to the reconstruction of nineteenth century politics. This can be done most effectively through the systematic and critical study of ideas. One problem that plagues this enterprise is the lack of a strong historiographical tradition to which to appeal. Whereas the study of ideas in the colonial period has the work of such scholars as Zavala, Phelan, Bataillon, Ricard, Hanke, Leonard, Lanning, and Whitaker to commend it, such study for the nineteenth century has been dominated either by political apologists or historicist philosophers.<sup>10</sup> In order to surmount this obstacle let me suggest four specific ways in which political history can be profitably studied through ideas.

First, we need to define political terms, principally those protean and universal categories, "liberal" and "conservative." The most common pitfalls in using these terms are: one, falling prey to the definitions imposed by nineteenth-century partisans themselves and perpetuated in our own day; two, dissolving the political content of these terms by socioeconomic analysis. The first pitfall applies principally to the traditional political historiography referred to above, but it occasionally plagues recent more sophisticated studies as well. For example, it is necessary to raise some questions when such astute analysts as Frank Safford and Peter H. Smith explicitly use political categories as defined by the contemporary participants themselves. Is it not possible that the very confusion Safford finds in applying conventional class, occupational, or regional explanations to political alignments in Colombia from 1830 to 1850 comes in part from a confusion on the part of the participants as to just what the self-designations "liberal" and "conservative" meant? Safford (1972: 367 fn.) implies that these terms had little ideological content. This may be true, but if so it must be demonstrated in part by direct analysis of the ideas involved. In determining the social basis of political alignments, is it not necessary to establish also what the political positions, programs, and issues were, and how they varied from situation to situation?<sup>11</sup>

Smith (1972) has done exactly this in a somewhat different kind of inquiry, a quantitative study of roll calls in the Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916–17. Smith uses factor analysis to isolate the issues which separated "jacobins" and "moderates," the self-designated factions in the convention. To complement his ingenious discussion of "centralization," the principal "factor" which captured divisions among the delegates, it would be valuable to probe the term "jacobin" itself: what was its ideological content in 1917 compared to 1893 or 1857? One might find, for example, that part of the disagreement over centralization in 1917 could be un-

derstood as a kind of reenactment of conflicts that existed within nineteenth century political liberalism.<sup>12</sup>

The second pitfall, namely the tendency to dissolve the political content of "liberal" and "conservative" by socioeconomic analysis, can be demonstrated by first recalling a point of our earlier discussion. We have seen that Latin America's uniqueness among developing and former colonial regions in having had a liberal experience under political independence has only strengthened the general view that ideas were "imitative" or even "unreal." The corollary to the absence of a strong critical historiographical tradition for the nineteenth century rooted in the study of ideas is the dominance in much historical writing of assumptions derived from Marxism and the sociology of knowledge, the basic theme of which, according to Robert K. Merton (1949: 458), is "the unwitting determination of ideas by the substrata; the emphasis on the distinction between the real and the illusory, between reality and appearance in the sphere of human thought, belief, and conduct." Merton goes on to note the "acrid quality" of such sociological analyses, which tend to indict, satirize, ironize, and devalue "the intrinsic content of the avowed belief or point of view." The key term in this negative and critical approach to ideas is "ideology," which came to mean the interest-bound thinking of ruling groups, whether specific classes in Marx's view of broader groupings within the total social structure in Mannheim's.

The widespread tendency exists in current writing on Latin America to give "liberal" an exclusively socioeconomic meaning, or at least to confuse its political and economic content. How often do we find "liberal" as tantamount to *laissez-faire* economics, though sometimes including as well constitutionalist opposition to state power. This search for a simple working definition of "liberal" often neglects (for examples see Véliz, 1967, and Morse, 1964) the significance of anticlericalism, a statist policy inspired by the Spanish Bourbons or the French Jacobins. Liberals such as the 1833 reformers in Mexico or the Rivadavian group in Argentina, who were antistatist in the economic realm, often pursued the solidification of state power to combat clerical privilege. The problem here is analogous to the use of "capitalism" as a political term by such contemporary theorists as Herbert Marcuse or Barrington Moore.<sup>13</sup>

Oversimplifying the definition of "liberal" leads to real difficulty in seeking out who, in social terms, the nineteenth century liberals were. For example, when the Steins discuss the "economic basis of neo-colonialism," they refer to a "Liberal middle class" which sought the liquidation of colonial legacies in Mexico and which ultimately turned to Porfirio Díaz as an "honest tyrant" to preside over economic development. Yet in a subsequent chapter on "politics and society," they identify liberal political programs as those of a "creole elite," and the "Liberal middle class" recedes from the forefront of their discussion.<sup>14</sup>

The only antidote for this kind of confusion is rigorous internal analysis of political ideas, constantly modified by behavioral evidence of the kind Smith (1972) and Richard N. Sinkin (1973) present, and by empirical findings on the sociology of the intellectual and political elite. In this way what Robert F. Berkhofer (1969: 73)



## THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

calls the "actors' and the observer's levels of analysis" can be combined "into a unified representation of past reality." The principal risk is not that present-day historians will focus only on the "actors' viewpoint," or that they will abstract ideas from their social and economic context.<sup>15</sup> As John Higham (1951: 470–471) has pointed out in tracing the course of intellectual history in the United States, the dangers lie at the other extreme. Only by starting with the system of ideas itself, by regarding "ideology" as a neutral term, can we properly understand the political terminology of the nineteenth century.

The study of ideas can, secondly, increase our understanding of the assumptions that underlie or guide policy. One postulate of such an inquiry is that it is still valuable for the political historian to study governance, emphasizing the formal institutions of power and not, as Womack (1971: 480, 485) has urged, focus his attention on informal institutions, such as the family, the business corporation, the church, and the hacienda. However valuable it is to study the informal structures, political history need not be turned exclusively into social history, though the distinctions between the two are and necessarily should be vague.<sup>16</sup> Smith (1970: 4–5), in apparent contrast to Womack, justifies a definition of "political elite" in twentieth century Mexico that omits informal leadership as not constituting a numerically significant segment of "that group of people which holds the most decisive portion of political power." Probably the most significant conclusion of Véliz and his collaborators (1967) is that the central government in contemporary Latin America, far from being the mere plaything of autonomous interest groups, is itself the principal force for change. The central government may also be far more important in the nineteenth century than Véliz and others would have us believe.

We approach politics through ideas with the presupposition that the rationale or logic of central government policy and the assumptions of the governing elite are still so insufficiently understood as to warrant searching examination. In contrast to what Lockhart (1972: 8) suggests for colonial social history, we begin by using sources that are conventional and traditional. For nineteenth century Latin America this means primarily printed materials: the writings of leading intellectuals who often had close relations with government; official and semiofficial utterances in pamphlets and newspapers; legislation; and parliamentary debates. Manuscript materials, especially private correspondence and unprinted ministry reports, should always be used where available, but they are not intrinsically superior as sources in the search for assumptions. The range of materials that are potentially valuable is very wide. Moreover, as one moves from the early to the late nineteenth century, the increase in quantity of documentation is staggering.

The first challenge for the historian is not to find unique materials, but to grasp the intractable and often elusive nature of the assumptions. In part his method is analogous to that suggested by A. O. Lovejoy (1936: 3–24) in a somewhat different kind of inquiry. The scholar must cut through the deceptive and often contradictory rhetoric of a political program and isolate the "component" or "unit" ideas. This effort may also lead him to what Lovejoy calls the "more or less unconscious" mental

habits of an individual or group. These mental habits may constitute formally expressed but subordinate or contradictory ideas within a political program. Or they may be group-derived ideas and part of the implicit culture an intellectual or a political spokesman shares with a larger group. It may be that the emphasis on assumptions undercuts my own argument, since reference to "unconscious mental habits" or "implicit culture" evokes questions of value systems, ethos components, and even myth. The risk is that of falling back on the very sort of cultural determinism I have been criticizing in others when applied to nineteenth century politics. I admit to an unresolved ambivalence or even an inconsistency on this matter. For example, I would never maintain that liberalism as a value system based on utilitarian ethics made much headway in nineteenth century Latin America. Yet liberalism as a set of rationally formed political and economic precepts did, so long as one defines liberalism properly in its peculiar Hispanic manifestation.<sup>17</sup>

From another vantage point it might be said that what I am really referring to is the study of ideology, and in part I would agree. Inasmuch as the propositions and the rhetoric of a political program are directed in defense of or in opposition to an institutional or social order, they are ideological. It is the *political* objective and the *polemical* function of ideas that make them ideological. Ideology, then, presupposes conflict in society or the existence of conflicting interpretations of the social order.<sup>18</sup> The assumptions of a political program or policy may also be based on tradition or myth, that is—beliefs or values which tend to bind together the groupings within society rather than divide them. Again, my objections are not to the term "ideology," but to the way it is construed in the tradition of Marxism and the sociology of knowledge, that is, the tendency to discount the internal structure or the components of an ideology in favor of regarding it only as a direct or indirect reflection or rationale of class or group interests.<sup>19</sup>

To pursue the example mentioned above, it might be demonstrated by the method I am suggesting that Spanish American liberals were much more tied to Hispanic precedent than their bombastic anti-Hispanic writing would suggest. This is certainly true of the Mexican liberals before 1867, who drew much inspiration from the Bourbon or Cádiz reformers, and true also of the "new liberal," Justo Sierra, in the late 1870s, for whom the Spanish conservative republican Emilio Castelar assumed a heroic stature. The tie to Hispanic precedent may also have been strong in Chile, even through the cry of *desespañolización* by José Victorino Lastarria or Francisco Bilbao was far more shrill than it was in Mexico. And as Barager (1959: 591 fn.) reminds us, "for all his admiration of the United States, Sarmiento's roots were in the Spanish liberal tradition—more deeply, probably, than even he realized." An assumption such as this may be revealed inadvertently in the formal rhetoric of a thinker or political spokesman, or it may come to light or be confirmed only by an analysis of the formation of policy or legislation of governments with which they were akin.<sup>20</sup>

One model that could be followed in the search for assumptions appears in the work of the French historian Elie Halévy. In his massive study of utilitarianism (1928) and in his exceptional essays on early socialism (1965) he successfully iso-

lated central conceptions or unit ideas which made up ideologies or doctrines. Moreover, he was able to identify contradictory elements or the dialectic existing within a body of thought. A good example might be his discussion of the conflict between the natural and the artificial identification of interests within utilitarianism, the one a rationale for laissez-faire policy, the other for statist anticorporate reform. Halévy was remarkable as a historian in that he maintained a balance between ideas and social analysis, between his attachment to the schematizing and stylizing usefulness of ideas in historical understanding and his realization that their formulation may be largely a result of particular economic and social circumstances.<sup>21</sup> This ambiguity toward the relation between ideas and social structure is a trait Halévy shared with Max Weber, with whom he is often compared.

Third, and akin to the search for assumptions, the study of ideas can illuminate political history by providing a way to compare nineteenth-century political structures. By comparison, I mean more the way that questions are posed, rather than the necessarily balanced treatment of a topic in two or more countries. There are only a few who have done monographic research with equal depth on more than one Latin American country, and it is not essential that we do so. "Comparison works best when specific phenomena in one context are used to stimulate new questions about similar phenomena in another" (Grew, 1969: 364). Moreover, the comparative study of political ideas in Latin America must begin with Europe, and indeed comparisons between countries must always be done with reference to Europe. Without a thorough study of the European manifestation and context of the ideas in question, comparison is groundless.

For example, to study comparatively the transformation of liberalism in Spanish America, we must begin with the European critique of French Revolutionary doctrines. One strand of this critique began with Burke in England and Bonald and De Maistre in France, and it resulted in the formulation of conservatism as a consciously expressed political ideology. However, more pertinent for studying the transformation of liberalism are the writings of Saint Simon and of Comte in his early years. Saint Simon's "influence" per se is not the primary concern here, but rather the terms of his argument, the political context in which he wrote, and why his argument may or may not have been relevant to Latin Americans. Saint Simon's search (carried on by Comte) for the bases of social unity, for a new order and even hierarchy in the aftermath of the Revolution, meant that he directed his tracts at the "productive" classes in society, the *industriels*, while condemning the non-productive remnants of nobility and clergy, but even more the doctrinaire "metaphysicians" and "legists."<sup>22</sup> He held these latter groups to be responsible for the chaos France had experienced since 1789. Saint Simon's arguments are particularly pertinent to an understanding of the concept of "scientific politics" as espoused by the "new liberals" of 1878 in Mexico, men like Justo Sierra, Telesforo García, and Francisco Cosmes, who combined their formulation with an attack upon the "old liberalism" or the "metaphysical politics of 1857. We must broaden our inquiry into the varied European responses to the French Revolution and to incipient industrialism, but Saint Simon and the early Comte provide a convenient place to start."<sup>23</sup>

In Spanish America, we find that the departure from doctrinaire liberalism (embracing utilitarian, anticorporate, and constitutionalist concepts) came much earlier in Argentina and even in Chile than in Mexico. By comparison to José María Luis Mora, Echeverría shows extreme sensitivity to the most recent currents of thought—Saint-Simonianism in a general way, Mazzini's Young Europe movement (1940: 460ff), and the Religion of Humanity of Leroux (1940: 195ff). By the late 1830s Alberdi and Lastarria had forsaken Bentham and were turning instead to the comparative philosophy of law as espoused by Jean-Louis-Eugène Lerminier—an immensely popular figure during the July monarchy. Edgar Quinet looms large in the writings of Lastarria and Bilbao in Chile.<sup>24</sup> These figures appear to have had little or no impact in Mexico, at least not before 1854 and most probably not before 1867. The terminology used by the Argentinian and Chilean *pensadores* hardly appears in Mexico, with the possible exception of Mariano Otero's pamphlets of the 1840s. An example might be *sociabilidad*, a key word in Echeverría's call for the reconciliation of political parties and for social unity in Argentina, and a word that figures in the title of Bilbao's most famous polemic, *Sociabilidad chilena*.<sup>25</sup>

To explain these differences in the orientation of thought and in the timing and character of European influences, we must compare institutional and social structures. One hypothesis might be that Mexican liberal thought and policy remained in an earlier Benthamite, Jacobin, and even Spanish Bourbon mold through the Reforma because of the prolonged ideological struggle against the church, a conflict which was markedly less intense in Argentina and Chile. To use another example, by studying comparatively the significance of a concept such as "federalism," one would be led into regional conflict and organizational imperatives in the three countries. Or we might probe Bilbao or Alberdi's ambivalence between their obvious attachment to European civilization, and their rejection of decadent Europe in the name of a rejuvenated "America." This emphasis on "America," except among some political conservatives, seems to have vanished from Mexican thought after the mid 1820s.

The reconstruction of nineteenth-century political history through ideas should by no means end with the thought of prominent thinkers, but in many cases this thought provides a necessary and convenient starting point. Such study of the *pensadores* may seem to some historians to be *passé* or to have "been done" by earlier generations of Latin American scholars. We simply cannot rely, however, on the traditional partisan and nationalistic interpretations of these figures, that make up most of the literature on the subject. Moreover, without a critical and even a comparative understanding of the intellectual bases of policy assumptions, the socioeconomic approaches to nineteenth century politics risk being constructed on sand. In addition to the pitfalls mentioned above, it is all too easy for otherwise wary historians to be trapped by what Womack (1971: 489–490) calls "precursorism," that is, tendentious interpretations which would extract from nineteenth-century thought justifications of or antecedents for later policies.<sup>26</sup>

Fourth and finally, the study of ideas can aid in the search for political continuities in modern Spanish America. The interpretative essay discussed in Part One are impressive because of their central concern with continuity and their experimental

attitude toward periodization. Substantively, however, these authors raise a fundamental question: Was there any significant continuity of nineteenth-century patterns into the twentieth century? Much of the skepticism about the liberal experience has focused on constitutionalism—the effort to guarantee individual liberty and limit central authority by the legal precepts of a written code. The strivings of liberal legislators to establish separation of powers, federalism, municipal autonomy, and even at times parliamentary supremacy or a plural executive typify the divergence between ideals and reality and between liberal institutional forms and political practice that is the hallmark of Latin American politics. Is there an effective response to such skepticism?

In the absence of a full reply let me cite one case, the career of liberal constitutionalism in Mexico from 1867 to 1910, a period when constitutional precepts and adherence to them appear to have been smothered by civil war, *de facto* dictatorship, and open intellectual hostility. In searching for a definition of “scientific politics,” or positivist philosophy in its political manifestation, that came to prevail during the regime of Porfirio Díaz, I found that I was forced to consider the heritage of liberal constitutionalism. The major political controversies of the period and several minor ones all focused on the constitution. Examples are the debate arising from the “dictatorial” *convocatoria* of Benito Juárez in 1867, the contention between “old” and “new” liberals in 1878, and the conflict between *científicos* and “jacobins” on the issue of irremovability of judges in 1893. Why did the Constitution generate such controversy during an era when it is generally regarded to have been a dead letter?

I would suggest that the Constitution of 1857 had unique symbolic power in Mexico. Because the republican, reformist, and patriotic cause of 1857–67 had been fought in the name of the constitution, the document acquired an aura of sanctity to which its post-1867 defenders could successfully appeal, despite changes in the general intellectual climate. The “old liberal” party, particularly through its organ *El Monitor Republicano*, hung on tenaciously until the hardening of the Díaz dictatorship that followed the great debate of 1893. At that point constitutionalism went underground, but it served to inspire the pre-1910 political clubs and it ultimately reemerged in the “effective suffrage, no reelection” movement of Francisco I. Madero. Do we not have here a possible explanation for the strength of the “Constitutionalist” cause during the revolutionary upheaval from 1910 to 1917?<sup>27</sup> This hypothesis could be tested by comparing the continuity of constitutionalism in Mexico with its late nineteenth-century course in Argentina or Chile, countries that experienced no mid-century Reform, civil war, or foreign intervention.

By comparison with Chile and Argentina, the sharply defined political periods in Mexico have inhibited the search for continuities, but these inhibitions may be breaking down. Womack (1971: 488–489) has noted that the men who were politically active during the 1920s matured in the Porfiriato and that perhaps they revived “many old habits of thought and action.” Anderson (1963: 114) has demonstrated that Alvaro Obregón’s financial advisors are old *porfiristas*. The methods I have outlined might serve well to probe the implications of these suggestions of continuity.

Similarly, if we were to inquire into the political assumptions of erstwhile liberals who collaborated with Maximilian, we might find that the empire was less ephemeral and more influential after 1867 than we have thought.<sup>28</sup> The major theme of technocracy—the idea that socioeconomic policy should be guided for the public good by an elite of governmental experts who are above politics and immune to pressures of economic interest—needs to be studied in nineteenth century Spanish America, and its continuity from the Bourbon era to the present day explored.<sup>29</sup>

The historian who would approach nineteenth-century politics through ideas feels under pressure to justify the validity of his enterprise. His focus arouses immediate skepticism because the study, or better the exploitation, of nineteenth century ideas has long been central to the traditional partisan interpretations of the national experience. This is as true in Chile and Argentina as it is in Mexico, and any focus upon ideas becomes associated with historiography that serves political and not professional ends. Moreover, the internal analysis of systems of ideas or ideologies is now suspect as being the product of an earlier liberal, or as Mannheim would say, an “idea-struck” age. And yet when thought is taken seriously, such as in the cultural interpretations of Latin American history cited earlier, the nineteenth-century liberal experience is judged an ephemeral or exotic “Western” overlay on more basic social and psychological processes.

The interpretations which see the twentieth century as the recovery of traditional Hispanic patterns or as the effort to break loose from the bonds of neo-colonialism have strong and legitimate attractions for an age in which the quest for identity and the problem of economic dependency are compelling concerns. But as historians in search of an integrated historical analysis we cannot overlook the legacy of political ideas and formal institutions which men took quite seriously for at least a hundred years. Rather we must assess this legacy for what it was and is.

NOTES

1. For example, one might compare in Sarmiento's *Facundo* (1961), chap. vii (“Sociabilidad: Córdoba—Buenos Aires”) with chap. xv (“Presente i porvenir”). This thematic complexity is insufficiently recognized by Barager (1959: 588) who characterizes Argentine historiography as liberal versus conservative.
2. The concept “in form” (in its sporting sense) is borrowed from Oswald Spengler (1928:2: 361–370) to whom Edwards refers frequently.
3. This ambivalence toward Portales was revealed by Barros Arana (1902:16:345–346) on whom Amunátegui Solar leans heavily.
4. Leopoldo Zea (1963) both describes this use of the notion “colonial” and uses it himself. Gibson (1963:388) warns that “we should not allow ‘colonial’ [like medieval] to be applied to everything that appears illiberal in Latin America or that is vaguely out of date.”
5. R. P. Dore (1964:236–237) has some shrewd remarks on this point, with special reference to the comparison between modernization in Latin America and Japan. One finds a discussion like that of Matossian (1958), cited by Hirschman (1961: 4–5), on ideologies of de-



## THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

layed industrialization (in India and East Asia) to be rather irrelevant to Latin America because in it the "West" is assumed to be alien, and legitimately so.

6. Morse (1964: 163) writes that Chile was unique in managing "to avoid the extremes of tyranny and anarchy with a political system unencumbered by the mechanisms of a party rhetoric of an exotic liberalism." Hirschman (1961: 5–6) stresses the absence of indigenous theories of economic development. Glade (1969: 185–186) refers to the setting up of "a mimetic system of government patterned after the norms of political liberalism." See also Dealy (1968) who cites numerous examples of this assumption of political imitation.
7. Zea (1968: 40,47) cited Karl Mannheim as a guide for his formulation of Mexican positivism as the philosophy of the bourgeoisie. On this phenomena in Argentina see Zea (1963: 217–218). For further discussion of Zea's views see Hale (1971).
8. The brief though complex argument of Véliz is a good example of the way in which the economic and cultural interpretations can be mutual reinforcing. Véliz emphasizes past imitation of foreign (particularly liberal) models in contrast to the present-day more authentic return to the centralist tradition. This change has come about, argues Véliz, because of the collapse of the world economy in 1929 and with it the prosperity which "artificially sustained" the political and economic arrangements of a small elite.
9. The muted passion of the Steins is revealed, among other places, in the dedicatory note of their book. See also the excellent recent review by John Lynch (1972).
10. Symptomatic of this situation is the fact that the multi-volume *Historia moderna de México*, directed by Daniel Cosío Villegas (1955–1972) divides its treatment into "political," "economic" and "social" categories, omitting any systematic treatment of ideas. It might be said, incidentally, that the treatment of politics by Cosío himself forms a strong exception to generalizations I have made about traditional political history. The method and presentation is traditional, but the tone is critical throughout. Cosío breaks away completely from the dictates of heroic centennial historiography.
11. Safford limits his definition of liberalism to an oblique reference to constitutionalism and mention of Santander, e.g., "Santanderean brand of liberalism" (356) without further elucidation. His use of the term "conservative" apparently implies more than politics, e.g., "aristocratic conservatism" (360), or Antioqueño conservatism is based on "deeply rooted religious piety" (363). I think it is necessary to go further than this, even if one's principal objective is to study the social aspects of politics.
12. Smith concludes (1972: 24) that voting on centralization bore no relation to the social or status makeup of the delegates. He suggests (26) that perhaps violent upheaval after 1910 may have liberated deputies from their social backgrounds and allowed them to vote their consciences. This may be one reason why some of the divisions of the "centralization factor" can be discerned in the earlier conflict of political ideas. If delegates were not voting according to social class, ideologies and political myths from the past may have had a particularly strong impact on them.
13. See Lichtheim's (1967: 180) critique of Marcuse. Moore's (1966) tendency in this regard is subtle, but nevertheless discernable.
14. Cf. Stein and Stein (1970), 141–144 with 166–171. In an earlier essay, Stanley Stein (1964: 114) explicitly avoids political content in defining "conservatism" as the network of economic privilege which pervades traditional political and social institutions. Safford (1971), discussed above, is particularly effective in his criticism of economic class interpretations of political conflict.

## *Latin American Research Review*

15. Though this is a criticism made justly by Jean Meyer (1971: 233) of Simon Collier's (1967) thoroughgoing and valuable study of ideas and politics in Chile from 1810 to 1833: "On the pretext of not giving in to the fashion of social and economic history, has one the right to treat ideas as Platonic entities floating in a sidereal void, without contact with human society?"
16. Cf Lockhart (1972: 6): "Indeed, any branch of historical investigation can be converted into social history by turning attention from its usual main object of study, whether laws, ideas or events, to the people who produce them." Lockhart has made a zealous and persuasive case for studying "the informal, the inarticulated, the daily and ordinary manifestations of human existence," and has asserted (1969: 428–429), for example, that formal colonial institutions like church and state were far weaker and less significant than has been assumed. His arguments, though applied to the colonial period, are also highly pertinent (or even more pertinent) to the nineteenth century, where formal institutions have always been regarded as weaker.
17. A further example of my ambivalence is that I respond favorably on the level of method to Marvin Meyers' (1963: 264) criticism of Louis Hartz (1955): in a book on political thought Hartz constantly substitutes "non-intellectual categories for ideas. It is basically, I think, a study of the *unconscious* mind of America, conditioned by a peculiar historical and social experience." Though I am attracted to Hartz' *conclusions* about the United States, I question this type of *method* when applied to nineteenth century Latin America.
18. In formulating a definition of ideology, albeit crude, I have leaned particularly on Baechler (1972) and Halpern (1961). Also valuable, though of varying points of view, are Ashcraft (1972), Bergman (1951), Birnbaum (1960), and of course Mannheim (1936).
19. A good example of this tendency is in Cockcroft (1968). It would seem important in such a study to probe, for example, the ideology of anarchism and determine how it was or was not espoused by the "precursors." Instead, the author merely refers (48 fn., 85 fn.) to other works on European anarchism.
20. In my study (1968: 87–92, 225–234) of the debates of the Constituent Congress of the State of Mexico in the 1820s, I discovered, for example, how much the legislators, when faced with the problem of reorganizing the municipalities after independence, relied on Spanish precedent, some liberal, some pre-liberal. Yet I find unpersuasive the kind of psychocultural argument advanced by the Chilean historian Eyzaguirre (1965: 138) that beneath Lastarria's ardor for foreign doctrines lay "an Iberian atavism which weighed on his unconscious mind." In Lastarria's advocacy of Anglo-Saxon-type federalism and municipal autonomy "was reborn the never extinguished impulse of Hispanic regionalism." Similarly unpersuasive, though documented and challenging, is the recent contention by Dealy (1968) that post-independence constitution-makers in Spanish America were not following liberal (Spanish or otherwise) precepts, but rather a more traditional set of Hispanic assumptions. The implication of this view is that Latin America's liberal experience was not even exotic or imitative, as other cultural determinists argue; there simply was no liberal experience at all.
21. See Gillispie (1950: 234–235). For a defense of his method see Halévy's response (1965: 273–274) to the socialist Max Lazard in 1936.
22. Both Halévy (1965: 38–39) and Manuel (1956: 320) have noted Saint Simon and Comte's debt to the Catholic traditionalists Bonald and De Maistre for their concept of the "high administration of an organic society."
23. Lichtheim (1967: xvi) says he was drawn to nineteenth century thought because of the common effort by historians, philosophers, and politically conscious writers "to understand

## THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

the significance of those twin upheavals, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution." In a sense we are studying in Latin America men who were attempting to understand the reverberations of these upheavals in their own continent, but reverberations that were often either greatly transformed or barely audible.

24. For Lerminier's influence see Alberdi (1886: 103–104) and Fuenzalida Grandón (1893: 26–28). For Quinet, see Lastarria (1909: 20–27), where he relies on Quinet's translation of Herder, and Bilbao (1897: 207–209, 272).
25. *Sociabilidad* was undoubtedly drawn from the French *sociabilité*. We must first establish the usage of the term in France, for example by Lerminier (1833), in order to discover its comparative significance in Latin American thought. For a pertinent discussion of "historiographic semantics," see Berkhofer (1969: 146–149).
26. See my comments (1967: 419–420) on Chevalier (1965).
27. My hypothesis bears some analogies to W. D. Raat's (1967) emphasis on philosophical "anti-positivism" during the Díaz period.
28. The Saint-Simonian and Pan-Latinist ideological context of the French intervention may have helped articulate the empire to Mexican culture. See Phelan (1968), an essay which is, incidentally, a fine example of "historiographic semantics."
29. See the interesting conceptual statement by Larson (1972) and a reference to ongoing (or until recently ongoing) research on Latin American technocrats at the University of California, Berkeley.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALBERDI, JUAN B.  
1886 Fragmento preliminar al estudio del derecho. Obras completas 1. Buenos Aires (1st ed. 1837).
- AMUNATEGUI SOLAR, DOMINGO  
1946 La democracia en Chile. Teatro político (1810–1910). Santiago.
- ANDERSON, CHARLES W.  
1963 Bankers as Revolutionaries. In: The Political Economy of Mexico: Two Studies by William P. Glade, Jr., and Charles W. Anderson. Madison.
- ASHCRAFT, RICHARD  
1972 Marx and Weber on Liberalism as Bourgeois Ideology. Comparative Studies in Society and History (CSSH). 14:130–168.
- BAECHLER, JEAN  
1972 De l'ideologie. Annales. 27: 641–664.
- BARAGER, JOSEPH R.  
1959 The Historiography of the Río de la Plata Area since 1830. Hispanic American Historical Review (HAHR). 39:588–642.
- BARROS ARANA, DIEGO  
1902 Historia jeneral de Chile. 16. Santiago.
- BAUER, ARNOLD J.  
1971 The Church and Spanish American Agrarian Structure: 1765–1865. The Americas. 28:78–98.
- BERGMAN, GUSTAV  
1951 Ideology. Ethics. 61:205–218.

*Latin American Research Review*

- BERKHOFER, ROBERT F., JR.  
1969 *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis*. New York.
- BILBAO, FRANCISCO  
1897 *El evangelio americano. Obras completas. 1*. Santiago (1st ed. 1864).
- BIRNBAUM, NORMAN  
1960 *The Sociological Study of Ideology (1940–60): A Trend Report and Bibliography*. *Current Sociology*. 9:91–172.
- BOURRICAUD, FRANÇOIS  
1972 *The Adventures of Ariel*. *Daedalus*. 101:109–136.
- CHEVALIER, FRANÇOIS  
1965 *Conservateurs et libéraux au Mexique*. In: *La intervención francesa y el imperio de Maximiliano*. México.
- COCKCROFT, JAMES D.  
1968 *Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900–1913*. Austin.
- COLLIER, SIMON  
1967 *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808–1833*. Cambridge, England.
- COSIO VILLEGAS, DANIEL et al.  
1955–1972 *Historia moderna de México*. 9 vols. México.
- DEALY, GLEN  
1968 *Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition*. *HAHR*. 48:37–58.
- DONOSO, RICARDO  
1946 *Las ideas políticas en Chile*. México.
- DORE, R. P.  
1964 *Latin America and Japan Compared*. In: *Continuity and Change in Latin America*. J. J. Johnson ed. Stanford.
- ECHEVERRIA, ESTEBAN  
1940 *Dogma socialista*. Buenos Aires (1st ed. 1839).
- EDWARDS VIVES, ALBERTO  
1966 *La fronda aristocrática*. Santiago (1st ed. 1928).
- EYZAGUIRRE, JAIME  
1965 *Fisonomía histórica de Chile*. Santiago (1st ed. 1948).
- FUENZALIDA GRANDON, ALEJANDRO  
1893 *Lastarria i su tiempo*. Santiago.
- GIBSON, CHARLES  
1963 *Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: Social and Cultural Life*. *HAHR*. 43:380–389.
- GILLISPIE, CHARLES C.  
1950 *The Work of Elie Halévy: A Critical Appreciation*. *Journal of Modern History*. 22:232–249.
- GLADE, WILLIAM P., JR.  
1969 *The Latin American Economies*. New York.
- GREW, RAYMOND  
1969 *On Reading Six Books in Search of Another*. *CSSH*. 11: 355–364.
- HALE, CHARLES A.  
1967 *Review*. *HAHR*. 47: 419–420.  
1968 *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853*. New Haven and London.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

- 1971 *The History of Ideas: Substantive and Methodological Aspects of the Thought of Leopoldo Zea*. *Journal of Latin American Studies* (JLAS). 3: 59–70.
- HALEVY, ELIE  
 1928 *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*. London (1st ed. 1901–04).  
 1965 *Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine*. In: *The Era of Tyrannies*. E. Halévy. 1965 (1st ed. 1907).
- HALPERIN, DONGHI, TULLIO  
 1969 *Historia contemporánea de América Latina*. Madrid.
- HALPERN, BEN  
 1961 "Myth" and "Ideology" in Modern Usage. *History and Theory*. 1: 129–149.
- HARTZ, LOUIS  
 1955 *The Liberal Tradition in America*. New York.
- HIGHAM, JOHN  
 1951 *The Rise of American Intellectual History*. *American Historical Review*. 56: 453–471.
- HIRSCHMAN, A. O.  
 1961 *Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America*. In: *Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments*. A. O. Hirschman ed. New York.
- JOBET, JULIO CESAR  
 1955 *Ensayo crítico del desarrollo económico-social de Chile*. Santiago.
- LARSON, MARGALI SARFATTI  
 1972 *Notes on Technocracy: Some Problems of Theory, Ideology and Power*. Berkeley *Journal of Sociology*. 17: 1–34.
- LASTARRIA, JOSE VICTORINO  
 1909 *Investigaciones sobre la influencia social de la conquista i del sistema de los españoles en Chile*. *Obras completas*. 7. Santiago (1st ed. 1844).
- LERMINIER, JEAN-LOUIS-EUGENE  
 1833 *De l'influence de la philosophie du xviii<sup>e</sup> siècle sur la législation et la sociabilité du xix<sup>e</sup>*. Paris.
- LICHTHEIM, GEORGE  
 1967 *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays*. New York.
- LOVEJOY, A. O.  
 1936 *The Great Chain of Being*. Cambridge.
- LOCKHART, JAMES  
 1969 *Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies*. *HAHR*. 49: 413–429.  
 1972 *The Social History of Colonial Spanish America: Evolution and Potential*. *LARR*. 7: 6–45.
- LYNCH, JOHN  
 1972 *Review of Stein and Stein (1970)*. *JLAS*. 4: 319–320.
- MCALISTER, LYLE N.  
 1963 *Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain*. *HAHR*. 43: 349–370.
- MANNHEIM, KARL  
 1936 *Ideology and Utopia*. London.
- MANUEL, FRANK E.  
 1956 *The New World of Henri Saint Simon*. Cambridge.

*Latin American Research Review*

MATOSSIAN, MARY

- 1958 Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization. Some Tensions and Ambiguities. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*. 6: 217–228.

MERTON, ROBERT K.

- 1949 The Sociology of Knowledge. In: *Social Theory and Social Structure*. R. K. Merton, ed. New York.

MEYER, JEAN

- 1971 Review of S. Collier (1967). *Revue Historique*. 246: 231–234.

MEYERS, MARVIN

- 1963 Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Appraisal*. *CSSH*. 5: 261–268.

MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR.

- 1966 *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston.

MORSE, RICHARD M.

- 1964 The Heritage of Latin America. In: *The Founding of New Societies*. L. Hartz ed. New York.

NEWTON, RONALD N.

- 1970 On "Functional Groups," "Fragmentation," and "Pluralism" in Spanish American Political Society. *HAHR*. 50:1–29.

PHELAN, JOHN L.

- 1968 Pan-Latinism, French Intervention in Mexico (1861–1867) and the Genesis of the Idea of Latin America. In: *Conciencia y autenticidad históricas*. Mexico.

QUESADA, ERNESTO V.

- 1950 *La época de Rosas*. Buenos Aires (1st ed. 1898).

RAAT, WILLIAM D.

- 1967 *Positivism in Díaz Mexico*. Salt Lake City (Unpublished dissertation, University of Utah).

ROMERO, JOSÉ LUIS

- 1963 *A History of Argentine Political Thought*. Tr. and intro. by T. F. McGann. (1st Spanish language ed. 1946).

SAFFORD, FRANK

- 1972 Social Aspects of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America: New Granada, 1825–1850. *Journal of Social History*. 5: 344–370.

SARMIENTO, DOMINGO F.

- 1961 *Facundo*. Buenos Aires (1st ed. 1845).

SILVERT, KALMAN H.

- 1963 The Cost of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina. In: *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development*. K. H. Silvert ed. New York.

- 1966 Leadership Formation and Modernization in Latin America. *Journal of International Affairs*. 20:318–331.

SINKIN, RICHARD N.

- 1973 The Mexican Constitutional Congress, 1856–1857: A Statistical Analysis. *HAHR*. 53: 1–22.

SMITH, PETER H.

- 1970 *Political Elites in Mexico: Social Mobility and Revolutionary Change* (unpublished Research Report).

- 1972 The Making of the Mexican Constitution. Conference on the Use of Quantitative Methods in the Study of the History of Legislative Behavior. Iowa City. (Proceedings to be published.)



## THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS

SPENGLER, OSWALD

1928 *The Decline of the West*. 2. New York.

STEIN, STANLEY J.

1970 *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America*. New York.

STEIN, STANLEY J. and BARBARA H.

1964 *Latin American Historiography: Status and Opportunities*. In: *Social Science Research on Latin America*. C. Wagley ed. New York.

VELIZ, CLAUDIO J.

1967 *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*. New York.

1968 *Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America*. *Foreign Affairs*. 47: 68–83.

WOMACK, JOHN, JR.

1971 *Mexican Political Historiography, 1959–1969*. In: *Investigaciones contemporáneas sobre historia de México*. México.

ZEA, LEOPOLDO

1963 *The Latin American Mind*. Norman (1st ed. 1949).

1968 *El positivismo en México*. Mexico (1st ed. 1943).