Book contents
- Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
- Advance Praise for Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
- Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- General Introduction
- Part I Neuroscience, Mechanisms, and RDoC
- Part II Phenomenology, Biological Psychology, and the Mind–Body Problem
- Part III Taxonomy, Integration, and Multiple Levels of Explanation
- Section 8
- Section 9
- Section 10
- Section 11
- Section 12
- 34 Introduction
- 35 Levels: What Are They and What Are They Good For?
- 36 Levels of Analysis in Alzheimer’s Disease Research
- Section 13
- Section 14
- Section 15
- Index
- References
35 - Levels: What Are They and What Are They Good For?
from Section 12
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2020
Book contents
- Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
- Advance Praise for Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
- Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- General Introduction
- Part I Neuroscience, Mechanisms, and RDoC
- Part II Phenomenology, Biological Psychology, and the Mind–Body Problem
- Part III Taxonomy, Integration, and Multiple Levels of Explanation
- Section 8
- Section 9
- Section 10
- Section 11
- Section 12
- 34 Introduction
- 35 Levels: What Are They and What Are They Good For?
- 36 Levels of Analysis in Alzheimer’s Disease Research
- Section 13
- Section 14
- Section 15
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter explores some issues having to do with levels in psychiatry and elsewhere in science. I distinguish among several different notions of level and discuss why talk of levels is sometimes useful in science, although it can also be a source of considerable confusion. I defend the claim that it is legitimate to think in terms of causal relations between levels (including so-called downward causation from upper to lower levels) against several recent criticisms, providing scientific example of when this motion seems appropriate.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Levels of Analysis in PsychopathologyCross-Disciplinary Perspectives, pp. 424 - 449Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
References
Batterman, R. (forthcoming) ‘Multiscale Modeling in Inactive and Active Materials.’Google Scholar
Batterman, R. (2019) ‘Universality and RG Explanations.’ Perspectives on Science 27(1):26–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalupka, K. Eberhardt, F., and Perona, P. (2017) ‘Causal Feature Learning: An Overview.’ Behaviormetrika 44:137–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craver, C. and Bechtel, W. (2007) ‘Top-down Causation without Top-Down Causes.’ Biology and Philosophy 22:547–563.Google Scholar
Eronen, M. I. (2015) ‘Levels of Organization: A Deflationary Account.’ Biology and Philosophy 30(1):39–58.Google Scholar
Glymour, M., Veling, W., and Susser, E. (2011) ‘Integrating Knowledge of Genetic and Environmental Pathways to Complete the Developmental Map.’ In Kendler, K., Jaffee, S., and Romer, D. (eds.), The Dynamic Genome and Mental Health. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kendler, K. and Campbell, J. (2009) ‘Interventionist Causal Models in Psychiatry: Repositioning the Mind–Body Problem.’ Psychological Medicine 39(6):881–887.Google Scholar
Kendler, K. (2011) ‘A Conceptual Overview of Gene-Environment Interaction and Correlation in a Developmental Context.’ In Kendler, K., Jaffee, S., and Romer, D. (eds.), The Dynamic Genome and Mental Health. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Heil, J. (2017) ‘Downward Causation.’ In Paoletti, M. and Orilia, F. (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York: Routledge, 42–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (2000) ‘Causation as Influence.’ Reprinted in Collins, J., Hall, N., and Paul, L. (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Oppenheim, P. and Putnam, H. (1958) ‘The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.’ In Feigl, H., Scriven, M., and Maxwell, G. (eds.), Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3–36.Google Scholar
Wimsatt, W. (1994) ‘The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal Thickets.’ In Matthen, M. and Ware, R. (eds.), Biology and Society: Reflections on Methodology, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 20. Calgary: The University of Calgary Press, 207–274.Google Scholar
Wilson, M. (2018) Physics Avoidance: Essays in Conceptual Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. (2015) ‘Interventionism and Causal Exclusion.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91:303–347.Google Scholar
Woodward, J. (Forthcoming) ‘Explanatory Autonomy: The Role of Proportionality, Stability, and Conditional Irrelevance.’ Synthese.Google Scholar
- 11
- Cited by