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35 - Levels: What Are They and What Are They Good For?

from Section 12

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2020

By
James Woodward
Edited by
Kenneth S. Kendler ,
Josef Parnas  and
Peter Zachar
Kenneth S. Kendler
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University
Josef Parnas
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen
Peter Zachar
Affiliation:
Auburn University, Montgomery
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Summary

This chapter explores some issues having to do with levels in psychiatry and elsewhere in science. I distinguish among several different notions of level and discuss why talk of levels is sometimes useful in science, although it can also be a source of considerable confusion. I defend the claim that it is legitimate to think in terms of causal relations between levels (including so-called downward causation from upper to lower levels) against several recent criticisms, providing scientific example of when this motion seems appropriate.

Keywords

levelsdownward causationseparation of scalesconditional counterfactual independence
Type
Chapter
Information
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives
 , pp. 424 - 449
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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