Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Brief Contents
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Background
- Part II Coordination, Distribution, and Trust Conventions
- Part III The Impact of Public Advice and Common Knowledge
- Part IV The Value of Advice
- Part V Advice and Economic Mechanisms
- 12 Chatting and Matching
- 13 School Matching and Learning under the Influence of Intergenerational Advice
- 14 Conclusions
- Index
13 - School Matching and Learning under the Influence of Intergenerational Advice
from Part V - Advice and Economic Mechanisms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Brief Contents
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Background
- Part II Coordination, Distribution, and Trust Conventions
- Part III The Impact of Public Advice and Common Knowledge
- Part IV The Value of Advice
- Part V Advice and Economic Mechanisms
- 12 Chatting and Matching
- 13 School Matching and Learning under the Influence of Intergenerational Advice
- 14 Conclusions
- Index
Summary
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behavior evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms – even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning.
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- Information
- Advice, Social Learning and the Evolution of Conventions , pp. 360 - 393Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023