

usually be attributed to their not being one of the fifteen nationalities after which a union republic has been named, rather than to special efforts to suppress data.”

This statement reflects a lack of familiarity with the literature.

The hangup that the Soviet statistical authorities seem to have about listing Germans in census tables continued to the 1979 census. The standard publication for the 1979 census results, *Naselenie SSSR* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980) lists the following ethnic groups under Kazakhstan (p. 6):

(in thousands)

Kazakhs	5,289	Belorussians	181
Russians	5,991	Uighurs	148
[Germans	900]	Koreans	92
Ukrainians	898	Azerbaijanis	73
Tatars	313	Dungans	22
Uzbeks	263	Others	1,414

The entry for Germans is omitted in this table (I inserted it to make my point, using other sources). The omission is a glaring one on two grounds: (1) it ignores the third largest ethnic group in Kazakhstan while listing many smaller groups; (2) it certainly does not limit the listing to ethnic groups with union republics of their own, as the reviewer contends. The reasons for omitting Germans in some census tables and listing them in others is one of the mysteries of Soviet statistical practice. The only explanation I can offer is that the authorities, for obscure reasons, have a feeling of discomfort in listing Germans in Kazakhstan and some other Asian republics, since the Germans, unlike other ethnic groups exiled in World War II, have not been permitted to return to their Volga homeland. In any event, I thought the point should be made since Sacks seems to absolve Soviet statisticians too easily.

It might be mentioned that an updated article on the Soviet Germans by Sidney Heitman, perhaps better organized and more to the point, appeared in *Soviet Geography*, November 1981.

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TO THE EDITOR:

In his reply to my letter (*Slavic Review* 41, no. 1 [Spring 1982]), John B. Dunlop failed unfortunately to address any of the essential issues under discussion. Instead, he added to his previous *ad hominem* a few — quite a few I must say — new ones, including even rumors. This kind of polemics speaks for itself and does not deserve a rejoinder. There was, however, one statement in Dunlop’s reply which is too important to let pass. He considers my failure “to distinguish [in Russian nationalism] hopeful, inward-looking, isolationist elements from expansionist, neo-fascist ones” politically dangerous “since the post-Brezhnev leadership is likely to be increasingly Russian nationalist in orientation” (p. 199, emphasis mine).

It is this statement, not the name-calling, which compels me to write this letter. All the more because Dunlop is not alone in his hopes. Many American sovietologists (indeed, a wide spectrum beginning with Richard Pipes on the one pole and ending with Jerry Hough on the other) seem to be flirting with a similar method of distinguishing the good guys from the bad guys among Russian nationalists. There are also powerful politicians in this country who believe that Russia is headed for an imminent economic collapse and it is the duty of the United States to do everything possible to accelerate this

process. In conjunction with the Dunlop-Pipes-Hough view, this course seems rather frightening.

Politicians' memories are usually short and they do not look beyond the possible Russian economic collapse. They do not even speculate about what could be its end result, especially when it is combined with a powerful nationalist (and fiercely anti-Western) movement. History presents us with a pattern of such a conjunction in the 1930s in Germany.

I still would not write this rejoinder if it were the only pattern I had in mind. For almost a decade and a half I have been concerned with the political potentialities of Russian nationalism. I initiated in 1969 in Moscow a debate on the nature of Russian nationalism of the nineteenth century in *Voprosy literatury* and *Voprosy filosofii*. My dissertation "Slavianofily i Konstantin Leont'ev," defended in 1970, was devoted to the degeneration of the "good guys" of Russian nationalism, precisely those to whom Dunlop refers now as "hopeful, inward-looking, isolationist," into those to whom he himself refers as "expansionist and neo-fascist." And "the specific character of Orthodox Christianity" (p. 199) which, as Dunlop assures us, is supposed to be the sole guarantor against such a metamorphosis, failed to stop or even to impede it (just as the specific character of Protestantism or Catholicism failed to do the job in Germany).

To be sure, I am not the only one to have noticed this sinister and alarming metamorphosis. The best Russian minds among both Westernizers (like S. Trubetskoi and P. Miliukov) and former Slavophiles (like V. Solov'ev) have exposed it more than once. Unlike Dunlop, however, I do not think this weakens my argument. On the contrary, I am convinced it strengthens it. For it makes it rather obvious that the degeneration of Russian nationalism is indeed a historical pattern of enormous political importance — which no amount of name-calling can alleviate.

Looking now at the ideological structure of the present-day Russian New Right we can see quite clearly why this pattern is still at work. These people have no program for constructive structural change in the Soviet/Russian socioeconomic system. Like medieval crusaders they are possessed exclusively with a religious change, namely with the replacement of communism by Russian nationalism as the dominant ideology of the empire. It is for help in this purely ideological, not structural, change that they appeal to the powerful Soviet military (see Solzhenitsyn's interview with the BBC as reported by *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia* [1979, no. 127, pp. 294–95]). And indeed, it would be unrealistic to expect from the Soviet military anything else — least of all should we expect a desire to change the hypercentralized structure of the Soviet command economy, which suits its needs so perfectly. But have we not already seen precisely such a combination of a militarized command economy with nationalism? And was it not called National Socialism?

It was anticommunist all right; but no less was it anti-Western. And did it not produce something so evil that even communism has so far failed to produce the like of it — a World War? Let us bear in mind that the good guys of Russian nationalism, like its bad guys, hate the West indiscriminately, including their benevolent fellow travelers, and not a bit less than their predecessors in the nineteenth century.

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